Probabilistic risk assessment modelling for passenger aircraft fire safety by Macey, P.
n, 
p W, 
UBRAaY 
Cranfield University 
Paul Macey 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment Modelling of 
Passenger Aircraft Fire Safety 
-l 
--1,, 
Innovation and Technology Assessment Unit 
IERC 
PhD 
Cranfield University 
Innovation and Technology Assessment Unit 
PhD Thesis 
Academic Years 1993-1996 
Paul Macey 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment Modelling of 
Passenger Aircraft Fire Safety 
Supervisor: Professor M. Cordey-Hayes 
April 1997 
0 Cranf ield University 1997 
Abstract 
This thesis describes the development of a computer simulation model for the 
investigation of airliner fire accident safety. 
The aim of the work has been to create a computer-based analysis tool that generates 
representative aircraft accident scenarios and then simulates their outcome in terms of 
passenger injuries and fatalities. The details of the accident scenarios are formulated 
to closely match the type of events that are known to have occurred in aircraft 
accidents over the last 40 years. This information has been obtained by compiling a 
database and undertaking detailed analysis of approximately 200 airliner fire 
accidents. In addition to utilising historical data, the modelling work has incorporated 
many of the key findings obtained from experimental research undertaken by the 
world's air safety community. 
An unusual feature of the simulation process is that all critical aspects of the accident 
scenario have been analysed and catered for in the formative stages of the programme 
development. This has enabled complex effects, such as cabin crash disruption, 
impact trauma injuries, fire spread, smoke incapacitation and passenger evacuation to 
be simulated in a balanced and integrated manner. 
The study is intended to further the general appreciation and understanding of the 
complex events that lead to fatalities in aircraft fire accidents. This is achieved by 
analysing all contributory factors that are likely to arise in real fire accident scenarios 
and undertaking quantitative risk assessment through the use of novel simulation 
methods. Future development of the research could potentially enable the undertaking 
of a systematic exploration and appraisal of the effectiveness of both current and 
future aircraft fire safety policies. 
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Chapter 1: An Introduction to Aircraft Safety 
1.1 Safofy In Commercial Air Transport 
1.1.1 Unavoidable I lazards - Aircraft Accident Survival 
Every form of human transportntion exposes its participants to sonne type of 
risk. In most circumstances, hazards can be interpreted as originating from a 
combination or two factors that are inevitably associated with any transport system; 
the presence of significant quantities of energy and the influence of human actions. 
'Flus, at the most general level, transportation accidents can be taken to comprise n 
loss of control over energy, caused by human fallibility. I'lle unavoidability of both 
these factors suggests that we will forever be dealing with issues of travel safety. 
This thesis is concerned with the examination of hazards associated with one 
of the most recent (and potentially safest) forums of travel; commercial air transport. 
Although the risks of air travel currently appear to be acceptable to most passengers 
flying with airlines around the world, this situation has not always existed and it may 
become steadily more difficult to maintain in the future. Ilowwwever, before these issues 
arc discussed fu rtller, it is perhaps necessary to briefly examine wlint the existing 
standards or airline safety arc and determine where opportunities for further 
improvement might lie. 
Over recent decades, somewhere In the region of 1000 people have typically 
died per annum, world-wide, in aircraft accidents (Taylor, 1996). Notably, this figure 
has remained remarkably consistent over the last 30 years. Most of these deaths accrue 
in major accidents, which tend to occur at n frequency of 10 - 25 events each year. 
With current traffic levels, these statistics imply an average 11ull-loss rate of around 
1.5 aircraft per million airline departures flown (Murray, 1996). As it result, the 
average risk or n passenger losing their life when making a single airline flight today 
is just under one in n million. 
These figures clearly demonstrate that aircraft accident relies (measured per hour 
flown) arc very low. Nevertheless, although accident rates have been decreasing 
steadily since the 1950's, further improvements arc becoming progressively harder to 
achieve. As a result, for the first time, we may now be seeing a levelling off in 
accident rates ('Taylor, 1996). Over the sane period, gro%%1h in levels of air traffic has 
been sufficient to ensure that accidents have occurred at a reasonably consistent 
frequency world-wide and have resulted in the deaths of similar numbers of people 
from year to year. I lowever, if traffic levels continue to rise as they have done in the 
past and accident rates do not improve any further, we should expect accidents to 
occur at greater frequencies in coming years. 
Given that even the prevailing figure of around 1000 fatalities per year is 
generally acknowledged as being unacceptable, both in human and economic terns, 
what can be done to improve (or at least maintain) the situation in the future? 
Obviously, the most direct way of reducing fatality numbers is to prevent accidents 
from happening in the first instance. Overall, approximately 60 percent of aircraft 
accidents are deemed as being "unsurvivablc" (Taylor, 1996). In these scenarios, 
precluding the event from occurring appears to be the only feasible way to reduce the 
losses or life involved. Consequently, the adoption or n preventative safety policy 
approach constitutes the primary approach of aviation authorities, aircraft 
manufacturers and operators alike. Accident prevention measures address areas such 
as Crew Resource Management (CRM), safety training and awareness, technological 
developments, systems redundancy, aircraft maintenance and operating procedures. 
However, accident prevention does not fall within the scope of the current 
thesis. Instead, attention is focused on a second way to improve safety in air travel - 
by reducing the lethality of accidents when, inevitably, they do occur, wherever 
opportunities might exist for doing so. Obviously, in order for such an approach to be 
worthwhile, there must be a reasonable prospect of occupants surviving in a 
significant number of aircraft accidents. The figure given above indicates that this 
survival potential is present in about 40 percent of cases. Although this proportion 
might appear to unfavourably small, it still constitutes a major area in which lives 
might be saved. In numerical terms, these "survivable" or "partially survivable" 
events have involved an average of about 600 passenger fatalities per annum in recent 
years (Taylor, 1996). This figure is too great to accept and consequently needs to be 
dealt with both through accident prevention and through accident lethality reduction 
measures. 
1.1.2 Air Travel: an "Acceptable" Risk? 
Air travel has developed over the last fifty years to become the pre-eminent 
form of transport over long distances. The scale of the industry has grown to the point 
where, world-wide, a commercial aircraft takes off on average almost every two 
seconds, twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year. The passengers aboard these flights 
are able to travel large distances in less time, with less cost and more convenience 
than provided by most other modes of transport. 
Most of these people will not pause to consider their implicit assumption that 
they will be arriving safely at their destination without drama or mishap. Passengers 
demand and pay for the right to expect travel cocooned in a comfortable, benign, 
environment, provided with in-flight facilities and professional cabin attendant 
services. Half-hearted safety demonstrations given before take-off may often be 
perceived as being irrelevant and cockpit announcements given in a relaxed, 
authoritative tone help to engender an air of absolute safety in the minds of 
passengers. Detachment from the technology and challenges associated with flight 
operations has grown to the point where frequent flyers may take air travel as for 
granted as riding in a taxi or train. 
However, these considerations cannot change the inescapable fact that air 
travel is, inherently, perhaps the most dangerous form of public transport. Modern 
transport aircraft consist of delicate, lightweight structures, with wings full of 
potentially explosive fuel and a fuselage typically crammed with large numbers of 
oblivious passengers. Engines provide a continual source of fire and propel the vehicle 
through an unpredictable and continuously changing environment as fast as 
technological limits will allow. If a catastrophic event occurs, an airliner may have to 
limp onwards for many hundreds of miles before an attempt. at a safe landing can be 
made. When examined in these terms, all commercial passenger flights constitute 
potential disasters waiting to happen. It has only been through the continual 
refinement of safety standards and procedures that air travel has grown to become an 
acceptably safe form of transport. 
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In recent decades, it has become apparent that there have been two keys to 
attaining this achievement. Firstly, travelling by air has continued to become safer in 
real terms, measured either as exposure to danger per mile or per trip flown. However, 
arguably, this factor alone has not been enough to ensure the continued acceptance of 
air travel. It has also been necessary to ensure the perceived risks of flying have 
remained acceptable in the minds of the general public. Although this second factor 
has been dealt with satisfactorily up until the present, problems may be encountered in 
maintaining this situation into the future. The reasons for this will be discussed in the 
next section. 
1.1.3 True Risk Versus Perceived Risk 
It was stated in the introduction that the average chance of a passenger losing 
their life when taking a commercial flight is slightly less than one in a million. By 
almost any measure, this is an extremely low level of risk exposure and it appears to 
be acceptable to most people, especially when presented logically in these terms. 
However, inevitably, accidents are impossible to eliminate entirely in aircraft 
operations. When these events occur, they are often extremely severe and involve loss 
of life both in a violent manner and on a very large scale. As a consequence of this, 
aircraft accidents have been to be subject to increasingly graphic and prominent 
coverage in the news media over recent years. Regardless of whether these 
developments are in the public interest or not, greater levels of awareness are liable to 
mean that people may become sensitised to the nature of hazards posed by air travel. ' 
For most passengers, any fears- associated with the occurrence of a major incident 
appear to subside quickly or else they are overridden by the necessity for travel or 
other practical considerations. A small proportion of airline passengers, however, may 
find their fears harder to overcome and have to travel under considerable stress or, in 
extreme circumstances, may even be unable to fly at all. In these cases, the perceived 
safety of air travel has decreased significantly, even though actual safety standards 
have remained unaltered. Unfortunately for the airline industry, perhaps, it is these 
perceptions rather than true facts that are most likely to be foremost in the minds the 
travelling public in the aftermath a major incident. 
For the lay person, the perceived risks of flying are directly related to the 
information that they receive about aircraft accidents. 'For most people, this is 
knowledge is obtained predominantly from media headline reporting of catastrophic 
incidents. The frequency at which this type of coverage occurs is obviously 
proportional to the -number of major air accidents that occur world-wide. 
Unfortunately, given long-term developments in air traffic and the levelling off of 
safety rates seen in recent decades, media coverage of major aircraft disasters looks 
set to increase significantly in the future. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect that 
greater exposure to these news events, in combination with ever more graphic 
depiction of their details, will result the perceived risk' of air travel increasing in the 
future. 
In revenue terms, the air transport industry is reliant on passenger perceptions 
of safety rather than ' the actual safety levels being achieved. Given the previous 
argument, this implies that the frequency, rather than the rate of occurrence of major 
accidents must be seen to be acceptable in the eyes of the general public if the air 
transport industry is to continue to prosper. It has already been seen that limiting the 
frequency of accident occurrence in times of burgeoning traffic growth may not be 
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possible to achieve. Also, with the prospect of larger aircraft types entering service, 
accidents are set to become more substantial (and even more newsworthy) in terms of 
size of the human tragedy involved. In business terms, the financial impact of these 
trends is likely to be compounded by spiralling rates of compensation settlements and 
ever tighter operating margins. These are clearly some very ominous problems for the 
air transport industry to deal with. 
1.1.4 Safety and the Future 
If it is not possible to prevent accidents from occurring at greater frequencies 
in coming years, what can be done to maintain public acceptance of air travel? It was 
seen earlier that the air transport industry has essentially adopted a two-way- approach 
in dealing with air safety; firstly through accident prevention and then by increasing 
the survivability of accidents when they do occur. Because using the former approach 
alone is not proving to be sufficient, then mitigating the human losses incurred in 
aircraft accidents occur looks set to become increasingly important in the future. 
Currently, most of the flying public choose not to ponder on the issue of aircraft 
accident survival and are thus likely to regard their prospects in such an event as being 
hopeless. If perceptions of safety are to be maintained, however, public attitudes 
towards aircraft accidents and even the treatment of these events in the media will 
have to change. 
This task will not be straightforward to achieve. The nature of aircraft 
accidents means that many lives are lost in unsurvivable crashes. The hopelessness of 
the situations that are encountered in these scenarios cannot be denied or concealed. 
However significantly more potential may exist when attempting to deal with events 
that involve less severe circumstances and in reducing the large number of passenger 
deaths suffered as a result of aircraft fires. It is the assessment of precisely these 
aspects of aircraft safety that form the subject of this thesis. 
1.2 Airline Safety: An Historical Perspective 
1.2.1 The Development of Aircraft Safety 
Commercial aviation was born in the years immediately following the First 
World War. Surplus war aircraft and the availability of returning pilots lead to a rapid 
rise in the use of aircraft in a miscellany of tasks, in both Europe and North America. 
These activities included entertainment (such as "barnstorming"), aerial photography, 
limited passenger services, advertising and postal delivery. In the years immediately 
following the war, many of the aircraft operators possessed a pioneering spirit that 
could sometimes verge upon recklessness and there existed an amateurish outlook 
towards the matter of safety. Correspondingly, accidents occurred at what now seems 
an appallingly high rate in the post First World War period. 
The regulation of fledgling commercial aviation industry was greatly 
facilitated by the formation of the US Airmail Service in the early 1920's. The 
operators of this service, the American Post Office Department, required its pilots to 
be tested and to have at least 500 hours of experience. An aircraft inspection and 
maintenance programme was also set up in concert with the training of pilots. The 
results of these activities were notable; in 1924 the US Air Mail Service experienced 
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one fatality every 463,000 miles flown; in'comparison with the average of one fatality 
every 13,500 miles for the remainder of the US commericial'aviation industry. 
In 1925, the US Post Office Department- transferred its, air mail services to private 
operators, establishing the World's first scheduled air services. Some of these early 
operators evolved into some of today's major American airlines. These carriers also 
offered a limited passenger service for wealthy customers, but this proved much less 
profitable than the carriage of mail. 
The first government legislation concerning the growing commercial aviation 
industry was the 1926 US Air Commerce Act. This gave the Department of 
Commerce regulatory authority over all commercial aviation activities and established 
responsibilities that were designed to promote the fledgling industry. A new 
Aeronautics Branch was formed within the Department of Commerce, to oversee the 
regulation of aircraft and airmen and to help establish a commercial aviation 
infrastructure. These early programmes created proper procedures for pilot training 
and regulated aircraft certification, operation and accident investigation for the very 
first time. 
The expansion of the US aviation industry in the 1930's and the development 
of new higher performance aircraft left the Department of Commerce struggling to 
provide the necessary oversight and support. Consequently, in 1938 the Civil 
Aeronautics Authority (CAA') was formed to deal with safety programmes and; for 
the first time, economic regulation. In 1940, the new authority was transferred back 
into the Department of Commerce and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was 
formed, responsible for all regulatory and investigatory matters. - 
After the Second World War, surplus transport aircraft and a ready supply of 
trained pilots lead to the expansion of non=scheduled services, by air taxi operators. 
The US CAA, at the time sympathetic to private and small operators, exempted these 
companies from economic regulation. In addition their, small aircraft were allowed to 
be operated to less stringent safety regulations than those imposed on the scheduled 
airlines. This differentiation is still maintained in airline operations today throughout 
the world. 
1.2.2 Leadership of the United States 
The introduction of commercial jet aircraft in the 1950's and' the mid-air 
collision of two large passenger aircraft in 1956 led to the . 
establishment of a new 
aviation organisation, the Federal Aviation' Agency (FAA), in 1958. This agency 
combined most of the functions of the old CAA and CAB, athough the latter was still 
maintained to deal with areas where a conflict of interest could potentially occur, such 
as economic regulation and accident investigation. 
The major roles of the FAA can be summarised as (Wells, 1991): - 
1. Setting minimum standards for the design, materials, workmanship, 
construction, and performance of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers and 
appliances. 
2. The provision of reasonable rules and regulations and minimum standards for 
inspection, servicing, and overhauls of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers 
and appliances, including equipment and facilities used for such activities. 
As distinct from the current UK Civil Aviation Authority 
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3. The specification of the timing and manner of inspections, servicing and " 
overhauls and the delegation of private persons to conduct examinations and 
make reports in lieu of Agency officers and employees: 
4. The prescription of reasonable rules and regulations governing the reserve'", 
supply of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, appliances, and aircraft fuel 
and oil, including fuel and oil carried in flight. 
5. The provision of other reasonable rules, regulations, or minimum standards 
governing other practices, methods and procedures necessary to provide 
adequately for national security and safety of air commerce. 
Following its creation, the FAA strengthened many. regulations concerning training 
and equipment, creating intense opposition within the air transport industry. In 1966, 
The Federal Aviation Agency became the Federal Aviation Administration, coming 
under the auspices of the newly formed Department of Transportation (DOT). It has 
held this name to date and the organisation remains the most prominent aviation 
safety authority in the World. 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was also established at the 
time that these changes were being made. The role of the . NTSB. was defined as 
providing an independent investigative body to determine and report the cause of 
transportation (rather than just aviation) accidents. Currently, all major US aircraft 
accidents are investigated by the NTSB, without obligation to either the FAA, airline 
operators or aircraft manufacturers. The body's responsibilities also include the 
undertaking of special studies related to safety and accident prevention. The 
remaining accident investigation duties of CAB also were moved to the NTSB. 
Following industry-wide dissatisfaction with CAB policies the operations of 
US airlines were deregulated in 1978. In the following six years, the CAB control of 
carrier routes and fares was phased out and the remaining functions of CAB were 
transferred to the DOT. The latter included performing carrier fitness evaluations, 
issuing operating certificates, collecting and disseminating airline financial data and 
providing consumer protection services. 
1.2.3 Europe and the Rest of the World 
Regulation of safety in commercial aviation was also quickly established in 
Europe and other countries after the close of the First World War. However, due to the 
fragmentation of civil aviation activities between countries, progress was slower and 
on a somewhat smaller scale than in developments in the United States. More 
recently, this situation has been addressed with the establishment of the pan-European 
Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA). This organisation has been formed with the aim of 
harmonising civil aviation operations, regulations and safety standards across all 23 of 
its member-states, operating on a scale directly comparable to that of the FAA. 
Significant progress is now starting to be made towards merging some of the safety 
regulations issued by the FAA and JAA. For example, in the case of airworthiness 
requirements for large aeroplanes, the US FAR 25 and European JAR 25 regulations 
are produced in an identical format and differences in wording are few enough for 
them to be highlighted with underlining in each of the two documents. 
Because the JAA is still at a relatively early stage in its establishment, it 
currently operates through its constituent national aviation authorities (Frantzen, 
1991). The most prominent of these include the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), 
-6- 
the French DGAC, the Italian RAI - and , the DFVLR in Germany. Each of these 
organisations possesses 'expertise in particular areas of regulation and safety within the 
civil aviation industry; consequently, their roles within the JAA are assigned to ensure 
an appropriate distribution of responsibilities. I 
Historically, the largest contribution to European civil aviation regulation and 
safety activities has been made by the United Kingdom and France. In the UK, an 
Accidents Investigation Branch (AIB) had been established within the Royal Flying 
Corps as early as 1915. When a Department of Civil Aviation was set up in the Air 
Ministry at the end of the First World War, the AIB moved to this department and 
became responsible for investigation of both civil and military accidents. The 1920 
UK Air Navigation Act gave the Secretary of State for Air power to- make regulations 
for the investigation of civil aircraft accidents and the first European legislation for 
this purpose were the UK Air Navigation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations of 
1922. Following the Second World War, the Ministry of Civil Aviation was created 
and made responsible for all certification and operating requirements, including the 
activities of the AIB. The AIB was passed to the Department of Transport in 1983 and 
in 1987 was renamed the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB). , 
In the area of safety regulation, the UK CAA and its predecessors have been 
responsible for the issue of British Civil Air, Worthiness Requirements (BCARs). 
More recently, under the auspices of the JAA, the CAA has also played a key role in 
the drafting many of Europe's Joint Aviation Requirements (JARs).. ' 
Outside of the US and Europe, other nations have played a comparatively 
minor role in the international development of civil aviation safety, as perceived from 
a Western standpoint, at least. Former Eastern Block countries have either developed 
standards independently or aligned themselves with the infrastructure established by 
the former Soviet Union. Most of these nations, including Russia; together with, far 
East countries such as China, South Korea, Japan and Indonesia are now adopting or 
are beginning to harmonise their indigenous procedures with FAA/JAA practices. 
In the past, British influence has been significant in Canada, India, South 
Africa, New Zealand and Australia. Transport Canada is now closely aligned with the 
FAA, with accidents being investigated independently by the Transportation Safety 
Board (TSB). In Australia, civil aviation falls under the responsibility of the Federal 
Department of Transport and accidents are handled by Bureau of Air Safety 
Investigation (BASI), which maintains close links with the UK AAIB. - 
In spite of the progress that has been made in improving safety regulation and 
standards around the World, some important black spots still remain. Most notably, 
these comprise continental Africa and South America. Operating standards in the 
latter, at least, have recently become the subject of FAA attention, but accident 
records indicate that much progress still remains to be made in many of the countries 
involved. 
1.2.4 Other Safety Organisations 
Increasingly, moves are being made towards establishing greater levels of 
international collaboration in the regulation of the global air transport industry. On a 
regional level, the activities of the JAA in Europe have already been mentioned; also, 
the FAA and Transport Canada are currently in the process of establishing a similar 
level of integration in North America. 
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Globally, however, the most universal influence is provided by the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO). This body was formed in 1947 to act as a specialised 
agency of the United Nations and it is charged with furthering development, co- 
and safety within the global air transport industry. The organisation's operation 
influence extends world-wide, across a total of approaching two hundred member 
states. Some of the roles that are played by ICAO in international air safety will be 
examined more closely in Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
Two other bodies worthy of mention here are the International Airline Pilots 
Association (IALPA) and the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF). Both of these groups 
are independent, non-profit making organisations that possess powerful lobbying } 
influence and hold widespread respect throughout the World's aviation safety 
community. 
1.3 The Formulation of Safety Policy & Legislation 
1.3.1 Safety Regulations Applying to Airline Operations 
All airlines World-wide are required to run their services according to a set of 
nationally adopted operating rules and procedures. These regulations govern - the 
every-day operation of aircraft in public service and define requirements for flight 
operations, facilities, inspection, maintenance and training. It has been seen that FAA 
or equivalent JAA rules covering these aspects of aircraft operations have been widely 
adopted in Western countries and, increasingly, harmonisation with these standards is 
beginning to occur in many other areas of the World. FAA legislation is published in 
the form of Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), many of which are (or are currently 
in the process of being) mirrored by directly comparable European Joint Aviation 
Requirements. For reasons of simplicity, therefore, the discussion in this section will 
be restricted to the examination of American FARs. Many of the observations made 
can be taken to be broadly applicable to air transport operations in Europe and the 
remainder of the World. 
When examining almost any aspect of safety in civil air transport, it is 
necessary to define the scope of interest. Safety issues in associated with wide-body 
jet airliners are frequently quite dissimilar to those encountered in small piston- 
engined public charter aircraft. These two categories of airliner operation are governed 
by different regulations, in terms of aeroplane design, crew training, flight procedures, 
airport facilities, maintenance, etc. Between these two extremes, many, different 
combinations of safety regulations can apply, depending on the size of the airline 
operator involved and type of aircraft being flown. 
In this thesis, interest lay primarily with the investigation of fire safety issues 
in large passenger aeroplane types. However, it was not straightforward to choose a 
suitable cut-off point for the study as several possibilities existed for defining what the 
minimum size of a "large" airliner might be. In order to illustrate some of the options 
that were available, the aeroplane size distinctions adopted in FAA air transport 
regulations will now be examined. 
In terms of aircraft operations, FAA rules differentiate between two types of 
air services; FAR Part 121 applying to the larger Air Carriers and FAR Part 135 for 
smaller Air Taxi Operators. The former are defined as airlines providing a service 
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with aircraft designed to carry more than 30 passengers or 7500 lb of cargo. Part 121 
carriers are required to adhere to stricter regulations in areas concerning pilots, 
facilities, maintenance and safety equipment. 
In addition to operating rules, the aircraft that airlines fly are universally 
designed and manufactured according to a set of strict technical requirements. 
Increasingly, these airworthiness FARs or the equivalent JAR standards are being 
adopted by aircraft manufactures world-wide, to ensure that their products are able to 
compete effectively in all global markets. FAA airworthiness standards are divided 
into two sections: FAR Part 23, applicable to small aeroplanes and FAR Part 25 for 
large transport category aircraft. These regulations are applied according to the 
maximum takeoff weight of the aircraft, and its passenger or payload capacity. For 
instance, small aeroplanes are defined as those with 19 or fewer passenger seats and a 
takeoff weight of 19,000 lb or less. If a such an aeroplane has more than 10 seats, then 
it is treated as being a commuter aircraft and the design must meet additional 
requirements contained within Appendix A of FAR Part 23. 
The FAA are also responsible for many areas of economic regulation, 
including the definition of traffic and financial reporting requirements to be adhered to 
by all operators of public service aircraft. Economic Regulations Part 217 and 241 
apply to operators of aircraft with more than 60 passenger seats, and Part 298 applies 
to operation of smaller aircraft. 
The three main areas of FAA legislation applicable to the US air transport 
industry are summarised in Table I. I. It can be seen different distinctions in aircraft 
Legislation Rules Applying Aircraft Rules Applying 
Category to Large-Scale Cut-Off Point to Small-Scale 
Operations Operations 
FAR Part 121 < 30 passengers FAR Part 135 
Operating Rules (Air Carrier) or (Air Taxi Operator) 
< 75001b cargo 
Airworthiness FAR Part 25 < 20 seats FAR Part 23 
Standards (Large Airplanes) and (Small Airplanes) 
< 19,000 Ib weight 
Economic FAR Parts 217 & 241 FAR Part 298 
Regulations (Certificated < 61 passengers (Commuter & Air Taxi 
Air Carriers) Operators) 
Table 1.1: Regulations Governing Air Carriers Operating in the USA 
size are used in each case, ranging from 20 up to 60 passenger seats. For the purposes 
of the present study, it was decided to consider only aircraft that possess at least 30 
passenger seats, in line with US FAR, 121 airline operating rules. The advantage of 
this particular cut-off point is that it excludes all modern piston-engine aircraft types, 
but still encompasses the large number of feeder-liner operations that are undertaken 
with turbo-prop airliners with less than 61 seats. 
1.3.2 Formulation of Safety Legislation 
The provision of legislation governing airline safety is undertaken by a 
complex international infrastructure, operating on many different levels. As outlined 
in the previous section, the oversight of regulators encompasses all sectors of the civil 
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aviation industry, covering aspects of airliner design, manufacture, operation and 
maintenance. Rule-makers face a complex and often torturous task when 
implementing a change in previously established legislation. A seemingly clear-cut 
case for a new safety improvement in a certain area may become less attractive or 
even be revealed to be highly undesirable when subject to more detailed 
consideration. The reasons for this are manifold. New legislation has to be appraised 
in terms of technical, operational, political and economic feasibility criteria as well on 
safety grounds. Many promising safety initiatives have been abandoned in the past 
because they have been proved to be too expensive, impractical to implement, or of 
limited effectiveness in everyday airline operations. 
Safety legislators can rarely act autonomously; policies must be formulated in 
the context of the air transport industry as a whole. A given rule may result in 
dissimilar repercussions for different aircraft manufactures, airline operators or even 
complete regions of operation. The latter implies that prevailing socio-political 
considerations, at both domestic and international levels may sometimes also need to 
be taken into consideration. 
Safety initiatives can also originate from outside of the formally established 
legislative infrastructure. Frequently, after a catastrophic incident has attracted a high 
media profile, a plethora of suggestions are voiced by members of the public, the 
media, political committees, consumer pressure groups, worker unions, etc. Most of 
the recommendations provided by these sources can usually be rejected immediately, 
on grounds ineffectiveness or the impracticality of their consequences. However, 
some ideas may well demand more detailed consideration, especially if a particular 
event has highlighted an unforeseen set of circumstances. Legislators therefore need to 
be seen as being receptive to new ideas and be able to provide clear justification for 
any policy decisions that are reached. 
1.3.3 The Application of Regime Theory to Airline Safety 
The process of formulating regulations in the area of air transport safety can be 
addressed with the application of classical regime theory. This approach involves the 
analysis of the policy making infrastructure as a complex system, or regime, operating 
and interacting at multiple levels within the prevailing environment of the airline 
industry. In general, infrastructures on this scale are too complicated to detail and 
analyse in anything but the most approximate manner. However, in spite of these 
limitations, regime theory has been used by some authors in an attempt to provide an 
insight into the air-safety regulation process. In this section, the some of work 
undertaken by Golich in this area (Golich, 1989) is presented. 
The complexities involved in the formulation, implementation and 
enforcement of safety policies within the air transport industry may be conveniently 
illustrated with the use of accident case studies. For example, the circumstances 
surrounding the 1974 THY' Airlines DC-10 crash resulted in media attention being 
focused on effectiveness of the prevailing safety regime in the air transport industry 
(Job, 1994; Prince, 1990). In the immediate aftermath of the accident, in which 374 
people lost their lives, many accusations were levelled by almost all parties involved. 
These groups ranged from passenger relatives, the media, THY airlines and 
Türk Hava Yollari - Turkish Airlines 
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McDonnell Douglas, the aircraft manufacturers, through to the European certification 
agencies, the Federal Aviation Authority, and the Turkish government. 
. Subsequent manoeuvrings resulted 
in,, protracted altercations breaking out 
between several of these parties. The points of contention spanned areas as diverse as 
the split-second actions of a baggage handler involved in dispatching the aircraft, the 
integrity FAA certification engineers, through to the influence of military-industrial 
lobby in the US government and assigning of international liabilities. 
In cases as complex as these, the application of regime theory may prove 
beneficial when attempting to understand how issues in aircraft safety are dealt with. 
The method can provide a structure through which the system of air-transport safety 
can be dissected and analysed. Regime theory attempts to recognise that legislative 
systems may be influenced as much by political and hierarchical considerations as by 
information derived on a more explicit basis. If insidious influences exist, then they 
are fully acknowledged and duly incorporated into the model. 
Golich's approach to the analysing the air-transport industry's safety 
infrastructure, is to divide the system into domestic, national and international levels. 
A suite of actors exist in each of these layers, with individuals usually performing in 
some level of a group hierarchy. Many interactions occur, both within individual 
hierarchies, and between co-existing hierarchical bodies. Given the overlaps that occur 
between different layers, many processes have multiple consequences and thus need to 
be considered at multiple levels within the overall system. It is precisely this innate 
complexity that regime theory has been designed to address. 
All regimes involve players. The regulatory system within the air transport 
industry is governed by personnel acting at different levels within their organisations. 
In order to deal with this, three types of participant are commonly differentiated in 
regime theory. For current purposes, these can be labelled as micro-actors, macro- 
actors and state elites, respectively. 
A close examination of almost any major aircraft accident will reveal existence 
of connections between system and unit levels of analysis, between micro and macro 
actors and between scenario variables involved. These relationships begin to tell us 
something about the process of change in the aviation industry. Such accidents 
commonly result from linkages between micro actors, corporate engineers and 
government bureaucrats working within narrowly defined terms of reference, and the 
larger forces of change in domestic bodies, international organisations, institutions 
and markets. The prevailing national civil aviation regime, as an intervening variable 
between international and domestic structures and processes both influences and is 
influenced by the nature of these linkages. 
Golich states that virtually all recent regime literature speaks of the need to 
develop interactive models that link domestic and international policy issues more 
closely, since "domestic policy" issues spill over into international politics and 
"foreign policy" has domestic roots and consequences. The lack of detail in system- 
level theories has led to poor explanatory or forecasting abilities. By adding domestic 
dynamics, scholars run the risk of losing parsimony, but potentially stand to gain a 
more accurate reflection of reality. Trying to understand the reciprocal dynamics 
taking place in and between both system and unit levels of analysis presents an even 
greater challenge. 
Researchers have identified, at both the system and unit levels, certain key 
variables that influence actor behaviour. We need to understand how these influence 
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state elites operating at the "intersection" of domestic and international politics as they 
select policies designed to serve their conceptions of aviation safety interests. 
At the system level, international power play and market structures are critical. 
Equally important are non-structural variables, such as changes in reigning ideas and 
knowledge, technological innovation, and shifts in the number and patterns of 
transitional interactions. 
At the domestic level, policy makers are influenced most fundamentally by 
ideology, which shapes public perceptions about appropriate state-economy 
relationships and about which and how issue areas should be managed by 
governments. Wielding special influence, bureaucrats determine the "short list" of 
feasible policies; they bias policy effects through selective interpretation and by 
varying policy implementation schedules. Private sector demands and actions are 
becoming increasingly important. Sometimes influence is exercised consciously and 
formally by economic interest groups or associations lobbying for special treatment. 
Policy can also be influenced less consciously, but no less powerfully, when 
corporations pursue survival strategies which place constraints on or create 
advantageous opportunities for state behaviour. Finally, policy selection will be a 
function of the limitations and possibilities inherent in the prevailing regime. 
Many scholars have noted that regimes, like many other institutions, resist 
change. Organisational inertia and the effects of prior policy choices are partially 
responsible for this phenomenon because state and non-state actors have learned how 
to operate both internationally and domestically within familiar parameters. 
Additionally, the positive contribution of regimes to reducing uncertainty and to 
facilitating global management of a wide-ranging number and type of issue areas 
means regimes will persist without supervision from a central authority. 
Nevertheless change does occur. State and non-state actors adjust to changes 
in domestic and international environments. They alter their beliefs and actions 
incrementally as a result of daily interactions or on the basis of new information. They 
develop knowledge or skill by study or experience, such as feedback about which 
policies have worked and which failed in the past. Knowledge, "... the sum of 
technical information and of theories about that information Ichich commands 
sufficient consensus ... to serve as a guide to public policy ... ", is affected 
by changes 
in reigning ideas. 
Communication provides o ortunities for state and corporate elites to learn , pp 
to redefine interests, and to select new policies. The exchange of ideas, knowledge and 
technological innovation can lead to regime creation and, later, to new ways of 
behaving within regime parameters. New rules and decision-making procedures may 
be adopted. Eventually, critical variables may be so altered that new or modified 
regimes begin to emerge, guided by different norms and principles. Crises often 
constitute the necessary catalyst for learning because they force decision maker 
recognition of structural and non-structural changes occurring in the system. 
The process of change never ceases. The daily behaviour of state and non-state 
actors, guided by regime dictates, creates new constraints and opportunities for 
international relations which eventually lead to changes in both internal and external 
environments. The process of constant, incremental adjustment eventually generates 
such tension between "old" principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
and the newly prevailing structural and non-structural limitations and incentives that } 
change is imminent. The incompatibility may not trigger change immediately. Often } 
-12- 
some identifiable crisis is the catalyst. Once elites recognise that 'adjustments are 
needed, regimes may facilitate the communication leading to their modification, 
because they "link states together" and shape reciprocal behaviour which "can affect 
the conceptions of self-interest". The latter influence the selection and implementation 
of adjustment policies. Macro-level changes are also affected by the daily behaviour 
of an aggregate of micro actors. These individuals operate according to domestic and 
international regime structures which delimit appropriate political and economic 
action at both levels. The contributions made by micro actors, prevailing ideology and 
regime influences in policy adoption are depicted in Figure 1.1. 
Changes wrought 
by micro actor 
behaviour 
Domestic Policy Selection & 
Ideology Implementation 
C Regime Parameters 
Fit ure 1.1: Influences in Policy Selection & Implementation 
. Receptivity is function of ideology and the pressures created by micro-level 
activity and demands. Adjusting policy selection and implementation adds -a 
dimension of learning. However, we cannot presume that all learning results in the 
selection and implementation of optimal policies. Government and corporate elites 
can be misinformed, select myopic, destructively conflicting policies, or implement 
policies poorly, as well as learning, selecting and implementing "good" policies 
"well". Because of the shifting and often conflicting demands to which decision 
makers must respond, policy selection and implementation can be influenced by 
"inappropriate" pressures. In the case of the THY airlines DC-10 accident, -concerns 
about declining political, military and economic power have affected decisions about 
technologically solvable safety problems. Fortunately, actors can learn from such 
failures as well as from successes. 
1.3.4 Knowledge Resources for Improving Safety 
If policy makers and airline operators are to be in a position to improve levels 
of safety within the air transport industry, they must be aware of the types of dangers 
that are being faced and the best means with which they can be combated. If such 
knowledge is to be utilised in strategic decision making, it needs to be precisely 
quantifiable and obtained in a reliable form. Consequently, much scientific research 
has been performed within the-area of aircraft safety with the objective of fulfilling 
specific information needs. The knowledge gained from these studies will be 
112 
examined in detail in the next Chapter. Thus, in this section, only a brief overview of 
aviation safety research is given. 
Most safety research programmes are instigated by national aviation = 
authorities, such as the FAA, CAA, Transport Canada and DGAC. Usually, initiatives 
are formulated in response to specific accidents, to analyse recently emerging 
concerns or to investigate new technological developments. In cases where adequate 
expertise and facilities exist, such work is usually performed in-house by the 
organisation(s) concerned. However, when specialised capabilities are called for, or 
no internal research facilities are maintained, other parties are called upon. In the past, 
these have typically comprised aircraft manufacturers, independent research 
organisations, military or other government agencies and educational establishments. 
Increasingly, aviation authorities are co-ordinating their spending on safety research 
and establishing joint programmes with the above types of organisation under national 
or regional initiatives. 
It is possible to categorise research activities into three broad areas, namely 
historical, experimental and analytical. Those in the first category involve the 
examination of past events and production of safety statistics, audits and benefit 
analyses. This type of research possesses the obvious advantage of being based upon 
real events, but the findings yielded may be imprecise or statistically unreliable. 
In constrast, experimental programmes attempt to quantify at first hand 
physical or behavioural phenomena that are in some way representative of those 
encountered in aircraft accidents. High levels of precision and repeatability of results 
can usually be demonstrated, but test conditions cannot always, be made to be 
adequately realistic. 
Lastly, analytical methods such as conceptual modelling and computer 
simulation are often used when historical information cannot be interpreted in 
sufficient detail or with adequate reliability and experimental methods prove to be 
impractical for some reason. These techniques are useful for establishing an 
understanding of complex phenomena, but are usually difficult to validate to a 
sufficient degree of certainty. 
In addition to the research activities overseen by national aviation authorities, } 
other organisations are actively involved in the study of aircraft safety. Aeroplane 
manufacturers and systems suppliers obviously possess a very direct interest in the 
safety of their products. As a result, they frequently undertake work that lies far 
beyond or is even totally unrelated to that which is strictly required for certification 
purposes. Unfortunately, information gained from such studies can sometimes be 
product specific, or is not made freely available. However, as airliners become ever 
more complex and difficult to certificate, the significance of these voluntary activities 
may be set to grow in the future. 
Some valuable contributions to air safety research have also been made by 
independent organisations, educational establishments and agencies based in other 
industries. The latter span areas as diverse as automobile safety, building regulation, 
the petrochemical production and fire fighting services. = 
1.3.5 Certification of Aircraft for Accident Safety 
The variable nature of aircraft accidents makes it difficult for them to be 
prepared for in advance. Consequently, current safety measures are designed, -to 
address potential dangers at source level and, wherever possible, provide a degree of 
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redundancy or flexibility to deal with unpredictable scenarios. Preparations` for dealing 
with emergency situations can be grouped into three areas; ground-based precautions, 
onboard measures and crew/passenger training. In the present study, attention will be 
directed primarily towards the latter two aspects, i. e. the hardware and "software" 
components of the aircraft itself. Whilst airport and other ground-based emergency 
services can occasionally play a significant role in accident survival, arguably, their 
influence is several orders of magnitude lower that that of precautions taken onboard 
of aircraft. 
The majority of airliners currently in large-scale passenger service World-wide 
with more than 19 seats have been certificated to FAR/JAR 25 Large Aeroplane 
Airworthiness Requirements. These standards are intended to ensure that all airliners 
are as safe and consistent in airworthiness features as it is reasonably possible to 
ensure. As a result, almost all aspects of aircraft design and construction are addressed 
with detailed stipulations or recommended practices. Those most directly 'applicable 
to aircraft accidents cover the following areas (JAA, 1994): - 
Cockpit Crew Provisions 
" survival equipment 
" pilot compartment view and smoke clearance 
" cockpit controls 
Passenger Provisions 
" doors and emergency exits 
" ventilation 
" pressurisation 
" emergency evacuation 
Crash Survivability 
" seat strength 
" stowage compartments 
" ditching 
Fire Safety 
" provision of fire extinguishers 
". protection of lavatory, cargo and baggage compartments 
" fire protection of aircraft systems 
" flammability, heat release and smoke emission of cabin materials 
*, lightning and static electricity precautions 
Many of these airworthiness regulations have been progressively modified 
over time, in order to take account of technological 'advances' and insights gained from 
operational experience. 'A significant proportion of these changes are not required to 
be backdated to' aircraft types that are already in service, 'under so-called 
"Grandfather" exclusion rights. Thus, it is should be noted that, technically; only the 
most modern aircraft in the World's airline fleet actually comply fully with prevailing 
certification safety requirements. 
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1.4 Outline of Thesis 
1.4.1 Summary 
In this chapter it has been seen that air travel is and almost certainly will 
continue to remain extremely safe. However, if levels of airline traffic continue to 
increase and a corresponding reduction in accident rates is not attained, catastrophic 
events will occur at greater frequencies in future years. The airline industry may then 
encounter problems with public perception of air safety. In addition to reducing 
accident rates, this issue can be addressed by increasing the survivability of events 
when they occur. Study of past accidents indicates that a significant potential for 
progress to be made exists in this area. 
Safety in commercial air transport has been developed progressively over 
many decades, primarily in the United States and Europe. On a global level, bodies 
such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation and co-operation through 
international research programmes are set to maintain advances in safety into the 
future. However, formulating new policies and implementing change in a complex 
industry is far from straightforward. Margins remaining for technical improvements to 
be made are becoming progressively smaller and analysis of safety must encompass 
many areas onboard the aircraft. In addition to issues of uncertainty about 
effectiveness of new measures, economic, political and historical constraints may also 
apply. 
1.4.2 Path of the Research 
This study attempts to deal with some of the issues now being faced when 
attempting to further improve levels of safety within the air transport industry. To 
provide a basis for the work, a wide-ranging review of existing research in the field 
and an extensive study of past aircraft fire accidents were undertaken. The results of 
these activities clearly suggested that an integrated and holistic approach to the 
analysis of aircraft fire safety was needed. The way chosen to achieve this was to 
construct a computer-based risk assessment model that incorporates a large quantity of 
information gathered from past accidents, together with results from many areas of 
scientific safety research. This tool works by generating aircraft accident scenarios 
and then simulating their outcome in terms of occupant survival rates. Details of 
incidents being modelled are formulated to vary in a probabilistic manner and be 
statistically representative of past events. 
Perhaps, the key to the work is that all significant aspects of aircraft accidents 
are incorporated within the analysis in a balanced and integrated manner. Achieving 
this required that the role of scenarios features, crash effects, fire development and 
evacuation by surviving occupants in aircraft accidents were closely examined. These 
four areas were represented explicitly within accident simulations with the 
construction of interacting sub-models. In consequence, this then enables the effects 
of new safety measures and the influence of future trends in accidents to be explored. 
The resulting risk assessment tool was used to undertake four case studies. Each of 
these demonstrates a different aspect of the programme's usage and provides an 
indication of how this type of research may contribute to the improvement of airliner 
safety in the future. 
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1.4.3 Thesis Map 
The structure of the thesis is portrayed in Figure 1.2: - 
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..................... 
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Figure 1.2: Map of the Thesis 
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Chapter 2: A Survey of Aircraft Safety Research 
2.1 Air Safety Research - An Introduction 
2.1.1 The Need for Research 
It was seen in Chapter 1 that there has been a consistent need to obtain more 
information about almost all aspects of aircraft accident survival. Those who are 
responsible for ensuring the safety of air travel require a detailed understanding of 
what accidents involve in order to formulate new safety measures and minimise the 
human losses incurred. As a result, knowledge gained can be applied in safety 
legislation, aircraft manufacture, airline operations and crew training. 
The majority of research undertaken to date has been funded by national 
aviation authorities. Much of this work is directed towards specific problem areas, 
with the aim of enhancing existing safety legislation. In addition to the obvious 
humanitarian and economic justification for such research to be undertaken, these 
organisations bear legal responsibility for safety regulation within their country's 
airspace. Aircraft manufacturers have also made important contributions in many 
areas. Although the findings made can sometimes be product or market specific and 
possibly justifiable on the grounds of quantifying product liability, any research being 
performed on a voluntary basis should be welcomed. 
Smaller-scale research studies are also initiated by independent bodies, such as 
military or government research organisations, educational establishments and private 
consultants. The possession a degree of autonomy can sometimes enable research 
needs to be pursued with more freedom than when investigators are more closely 
involved with the industry. Finally, important lessons can be learnt in aircraft accident 
safety from research undertaken other industries. Examples of the areas involved 
include the quantification of liquid hydrocarbon fires, evacuation from buildings, 
materials combustion, smoke toxicology and automobile crash dynamics. 
2.1.2 Topic Areas Covered 
The complex nature of aircraft accidents means that they can potentially 
involve a range of different survival issues. Consequently, this has meant that research 
into aircraft safety has evolved in a number of specialised areas. Those which are 
surveyed in this chapter are: - 
" Historical air accident data 
" Aircraft crash testing and impact modelling 
" Experimental fire tests and fire modelling 
" Determining the effects of fire on people 
" Aircraft evacuation trials and simulation modelling 
Each of these areas will now be dealt with in turn in subsequent sections of the 
chapter. 
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2.2 Historical Air Accident Data 
2.2.1 Accident Data Collection and Analysis 
Since the earliest days of commercial air travel, investigations have been made 
when accidents involving aircraft have occurred. These enquiries usually result in 
information being generated and made available for those concerned with air safety. 
Such data can then be collated and analysed, resulting in an appraisal of current 
standards and their extrapolation into future trends. This enables the effectiveness of 
current practices to be evaluated and areas of special concern identified. Armed with 
this information regulators can prioritise and implement new safety improvements for 
the air transport industry as they prove necessary. 
The quality and the extent of such information can vary enormously. In the 
fledgling days of commercial air transport, the US Air Mail service kept records of 
accidents occurring within its fleet of aircraft. However, civil aircraft accidents were 
not investigated systematically anywhere until the introduction of the US Air 
Commerce Act of 1926 (Wells, 1991). Since that date, the majority of industrialised 
countries have instituted a system for the investigation and reporting or air-accidents, 
in some form or other. This process has not become universal, even amongst nations 
that are signatories to the Chicago Convention (ICAO, 1994) - many countries choose 
not report their accidents openly because of cultural, financial or political reasons. 
In spite of often incomplete or inadequate data, much work has been 
performed in gathering information about aircraft accidents. These activities have 
been undertaken by aircraft manufacturers, national aviation authorities and individual 
researchers in many countries. Most of the data gathered comes from the official 
reports issued by the government deemed to be responsible for the investigation of the 
incident under Annex 13 of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) 
Chicago Convention. In addition, many national authorities allow documents 
associated with the compilation of the official accident report to made available on 
request. Many of the larger airlines and aircraft manufactures also retain detailed 
information about accidents incidents, particularly those involving their own aircraft. 
2.2.2 The Aircraft Accident Report 
The ICAO Chicago Convention Annex 13 recommends a standard format for 
the writing of accident reports. This is intended to structure the information obtained 
from an investigation in a logical and concise manner, and ensure that no important 
omissions are contained in the final publication. Example headings for the main 
sections of a report include "History of the flight", "Weather", "Injuries to persons", 
"Damage to aircraft", "Analysis", "Conclusions" and "Recommendations". This 
standardised reporting format appears to have been widely adopted and has greatly 
increased quality of information available to those involved in the detailed analysis of 
such accidents. Inevitably though, some governments still persist in issuing nothing 
more than the most terse of summaries, even after a major accident has occurred. 
These often contain little or no useful information, and are usually concerned chiefly 
with apportioning sole responsibility for the incident to the flight crew. 
2.2.3 Compilation of World-wide Accident Data 
To date, most of the collection, archiving and analysis of accident data by the 
world's air safety community has been undertaken in an uncoordinated manner. The 
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most comprehensive record of commercial aircraft accidents currently available is 
probably the UK Civil Aviation Authority's World Airline Accident Summary 
(WAAS) (CAA, 1996). This provides basic details and short descriptive, summaries of 
most accidents and serious incidents involving aircraft in passenger or cargo revenue 
service world-wide. The information is derived from official accident reports or, in 
their absence, from other sources. WAAS is updated annually and it constitutes a 
logical starting point for most investigations involving aircraft accident data analysis. 
More extensive information on selected accidents occurring between the 
1950's and the 1980's can be obtained from the ICAO Aircraft Accident Digest series 
(ICAO, 1980). These volumes contain an edited version of the official report for many 
of the more serious accidents, conveniently formatted in the ICAO standardised 
layout. Only a small proportion of all accidents is covered by the publication, usually 
incidents that are relatively severe, or possess some other special significance. 
Nevertheless, the digests provide a convenient supplement to the basic WAAS data 
and make available the contents of many *reports that would otherwise be very 
difficult to obtain. 
Other sources of accident summary data include the computer-based ADREPS 
(ICAO, 1995) and the various national aviation authority incident reporting systems in 
place around the world. Comprehensive records are also maintained independently by 
academic researchers, such as Taylor (Taylor, 1991). Some aircraft manufacturers, 
notably Airbus, Boeing and Fokker, together with organisations associated with the 
insurance industry, such as the UK-based Airclaims Ltd., also collate accident data. 
2.2.4 Data Classification and Analysis 
Many of the organisations and individuals who, maintain historical records of 
aircraft accidents are actively involved in the interpretation and statistical analysis of 
their data. Most published studies adopt one of two approaches; namely the 
identification of long term trends from categorical data, or alternatively, the 
undertaking of a more detailed investigation chiefly concerned with some specific 
aspect of air safety. 
Work involving the identification of long term trends usually encompasses 
more accident cases than investigations utilising the second approach. Typically, these 
studies encompass hundreds of incidents, drawn from, for example, revenue passenger 
operations world-wide since the start of the jet age. The sheer quantity of cases 
requires that the data be coded or categorised in some manner for the undertaking of 
any meaningful analysis. These classifications might include country of the aircraft's 
registration, phase of flight during which the event occurred, aircraft age, scheduled or 
charter service, aircraft size, etc. 
The results of these long term studies are usually smoothed and presented with 
time as an independent variable, so that trends can be reliably identified. Given that 
the data has been obtained from a high proportion of all aircraft operations, the 
conclusions of these long term studies are usually assumed to apply to the industry as 
a whole. The world's largest aircraft manufacturer, Boeing, is particularly noted for 
the production of these types of study (Murray, 1995). 
In contrast, many investigators utilise historical accident data in an attempt to 
resolve more specific safety issues. An example might be the work undertaken to 
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judge relative safety of wide-cut aviation fuels' in accidents involving aircraft crashes 
(Taylor, 1991). The requisite data (the proportion of occupants killed by the effects of 
tire) could only be determined for 49 of the 75 accidents under consideration, but 
some reasonably clear indications were still obtained. 
In order to extract the maximum information for this type of study, accidents 
can be closely examined and analysed on an individual basis. This may reveal 
evidence that is essentially anecdotal or descriptive in nature, and thus masked by the 
use of a strictly categorical method. The additional "background" information can 
often lend more credence to findings, where the use of a small sample size means that 
results cannot be guaranteed to be statistically significant. Also, conclusions cannot 
necessarily be applied in a wider context than from which the basic sample data was 
drawn, unless a generic applicability can be demonstrated. 
2.3 Aircraft Crash Testing and Impact Modelling 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Most aircraft accidents involve some form of crash (i. e. a rapid deceleration 
where significant structural damage to the airframe is incurred). Much work has been 
undertaken to investigate structural deformation and occupant survivability for 
transportation accidents in general. Experimental crash testing techniques have been 
predominantly used in the past, but computer-based analytical studies are becoming 
increasingly common. 
A significant proportion of this research has been undertaken by the 
automotive industry. However many of the findings published in this context are 
directly applicable to the air transport. In addition to the work by the automotive 
sector, much work has been performed to specifically investigate occupant 
survivability and fuel tank integrity aircraft crashes (Thomson, 1984). 
2.3.2 Airframe Crash Tests 
When an aircraft crashes, large deformation and crushing of its structure can 
occur, often posing considerable danger to the occupants in conditions that might 
otherwise be survivable. As a result, numerous experimental trials have been 
performed to test the response of aircraft structures in crash impacts. The most 
comprehensive tests utilise a remotely piloted aircraft, complete with 
anthropomorphic test dummies, carefully instrumented to record impact decelerations 
and deformations. The crash test aircraft is flown into the ground along a precisely 
determined flightpath, usually so as to collide with a prearranged set of obstacles. 
These tests are extremely costly to perform with large commercial aircraft types and 
they arc therefore undertaken relatively infrequently. A well-documented example is 
the FAA Controlled Impact Demonstration (CID) of 1984, which also involved the 
fire evaluation of an anti-misting kerosene (Blake, 1985; Hayduck, 1986). 
Ground-based impact testing of complete airframes is considerably more 
straightforward to perform than free flights trials. Typically aircraft are attached to 
1 Wide-cut fuels are more volatile than grades of aviation kerosene currently in widespread use and 
thus vaporise more easily. Their use was commonplace in the 1960's and 1970's, but they have been 
phased out since, primarily as a result of concern over their safety. 
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some form of guidance rail and taxied under their own rower into obstacles at high 
speed. The principal disadvantage of ground"bascd testing is that it is difficult to 
produce an adequate component of deceleration in the vertical direction, with some 
fora, of hilt or up-slope usually being employed (Spicer, 1964). Some of these trials 
have involved the destructive testing of a large number of airframes and the analysis 
of fuel fire initiation is it common theme (l'inkel, 1953.1958). 
When researchers are concerned with more detailed aspects of aircraft 
structural crashworthiness, it may not be necessary to test an entire aircraft. Often, 
representative sections of cabin seating or fuel tank structure can be tested adequately 
in isolation. When testing passenger seating for example, the use of three scats rows is 
common, to determine the efFects the scats in front and behind the instrumented test 
row (Johnson ct al., 1988). These small scale experiments are often used for 
comparative or optimisation studies, where multiple runs arc required. The initial 
development of anti-misting safety fuels was undertaken in this way, with structures 
built to rupture in n similar manner to wing fuel tanks (Miller and Wilford, 1971). 
In recent years, computational methods have been increasing used to predict 
the behaviour of structures in crash conditions. Initially, the use of these techniques 
was restricted to simplified "stick" representations of very basic structural elements or 
individual occupants. I lowwwcvcr, non-linear analysis techniques have advanced rapidly 
and it is now feasible to model complete aircraft configurations or the dynamic 
interactions between multiple rows cif seated passengers (Wittlin and Neri, 1990). 
2.3.3 Occupant Impact Testing 
The development of passcngcr seats, together with their occupant restraint 
systems, has been predominantly influenced by the necessity to provide adequate 
support and retainmcnt in crush situations. For modest and moderate impact forces, it 
is possible to use human volunteers as test subjects; the Eiband curves suggest that 
vertical accelerations of up to 15g (sustained over 0.005 to 0.5 seconds) me tolerable 
for able-bodied voluntccrs (Liiband, 1959). 1Iowwwcvcr, experience obtained from past 
accidents and airframe impact testing has shown that accelerations of up to SOg may 
be encountered in many crush situations. In order to obtain the kinematic responses of 
occupants in such extreme conditions, it is necessary to resort to the use of 
anthropomorphic dummies. 
Time experimental tests have shown that aircraf occupants face three main 
dangers during severe crash impacts (Snyder, 1976): - 
1. Ejection from the scating position 
2. Application cif cxcessivc forces to the body 
3. The occurrcncc of largc rclativc motions between adjacent 
body segments (whiplash and flailing) 
Occupant ejection and flail injuries have been addressed by the development of 
improved scat restraint systems, improved occupant bracing positions and the 
controlled deformation ofscats backs. 
Peak acceleration forces can be reduced by the use of energy absorbing scats, 
which spread the deceleration over a longer time interval with the use of collapsing 
structures (Alforo-13ou ct nl,, 1985). In this way, the kinetic energy of the occupant 
can he managed so as to reduce the severity of any impact injuries. 
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2.4 Experimental Fire Tests and Fire Modelling 
2.4.1 The Danger of Fire 
As well as crash impacts, many survivable aircraft accidents involve 
a 
significant fire. The large quantities of fuel, together with flammable cabin 
furnishings carried by most passenger aircraft provide a significant fire potential even 
without the occurrence of a crash accident. Historical research suggests that up to 
three quarters of the fatalities in many survivable fire accidents may be attributable to 
the effects of the fire (Speitel, 1988). As a consequence, much research has 
been 
undertaken by the aircraft fire safety community into understanding, quantifying and 
reducing the threat of the effects of fire in aircraft. The work can be divided into four 
categories; namely the fire testing of airframe structures, cabin interiors and aircraft 
materials, together with fire extinguishment. Each of these is now considered in turn: 
2.4.2 External Fuel Fire Tests of Airframe Structures 
These are intended to reproduce the scenario of an external fuel fire in the 
vicinity of an aircraft fuselage. The emphasis of these studies is usually concerned 
with establishing the characteristics of the fire and its effect on the airframe structure 
and the development of the environment inside the aircraft cabin. The FAA has 
contributed most of the published work in this field to date (Sarkos et al., 1991). 
External fuel fire tests are usually conducted with actual aircraft structures, 
modified, if necessary, to represent typical passenger aircraft door configurations or 
impact damage. Experiments have shown that a typical airliner fuselage will only 
provide resistance to an adjacent external fuel fire for 30-60 seconds (Sarkos et al., 
1991). After the fuselage structure has been breached, fire usually spreads rapidly, 
aided by high levels of ambient thermal radiation. Other significant conclusions 
obtained from destructive airframe fire testing include (Sarkos et al., 1991): - 
1. An aircraft standing on its undercarriage is more vulnerable to an 
external pool fire than an aircraft resting on its belly. 
2. The wings can provide an effect shield from flames for the fuselage and 
overwing exits. 
3. The presence of flame penetration paths and the effects of acoustic wall 
linings can play a significant role in fire penetration. 
4. The earliest cabin threat from the burnthrough process is smoke 
obscuration, produced from the pyrolysis of aircraft materials. 
These trials obviously involve the airframe being tested to destruction and so they are 
necessarily expensive to conduct. 
When the researchers are concerned primarily with measuring the cabin 
thermo-toxic environment, as opposed to determining the fire resistance of the 
aircraft's structure, a different approach may be used. This involves the airframe being 
lined and insulated to protect it from fire damage, thus preserving its structural 
integrity during the trial. When the primary mechanism of fire spread is by convection 
of heat and smoke, this approach can yield convincing results (Hill and Sarkos, 1985). 
However, the heat reflectance and absorption properties of the protected structure may 
be quite different to those of the bare airframe. This implies that care needs to be 
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taken when interpreting the effects of radiative heat transfer' in results obtained from 
tests utilising these non-destructive techniques. 
The results of external fuel fire experiments are commonly plotted as time 
histories of ambient temperature, light transmission and heat flux. Often, marked 
stratification of the cabin atmosphere is encountered and measurements therefore tend 
to be recorded at a series of heights above the cabin floor. 
The influence of wind strength and wind direction have been shown to play a 
major role in determining the effects of external fires in many circumstances. This is 
because the connective heat transfer in the first 90 seconds of a fire will be dominated 
by wind conditions and fuselage openings (Eklund and Sarkos, 1985). In the most 
favourable conditions, no fire penetration may occur at all, whilst at the other extreme, 
convective heat flux may occur through openings to make the cabin rapidly non- 
survivable. 
The effectiveness of cabin water spray systems has been investigated with full 
scale airframe fire tests (Hill et al., 1992; Whitfield and Whitfield, 1988). The results 
of these trials have shown that water spray systems have the potential to reduce the 
rate of fire spread and concentration of fire products within the passenger cabin. Other 
contributions of full scale testing include the initial demonstration of the value, of fire 
blocking layers in passenger seat cushions (Sarkos et al., 1991) and the investigation 
of the use of Halon in cabin fire protection (Sarkos, 1975)., 
2.4.3 Cabin Mock-up Fire Tests 
Once a fire has penetrated into the cabin of an aircraft, cabin furnishings and 
trim quickly pyrolise, ignite and then contribute significantly to the effects of the fire. 
In order to increase our understanding of these often complex processes, many smaller 
scale experimental fire tests have been undertaken. Because the focus of these tests 
lies chiefly with obtaining the fire properties of the cabin contents, as opposed to the 
fire resistance of the cabin structure, partial cabin mock-ups can be used. These tests 
are essential to relate the findings of materials fire experiments, conducted in small 
test chambers, with the comprehensive, but costly airframe fire tests described in the 
preceding section (Lopez, 1985). II 
The, walls of small scale mock-ups usually incorporate some form of 
ventilation control and tend to be constructed of steel, for durability in fire (Duskin, 
1985). Alternatively, if the testing only involves low ambient temperatures, such as 
determining visibility in smoke, sections of real aircraft fuselage can be used, with the 
advantage that cabin seating, lighting and trim are already pre-installed (Madgwick, 
1982). 
Cabin mock-ups are particularly useful when researchers are- interested in 
some of the more complex interactions that occur when a mixture of cabin materials 
undergoes simultaneous pyrolysis and combustion. In these circumstances, the fire 
products may differ significantly in composition in comparison with those obtained 
when same materials are tested individually (Auvinet and Favand, 1975). 
A related area of work involving the use of mock-ups is in the fire testing of 
cargo compartments (Ball, 1991) and lavatory units (Kourtides et at., 1985). 
Underfloor cargo bays in passenger transport aircraft may contain large quantities 
flammable material and are commonly inaccessible in flight. It is thus essential to 
provide these compartments with adequate fire detection and/or suppression measures. 
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2.4.4 Fire Characteristics of Materials 
Materials intended for application in passenger aircraft have to exhibit 
adequate fire performance 'in particularly demanding conditions. The primary. 
difficulties associated with optimising the fire properties of aircraft cabin materials are 
(Hilado, 1985): - 
1. They are highly engineered materials because of the emphasis on 
minimum weight; 
2. They are employed in environments that permit limited or no 
egress in the event of a fire; 
3. They face possible exposure to high heat flux levels because of :. ý 
their proximity to fuel; 
As a consequence, airworthiness requirements specify a well-defined list of fire 
criteria that must be met by materials to be used in the passenger cabins of large 
aircraft (JAA, 1994). These criteria include burnt rates, self-extinguishment, flame 
penetration, smoke generation and, in the case of seat cushions, weight loss during 
flammability testing. Compliance with these requirements is demonstrated with the 
use small scale materials fire tests. 
The fire testing of materials is a mature technology and it has been largely 
developed outside of the aerospace industry. Many types of standard fire tests have 
been evolved to measure numerous material parameters in addition to those listed 
above and they are too numerous to list here. Brief overviews of the fire testing Of 
materials in an aerospace context are provided by Godfried and Hilado (Godfried, 
1975; Hilado, 1985). 
One area in which aircraft fire safety has contributed significantly to the more 
widespread use of fire resistant materials is in the application of fire blocking layers to 
polyurethane foam seat cushions. Polyurethane foam has been widely adopted for seat 
cushioning in transport and domestic applications; it is cheap, light, resilient and 
widely available in many tailored grades. However, the pyrolysis of polyurethane 
based materials in air yields large quantities of many lethal substances, particularly 
carbon monoxide and HCHO (Spurgeon et al., 1985). In contrast, neoprene 
(polychloropene) based foams posses far more favourable fire characteristics, 
exhibiting high char yields, good ablation efficiency and low smoke emissions (Parker 
and Kourtides, 1982). The principal disadvantages of neoprene foams are their higher 
densities (typically 46 kg/m3 in comparison with around 24 kg/m3 for traditional 
polyurethane foams) and their greater acquisition costs. 
The solution adopted by the aerospace industry has been to use cushions 
constructed from polyurethane foam encased in a neoprene foam fire blocking layer. 
Fire tests have shown that this form of cushion construction can offer significant 
improvements in fire protection (Kourtides and Parker, 1985). Other forms of cushion 
fire-blocking layers include E-glass, kevlar/nomex mix, and polyacrylonitrile based 
fabrics. 
Most materials fire testing involves the use small samples, a standard method 
of heat addition and a rigorously controlled test atmosphere. Care must be taken when 
interpreting the results of these laboratory fire tests; as noted previously, materials can 
exhibit markedly different behaviour in full cabin trials. Nevertheless, small scale 
testing is invaluable for the initial screening of materials and it provides a suitable 
basis for the development of more comprehensive fire-worthiness experiments. 
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2.4.5 Fire Containment and Extinguishment - 
The role of fire-fighting services in the event of an aircraft fire is to save life. 
This is achieved by isolating the effects of the fire from aircraft occupants and by 
extinguislunent of the fire. Given that an aircraft is likely to be damaged beyond use 
by even a relatively modest fire, little or no priority is assigned to the restriction of 
material destruction until all those on board have been saved. 
In the case of fires that start inside the fuselage of an aircraft, the first 
intervention may well be by the onboard crew members. Most of these internal fires 
arise in lavatory or cargo compartments. Although they might be relatively modest in 
size, the close proximity of internal fires to passenger means that they can represent a 
considerable threat to life, often within 10-15 minutes of their initiation (Kourtides et 
al., 1985). The primary method for dealing with these categories of fires has been the 
introduction of smoke detection, ventilation restriction and Halon-based fire 
suppression systems. The latter will phased out in the near future as a consequence of 
the Montreal Convention on halogenated hydrocarbons and the provision of suitable 
alternatives is being actively pursued (Ball, 1991). 
Aircraft fires that involve large quantities of fuel, usually as a result of a crash, 
provide a quite different set of circumstances. Some of the main problems faced by 
the emergency fire-fighting services include (Nash, 1975): - 
1. There is a very high hazard involved. Modern passenger aircraft may 
carry up to 600 passengers. 
2. Any crash is likely to render helpless a large proportion of the 
occupants, who nevertheless must be regarded as potential survivors, 
unless shown to be otherwise. 
3. The discharge of large quantities of a volatile liquid fuel in the 
immediate surroundings usually produces a very rapidly growing and 
often catastrophic fire situation. 
4. The strength of the aircraft structure can never be adequate to withstand 
the tremendous effects of impact damage. 
5. Aircraft payload margins do not allow for the installation of fire- 
fighting systems capable of dealing with a major fire - even if they were 
to remain operational after a crash. 
6. The location of the accident site cannot be known, at least with any 
precision, until the aircraft comes to a stop. 
7. The time scale of an aircraft fire under the worst conditions and the 
likely survival time of the occupants are both so short that the changes 
of fire-fighting services taking effective action in time to save lives are 
low, except if the accident occurs on the airfield. 
Aircraft fires can present two types of extinguishment problem, namely quasi 
two-dimensional (spilled or pool fires) and quasi three-dimensional (running fuel or 
jets and spray of fuel) (Fiala, 1982). The most effective media for combating these 
two categories of aircraft fires are water-based foams and dry powders respectively. 
All fire fighting agents work by inhibiting the hydrocarbon-air/oxygen 
interaction. This can be achieved by three distinct ways; by forming a physical barrier 
between the reactants,, by absorbing heat from the combustion process, or, finally, by 
chemical means through trapping of free radicals involved in the combustion reaction. 
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Most agents utilise at least two of these inhibition mechanisms for their effectiveness 
and it can be difficult to differentiate between the latter two in some circumstances 
(Fiala, 1982). 
Fire-fighting foams work by sealing the fuel from any air'oxygen supply and 
by heat absorption. They are very good at dealing with large scale spill fires, but are 
not effective with running fires, such as fuel falling from ruptured tanks to the ground. 
Foams arc generated on demand by aerating a solution of foaming agent in water, 
resulting in expansion ratiosI of up to 1000. However, for the extinguishment of large 
fuel spill fires only `'low expansion" foams are used; these are formed with a solution 
strength of 3-6 percent and expansion ratios in the range of 6 to 30. As a result of their 
relatively high density and viscosity, these foams can be projected up to 50 meters, are 
less affected by wind/fire draughts and are more able to penetrate into restricted areas, 
than mixtures utilising higher expansion ratios (Nash. 1975). 
Many post crash fires can be extinguished more efficiently with the use of dry 
powders or Ilalon in combination with aqueous foam. 1-l: alon and other similar gases 
work by physical displacement, heat absorption and chemical interference. They can 
be particularly effective for "mopping up" enclosed areas with limited accessibility, 
such as underfloor compartments, wing leading edges, undercarriage hays, etc. 
I lowevcr, fire-fighting gases are "transient" agents, unsuited to dealing with large 
open tires. As such, they are used in a secondary role. 
I)ry powder extinguishers are very effective in dealing with both open spill 
tires and enclosed compartment fires. Working in a similar manner to gaseous agents, 
they arc only effective whilst being applied, and leave the fire unprotected when 
application ceases. Powders suffer from the disadvantages that they tend to obscure 
the fire zone and may have severe choking effects on any survivors (Nash. 1975). 
2.4.6 Modelling, of Fires 
1 he inconvenience and expense of conducting full scale fire experiments have 
resulted in considerable effort being applied to the modelling of fires by 
computational means. Most accident fires are extremely complex in nature, containing 
many chemical processes and interaction mechanisms that are poorly understood. 
Their simulation therefore requires that many approximations and simplifications be 
ºnaulc in order for a tractable model to be derived. 
In most fire models, details of chemical reactions are left unrepresented and an 
aiwim y is formulated on a strictly physical basis. This treats the fire as being a form 
of "black box", defined purely in terms of its physical interactions with the immediate 
surroundings. Fire parameters are usually minimal, for example consisting of heat and 
smoke output levels, together with rates of oxygen and fuel consumption. Typically, 
fire growth characteristics are either assumed a priori or calculated from empirically 
derived relationships. 
Two types of approach have been adopted for the modelling of fire; zone models and 
field models. These differ primarily in terms of their resolution and degree of reliance 
on empirically derived approximation. 
tonal lire models have been developed directly from established traditional 
hand calculation methods (13RF, 1991). The geometry of the fire atmosphere is 
1 Defined as the ratio of the volume of the made up foam to the volume of the solution from which it 
was made. 
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represented by a small number oI, analytical i. ones, lot example the lire core, fire 
plume, smoke layer and free atmosphere. Interactions between runes and the resulting 
changes in their geometry are determined ü-oni semi -empirical physical 
approximations or from experimentally derived data. /, one models are dependent On 
prior assumptions 01' how it fire and its productions will behave. As such, they are 
limited to dealing with reasonably well defined situations, where fire hrliavio tie is 
likely to he consistent with previous experience and experimental linclings can thus be 
applied. Most Zone models therefore deal with fires in closed] comupartnients, where 
1-re plume and smoke layer relationships are well understood (%uko \\ski, 1978). 
The simplicity cif zone models enables them to be reaciiI) extended toi Consider 
niOrt' complex OCOn)ctry, such as it complete building, liar example (Cooper, 1988). 
This process can be further continued with the division OF r. oººes into snnallcr suh- 
zunes, to pro idle an increased resolution of* the lire Itni()til)llcrc, a technique used in 
the I)A('I IRI', aircraft cabin fire model (Poulio s, I986). Developments in computer 
technology have enabled the cliscretis, ºtion of the lire doºººcºin in ever higher 
resolutions and when Combined \\ith associated advances in ('0111pulatiolial Fluid 
Dynamics (('I"I)), this has lead to the estahlitihmrnt 01, icld nioclrlling, techniques. 
Hot smoke layer 
  
Fire 
II 
Enclosure 
geometry 
Figure 2.1__Zow and Field Rejweseti ationsof Fire 
Field modelling utilises lar fewer assumptions about the nature and behaviour 
oaf' lire products. It does this by avoiding resort, as far as possihle. to established 
experimental correlation and attempts toi return to first principal's toi solve the basic 
km s of' physics Ii>r a general lire domain (BRI':, 1991 ). The approach generally 
requires that the geometry of the pi'obleni be (iiscretisedi into, a grid of' snnaII elements 
or cells. Boundary conditions, together with theoretically dcrived rules of 
conservation and equivalence are used to set up a large mill lm. or mathematical 
equations. These are solved numerically by computer to establish a fiic solution. 
Field modelling techniques do not Irre-assume the nature oI' iire effects. This 
means that tlºe) have tue potential toi reveal new nicchanitiºns of fire behaviour that 
vvere prcv iuººsly unappreciated or only thought to occur in other contexts (Deane!, 
the principal limitation of the fidel modelling approach is in coýnipplexit)' 01' 
problem definition (I'huº»as, 195). It requires that lire scenarios are precisely defined 
in terms of, boundary conditions, chemical processes, physical properties, geometrical 
nme"sh, etc. This inb. rnmation is often unavailable or else impractical toi ; generate. 'I 'bus 
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(a) Zone Model (b) Field Model 
resort has to be made to simplifying assumptions, along the lines of zone modelling 
techniques. For this reason, field modelling has tended to focus on established fire 
problems, such as the spread of heat and smoke in enclosures, where the problem is 
concisely bounded and suitable experimental data is often readily available (Galea and 
Markatos, 1991). 
Another significant drawback of field modelling techniques in some contexts 
is that solution times are often measured in hours, rather than the seconds usually 
required by zonal methods. 
2.5 The Effects of Fire on People 
2.5.1 Fire Lethality 
Most accidental fires produce large quantities of heat, smoke and toxic gases. 
These three products are encountered in high concentrations in most fire 
environments, and each of them can represent a serious threat to human life. 
Accordingly, much research has been undertaken to investigate the lethality of fire to 
humans, mostly within the fields of combustion toxicology and physiology. 
Fire can be considered to affect people in three phases; firstly behavioural, 
followed by progressive incapacitation and finally, lethality., (Purser and Woolley, 
1983). It is pertinent to note that the nature of the influence of fire changes from being 
essentially psychological at first, through to being predominantly physiological as 
unconsciousness approaches. The existence of a complex "grey area" of behavioural 
and physical interactions during the process of human incapacitation by fire requires 
that interpretation of research findings should be subject to caution. 
Issues involving problem complexity can be addressed, in part, by the 
laboratory testing of animals. However, here researchers face difficulties of ethics, 
cost and applicability of results. Therefore, pathological evidence and the 
investigation of circumstances surrounding real fire casualties, particularly the 
survivors of serious smoke exposure, are used in addition to experimental research. 
Most fires deaths occurring in aircraft accidents are attributable not to bums 
and exposure to heat, but to the combined effects of toxic smoke products (King, 
1989). This stems directly from the fact that interiors of modem passenger aircraft are 
composed predominantly of synthetic polymeric substances, such as PVF, 
polyamides, epoxies resins, polyurethane and neoprene foams. When these materials 
are subjected to the effects of heat, they produce a complex mixture of volatile species 
and combustion products. These toxic gases and smoke are generated in large 
quantities by almost all types of fire and their effects can be highly lethal, even in 
modest doses. Consequently, research has been dedicated to quantifying and 
understanding the effects of combustion toxicity on both human physiology and 
behaviour. 
Much progress has been achieved in the investigation of fire lethality. 
Researchers posses a basic appreciation of how heat, smoke and toxic gases, when 
considered individually, constitute a threat to human life. However, current 
knowledge levels are still rudimentary in areas where different incapacitation 
mechanisms act in combination. There remains much progress to made in a hugely 
challenging field. 
S 
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2.5.2 Physiological Effects of Fires 
The primary products of fire are heat, smoke and toxic gases. Together, these 
three elements together form the total fire hazard, with its associated 'fire atmosphere. 
This fire atmosphere can have a wide ranging effect on people: - 
1. High ambient temperatures levels may result in serious burn injuries, 
especially to the respiratory tract. 
2. Smoke particles in the atmosphere restrict vision. 
3. Toxic and narcotic gases are usually present, causing rapid 
incapacitation and death. 
4. Ambient oxygen levels may be low, resulting in hypoxia induced 
behavioural changes and increased respiration of fire atmosphere. 
5. The presence of irritants causes painful effects to eyes, upper respiratory 
tract and lungs. 
In most fires, the effects of toxic and irritant gases, together with the presence of 
dense smoke particles are predominant. The synthetic materials commonly used in 
aircraft cabin fittings are capable of producing large quantities of highly, noxious 
smoke in a very short time. In some circumstances, this can result in complete 
incapacitation through the effects of severe irritation before other factors, e. g. heat 
exposure, narcosis or hypoxia, become significant (King, 1989). 
2.5.3 Origin and Nature of Fire Products 
(The following description is based on material published by the UK Building 
Research Establishment (BRE, 1985)) When polymeric materials are heated, a 
complex range of chemical products is usually formed. If these products are produced 
in sufficient quantities and ignited, flames and large quantities of heat result, making 
the process self-sustaining. In these conditions, gases temperatures of above 1000°C 
can be generated. Conversely, under some circumstances, -smouldering (non-flaming) 
combustion may be established. This process may take place in an atmosphere 
containing oxygen (thermal oxidative decomposition) or in an inert atmosphere 
(pyrolysis). The decomposition products of typical cabin polymeric materials' are 
summarised in Table 2.1. 
The presence of flames tends to destroy volatile decomposition products with 
the formation of a small range of simple combustion products, such as carbon 
monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (CO2) and water (H20). If nitrogen is present in the 
polymer, hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and ' oxides of nitrogen (NOX) may also be 
produced. In many cases, a similar range of these base products has been found to be 
produced from quite different materials, which simplifies the analysis of combustion 
toxicology significantly (Woolley and Fardell, 1982). 
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Elemental Example Pyrolysis 
Oxidative 
Decomposition 
Composition Materials Products Products 
CH polyethylene, hydrocarbons 
CO, hydrocarbons, 
polypropylene oxygenated species 
CHO wood, polyesters 
CO, hydrocarbons, 
oxygenated species 
as for pyrolysis 
hydrocarbons, CO, hydrocarbons, 
CHN polyacrylonitrile amines, amines, cyanides 
cyanides 
CO, hydrocarbons, 
CHNO polyurethanes cyanides, as for pyrolysis 
oxygenated species 
CHCI polyvinylchloride 
hydrocarbons, 
hydrogen chloride 
CO, hydrocarbons, 
hydrogen chloride 
phosphorus numerous 
and polymeric phosphorus and antimony containing products 
antimony materials 
Table 2.1: Polymer Thermal Decomposition Products 
The thermal decomposition of even a single material can produce a complex 
mixture of substances. The nature of these products can vary considerably with the 
prevailing combustion environment, with the concentration of gaseous reactants, 
ambient temperature and oxygen availability usually being highly significant. When = 
local conditions only provide sufficient oxygen for the partial reaction of gaseous 
species, incomplete combustion occurs. In these circumstances, decomposition 
products are not able to be fully broken down into simple base products and complex 
mixtures of relatively large molecules result. Low-oxygen combustion environments 
lead to organic compounds producing carbon particles and carbon monoxide, because 
complete oxidation to carbon dioxide cannot be fully supported. In consequence, 
incomplete combustion is usually characterised by high levels of smoke production 
together with the presence of low temperature yellow-orange flames. 
2.5.4 Fire Toxicology 
As a result of chemical studies of experimental fires and animal exposures to 
the thermal decomposition products from a wide variety of materials, two 
fundamental points have emerged concerning the nature of fire product toxicity 
(Purser, 1988): - 
1. Although thermal decomposition of a wide range of materials leads to 
the formation of a large number of complex chemical products, fire 
toxicity is dominated by the effects a small number of base products. 
2. Toxic effects are dominated either by a narcotic (asphyxiant) gas, such 
as carbon monoxide or hydrogen cyanide, or by complex mixtures of 
irritants. 
t, 
i 
I 
Narcosis is the oxygen starvation of the brain. Its effects are fairly predictable 
and they can result from the presence of a narcotic gas, high carbon dioxide 
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concentrations, or from'low ambient oxygen levels. The two most important narcotic 
fire products are carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide. 
A particularly dangerous characteristic of human narcosis is the relatively 
short transition time between near-normal behaviour and unconsciousness. This is 
because the body is able to adapt and compensate for limited doses, leaving the victim 
unaware. However, further exposure leads to a collapse of this defence mechanism 
and deterioration is rapid and severe. The symptoms of progressive narcosis are 
behavioural changes, such as lethargy or euphoria, followed by poor physical co- 
ordination, unconsciousness and death. 
Narcosis levels are quantified with the use of Haber's Rule, which states that 
the accumulated effective dose from a product is equal to its concentration multiplied 
by the exposure time (Hartzell et al., 1985). However, in the case of carbon monoxide, 
both inhalation and excretion by the lungs occur, and the' effective dose becomes 
dependent on the rate of uptake (Coburn et al., -1965). In aircraft fires carbon 
monoxide exposure times are relatively short (less than one hour) and the effects of 
excretion can be ignored, thus enabling Haber's Rule to be applied (Stewart, 1973). 
The effects of most narcotics acting in combination can be assumed to be linearly 
additive. This implies that the total accumulated dose is given by the' sum of the 
Fractional Effective Doses (FED's) for each individual product present. 
The effects of irritant fire products are less well understood and harder to 
determine than the effects of narcotics. During exposure, the most important form of 
incapacitation is by sensory irritation. This results in painful effects to the eyes, upper 
respiratory tract and lungs, but is unlikely to be fatal. These effects occur immediately 
and their severity is dependent on prevailing exposure levels, although a degree of 
adaptation can occur with continued exposure. Sensory irritants are classified by 
Respiratory Depression 50 percent (RD50) 'values, which the concentration of irritant 
required to reduce breathing rate of laboratory rodents by 50 percent. 
The second effect of irritants is acute pulmonary response, in the form of lung 
inflammation and oedema (fluid production). This reaction takes 6-24 hours to occur 
and it is the main post-exposure cause of fire deaths. The severity of pulmonary 
irritation response is dependent on accumulated levels of exposure. 
In complex atmospheres, as are likely to be encountered in aircraft fires, the 
effects of irritants appear to be considerably worse than predicted by the addition of 
individual components. This suggests that interactions or the production of short-lived 
chemical species with a very high irritancy potential may be occurring. 
2.6 The Evacuation of Aircraft 
2.6.1 The Fire Evacuation Problem 
The need for safe and expeditious movement of large numbers of people 
within confined spaces can arise in many circumstances (Fennel, 1988). In these 
situations, the efficiency of the evacuation process may often be dependent on the 
degree of co-operative and altruistic behaviour exhibited between participants, as well 
as the nature of the evacuation environment. History has provided many examples of 
how human tragedies can result when the movement of large crowds breakdown and 
panic behaviour ensues (Bryan, 1988). 
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The effects of fire usually serve ' to exacerbate difficulties in evacuation, 
blocking escape paths, reducing visibility, restricting aural communication, etc. Many = 
survivors of major fire accidents recount how the dangers of fire can develop in a 
latent manner, with the perilous nature of the situation not becoming generally - 
apparent until it was too late to take effective action (Fennel, 1988). These problems 
can rapidly transform a seemingly straightforward evacuation process in to. an 
extremely critical matter of escape and survival. 
The need for research into the safe evacuation of people from enclosed spaces. 
in fire situations is therefore readily apparent. In consequence, evacuations tests have 
been undertaken to investigate fire safety implications in widely differing contexts, - 
ranging from high-rise buildings, cinemas, museums and shopping malls through to 
undersea train-tunnels, passenger ships and aircraft. The results of many of these trials 
have not been publicly reported in detail, with the notable exception of the 
evacuations undertaken by the aviation industry. Presumably this is because the 
testing in other fields has been primarily concerned with the obtainment of one-off 
fires-safety certificates, rather than being formal research-investigations intended for 
industry-wide dissemination. Given that this thesis is concerned with egress primarily 
from aircraft, the lack of formally reported evacuation trials in other contexts need not 
be a matter of concern. However, contributions in experimental evacuation research 
from other industries could potentially provide a valuable supplement to the aircraft- 
specific testing that has already been undertaken. 
In addition to the experimental approach, the problems associated with large- 
scale evacuation of people has been investigated with the use of computer simulation 
programmes. Although work along these lines appears to have been initiated in the 
1970's, the computer simulation of evacuation has only become technologically 
feasible during the last decade or so. Unlike the work in experimental evacuation, 
computer evacuation models have been developed by the building industry as well as 
in the context of aircraft safety. 
2.6.2 Experimental Aircraft Evacuation Trials 
Many types of aircraft accident involve a high probability of a catastrophic fire 
occurring without the passengers necessarily being disabled by crash injuries. In these 
circumstances, it is imperative that the occupants of aircraft are able to evacuate 
themselves to safety in a short a time as is practicably possible. In order to ensure this, 
much research has been performed to investigate the problems encountered in aircraft 
evacuation. This work typically involves the use of actual aircraft, or at least high 
fidelity cabin mock-ups, together with large numbers of volunteers to perform the role 
of evacuating passengers. 
Formal evacuation safety standards are defined in the airworthiness 
requirements issued by the FAA and JAA (JAA, 1994). These certification standards 
apply to all large passenger aircraft in public service and stipulate the following: - 
"... it must be shown that the maximum seating capacity, including the 
number of crew members required by the operating rules for which 
certification is requested, can be evacuated from the aeroplane to the 
ground under simulated emergency conditions within 90 seconds. 
Compliance with this requirement must be shown by actual 
demonstration... " 
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It is obviously not feasible to reproduce simulate true "emergency conditions", 
including effects of fire, crash injuries and disorientation. However, efforts are made 
to incorporate some degree of realism by deactivating half of the total number of 
emergency exits. The disabled exits are distributed evenly along the length of the 
cabin and their locatto are' i6t indicated to the participants. It is the responsibility of 
the cabin crew to ascertain the serviceability of exits and redirect passengers 
accordingly. 
Additional realism is added to the 90 second trials by undertaking them in 
darkness, using only the emergency lighting provided on the aircraft, and by the 
distribution of loose articles, such as hand baggage, pillows, blankets, etc., throughout 
the cabin. i' r' 
- --`"Given the risk and unpredictability associated with the conducting of a live 
demonstration, manufacturers undertake preparatory trials in an attempt to identify 
and correct any problems that may be encountered in the one-off certification test. The 
results of these preparatory tests are not openly reported, as they represent 
commercially sensitive information in the highly competitive aircraft . sales market. 
However, because manufacturer evacuation testing is strictly oriented towards 
certification requirements, it would possibly contribute little additional information 
beyond the results provided by the actual qualification trials. 
Evacuation testing is notoriously expensive and difficult to perform safely. As 
a consequence, aircraft evacuation trials are only routinely undertaken by major 
manufacturers and a few specialist institutions, the latter usually acting under contract 
to national airworthiness authorities. Minor injuries are common, even when 
participants are instructed to behave in an orderly manner. The most serious incident 
to date occurred 1991, when one volunteer was paralysed and 46 others were injured 
during FAA certification testing of a wide body aircraft (Flight, 1993). The now 
paralysed woman tripped at a doorway and slid head-first down an escape slide, 
fracturing her neck. The 405-seat aircraft involved had failed to pass the 90 second 
evacuation test after two attempts. 
The use of emergency escape slides has always been problematic, with 
typically 5-6 percent of their users being injured on hitting the ground or when 
colliding with each other (Flight, 1992). To reduce these risks to the absolute 
minimum, cushioning mats and able-bodied helpers are placed at the bases of slides to 
aid evacuees in moving away promptly and safely. Since evacuation rates, in general, 
appear to be determined by conditions immediately inside exits, these obligatory 
safety precautions have no discernible effects on measured egress times. 
The mishaps surrounding the 1991 certification tests resulted in the FAA 
issuing new guidelines requiring that testing of escape slides be conducted separately 
from large-scale cabin evacuation trials. Certification trials now require passengers to 
vacate onto platforms at door level, with the allowable time being reduced from 90 to 
62 seconds'. The troubled wide-body aircraft was able to complete the revised test in 
56 seconds during 1992. 
In addition to safety problems, large-scale evacuation trials also present many 
difficulties from a purely experimental standpoint. Some of these include: - 
Reportedly, -15 seconds of this reduction is to take account of time previously required for door 
opening and slide deployment, with the remaining 13 seconds being attributed to the hesitation factor 
formerly encountered at the top of slides. 
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1. Large numbers of suitable people must be recruited to act as 
test subjects 
2. Repeatability of evacuation trial results maybe poor 
3. Test subjects have to be motivated to behave naturally 
4. It is difficult to represent the effects of fire in an adequate 
(and ethically acceptable) manner 
The evacuation research trials undertaken on behalf of national aviation 
authorities are rather different in nature from those performed in certification testing. 
Typically, research trials involve a smaller number of participants and are used ' to ' 
investigate specific issues in evacuation safety, such as the evaluation of new ideas or 
the refinement of current procedures. All tests are recorded in detail with video, 
cameras, allowing exit flow rates to be calculated and plotted against time. As the 
majority of the research is funded by public bodies, the results are openly published. 
The outcome of such testing can often provide the basis for modification of existing 
certification rules. Thus, there is usually a requirement for increased realism and the 
statistical significance of results to be demonstrated. The latter can be achieved by 
conducting multiple runs, usually backed up with the use of a control case. 
Some of the topics addressed by FAA and CAA evacuation testing include: - 
1. The effects of non-toxic smoke (Muir and Marrison, 1990) 
2. Influence of acoustic signals (Muir and Bottomly, 1992) 
3. Seating configurations adjacent to exits (Muir et al., 1989) 
4. The effect of passenger motivation (Muir et at., 1989) 
5. Influence of cabin crew behaviour (Muir and Cobbet, 1995) 
6. Escape of handicapped passengers (Blethrow et al., 1977) 
An innovative feature of some of these trials has been the stimulation of 
motivated behaviour in the participants. This has been achieved by the introduction of 
a cash bonus payment system, whereby those who are first out immediately receive a 
modest payment in reward. The effectiveness of the incentive on evacuee behaviour 
can be startling, with jamming, crushing and clambering over seats becoming 
significantly more prevalent (Muir et al., 1989). The character of the motivated 
evacuations corresponds well with the behaviour that occurs amongst passengers 
when cabin conditions are perceived to become life-threatening in real accidents. 
Paradoxically, pushing and jamming of passengers serves only to slow down the 
evacuation process. 
Other significant results provided by evacuation research testing include the 
demonstration of how critical bulkhead door widths and seating configuration 
adjacent to exits can be. Cabin safety regulations have been modified as a direct 
consequence of these findings. Recent work has also shown that assertive behaviour 
by the cabin crews can greatly increase exit flow rates beyond those achieved by 
undirected passengers (Muir and Cobbet, 1995). 
2.6.3 Evacuation in Smoke 
A limited number of trials have been undertaken to determine the effects of 
non-toxic smoke (Muir and Marrison, 1989). They have shown that, in general, 
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evacuation rates are slowed down and that rates of progress become more dependent 
on the width of passageways and seat spacing. Ethical constraints prevent trials from 
being undertaken with toxic smoke in the West. 
In contrast, work has been reported by An, in Japan, which involves the testing 
of, individual's response to the effects of irritant wood smoke (Jin, 1981; Jin, 1989). 
Two types of tests were tried; the first involved volunteers moving through a smoke- 
filled corridor to a door and the second required simple tasks to be performed whilst 
seated in a room with progressively increasing smoke density. Significant findings 
included: - 
1. Walking speed slowed when in heavier smoke densities 
2. Smoke tolerance was higher when subjects were familiar 
with their surroundings 
3. Males tended to feel physiological discomfort, whereas 
psychological discomfort was more dominant in females 
4. Smoke tolerance increased as subjects gradually became 
acclimatised to conditions with time 
2.6.4 Computer Simulation of Occupant Evacuation 
2.6.4.1 Background 
The limitations and expense associated with large scale evacuation trials have 
resulted in the development of a range of computer simulation models being 
developed to represent the evacuation of people. The discipline is still at a relatively 
early stage in its development, and much progress needs to be made, particularly in 
the representation of human decision making processes and behaviour, iýHowever, 
indications are that computer-based simulation of evacuation will complement and, in 
the longer term, potentially replace experimental evacuation trials ?)^ 
In general, computer-based evacuation research appears to be dominated by 
applications for the aviation and building sectors, with no work being located, for 
example, in the offshore, railway or shipping industries. A total of eleven evacuation 
models was identified, nine of which have been examined in detail. One of the 
excluded models is currently under development by the UK Building Research 
Establishment and forms part of an innovative fire risk assessment tool called CRISP 
II (Phillips, 1992). This work addresses the interactions between occupant behaviour, 
fire properties and building design in typical domestic house fire scenarios. 
Unfortunately, further details about the programme could not be released for 
publication at the time of writing. The two remaining evacuation models were only 
discovered at a late stage of the current research, and adequate information to enable 
their inclusion within the survey has yet to be acquired'. 
Brief descriptions of the eight evacuation models are provided in the 
subsequent sections, followed by a table summarising their main properties. 
I The two models in question are by Singh, under contract to Transport Canada, and by Marchant at the 
University of Edinburgh. 
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2.6.4.2 EXODUS ~`' 
This a prototype egress simulation that models the evacuation of individuals 
from an enclosure such as an aircraft, train or cinema type of building (Galea et al., 
1993). The path of each individual is represented by movement across a grid and the 
thermo-toxic effects of fire can also be accommodated. The programme core 
comprises five interacting components, modelling the local environment hazard and 
toxicity together with the passengers' movement, behaviour and attributes. EXODUS 
was originally built within the G2 expert systems software environment, but has been 
re-coded in C/C++. Key features of EXODUS include: 
" Comprehensive passenger characteristics, defined by 22 
physical and psychological attributes. 
" Hazard and Toxicity sub-models used to model thermo-toxic 
incapacitation. 
" Simple "nearest serviceable exit" escape strategy 
" Evacuee seat jumping capability 
2.6.4.3 STRATVAC 
This model is used to study escape strategies used by passengers evacuating a 
burning aircraft (Cagliostro, 1984). The movement of individual passengers across a 
grid is controlled interactively by test subjects. Passengers have identical 
characteristics and, once the evacuation is under way, - their view is limited to only 
their immediate environment. Movement conflicts can be resolved amicably or by 
gambling for a contested location. In addition to fire spread and ingress, cabin 
blockage resulting from debris can also be represented. STRATVAC is programmed 
in FORTRAN 77 and utilises dedicated graphics software. Key features of 
STRATVAC include: 
" Interactive control by test subjects 
" Random fire model 
" Evacuees restricted to localised view and have to remember 
overall cabin layout during evacuation process. 
" Random cabin and exit blockages used to complicate 
evacuation process. 
2.6.4.4 EVAC 
This model is intended to simulate certification evacuation trials from aircraft 
as opposed to actual fire evacuations (Parks and Ostrand, 1982). Passenger egress as 
individuals across a discrete grid, controlled by comprehensive decision models. The 
latter can take into account factors such as personal choice, established flows and 
attendant instructions. Performance fidelity is achieved by an explicit micro- 
modelling approach, i. e. evacuee attributes, movements and actions are modelled in 
detail. No facilities for simulating of fire or passenger incapacitation are provided. 
Key features of EVAC include: 
" Elaborate behaviour models for determining actions of 
individual passengers, e. g. fore/aft movement decision based 
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on boarding entry point, flow bias, exit proximity and queue 
flow rates. 
" Ability to resolve the effects of increments in detailed data, 
such as seat pitch, aisle width, visibility levels etc. 
" Model complexity results in sensitivity to random passenger 
input data. This leads to quasi-chaotic results, typical of real 
evacuation trials. 
2.6.4.5 TAKAHASIII 
Takahashi's model simulates orderly mass evacuations from multi-story 
buildings (Takahashi et al., 1989). Evacuees are assumed to move in a homogeneous 
ensemble which is modelled by a fluid flow analogy. Buildings are represented by a 
network of interconnected volumes, linked by flow controlling exits. A simple 
behaviour model distributes flows between multiple exits so as to achieve minimum 
escape times. The assumption of a low hazard level precludes the incorporating the 
effects of fire and evacuee incapacitation. Takahashi's model is programmed in 
FORTRAN, and includes the following features: 
" Unique fluid ensemble modelling of egress, which implies 
large numbers of evacuees and orderly behaviour. 
" Relatively modest computational requirements. 
2.6.4.6 EXITT 
This model simulates occupant decisions and actions in residential building 
fires (Levin, 1989). Evacuees are modelled individually and the building room layout 
is represented by nodes and linksr-. Evacuee behaviour is modelled by a relatively 
sophisticated set of heuristics, or"they can be controlled interactively by answering 
simple questions. Occupant charactcristicsare individually specified by seven 
coefficients. Their awareness, decision processes and egress are affected by smoke, 
noise and alarms. Escape route is deterrnýed by a shortest path algoritlun, with 
demerits for passing through smoke or' windQ\ws. The model is programmed in the 
BASICA language. Key features of EXITT include 
" Some unique behaviour models e. g. collection of infants and 
faster travel after encountering smoke filled rooms. 
" Ability to read Jn smoke distribution data and estimate 
physical and psyElhological impact. 
2.6.4.7 KOSTREVA 
Kostreva's model performs optimal path analysis of the evacuation of 
individuals from structures which are involved in fires (Kostreva et al., 1991). 
Evacuees are modelled discreetly and move across a network of nodes. Escape 
strategies are based on globally optimal egress paths and these are determined with 
dynamic programming techniques. Features such as blockages and variable link 
attributes, such as cost and traverse time, are incorporated into the model. Key 
features of Kostreva's model include: 
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" Global egress strategies that mimic intelligent decision 
processes. 
" Concept of an egress path composed of optimal links; the 
dynamic simulation environment means that optimal path 
may vary with time. 
2.6.4.8 EXIT89 
This is an evacuation model that simulates the egress of a large population of 
individuals from a high-rise building (Fahy, 1991). Evacuees are treated individually 
and they are moved through a network, of rooms, corridors and stairwells. All 
evacuees possess identical (average) attributes and no attempt is made to model 
behavioural variations. Egress strategy is based on 'a shortest route rule base, with a 
strictly local perspective. Exit paths can be blocked by smoke and egress speeds are 
defined as a function of crowding levels (based on body size) to reproduce queuing 
effects. The EXIT89 model is programmed in FORTRAN. Key features of EXIT89 
include: 
. ,T " Limited treatment of evacuee characteristics enables large 
populations and complex buildings to be modelled. 
" Ability to read in smoke distributions from external 
programmes and estimate psychological impact. = 
6.4.9 Colt Vegas 
Vegas is an evacuation model developed within the Superscape Virtual 
Reality (VR) package by Colt Virtual Reality Limited (Potel, 1995). Evacuees are 
represented as individuals, with a pre-defined set of attributes and general evacuation 
scenarios can be constructed. Additional functionality can be created by the use of an 
in-built scripting language. Key variables can be altered interactively, for example 
altering the width of an exit, and the effects displayed immediately. Very simple rules 
are used to determine people's behaviour; such as a fixed speed of movement, and 
assignment of pre-determined actions according to the output of a random number 
generator. 
The effects of fire are incorporated with a zonal model for heat and smoke flux. To 
run in real time, in concert with the evacuation simulation, the fire domain is split into 
five zones. Fire parameters are limited to starting location, size and rate of growth, all - 
pre-determined from user input. 
Vegas possesses an impressive three-dimensional graphic display of the evacuation 
process, which allows the user to view simulation from any vantage point or as one of 
the participants. As a consequence, however, only can only up to about 500 people 
can be modelled reliably. Key features of Vegas include: - 
Powerful spatial modelling and graphics display capabilities. 
" Very basic evacuee behaviour and fire spread modelling. 
" Use of script language to enable programming of new -; 
functionality. : 
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2.6.5 Computer Evacuation Models: Conclusions 
These eight examples illustrate some very diverse and original approachesýto 
evacuation modelling. However they all possess, in some form or another, the 
following features: 
1. A spatial representation of the enclosure(s) being evacuated. This may 
consist of a discrete grid, a network, a numerical array or simply just a 
bounded area. 
2. A clock or other similar type of time accounting system, to give the 
simulation a time-scale. 
3. Some form of heuristic evacuee decision making process. This might 
range from interactive instruction from test subjects through to an 
evacuee simply aiming for the nearest available exit. 
4. Representation of evacuees' physical and/or psychological 
characteristics and status. These may be averaged from sample 
populations and a "fluid" analogy adopted or the attributes of 
individuals may be modelled discreetly using a "ball-bearing" approach. 
5. The existence of an objective or end status e. g. the achievement of 
egress or incapacitation. 
A summary of the features of each model is provided in Table 2.2: - 
Simulation Scenario Spatial Evacuee Decision Thermo-toxic 
Model Type Representation Representation Stimuli Incapacitation 
aircraft/ 
individuals on global 
EXODUS 
general 
discrete grid grid nodes (one + yes 
per node local 
individuals on global 
STRATVAC aircraft discrete grid grid nodes (one + no 
per node local 
individuals on global 
EVAC aircraft discrete grid grid nodes (one + no 
er node) local 
TAKAHASHI building 
volume lume 
continuous 
network 
fluid ensemble local no 
EXITT building node individuals on 
global 
+ yes network grid nodes local 
KOSTREVA building/ node individuals on global no general network grid nodes 
EX/T89 building node individuals on local no network grid nodes 
VEGAS general free space 
individuals in 
free space 
local yes 
Table 2.2: Classification of Evacuation Simulation Models 
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The variety of techniques used to implement -features within the simulation 
models are extremely wide-ranging. Some of the differences in method are obviously 
due to the dissimilar contexts in which the models were formulated. For example, 
some of the simulations are optimised to represent thousands of individuals moving 
on different floor levels, whilst others model tens of evacuees passing through a single, 
constriction. However, even when taking such variations of scale into consideration, 
there appears to be no historical consensus on the best modelling strategy for the 
analysis of complex evacuation problems. The different approaches possess relative 
strengths and weaknesses and none appear to be satisfactory in all aspects. 
An essential feature of any simulation model is an adequate representation of 
the evacuees' decision making processes. It is perhaps in this area that the models 
described show the greatest diversity in methods of implementation. However, it 
possible to categorise the evacuee decision processes as being in response to local 
stimuli, global stimuli or to a combination of the two. The evacuee decisions are 
inevitably based on heuristics or rule sets, which can be built up to the desired level of 
sophistication. The formulation of the evacuee rule sets is of fundamental importance 
as they determine the dynamics of the simulation. It is apparent that the reduction of 
an evacuee's complex behavioural characteristics to numerical models is conjectural 
process. It was noted that several of the authors acknowledged the tentative nature of 
their evacuee rule sets and they therefore ensured their accessibility for modification, 
"to accommodate new information as it emerged". 
It is thought that the best overall approach for the construction of an 
evacuation model is to combine features and ideas drawn from the various simulation' 
models that have been examined. The accurate simulation of evacuation from an, 
aircraft cabin necessitates that two conflicting requirements be met. Firstly, the,, 
complex and confining nature of the cabin geometry requires that spatial resolution be 
sufficient to represent the effects of critical gaps and distances. Secondly, the scale of. ,-, - the simulation problem will vary enormously; for example, a small commuter aircraft : 
type might perhaps only have 30 individuals onboard, whilst potential future large" 
aircraft designs could well carry 800-1000 passengers. The compromise in this 
conflict of resolution and scale is a key characteristic in all of the models surveyed.. 
The emphasis of some of the modellers lies on the formulation of a relatively i 
simple programme within a commercial simulation package. This allows rapid re- 
coding and experimentation to be used during the development process, thus helping 
to nurture ideas and progress in the short term. However, the model will inevitably be 
subjected to the constraints of its development environment, unless it is translated into 
a standard computer language at a later stage. Also, there appears to be a danger from: 
the use of superficial modelling practices. These can occur when, for example, the 
restrictions of in-built routines force compromises in functionality to be made, or 
when excessive emphasis is placed on graphical display. 
Three of the programmes surveyed incorporate some form of mechanism for, 
representing the effects of fire on evacuation process. In each case the associated fire' 
model is either extremely basic, or else is provided by an external programme. 
However, the value of adding dynamic influences to the evacuation is still clearly, 
demonstrated by the increase in realism provided; for example, exits becoming 
unusable and evacuees slowing down. The integration of more advanced types of fire 
models would necessitate the use of a modular programme construction, as proposed 
by Phillips (Phillips, 1994). 
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2.7 Evaluation of Research: Implications for the Study 
2.7.1 Breadth and Balance of Air Safety Research 
The work surveyed in this chapter has been extremely varied, covering 
numerous and often highly contrasting aspects of aircraft safety. Research ranges 
from, for example, combustion chemistry on a molecular level through to full-scale 
crash tests with remotely piloted aircraft, complex numerical modelling and 
evacuation trials with live volunteers. 
In spite of the diversity of the work covered, it is possible to identify 
essentially three basic approaches to the undertaking of research. These involve 
historical, experimental and analytical methods, respectively. To date, work involving 
the first of these approaches has tended to been Undertaken independently from that in 
the second and third categories. Knowledge obtained from past accidents appears to 
be regarded as useful background information for those concerned with air safety, but 
historical findings have rarely been utilised directly in scientific research. 
In constrast, experimental work and analytical methods have proven to be 
highly complementary in many disciplines. In combination they can be used to 
calibrating and extrapolating the other's findings, respectively. These dual-approach 
techniques have been utilised widely in areas such as crash, fire, toxicology and 
evacuation analysis. 
As well as comparing different modes- of research, it possible to examine 
progress made across different aspects of aircraft safety. Essentially, most of the work 
described in this chapter can be placed somewhere within main three fields of safety 
analysis. These are aircraft crash, fire and evacuation research, respectively. Figure 
2.2 illustrates an interpretation of the progress that has currently been made across 
these three areas. Note that a continuous horizontal axis has been used to depict 
HIGHLY 
DEVELOPED 
(large body of expert 
knowledge exists) 
Level of 
Research 
RELATIVELY aircraft fire testing evacuation UNDEVELOPED crash & trials & (little or no established analysis modelling simulation theory In the area) 
Field of Research 
Figure 2.2: Aircraft Safety Research: Current State-of-the Art 
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"different" fields of research; this should be taken to imply that all areas of aircraft 
safety overlap to a significant extent. The vertical axis in the diagram plots the level of 
development (not necessarily equal to levels of progress) to o have been made' across 
each field. It can be seen that three main areas of specialisation occur in safety 
research, centred on crash analysis, fire testing/modelling and evacuation 
trials/simulation, respectively. Progressively lower levels of expertise have: been 
attained in each of these three areas; however crash research appears to be highly 
specialised (i. e. a narrow peak) in comparison with the greater level of diversity found 
in fire research. Significantly, relatively little overlap was perceived as occurring 
between these two areas. A greater, but arguably, still insufficient degree, of 
collaboration appears to exist between combustion, human toxicology and evacuation 
analysis. 
2.7.2 Implications for the Current Programme of Research 
Study of the work that has been undertaken in aircraft safety indicated that 
substantial levels of scientific expertise exist in the analysis of crash effects, . 
fire 
development and passenger evacuation. However, researchers tend to focus-their 
efforts in only one of these areas and then attempt to attain a very high level of 
knowledge. Inevitably, this has lead to voids or gaps in understanding in areas that do 
not lie within established scientific disciplines, or cannot be dealt with adequately 
with established methodologies. In contrast, findings established by historical analysis 
usually span all features of accident safety, as they occurred in the past. Information 
obtained by this route is, however, less precise and of a lower level than that provided 
by scientific studies. 
Ideally, research into almost any aspect of accident safety needs to combine 
knowledge from both scientific and historical sources, wherever possible. This is then 
likely to lead to the production of more balanced and widely applicable findings. 
However, the task of linking two seemingly dissimilar types of information together 
appears to be far from straightforward, in either specialised areas of safety research or 
more general accident survivability studies. As a result, currently, very few examples 
of these types of approaches to research exist and suitable methodologies have yet to 
be established in any area. 
The current thesis seeks to demonstrate that is feasible to address these 
perceived deficiencies in existing aircraft safety research. In Chapter 3, it is described 
how the research objectives associated with this task came to be derived. The means 
by which a suitable research methodology was formulated is also recounted in detail. 
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Chapter 3: Derivation of Research Methodology and 
Objectives' 
3.1 Background to the Research 
3.1.1 The Formulation of a PhD 
This chapter describes the initial planning of the research programme. This 
process essentially consists of finding a researchable subject, deciding what form the 
study should take and what type of research issues it would attempt to address. The 
outcome of these decisions would determine the overall nature of the investigation 
and establish a fundamental structure for the research activities, around which a more 
detailed work plan could be developed. 
Ideally, the formulation of research in this context should be governed by 
academic considerations alone. However, external factors can often serve to-limit or 
oppose academic intent and thus shape the research process to some extent. These 
external influences might include personal relationships, the nature of the research 
environment, political influence, practical resources and financial constraints. In the 
case of this thesis some of these factors were significant during' formulation of the 
research plan. Specific examples include focusing the study. area down from fire 
safety in general to fire safety in transport aircraft, and the adoption of a holistic as 
opposed to a specialist perspective. The first section of the chapter therefore outlines 
the background to the research and details some of the more important external 
influences and their effects on the overall direction of the programme. 
The process of focusing the research topic was an essential prerequisite before 
the establishment of individual work tasks and the undertaking of more detailed 
studies could begin. However, the initial planning stages were of fundamental 
importance and needed to be undertaken with the possession of a reasonable level of 
knowledge in the chosen field of study. Therefore, a significant part of the literature 
survey was required to be in place before any real consideration could be given to 
choosing the research approach. In consequence, the survey of existing research could 
be viewed as occurring in two phases, with the decision-making and structuring of the 
current study occurring around the period of transition between the two stages. 
The arguments developed in this chapter were formed predominantly as a 
product of the preliminary phase of the literature survey. This part of the literature 
study was deliberately made wide-ranging in extent, in an attempt to provide an 
overview of all areas of potential interest in the field of fire safety. It was regarded as 
an exploratory exercise, branching out as far as was possible in order to establish the 
limits of existing knowledge in the various disciplines of fire safety. As will be seen 
later in the chapter, this initial research included a limited survey of historical records, 
in addition to scientific and technical reports. With this information in hand, it was 
then possible to plan the nature of the current undertaking, providing justification for 
the chosen approach, where necessary. This resulted in the formal adoption of a 
computer-based simulation methodology. 
The second phase of surveying existing research was more involved than the 
preliminary work. It partially consisted of acquiring more detailed knowledge in 
specific areas of research that were judged to be most relevant in the context of 
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aircraft fire safety. A general overview of this information was provided in Chapter 2. 
Many aspects of the surveyed fire safety research are also given more --detailed 
consideration in the context of Chapter's 5-8, where they were of direct relevance in 
the process of constructing the computer model. A substantial proportion of the 
second phase of the literature survey was dedicated to building a database containing 
historical information about past aircraft accidents. The need for this information and 
its significance is explained later in this chapter. The collection, sorting and analysis 
of this data is recounted in Chapter 4. 
The literature survey inevitably formed an ongoing activity throughout the 
course of the research programme. However, it was found that most of the material 1- 
describing scientific and technical research was obtained during the first 12 months of 
the study. In comparison, the compilation of the accident database was a `more . 
prolonged process and it was not drawn to a close until the third year. 
The final section of the chapter deals with the development of the research 
objectives. These consist of a series of statements describing the focus of the research 
and how it would be structured to achieve the overall research aim. As outlined in the 
next section, the research objects formed the basis from which detailed research 
design was begun. 
3.1.2 The Research Design Process 
It was a requirement of the department in which the study was being, 
undertaken to carefully structure the design of the research and to justify the choice of 
approach at each stage of the process. In addition, the provision of a contribution to 
knowledge had to be demonstrated and the work placed in context within existing, 
work in the field. In short, the fulfilment of these requirements would ensure that 
justification could be provided for what the research topic should be, why it should be 
studied and how it would be investigated. 
More formally, this process involves choosing the topic area to be studied, -'the 
formulation of the research aim, selection of a suitable methodology and designing the 
research objectives, leading to detailed research design. For convenience, this 
procedure can be represented as part of a linearly structured plan of activity (See 
Figure 3.1). However, it should be appreciated that, in practice, many of these tasks 
Researchable Requirement 
Literature Problem for Contribution 
to Knowledge 
The Research Aim 
Research Objectives 
Choice of Methodology 
Detailed Planning 
IHIV 
Figure 3.1: The Research Design Process 
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were carried out in parallel and that significant backtracking may occur. 
The first task to be performed in the initiation of any research undertaking is to 
identify a researchable problem and establish the aim of the activity. Often, the 
research aim will be communicable in the form a succinct statement, perhaps 
consisting of only a single sentence. The intended aim in most research is to address a 
perceived problem. The latter can be obtained from study of the area under 
consideration and the identification of a difficulty, requirement or issue that requires 
addressing. Closer examination of the matter and analysis of the -requirements of 
potential knowledge customers will enable a researchable problem to be formulated. 
In the educational context, a requirement will also exist to demonstrate the originality 
of the research. This means that if the chosen topic has already been addressed by 
other researchers, then the proposed study must differ from the existing work in some 
significant aspect. In most circumstances, genuine research will never be precisely 
duplicated by independent workers. Thus, in practice, the requirement for original 
work serves mainly to prevent plagiarism or mis-attribution. 
An additional academic consideration is the necessity for research to provide a 
tangible contribution to existing knowledge. This implies that awareness of work 
published in the area of study must be demonstrated and the new contribution placed 
into context within the field. This commonly involves the identification a particular 
gap or apparent inadequacy in the information provided by existing literature and 
shaping of the research programme to fill any associated need. 
A prerequisite for establishing the aim of a research project is an appreciation 
of relevant work undertaken by others in the area of activity. A comprehensive 
knowledge of existing research is particularly essential in an academic environment, 
where a sufficient degree rigor must be exhibited throughout the programme. This 
information is usually obtained from the undertaking a survey of published research 
literature and from previous experience in the area of research. The literature survey 
can never be completely exhaustive and results obtained will be dependent on the 
environment and facilities in which it is carried out. The survey will often form an 
ongoing part of the research effort, in order to include new material as it becomes 
available. It may often be necessary to cover new subject areas, if changes in the 
direction of the research dictate. 
An integral part of the survey process is the preliminary interpretation of the 
gathered material and drafting of summary notes for future reference. Much of the 
information obtained will inevitably prove to be redundant in the longer term, but it 
may be difficult to gauge the true significance of a piece of work until a reasonable 
amount of knowledge has been accumulated. It is therefor common practice to 
instigate some form of cataloguing system to enable convenient return to the required 
material. 
The research objectives stipulate how the aim of the work will be achieved. 
They consist of series of statements that describe the following: - 
" The nature of the research problem and what aspects of it 
will be considered 
" The main tasks that need to be performed to achieve the 
research aim 
" The research methods or other techniques that will be used 
" The envisaged outcome or product of the research 
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In essence, they provide a summary plan for structuring of the research activities, and, 
in an academic context, the objectives of what the contribution to knowledge will be. 
3.1.3 Personal, Departmental & Institutional Influences 
The starting point for the entire study was the acceptance of a preliminary 
research title, provided by the research supervisor. This title was probably intended 
more for administrative convenience than academic purposes. As such, it', was 
considered to be unrestrictive and open to different interpretations: - 
"Dynamic Fire Risk Assessment Models Applied in Transport Contexts" 
The title was to be regarded as essentially provisional in nature and open, to 
modification, as changes in the emphasis of research dictated. In consequence; - the 
only historically imposed constraint on work content was the requirement to study 
some aspect of fire safety in a human context. Initial discussions quickly resulted a' 
consensus that the research should be undertaken with a comparatively holistic 
outlook, rather than from, say, a purely scientific, sociological, or policy-study 
standpoint. This decision was a consequence of the multi-disciplinary nature of the 
research department in which the work was to be undertaken and the preconceived 
intentions of the author. , The term "Risk Assessment Model" can possess quite different connotations in 
some specific circumstances (Hall, 1991). However, for the purpose of formulating 
the research, it was provisionally regarded as implying that some form of qualitative 
risk analysis would be undertaken. Definitions of risk are numerous, but in the context 
of fire safety, the following seems reasonable (Hall, 1992): - 
"Risk refers to (a) a type and degree or peril or loss; (b) the 
relative likelihood or degree of probability that that type and 
degree of danger or peril or loss will occur. "S 
Thus, risk assessment is usually associated with some form of probabilistic analysis, 
where rational objectivity or judgement may often be iised to supplement incomplete 
physical knowledge (Kersken-Bradley, 1988). Once the work had been planned in, 
detail, it still appeared to remain comfortably within the scope of risk assessment 
modelling. In consequence, the term was retained for the duration of the study. 
A significant early influence on the emphasis of work was the existence of two 
departmental contacts working in the field of fire safety. These researchers were. 
involved in the development of computer-based fire risk assessment models' and the 
undertaking of applied aircraft evacuation research2 respectively. For reasons that will 
become apparent, both of these contacts were destined to become advisory supervisors 
for the study. The two advisors, together with the personal supervisor, formed a 
supervisory panel that was to be convened as required thought out the duration of the 
work. 
The availability of information at the host institution together with- the 
aeronautical background of the author quickly resulted in attention being focused on 
W. G. B. Phillips, formerly of the Fire Research Station, a department of the Building Research ; 
Establishment, UK. 
2 Professor H. C. Muir, head of the Department of Applied Psychology in the College of Aeronautics, 
Cranfield University, UK. 
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the topic of civil aircraft fire safety. It was recognised that many of aspects of research 
undertaken within seemingly specialised fields of fire safety are applicable in a more 
general' context. For example, initial reading revealed that there appeared to many 
similarities between fire safety in air transport and the equivalent problems faced in 
the rail, offshore engineering, shipping and building industries. This suggested that 
knowledge could potentially be obtained from many branches of fire safety research, 
even though the thesis would be constructed within the context of aircraft safety. The 
corollary of this was that the work could probably be adapted or extended to address 
fire safety concerns in other industries. 
These considerations resulted in a distinct honing of the research emphasis, 
coalescing it down from "transport contexts" in general to specifically the study of 
transport aircraft. In order to reflect this clarification in emphasis of the study, and 
acknowledge the possession of a degree of ownership by the author, the research title 
was changed to: I 
"Probabilistic Risk Assessment Modelling of Passenger Aircraft Fire Safety" 
It will also be noted that the term "dynamic" modelling had been dropped. The phrase 
could have implied the adoption of a particular type of approach in the research 
department in which the work was being undertaken. Its omission was therefore a 
precaution to avoid any confusion or mis-representation concerning the nature 
research methodology, which still had yet to be determined. 
It was not known during the preliminary stages whether or not a computer- 
based methodology would be adopted. Both the host department and three supervisory 
staff were remarkably well balanced between those who were conversant in use of 
computer modelling techniques and those who were not. The author was proficient in 
the use of a number of complex computer-based applications and operating systems, 
but had no recent programming experience. 
For these reasons, the possibility of constructing a computer-based model was 
regarded strictly as an open option during early discussions with supervisory staff. 
However, ideas evolved quickly during the initial stages of the literature survey, when 
the complex nature of events occurring in aircraft accidents became apparent. The 
importance of dynamic interactions between aircraft occupants, fire and the local 
environment clearly required their representation within any meaningful form of 
safety analysis. This form of modelling could only be undertaken with the use of 
computer-based approach. 
3.2 Initial Findings Obtained from Accident Data and Statistics 
3.2.1 The Relevance of Historical Information 
Those concerned with understanding the issues surrounding fire safety in 
commercial passenger aircraft have two main resources of information with which to 
work from. These consist of historical data about events that have occurred in the past 
and the findings obtained from scientific investigation. The two classes of material 
yield quite different, but complementary, types of information. Historical data can 
generally be taken to be authoritative but it is essentially qualitative in nature and may 
often be incomplete. In contrast, scientific work is undertaken systematically and 
provides quantifiable results. However, scientists are usually forced utilise an artificial 
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experimental environment, which can make it difficult to guarantee the ; wider 
applicability of the findings obtained. 
The potential value of historical information, in the form of accident reports 
and studies based on past accidents, was realised at an early stage of the investigation. 
Initially, the historical material was regarded as merely an adjunct to the scientific 
literature, rather than as an integral part of the survey. However, as the',,. work 
progressed, it became apparent that both the quality and the extent of available 
historical information could be sufficient enough for the material to form a major 
contribution to the basis of the research. 
If accident data were to constitute a significant part a the study, it had to be 
accepted as being a reliable and authoritative description of actual events-This 
requires that the publishers of historical documentaries have access to adequate source 
material and evidence with which to work from. In addition, this information must be 
gathered, interpreted and reported in an objective and factual manner as possible..:. =. ` 
An obvious difficulty in undertaking studies into accidents and human 
disasters in general is that the nature of these events precludes a researcher from 
obtaining contemporary evidence during the actual occurrence of an incident. 
Scientific research into safety matters attempts to reproduce particular aspects of an 
accident in a controlled and reproducible manner, enabling them to be closely studied 
at first hand. These experiments can therefore be seen to constitute a form a secondary 
evidence. In contrast, those responsible for the investigation of accidents can usually 
gain access to physical evidence at the scene. This primary material has to undergo an = 
interpretation process, yielding information of a secondary level. Equivalent 
secondary material may often be obtained in the form of witness statements and 
through the experimental reconstruction of key events. A report resulting from such an 
investigation must therefore be regarded as a product of secondary evidence. 
The objectivity of an accident report is very difficult to either prove'' or 
disprove conclusively. In the context of aircraft accidents, perhaps the most reliable 
indicators are the independent nature of many of the investigatory and reporting 
organisations, such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the US National 
Transportation Safety Board and the UK Air Accident Investigation Branch. In many = 
instances, nations with an underdeveloped air transport infrastructure have chosen to 
delegate responsibility for the investigation of an accident to a team of professionals 
brought in from another country. This arrangement has been provisioned for by 
amendments to the ICAO Chicago Convention and it has often proven beneficial for 
all involved parties. 
In some countries, the production of accident reports is overseen by 
government or other official bodies, whose members may posses a vested interest in'. ', 
the outcome of any investigation. This can often lead to undue influence being exerted 
to exonerate the role played by official institutions, procedures and standards. 
However, in most circumstances, it is plainly apparent when the content of a report- 
has been prejudiced, usually from the character of the conclusions and the absence of 
any constructive recommendations. In these circumstances, a thorough investigation 
of the accident is rarely undertaken and this usually results in little or no useful fire .; 
safety information being provided in the report. 
The reporting of accidents in many countries falls somewhere between the two 
previously described extremes. Often, genuinely good intention appears to exist, but 
inexperience, probably in combination with a lack of resources precludes the 
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undertaking of a detailed inquiry. Correspondingly, 'reports tend to focus on factual 
aspects obtained from the scene of the incident, with less emphasis on the analysis and 
interpretation of events. In spite of these limitations, reports falling within this 
category can provide much valuable material for the safety researcher. 
These interpretations were formed from the study of a limited number of 
accident reports in the exploratory stages of the study. However, it was clearly evident 
that the quality and integrity of information provided in many of the accident reports 
would be sufficient enough to justify its use as a substitute for primary data. It was 
also apparent that, given the limitations of scientific techniques, much of the 
information provided by the historic material would be impossible to obtain by other 
means. 
Where information concerning past accidents was possible to obtain by 
scientific investigation, the historical material could also form an invaluable basis 
from which the contributions of scientific research could be evaluated. 
3.2.2 The Construction of a Preliminary Accident Database 
In the initial stages of collating information from past accidents it became 
apparent that the order of several hundred reports could be of direct relevance to the 
study fire safety. These particular accidents would need to be systematically identified 
from thousands of incidents available on record, according to a set of suitably defined 
criteria. It was not possible to decide what these criteria should be for the first phase 
of the data gathering, as ideas concerning the direction of the study had still to be 
developed. The preliminary phase of the information gathering process was therefore 
split into stages, each of which served to progressively cut down the number of 
accidents under consideration and make the analysis more manageable. 
The first stage would log the two thousand or so incidents that involved public 
transport aircraft and were probably serious enough to warrant further investigation. 
These would then be subjected to a second round of more detailed analysis, in order to 
ascertain the role played by fire in each case. This acceptance/rejection process would 
then lead to the formation of a database of key accidents where fire was definitely 
known to have played a significant role. Tlie preliminary information gathering and 
classification process is detailed in the first section of Chapter 4. 
The purpose of the initial survey was to find out exactly what type of events 
typical aircraft fire accidents were likely to involve. The intention was to obtain a 
basic familiarisation with all aspects of the accidents and then identify particular areas 
which might be suited to some form of analysis. At first sight, the preliminary 
accident data survey could be regarded purely in terms of an information gathering 
exercise. However the activity was undertaken in parallel with the literature survey 
and considerable effort was taken to compare and relate the information being 
simultaneously accumulated in the two areas of work. The data gathering was thus 
equally important for its contribution to the gestation of ideas and formulation of the 
overall research programme. 
A key requirement for the preliminary data gathering work was to provide 
some basic statistical information about historical events. The nature of accidents was 
found to vary enormously from incident to incident, and completely different 
outcomes could often result. Specific classes of accident might require the use of a 
different type of approach in their analysis, or perhaps be of only marginal 
significance. It was therefore required to obtain some indication of the relative 
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frequency at which different types of accident had occurred in the past and prioritise = 
them in terms of fire safety issues. This would enable the emphasis of the research to 
be shaped by historical precedence, rather than it being left exclusively to intellectual 
propensities. 
As the information gathering progressed, it was discovered that many accident 
reports provided significant quantities of information in the format of a descriptive 
narration. Most of this material was essentially qualitative in nature and would not be 
amenable to a straightforward coding or classification process, making it impossible 
to represent it adequately within the preliminary database. However, provision was 
made for several lines of descriptive notes to be included in each accident record, thus 
enabling key anecdotal information to be recorded where necessary. 
In consequence, it was appreciated that the second phase of the accident data 
gathering and analysis would have to include provision for dealing with an 
appreciable quantity of descriptive evidence. In addition, another adjustment that 
could be usefully incorporated into the second stage would consist of recording the 
sources from which information was derived. This would be of potential value in 
resolving situations where contradictory evidence had been obtained from multiple 
sources. 
In summary, the preliminary data survey had covered the order of 10,000 
recorded incidents listed in the World Airline Accident Summary (CAA, 1996) since 
1948. Of these, approximately 2000 were considered to be of potential relevance to 
study and their details were recorded for further analysis. Once the objectives and 
bounds of the research had been formulated, it was possible to reduce this number 
down a total of around 200 incidents for inclusion in the second stage of the survey. ý t 
3.2.3 The Nature of Past Aircraft Fire Accidents 
The preliminary survey of aircraft accidents revealed a large quantity ý of 
information, whose content would provide important implications for deciding the 
overall direction of the research. It should be noted that, at this early stage, the 
recorded details were relatively basic, much of the data was still incomplete and little 
statistical analysis had been undertaken. However, ample evidence had been obtained 
to provide some fundamental pointers as to what real aircraft accidents were likely to 
involve. These were of sufficient importance to justify the time spent data on the data 
gathering effort and reaffirm the need for undertaking the second phase of the accident 
data survey. 
The most important revelation to be provided by the preliminary data was that 
the vast majority of aircraft fire accidents involve some form of impact. The term 
"crash" was regarded as being generally unsatisfactory or even misleading when used 
to describe many types of incident. Therefore, as explained in Chapter 4, two terms 
were formally introduced in order to classify the occurrence and nature of aircraft , "crashes". These were significant impact and significant fuselage disruption 
respectively. The probability of an aircraft accident involving a significant impact is 
shown in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2: The Occurrence of Impacts in Fire Accidents 
It was apparent that approximately ninety percent of the fire accidents had, involved a 
significant impact. Effectively, this can be taken to mean that nine out of ten 
survivable fire accidents will result in the aircraft no longer being supported by its 
undercarriage. It also was apparent, even from incomplete figures, that passenger 
injuries and fatalities in most fire accidents were just as likely to be caused by the 
effects of impact trauma, as from the effects of fire. These early indications were 
reinforced by results obtained in the second stage of the past accident survey. 
3.2.4 The Diversity of Aircraft Fires 
The nature and characteristics of fires in the surveyed accidents showed 
significant variation from one case to another. For example, on some occasions very 
severe fires have occurred, but they have had comparatively little effect on the aircraft 
occupants. Conversely, in other instances, smoke products produced from relatively 
small fires have killed hundreds of passengers. The diversity in effects resulting from 
different types of fire clearly indicated the need for some form of classification 
process. This was necessary in order to identify the differences and commonalties 
between various fire types and establish how these related to the different types of 
outcomes that had been, observed. In the early stages, every accident fire appeared to 
be almost completely unique, but as the data gathering progressed, some common 
themes emerged and meaningful categorisation thus became possible. 
The first distinction to be made was between those fires that had originated inside the 
pressure shell of the fuselage and those that started outside the aircraft. (These two 
categories will subsequently be refereed to as internal and exterior fires respectively. ) 
The dangers associated with these two classes of fire are often quite different in 
nature, as outlined in the following paragraphs. 
Internal fires are most likely to start in galleys, toilet compartments or 
underfloor cargo holds. Minor galley fires are relatively common, but because of their 
generally minor nature and the close proximity of cabin staff, they have rarely 
constituted a serious threat to life. However, when an internal fire starts in an 
inaccessible and/or unattended part of an aircraft in flight, the consequences can be 
very serious indeed. The danger stems from the fact that the occupants of the aircraft 
are trapped with the fire inside a sealed structure and have to remain so until the 
aircraft can be safely landed. Internal fires have produced some catastrophic results in 
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the past, but they are comparatively rare, comprising only seven percent of the total 
number of accidents surveyed. Improvements in operating procedures and ' the 
introduction of automatic fire detection and suppression systems in the last decade 
appear to have largely nullified the threat posed by internal fires. 
The vast majority of aircraft accidents surveyed involved exterior fires. These 
differ from interior fires in that they usually involve the aircraft's fuel and therefore 
tend to grow rapidly to a larger size, with more destructive consequences. Many 
accidents involve the aircraft being subjected to a severe impact, resulting in the , 
rupturing of wing fuel tanks and large quantities of fuel being released. If the fuselage 
structure also happens to have been severely damaged, fire can easily ingress into the 
passenger cabin, often with horrific consequences. For convenience, it was decided to 
group these types of incident under the label of impact fires. Development of the 
precise definition of this term is expanded upon in Chapter 4, but for the preliminary 
survey work, it was taken to mean the presence of a fire in the immediate vicinity' of 
the passenger cabin together with the existence of significant tearing or open 
dislocation of the cabin structure. The implication of this definition is that impact fires 
are able to enter the cabin rapidly and thus pose an immediate threat to the aircraft 
occupants. This was found to be the most common type of exterior fire, occurring in 
just under half of the surveyed accidents. } 
In circumstances where the fuselage has remained essentially intact after an 
accident, a limited degree of fire protection may be afforded by the cabin structure. In 
many instances fire can occur close to an aircraft's fuselage and this measure of 
protection can be critically important in increasing time available for the egress of, 
passengers. However, flame penetration may usually be expected to occur in a matter _ 
of minutes, or even within thirty seconds in the most extreme circumstances. 
Nevertheless the presence of fuselage structure appeared to make these fires 
sufficiently different from the impact fires to merit separate classification. The title 
burnthrough fires was chosen. This term implies the existence of a fire in close 
proximity to the aircraft fuselage and which is able to penetrate through to the 
passenger cabin before the aircraft can be completely evacuated. Burnthrough fires 
were found to be the second most important category of fires, occurring in over one 
quarter of the incidents. 
In many of the less critical accidents, fires have been centred away from the 
occupied sections of the aircraft, or else they have required significant time to grow to 
a potentially hazardous size. This can often allow for all surviving occupants to reach 
safety before the fire effects become potentially dangerous. This fire type was given 
the label external fire, signifying that no substantial burnthrough into the cabin area 
occurred during the course of the evacuation period. External fires have been 
comparatively rare, only constituting around one in ten of the accidents surveyed. 
The categorisation of each of the accident fires into one of these four classes 
was initially perceived to be reasonably straightforward process, as the four classes of 
fire had been defined so as to be quite distinct. However, upon detailed examination, a-- 
significant proportion of the accidents could arguably be assigned to more than one 
category. Thus it became apparent that, in some instances, distinctions would not " 
necessarily be clear-cut. This change in perception prompted a re-examination of the . 
relationships between the internal, impact, bumthrough and external fire categories, 
which yielded a rather surprising result. Ironically, it was concluded that the 
association between the fire "categories" should really be regarded as a continuous 
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distribution. This can be illustrated by considering each fire type in terms of the time 
required for the fire to ingress into the passenger cabin. 
Impact fires are able to gain access around about the time that aircraft comes to 
a stop, because of extensive fuselage destruction. For the sake of argument we can 
define this point as time zero. In-flight fires usually have to endured for several 
minutes before the aircraft can land; thus they can be interpreted as occurring at some 
negative time before the aircraft stops. In contrast, burnthrough fires require a short 
(positive) interval before they can enter the cabin area. By definition, external fires 
take significantly longer to penetrate, or else may not be able to penetrate at all. The 
latter case may be interpreted as corresponding to an infinite burn-though time. This 
argument is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
time of fire ingress after aircraft comes to a stop 
Figure 3.3: Fire Classification as a Function of Ingress Time 
In spite of this re-appraisal of the fire classification process, the identification of four 
fire categories was still considered to be a valuable first step in the analysis of the 
historical information. Perhaps the greatest single contribution that it would make was 
to reveal the fact that undertaking an adequate analysis of aircraft fire safety would 
need to involve far more than merely the study of fire. 
3.2.5 Implications for the Modelling of Aircraft Fires 
Initial impressions gained from the historical data suggested that the diversity 
of the characteristics present in each of the four types of accident fire would make 
their analysis difficult. Ideally, a single general model would need to be formulated, 
able to deal with all types of aircraft fires in a consistent manner. Alternatives to this 
included the creation of a family of specialised models, each addressing a specific 
type of fire scenario, or else restricting the study to consider only one particular class 
of fire. The universal fire modelling approach was thought to be the most appealing of 
the three, but it was not immediately obvious if it would be feasible to achieve. In 
consequence, considerable thought was applied to identifying the most important 
aspects of accident fires and determining how they might contribute to occupant 
fatalities. This effort represented an attempt to return to the absolute fundamentals of 
the fire survivability problem and establish whether or not any substantial common 
links existed between the various types of fire accidents. 
As has already been seen, the first step in the analysis of the accident fires had 
been to classify each of them into one of four categories. This inadvertently led to the 
discovery of the first conceptual link between the surveyed fires; their consequences 
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can, to a large extent, be characterised in terms of the time required for ' ingress of fire 
into the cabin. 
The value of this finding was threefold. Firstly, it encompassed all types of fire 
with a single-dimensional parameter (fire ingress time, measured from the point at 
which the aircraft comes to a stop). Secondly, this variable was known -to 
be 
reasonably straightforward to ascertain for most incidents. Finally, because-the 
parameter provided classification on a continuous scale, it would be innatelytmore 
suited to describing those "crossover" accidents that did not fit cleanly into discrete 
categories. 
Another, rather more obvious, feature shared by all the accidents was ° the 
significance of the fire size. If all other parameters are held constant, the larger, the 
fire, then the more serious its effects would be on potential survivors. This statement 
is deceptively simple; however, in order to make quantitative use of it, we need to 
know precisely just what makes one fire larger than another. In this context, fire "size'. ' 
should perhaps be taken to mean some undefined measure of the rate of output of the 
three main products of fire, i. e. heat, smoke and flame. These fire properties. are 
difficult to measure in closely controlled experimental conditions, and practically 
impossible to quantify accident situations. Even if precise information about heat, ', - 
smoke and flame production is obtained, it is not known how these characteristics 
should be combined to produce a single measure of fire size. 
To avoid these inherent difficulties in measuring fire size, most fire 
experiments utilise some form of standard fire source. These are intended to produce 
reasonably consistent quantities of fire products and be straightforward to replicate. 
Typical examples of standard fires include a domestic armchair, a rectangular pool of 
kerosene, oil/gas burners, or cardboard box loosely filled with cotton rags. In large . 
scale aircraft fire safety experiments, the most common types of standard fire source 
are rectangular pools of aviation grade gasoline or kerosene (e. g. JP-4, or similar). 
This is presumably because most aircraft fires predominantly involve spilt fuel, in 
their early stages, at least. The particular advantage of using a pool fire analogy is that 
it allows for the effective size of a fire to be specified in terms of its ground area. For a 
rectangular fire, this means the provision of length and width, or, in the case of a 
circular analogy, simply a fire radius. 
Although this solution to the problem of quantifying fires has been developed 
for the purposes of undertaking fire experiments, it was thought to be of potential, use 
in the analysis of aircraft accidents. It was considered that many reports contained- 
enough information on the size and effects of the accident fire to enable a reasonable 
estimate of an equivalent pool fire size to be made. This would probably enable most 
of the incidents involving exterior fires to be quantified with of a logical and 
consistent measure. However, the pool fire analogy is not applicable to the cases of, 
internal fire, where the source is most likely to consist of interior furnishings and/or 
cargo. Given that internal fires represented only seven percent of the surveyed 
accidents and appeared to be becoming increasingly rare, they were thought to 
represent a low priority. Internal fires were therefore regarded as special cases, that 
would have to be addressed with a different type of fire model. 
The study of research literature indicated that large-scale experimental fire 
tests always involved fully developed pool fires of a fixed size. However, information 
about past accidents suggested that the development characteristics of real fires were - 
usually markedly different from those of the test fire cases. Aircraft fires generally do 
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not grow rapidly to a fixed size and remain centred in one position; rates of growth 
and direction of spread often differ considerably from incident to incident and 
emergency services usually intervene. No information on these aspects of accident 
fires could be located in the literature and it became increasingly apparent that the 
issue would require addressing. Significant attention was therefore applied to studying 
the problem of the fire growth, spread and extinguishment. 
In terms of accident survivability, we are concerned with the preservation of 
life and it is this time history of a fire during the period of evacuation from the aircraft 
that is of primary importance. Where surviving occupants have been unable to 
extricate themselves, they have usually succumbed to the effects of the fire, either 
during, or soon after the evacuation period. This then naturally leads to the concept of 
a survival window, i. e. the existence of a short period of time after the occurrence of 
an accident during which potential survivors possess a reasonable opportunity for 
escape. Historically, this period has typically ranged from one to five minutes, 
although much longer intervals have been required in a few instances. 
The fact that we are only interested in the characteristics of accident fires 
during a relatively short survival window has two important implications. Firstly, 
most fires tend to change size significantly during their first few minutes. For 
example, where impacts produce fuel misting, a large and immediate "fireball" 
generally subsides into a smaller steady state conflagration. Alternatively, in cases 
where the fire might initially be quite small, progressive leaking from ruptured fuel 
tanks can often result in steady growth of a fire. This implies that aircraft fire 
accidents must be considered as dynamic events, undergoing significant changes in 
nature within short time intervals. 
Also, a short survival window implies that the intervention of emergency 
rescue services may not have a major role in reducing the number of casualties in 
most accidents. This conclusion was reached after careful study of historical events; 
the initial data survey indicated that, the arrival of emergency services on the scene 
occurs, on average, about three minutes after an aircraft comes to a stop. If an 
additional minute elapses before effective fire-fighting begins, then often little can be 
done to help survivors in critical situations. Typically, after a few minutes most 
passengers will either be safe or already well beyond help. Trapped survivors have 
tended to struggle out unaided, or else be unconscious and/or inaccessible and thus 
likely to succumb in a very short time. 
In comparatively rare instances, a fire, can require a significant time'to become 
established after an accident occurs. Emergency rescue services are often then able to 
play a valuable role in expediting the evacuation process and maintaining the 
availability of escape, routes. However, aircraft can still be destroyed by fire several 
minutes after having been safely evacuated. This has occurred even when substantial 
numbers of fire-fighting appliances have been in attendance and such events illustrate 
the scale of the problem in dealing adequately with a large scale aircraft fire. 
The decision was therefore made that it would be possible to ignore the effects 
of emergency, intervention in aircraft fire accidents, at least for a first level of 
approximation. This would allow for a considerable degree of simplification to be 
achieved, in that occupants could be treated as self-rescuing and fires could be 
assumed to behave as if they were unregulated. The latter point was especially 
valuable in that it allowed for the utilisation of a substantial body of research 
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undertaken into quantifying the properties of large open hydrocarbon pool fires 
(Mudan and Croce, 1988). 
If this conclusion seems in any way controversial, then it should be 
appreciated that other researchers have reached the essentially the same verdict; "In 
the case of a severe spill fire, the study showed that an equipment response time of 60 
seconds or less is required to produce a reasonable probability of rescue" (Chicarello 
and Shpilberg, 1976). Subsequent discussions held with specialists in the fire safety 
industry have served to confirm these findings. - 
In summary, this section has described the development of ideas concerning 
the modelling of aircraft fires, based on the interpretation of past accidents. Although 
the fires were initially perceived as being both extremely diverse and complex, ' an 
understanding of the fire problem was gradually developed. This was achieved by 
identifying some key aspects of fire survival and using these to unify the analysis of 
past accident fires. In effect, this meant that the most important differences between 
fires in past accidents could be quantified in terms of three variables. These are: - 
1. The position of the fire : _.. 
2. The time required for ingress of fire into the cabin 
3. The size of the fire during the evacuation period 
The interpretation of aircraft fires in terms of these parameters would also facilitate 
the use of a pool fire analogy for modelling the vast majority of accident fires. Much 
information is available on open pool fires, obtained from both experimental research 
and theoretical analysis; thus this is the most obvious modelling approach to adopt. 
It was observed that the development of accident fires was often very dynamic 
in nature and this would have to be represented in the fire analysis. Also, it was found 
that the intervention of emergency fire-fighting services rarely played a significant 
role in fire survival during the critical first few minutes of an accident. These 
considerations suggested that a comparatively simple zonal model, incorporating 
dynamic growth behaviour, would be best suited for the analysis of aircraft fires. 
3.2.6 The Importance of the "Total Accident Scenario" 
The analysis of historical data showed just how diverse many aircraft fire 
accidents could be. This was not realised immediately because, at first, attention was 
confined purely to examining the fire survival aspects of each incident. Thus, the 
scope of the analysis was restricted to ascertaining the physical attributes of each 
accident fire and determining how these affected survivors attempting to evacuate 
from the aircraft. However, as the analysis progressed, it became apparent that far 
more background information was required in order to characterise the nature of the 
fire survival problem in many of the accidents. Relevant features could potentially 
include the aircraft type involved, the nature of the accident site, weather conditions, 
evacuation details and the consequences of any crash that might have occurred. 
Consider, for example, details of the three incidents listed in Table 3.1. The 
information provided has been taken directly from the results of the preliminary 
accident survey and describes three accidents that occurred within a period of 18 
months during 1984-85. Note that the basic scenario appears to be very nearly 
identical in each case; all three incidents involved the same aircraft type, included an 
emergency evacuation in the presence of large scale burnthrough fire and were caused 
by a catastrophic engine failure whilst the aircraft was on the ground. 
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Date Aircraft Type Location Killed injured OK Fire Type Site Notes 
Calgary Engine failure on ground. Fuel tank 840322 B-737-200 (Canada) 0 1 119 Burnthrough taxiway penetrated; rapid 
fire. Evacuated through 
all 4 rhs & front Ihs exits In -3mins. 
Douala #2 engine failure during taxi. Fuel tank 
840830 B-737-200 (Cameroon) 2 0 116 Burnthrough taxiway punctured & fire followed. Evacuated in 
-90s. 
Manchester 
#1 engine failure on takeoff & fuel tank 
850822 B-737-200 (UK) 55 15 67 Burnthrough taxiway punctured - aborted. Evacuated through fwd doors & rhs overwing exits In 210s. 
Table 3.1: Three Aircraft Fire Accidents 
However, in spite of these striking similarities, it can be seen that three very different 
outcomes resulted in each case. The first incident produced only one serious injury; 
two fatalities occurred in the second case and the final accident involved 55 deaths. It 
should be noted that in all cases, casualties were due entirely to the effects of fire. The 
contrasting fatality rates occurred for very basic reasons; however these reasons are 
not readily apparent from inspection of the rudimentary information gathered in the 
preliminary accident data survey. It was therefore obvious that the risk-assessment 
modelling task was going to involve significantly more work than had originally been 
anticipated. 
The highlighting of these inadequacies in the preliminary data analysis lead 
directly to the concept of a total accident scenario being formulated. This was defined 
as consisting of "the combination of all accident parameters and circumstances that 
significantly influence the survival prospects of accident victims". The past accident 
data that had been obtained up to this point clearly suggested that the performing of a 
satisfactory risk-assessment study would need to involve the analysis of these total 
accident scenarios. This information should describe precisely how and why aircraft 
accidents result in casualties, rather than just indicating what has occurred, when, and 
where. Without this level of knowledge, it would be very difficult to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of the many critical features that determine fire 
survivability in these events. Specialised studies can be performed on specific aspects 
of aircraft fire safety, but the results obtained from these endeavours then have to be 
placed into the context of real events if they are to be of significant value in policy 
formulation. 
These considerations implied a need to establish the details of the total 
accident scenarios for all the incidents collated in the preliminary survey database. 
The emphasis of this requirement lay with the gathering of significantly greater 
quantities of descriptive material, in order to provide a more detailed understanding of 
the incidents. This, then, constituted the primary justification for undertaking the 
second round of accident data gathering and analysis. Before this work could 
commence, it was first necessary to decide precisely what categories of additional 
information would be required and how they should be organised. It was stated 
previously that detailed interpretation of the accident fires had already been 
undertaken, as part of the fire classification process. Three other aspects of the 
accidents were identified for treatment in an equivalent level of detail. These were 
general scenario details, the effects of crash impact and the evacuation of survivors, 
For example differences in wind conditions, rate of fire spread, passenger behaviour and passenger 
familiarity with the location of emergency exits. 
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respectively. The remainder of this section discusses these information categoriesal d 
provides the reasons why they were considered to be relevant to the study .' The 
organisation and recording of this information in the second phase of the accident data 
survey are detailed in Chapter 4. 
In some instances, seemingly minor details can have a major influence the 
outcome of aircraft accidents. Consider, for example, the growth in size of a pool fire. 
This usually be governed by the type of terrain present at an accident site; fuel can 
easily spread to cover large areas on a concrete runway surface, but will quickly be 
absorbed by a ploughed field. Alternatively, if an aircraft happens to crash into a built- 
up area, unusual ventilation effects, heat reflection and the combustible remains, of 
buildings may sometimes serve to exacerbate fire development. There have been 
many cases in which circumstances similar to these combine to produce unusual or 
unexpectedly severe fire effects. Therefore, an attempt was made in the second phase 
of data gathering to note any details or general aspects of the accidents that might 
have had a significant effect in determining fire lethality. This information "often 
included the following items: - 3. _x 
" Local weather conditions at the time of the incident 
" Type of terrain present at the accident site 
" Quantity and type of fuel being carried 
" Accessibility of the aircraft wreckage 
" Prevailing wind speed and direction _. , 
Given that the role played by these features in the development of fires is, in many 
cases, poorly understood, their inclusion in the survey was thought to be justified even 
if their relevance could not be directly ascertained. 
An attempt was also made to record some other miscellaneous items of 
information. These included the type of flight involved, time of day, light conditions 
and a brief synopsis of events, together with the reported cause of the accident. In the 
latter case, causal details were not expected to contribute significantly to the study of 
fire safety. Nevertheless, this information was valued because it helped to portray a, 
more complete picture of events occurring in the accidents. 
It has already been shown, purely from the fire classification analysis, that the. 
survival prospects of passengers involved in a fire accident are closely related to the 
structural integrity of the aircraft's fuselage. Thus, when the cabin structure has been - 
severely ruptured or dislocation of the fuselage occurs, survivors have a significantly 
higher chance of succumbing to the effects of fire. This implies that the consequences 
of severe impact damage may be just as important as the effects of fire in determining 
fire survivability in many incidents. Thus, it was judged that the role of impacts in 
aircraft fire accidents warranted further investigation. 
As well as structural damage, impact forces can produce a host of other 
dangerous effects. Typically, these include the blocking of emergency exits, 
displacement of cargo and baggage, significant quantities of debris, loss of cabin 
lighting and seat failures. Most crash accidents also involve large numbers of 
occupant injuries and fatalities which occur as a result the effects of impact trauma. 
Thus, it was apparent that information was needed in order to clarify what proportion 
of fire accident fatalities could be attributed to the effects of impact forces. This was 
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obtained by summing the fates met by the 19,405 accident victims accounted for in 
the preliminary database. The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 3.4. 
Seriously Impact 
Injured Fatalities 
12% 16% 
Estimated figures 
for survivable 
turbine-engined 
airliner fire 
ý 
WA 
Fire Fatalites 
accidents 1958- 17% 
1994. 
Unharmed or 
Minor Injuries Cause of Death 
44% Unknown 
11 %v 
Figure 3.4: Casualties in Aircraft Fire Accidents 
It can be seen that the average survival rate in past aircraft fire accidents is around 56 
percent. Significantly, deaths are almost equally as likely to result from impact trauma 
as from the effects of fire. Note also that serious injuries occur in only 12 percent of 
those involved, which suggests that vast majority of occupants either escape from the 
aircraft safely, or else they tend to die from the effects of their injuries. 
Two interesting points arise from these statistics. Firstly, on average, at least 
56 percent of people involved in the accidents have successfully escaped from the 
aircraft, usually within 2-3 minutes of it coming to a stop. This means that most 
survivable aircraft fire accidents will have involved some form of large-scale 
emergency evacuation. 
It is also apparent that impact deaths occur almost as frequently as fire deaths. 
It must therefore be assumed that many of the serious injuries result from the effects 
of impact forces. In addition, many of those succumbing to the effects of fire are 
likely to have been previously incapacitated through serious impact trauma injury. 
These injuries, incapacitation and deaths resulting from impact forces must be 
considered in any form of aircraft fire safety analysis. 
The process of passenger evacuation also plays a critical role in most aircraft 
fire accidents. It has already been pointed out above that because, on average, over 
half of an aircraft's occupants are likely to escape without serious injuries, emergency 
evacuations have occurred frequently in past accidents. However, hidden in these 
figures is the frequency at which seemingly benign situations rapidly degenerate into 
desperate struggles of life and death. Indeed, it is not uncommon for passenger 
incapacitation and deaths to occur within two or three minutes of a serious 
conflagration breaking out. Historically, in past accidents, 20-25 percent of passengers 
have probably succumbed to the effects of fire in this manner. 
Rates of passenger egress can vary widely from incident to incident. For 
example, in the three Boeing 737 accidents examined earlier in the section, evacuation 
times ranging from 1 V2 to 3'/2 minutes were achieved. Reasons for this diversity in 
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performance can be difficult to ascertain,. as a large number of factors are usually 
involved. Some of the most prominent of these include: - . r' 
" Passenger attributes and behaviour 
" Configuration of the aircraft's cabin 
" Availability, usage and effectiveness of emergency exits 
" Rapid degradation of the cabin thermo-toxic environment 
" Actions of the aircraft's crew members 
" Consequences of any crash impact 
Given the prominence of occupant egress in the overall fire survival process, it was 
contemplated that as much information as possible would need to be gathered in this 
area. Many of these aspects are addressed in accident reports under the heading of 
"Survival Aspects". However, this information was, in most cases, descriptive, in 
nature, sometimes incomplete, and often too volumous for straightforward . 
incorporation into a computer database. This implied that such data would be difficult 
to analysis in a systematic manner and integrate, where applicable, into a quantitative 
safety analysis. 
However, in spite of these difficulties, it was " thought essential that a 
comprehensive understanding of the evacuation aspects of the fire accidents be 
obtained. This could only be achieved with the possession of a convenient and 
consistent collation of the all the acquired information. Thus, the second phase of 
information gathering and analysis included the preparation of summary descriptions 
detailing evacuation and survival aspects for each of the incidents on record. 
In summary this section has described how many features of aircraft accidents 
combine to determine the number of lives lost due to the effects of fire. Nominally 
similar accidents may result in highly contrasting fatality rates, as a result of 
differences in key survival aspects. These effects are often abstruse and can be 
encountered in crash, fire, evacuation or more general aspects of an accident. It was 
thus concluded that, wherever possible, more detailed information should be obtained 
for each of the incidents listed in the preliminary database. This would enable "Total 
Accident Scenarios" to be formulated and ensure that all relevant safety aspects were 
integrated within the safety analysis. 
These conclusions were to hold some important implications when interpreting 
the contributions to have been made by scientific research in the field of aircraft fire 
safety. Some of the issues involved will now be examined. 
3.3 A Re-appraisal of Fire Safety Research 
3.3.1 The Interpretation of Scientific Work 
The undertaking of the historical survey provided a thorough appreciation of 
the events to have occurred in past aircraft fire accidents. However, in order to 
construct a meaningful risk assessment model, it was required to combine this . 
knowledge with additional contributions from scientific fire safety research. However, 
before this would be feasible, had to be ensured that the information obtained from 
experimental and theoretical activities would be compatible with historical events. 
This could only be achieved by re-examining the research to have been published by 
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the fire safety community in light of the conclusions reached in the preliminary 
accident survey. 
It was possible to interpret the research undertaken by fire safety research 
community from two distinct perspectives. Firstly, the scientific work could be 
interpreted purely in its own right, without reference to its practical application or 
relevance to past events. The validity of results then has to be judged on a self- 
contained ý and essentially scientific basis. Significant findings can then be 
incorporated into a safety analysis verbatim in the form of self-contained "black-box" 
mechanisms, or alternatively, just used to provide a generic insight into real-world 
processes. 
Alternatively, contributions made by scientific research could be assessed in 
the wider context of actual aircraft accidents. This involves the appraisal of a work's 
utility in terms of its degree of correspondence with real events and practical 
relevance to matters of fire safety, in addition to 'its scientific integrity. The 
consideration of all three of these aspects constitutes a challenging test that has only 
been passed in a few select areas of safety research. However, in fairness, it should be 
pointed out that these criteria are far more wide-ranging than the limited contexts 
discussed or envisaged by most safety researchers. If a piece of research is found to be 
satisfactory in terms of realism, relevance and scientific rigor, then its findings 
obviously have the potential be integrated into a safety analysis at a fundamental 
level. In such circumstances, scientific knowledge could be expected to play a very 
substantial role in contributing to the basis of a risk assessment process. The 
assessment of scientific fire safety research using these two levels of appraisal will be 
related in the following two sections. 
3.3.2 Evaluation of Research in a Scientific Context 
Most of the research undertakings to have been analysed were probably 
intended to contribute to fire safety research on a purely scientific basis. The first 
point to be made is that, as far as it was possible to judge, published findings were 
probably scientifically valid in all cases. However, this does not necessarily imply that 
they could be incorporated directly into an analysis of aircraft fire safety. Reasons for 
this are numerous and diverse. In general they include the restricted scope of 
individual studies, incompatibility of results obtained across different disciplines and 
inherent limitations in experimental and theoretical methods used. 
Traditionally, the scientists and engineers involved in the research activities 
examined have trained and worked within a single specialised discipline. This can 
often lead to under-emphasis of the role played by factors that happen to fall outside 
the investigator's area of expertise. Alternatively, the significance of these parameters 
can be acknowledged, but then their values prescribed arbitrarily or determined by 
experimental capabilities. A prominent example of this has occurred in the fire testing 
of materials, where "Most presently available methods are deficient in not providing 
sufficient heat flux and in not providing one-dimensional heat f ux. " (Hilado, 1985). 
Similarly, when compiling and evaluating data on past aircraft accidents, statisticians 
are often forced to shape and interpret information in order to make it compatible with 
formal methods of analysis. This may involve the over-simplification of complex 
relationships, the omission of descriptive, "noisy", statistically insignificant, or other 
difficult data and the practice of "data dredging". As a result, the true diversity of a 
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problem may go unappreciated, key inter-dependencies can be missed or, conversely, 
spurious relationships warranted undue attention. 
In such circumstances, complacency can sometimes result. For instance, until 
comparatively recently, strength requirements for passenger seats were determined 
primarily through the application of engineering "judgement". However, . as - 
knowledge of human survival capabilities in severe decelerations has become more 
widespread, anatomical considerations and dynamic behaviour have come to dominate 
impact testing of aircraft seating. This has resulted in the imposition of far more 
stringent passenger seat strength requirements. 
Several branches of fire safety research have only been established or only 
risen to prominence comparatively recently. These new disciplines may well 
eventually make valuable contributions towards the improvement of safety standards 
in the future. However, in some cases, the true role of the research needs to be 
established and much groundwork put in place before significant achievements can be 
made. These facts may not always prevent unrealistic claims being made about current 
capabilities in developing areas of research. Consider, for example, the use - of 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) for the modelling of fires'. The technology of 
CFD is approaching maturity in some other engineering applications, but the adequate 
simulation of a typical aircraft fire remains beyond current capabilities. A contributory 
reason for this is that the direction of fire modelling has largely been predetermined 
by the availability of software capabilities established and optimised in other fields of 
CFD. Thus, fire modellers have always been forced to make many approximations 
and restrict the application of their codes to unrealistically simplistic fire situations. 
These facts may not always be openly acknowledged in the reporting of the work. ,I In fairness, it should be pointed out that considerable advances have been 
made in the computer modelling of impacts and large-scale structural deformations. In 
many areas, developments in dynamic and non-linear methods have greatly reduced or 
even eliminated the need for experimental impact testing. 
The surveyed research literature encompassed many diverse aspects of aircraft 
fire safety. Consequently, it was found a wide range of different research approaches 
and methodologies were used and a number of different scientific disciplines were 
involved. This obviously enables investigative techniques to be matched to the 
particular needs of the research in question, but may sometimes lead to the creation of 
gaps or incompatibilities in knowledge where areas of study overlap significantly. An 
example of this may be seen in different approaches adopted by experimental 
psychologists and computer modellers when analysing aircraft evacuations. With 
social scientists, the emphasis of research lies with interpreting interactions between 
behaviour patterns, local environment and personal characteristics of evacuees. Trials 
are usually recorded on video in order to obtain a complete illustrative record of , activities, rather than just to facilitate the timing of discrete events. Generally, 
descriptive observations tend to feature just as prominently as measured evacuation 
rates in the reporting of results. 
In contrast, computer scientists have treated the process of passenger egress in 
terms of precise micro-analysis of events and their timings. This necessitates that the 
complexities inherent in human movement and behaviour be reduced to simple 
As opposed to combustion modelling -a specialised branch of CFD dealing with the controlled 
combustion of fuels in engineering applications, such as engines, furnaces, ovens, etc. 
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mathematical relationships. Diversity in human characteristics can be incorporated by 
choosing passenger traits from suitable probability distributions. Emphasis lies 
predominantly with the quantification of evacuation dynamics, rather than with the 
obtainment of an increased understanding of human behaviour. 
These contrasting. approaches of analysing problems encountered in the 
evacuation of aircraft make for an interesting comparison. However, the task of 
integrating and applying the work of the two schools is far from straightforward. The 
primary difficulty is that experiments do not deliver results directly suited to 
computational analysis and that no convenient interface appears to exist between the 
two. Thus, for example, computer modellers have yet to represent collective 
behaviour or deal adequately with more nebulous psychological interpretations. 
Correspondingly, the social scientists have rarely quantified their results in a form 
compatible with analysis by, computer simulation. If some form of synthesis is to be 
achieved, then either traditional boundaries within the two fields need to be expanded 
until overlap - occurs, or suitable linkages must 
be forged by inter-disciplinary 
specialists. 
This example of how different disciplines can possess dissimilar outlooks 
when working in the. same area of fire safety research is by no means unusual. It can 
also be argued, for instance, that equivalent differences exist between -experimental 
fire testers and computational fire modellers, or between materials combustion 
researchers and combustion toxicologists. . 
It was revealed in a significant proportion of the research publications that 
currently established experimental methods are unable to deal adequately with many 
of the more complex phenomena encountered in the field of fire safety. Practical 
difficulties can often be encountered in the following areas: - 
" Recording of certain types of parameters 
" Maintaining control over the test environment 
" Dealing with time dependent or random factors 
" Establishing representative test conditions 
" Ensuring that ethical constraints are satisfied 
In many cases, more straightforward experimental errors can be dealt. with during the 
processing of results. However, it is often necessary to add, modify or remove test 
constraints in order to obtain a tractable experimental procedure that is capable of 
providing meaningful or repeatable results. Sometimes, this may lead to pertinent 
aspects of the subject under investigation being masked or their influences being 
modified in some, way. Parameters dealt with in this way are usually those that are 
either unpredictable or else difficult to control; for example weather, people and fire. 
Thus, an applied researcher is usually forced to make a compromise between 
experimental fidelity and practicality in the design of research. Deliberate over- 
constraint appears most likely to be applied in experiments involving significant 
safety issues and high costs; such as in full-scale aircraft fire testing and passenger 
evacuation trials. 
More generally, undue reluctance can sometimes be shown for dealing with 
probabilistic, time-dependent and other "difficult" or inconvenient parameters. These 
can often be unnecessarily reduced to average, steady-state or discrete values, with the 
loss of potentially significant information. Examples of these parameters include the 
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fluctuation of flames, wind, dynamic impact loads and the diversity of materials 
typically involved in cargo fires. 
In conclusion, it is apparent that, within its terms of reference, the scientific 
research surveyed has made many valuable contributions to the study and analysis'of 
aircraft fire-safety. However, even within well-established disciplines, significant 
challenges still remain to be overcome in almost all branches of research. This derives 
from the fact that aircraft fire accidents generally involve many complex, stochastic, 
and extreme phenomena that are not readily amenable to experimental analysis. -In 
some instances, specialists have been shown to be reluctant to consider pertinent 
aspects of a research problem that happen fall outside their area of expertise. 
From a wider perspective, the task of integrating work undertaken across .a 
range of disciplines also appears to be substantial. Even where no gaps in coverage 
exist between related subject areas, contributions from adjacent field of research may 
not be compatible with each other. Much gap filling and cross-interpretation is needed 
before experimental research can begin to provide a more complete picture. 
3.3.3 Compatibility with Historical Events 
If findings obtained from safety research were going to play a substantial role 
in the risk analysis, then it would necessary to demonstrate rather more than just their 
scientific integrity and the general compatibility of their results. Although 
investigative procedures may appear perfectly valid from a scientific viewpoint, they 
may sometimes be applied in inappropriate circumstances. This may lead to the 
obtainment of results that are "scientifically" correct, but unsatisfactory, irrelevant or 
even misleading in the context of risk assessment. Much of the safety research 
surveyed appeared to fall into this category. These undertakings are probably, 
justifiable on the basis of their intrinsic scientific merit and potential value in the 
longer term, rather than in terms of their direct practical utility. It was thus necessary 
to ensure that any research findings used in the safety analysis were adequately 
representative of the events known to occur in real aircraft accidents. 
The inapplicability of many safety research findings for the purposes of risk 
assessment is probably a direct result of the catastrophic nature of most aircraft fire 
accidents. Many of the phenomena encountered can be very extreme, difficult to 
reproduce, or else impossible to quantify in scientific terms. Consider, for example, 
the imponderable complexity of events that typically occur in aircraft crashes, 
accident fires and large-scale passenger evacuations. These are practically impossible 
to reproduce in an experimental environment or analyse adequately in real accidents. _ In consequence, researchers are usually faced with challenging problems when 
attempting to investigate real issues in air safety. Almost inevitably, the use of 
analogy, approximation and artificial bounding of a problem have to be relied upon to 
a much greater extent than in most other fields of research. This implies that, 
experimental procedures will be farther removed from real situations and thus results 
might be expected generally to be less representative of actual events. It was therefore 
reasonable to anticipate that satisfactory correspondence between the scientific safety -. 
and real events could not be taken for granted. -- 
The preliminary accident data survey had revealed that aircraft fire accidents 
were very diverse in nature. It appeared to be impossible to characterise a "typical" 
incident, because basic circumstances could often be completely dissimilar from 
accident to accident. Even when two scenarios appear to be superficially similar, very 
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different outcomes could sometimes result. The inconsistent nature of real accidents 
appears to be particularly hard to accommodate in safety research, as one of the 
primary tenets of scientific investigation is the ability to obtain repeatable results. 
In some types of work, the complex nature of the process being investigated 
yields a natural variation in results. This can occur in spite of best efforts of 
researchers to enforce the consistency of readings taken in a series of supposedly 
identical tests. Two examples of this type of research can be found in passenger 
evacuation trials and ground-based crash testing of aircraft. In both cases, it has 
proved necessary to undertake multiple tests in order to determine the level of 
consistency of being obtained. Results are usually plotted in the form of distributions 
or envelopes and findings given with an associated level of probability or statistical 
significance. Although this method of analysis is obviously time consuming and 
expensive, it represents an extremely constructive approach to the scientific 
investigation of difficult safety issues, such as aircraft impacts, crash fires and 
passenger evacuation. The more complex features and probabilistic aspects of aircraft 
accidents are not designed out of the experiment, or merely ignored. Instead, efforts 
are directed at exploring meaningful problems and designing realistic experiments, in 
spite of the inconvenience involved. In some circumstances, this will increase the 
likelihood of inconclusive results being obtained. Although this might be frustrating 
from a scientific point of view, it may provide a more accurate reflection of the true 
nature of the real life situation being investigated. 
3.3.4 Related Difficulties 
In many cases, it is unfeasible to undertake a series of identical experiments to 
ensure consistency of results, because of financial or practical reasons. With only a 
single set of results to work from, it is obviously impossible to determine the extent to 
which probabilistic factors may have influenced the outcome of an experiment. This 
problem tends to dealt with in one of two ways; either the issue is ignored or test 
conditions are constrained to exclude the effects of randomly varying parameters. 
Examples of the latter include fixing the size and shape of a fire, the use of standard 
impact deceleration rates and the disabling of one half of available emergency exits. 
There may sometimes be a danger that these decisions can be made arbitrarily, 
without due reference to actual conditions that are known to have occurred in past 
accidents. Consider, for instance, the fact that researchers have reported difficulty in 
completing a programme of airframe fire tests, because they were waiting for zero 
wind conditions to occur. This appears to be a case where rigid adherence to test 
procedures has served to highlight inadequacies in formulation of an experiment. 
Sub-scale tests or mock-ups are often used in experimental investigations. This 
may enable a greater degree of control to be exerted over the experiment, as well as 
being more convenient and less costly than full scale trials. However, care is 
obviously required to ensure that real conditions are adequately approximated in the 
experiment. This has been a problem in fire testing of cabin materials, where marked 
differences have sometimes been found to occur between laboratory and in situ 
performance in accidents. 
In a similar vein, difficulties are encountered in the field of combustion 
toxicology when attempting to apply results obtained from animal testing to humans. 
Primates are more representative of humans than rodents, both in terms of behavioural 
and physiological characteristics. However, their greater cost of upkeep and lower 
_4'7 
powers of recovery have resulted in rats becoming the most common species' 
in 
animal toxicological testing. Extrapolation of findings to humans is problematic 
because it is rarely possible to ascertain accurate toxicity exposure histories 
in 
accident victims. Thus, results obtained from animal testing can only be, used- 
for 
initial screening purposes, or, at the very most, approximate cross comparison of toxic: _ 
substances. 
An obvious problem in undertaking safety research is that only one or two 
significant aspects of safety can be analysed in a single test. It has been-seen how 
many accidents involve complex interactions between the effects of impact, fire and 
occupant evacuation. These cross influences can often be impossible to represent 
adequately in experimental research. However, rather than ignore their potential 
significance, researchers may sometimes attempt to crudely represent the effects of 
key interactions. Examples of this practice include the use of cut-outs to represent 
fuselage rupturing in airframe fire tests, the undertaking of evacuation trials with 
obstacles and in darkness, and the opening of exits in cabin fire testing. Although 
these measures are often only approximate in nature, they are usually simple to 
implement and can serve to increase the realism of a test to a significant degree. 
Ideally, however, the design of large scale tests in any area of aircraft safety should 
involve researchers from a number of different disciplines. This might help to ensure 
that ancillary aspects of the problem area under study are adequately catered, for, 
whenever this is conveniently possible. 
Even when research only involves activities a single specialised discipline, the. - 
fundamental assumptions used may prove to be unrealistic. This can occur for reasons 
of experimental convenience, or perhaps because of limitations in analytical 
capabilities. One example is in the fire testing of materials. Standard fire tests involve 
rates of incident heat flux that are significantly lower than those commonly, 
encountered in aircraft fire accidents. In consequence, the true fire properties of some 
materials were not discovered until after they had entered service. As previously 
mentioned, this may situation may have arisen, in part, because materials scientists 
responsible formulating the tests were generally unfamiliar with the high intensity of 
aircraft fuel fires. 
In other cases, the scope of research may be deliberately restricted to coincide 
with analytical, rather than experimental capabilities. For example, computational 
modelling of aircraft fires appears to have focused exclusively on internal ,, 
fire 
scenarios. The preliminary accident data survey showed that these types of fires occur 
rarely in comparison with cases of bum-through and impact fires. Thus again, through 
lack of appreciation, research activities can be governed by matters of convenience, 
rather than by real world data needs. 
The extreme nature of many aircraft fire scenarios is impossible to reproduce 
safely in evacuation trials and crew training tests. The incorporation of non-toxic 
smoke into evacuations, motivation of evacuees with rewards and forceful behaviour 
by cabin crew are all extremely beneficial, but these techniques can never recreate a 
fully adequate level of realism. Trials undertaken with irritant smoke in Japan may 
provide an accurate insight into human behaviour in truly adverse conditions, but this 
type of work is unlikely ever to be undertaken in the West. Currently, the most, - hazardous fire testing undertaken in the UK. involves the training of fire fighters. _ However, these individuals are highly trained professionals and their performance 
cannot be taken to be representative of aircraft accident victims. 
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3.3.5 Conclusions 
In general, it was concluded that scientific research undertaken in the area of 
aircraft safety is not always well matched with events that are likely to be encountered 
in aircraft accidents. Consequently, use of scientific findings alone is not adequate 
when attempting to analyse issues in accident survival. In order to estimate true levels 
of risk, research findings about specific hazards must be placed in context by 
combining them with information obtained about real events. This does not imply that 
much of the safety research undertaken in the past is inherently flawed or inapplicable. 
In many cases, the scope of an investigation is deliberately restricted for very sound 
reasons. Thus, such work is only intended to provide a limited insight into one 
particular aspect of a complex problem area; the results obtained are useful for 
indicative purposes, but cannot be applied directly in a wider context. 
In some types of research, the results obtained are directly applicable to 
circumstances met in real accidents, but only a small sub-set of accident scenarios is 
covered. As a result, it can be difficult to incorporate these partial findings into 
accident risk analysis, which, in order to obtain balanced results, must treat all 
scenarios types in an even-handed manner. If results are to be interpolated between 
different sets of experiments, it is necessary that an adequate range of different 
circumstances is investigated. 
In summary, if research findings are to be applied to' assessing issues in 
aircraft safety, then it is desirable that the work concerned meets a number of criteria. 
These are as follows: - 
" Address issues that are encountered in a high proportion of accidents 
" Related work to that being undertaken in associated areas 
" Possible to quantify the effects of experimental compromises, where 
they have been necessary 
" Findings are compatible with observations made about real events 
" Procedures used are adaptable to deal with different circumstances 
"A contrasting range of experimental conditions is covered 
3.4 Formulation of a Computer-based Modelling Methodology 
3.4.1 Challenges Faced in Improving Aircraft Accident Safety 
Many issues in aircraft fire safety appear very difficult to address within the 
limitations imposed by the use of established scientific methods. The complexity of 
aircraft accidents necessitates that large quantities of information must be drawn 
together from different areas of scientific research before meaningful conclusions 
about human survival can be derived. Significantly, however, much of the knowledge 
required is steadily being assembled by specialists working in many fields of aircraft 
safety. Although gaps in understanding still exist in many areas, when identified and 
prioritised, they may become feasible to bridge in the longer term. 
The translation of research findings into new safety policies is also an 
extremely challenging task. If new measures are to be introduced, their effectiveness 
must be assessed in the context of risk levels faced in real accident scenarios. Most 
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incidents involve a combination of crash disruption and large fuel fire. However, the 
nature of the fire survival problem can differ considerably from accident to accident. 
For example, a night-time crash occurring a large distance off airport constitutes a 
quite dissimilar predicament to, say, an uncontained engine fire on takeoff, or an 
iniliýght cargo fire. As well as their potential diversity, aircraft fire accidents also tend 
to involve many complex, highly interactive and dynamic phenomena. These 
attributes can make it difficult to integrate knowledge obtainable from past events, or 
plan purposeful research programmes to investigate matters of concern. 
Similarly, it is also far from straightforward to perform a satisfactory analysis 
of the wider effects of either current or proposed new safety measures. In addition to 
purely objective considerations, those involved in the field of aircraft safety also deal 
with an highly emotive subject matter. This is occasionally highlighted by the 
vociferous, but often poorly informed media coverage and public lobby'inu that can 
occur in the immediate aftermath of a major accident. These problems are likely to be 
encountered with increasing frequency in the future. The formulation of safety policy 
must also take into account the highly cost sensitive nature of the air transport 
industry, together with possible political implications and the limitations imposed by 
historical precedence (Transport Committee. 1990). 
3.4.2 Identification of a Research Need 
Faced with these challenges, those committed to minimising the hazards 
encountered in aircraft fire accidents need to integrate a large body of information 
containing many diverse and often seemingly incompatible types of data. In spite of 
the quantity of knowledge available, appreciable gaps in understanding still have to be 
dealt with in some areas. Consequently, scientists, engineers and policy makers can 
routinely be forced to make decisions involving significant factors that lie outside 
their own areas of expertise and without access to suitable sources of information to 
refer to. Greater levels of accountability in the policy formulation process also mean 
that there is increasingly a need to provide clear quantitative justification for many of 
the conclusions reached in matters of public safety (CAA. 1991). 
The addressing of these difficulties clearly requires that maximum utilisation 
is made of all available information sources in any decision making process. Thus, 
there exists a need for some form of knowledge framework or decision support tool. 
This should be capable of combining the many sources of information available in the 
field of aircraft safety in an explicit manner. The complexity of events typically 
encountered in aircraft fire accidents clearly suggests that this tool should utilise 
computer simulation methods, in order to provide an adequate level of analysis. Also, 
all important features of accident survivability need to be considered. such as fire 
development, passenger evacuation and the effects of any crash impact. 
The use of such a computer simulation tool might then enable findings from 
more specialised branches of safety research to be integrated within an holistic 
accident safety analysis for the first time. In the longer term, the development of these 
techniques could potentially yield a tool capable of supporting, a systematic risk 
assessment analysis of key issues in aircraft accident survival. 
3.4.3 Establishment of a Methodology 
The primary challenge in constructing such an accident analysis tool is in 
dealing with the sheer quantity, diversity and intricacy of the information available in 
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the field of' aircraft safety. Obviously, in order to create a tractable Computer model, it 
is necessary to make many simplifications and approximations in the a11,11yti1S process. 
In some instances, gaps in knowledge have to he bridged \\ltll little more than the 
application cal educated guesswork. In order to nºininiise the consequences 01' these 
difficulties it was decided to formulate a research methodology based upon a 
combination of historical accident analysis, existing scientific safety research and 
computer simulation. (riven that tue work was primarily concerned with assessing 
survivability of aircrall accidents, these events constituted a logical base unit fier the 
analysis. Thus, the computer I1 oriel would elii: ctively he designed toi generate aircraft 
accident scenarios and then simulate their outcome in terms Of the number of 
casualties involved. 
For the model to he able to fulfil its intended purpose, scenarios Of accidents 
being analysed needed to be representative of those CIICOunteredl in reality. The 
infOl-Illation required to ensure this could be obtained by undertaking a survey of 
aircraft accidents that have occurred in (lie past. Ile features and relative Iiklilioods of 
different accident types alight then he cleterniilled and recreated \\itlº the use of 
probabilistic techniques in the analysis n xicl. 
Ile events occurring within accidents needed tu he simulated in detail. It Iº, ls 
been seen in this chapter that most incidents involve significant crash impacts, large 
fuel Iires and the evacuation 01' substantial numbers 01' passengers. 'I Ili. ') implied that 
the simulation tool would need to incorporate crash effects, lire d eveloopment, thernlo- 
toxic incapacitation and occupant egress models. 'I liese dilierent aspects of analysis 
would interact heavily with each other and so needed to he integrated togetlher in a 
balanced manner. The overall concept of this accident simulation methodology is 
depicted in Figure 3.5. 
ACCIDENT CRASH 
LSCENARIO EFFECTS 
GENERATOR (IF ANY) 
1 
FIRE 
1 DEVELOPMENT 
MODEL 
OCCUPANT CABIN 
EVACUATION THERMO-TOXIC 
1 MODEL ENVIRONMENT 
1 
SIMULATION 
Accident S-imuliti()n_MctliociººIoyy 
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3.5 Thesis Aim and Objectives 
3.5.1 Research Aim 
The aim of this thesis can be defined as followw-s: - 
To create a computer-based simulation and risk assessment tool that can be 
used to analyse key issues in aircraft fire accident safety in a balanced and 
holistic manner. 
3.5.2 Research Objectives 
The objectives associated with this aim were: - 
1. To construct a computer-based risk assessment tool suitable for 
investigating issues in aircraft frre safety. 
2. To deal with a fully representative range of accident scenarios as 
opposed to ju st those that are more amenable to established methods of 
analysis. 
3. To utilise a holistic approach, modelling all factors that influence frre 
lethality in a balanced and integrated manner. 
4. To demonstrate that it is feasible to undertake quantitative risk analysis 
of aircraft accidents, safety issues and safety policies. 
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Chapter 4: Use of Past Accident Data and Statistics 
4.1 Introduction: Investigation and Reporting of Civil Aircraft Accidents 
4.1.1 The Investigation of Aircraft Accidents 
'I'he high casualty rates and material losses encountered in catastrophic aircraft 
accidents provide it powerful incentive fier attempting to eliminate their occurrence. 
(liven that this tim or complete prevention will he impossible toi achieve within the 
loresccable future, equal efforts have also been directed towards rcciucinu the lethality' 
or the incident" when they occur. These mutual approaches to dealing with the 
challenge or increasing the safety of stir-travel can he conveniently labelled as 
etc"ciclentt 1)1'c'vellfic, n and cucciclc'n f »tilis; crtin)t respectively. A prerequisite fier the 
pursuit or these two objectives is the attainment or a thorough undcrstancling or the 
problems encountered in past events and detcrntining the implications that they mi ht 
hold fier the future. This can only be achieved through the investigation and reporting 
of'aircraft accidents. 
The widespread tºtilisattion of' air transport has ensured that almost all nations 
have been provided with it motive fier co-operation in matters or the organisation and 
safety or air transport operations. As recounted in ('halter I, this impetus led to the 
f6rntatioýn of, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in 1047, a body 
responsible liar the co-ordination or air transport activities ººn it world-\\ icie level. The 
remit ofthis organisation was largely set in place by the 19.14 Chica. go Convention, to 
which 52 nations were signatories (ICAO. 1994a). Included in the I('AO's terms of 
reference is the issuance or guidance can the investigation and reporting or aircraft 
accidents, as specified in Annex 13 of the Convention (I('AO, 19 941)), Amongst tits 
numerous läcililies and services provided by the I('AO i,, the collation, translation and 
disscº»ination or the more significant accident reports that are pt'odticml by the IS3 
currently contacting states world-wick 
i. 
All I('AO Atemher states are obliged to investigate and openly report the 
occurrence of aircraft accidents. 'Iltus, the term "accident" acquiued it legal 
significance and it nccd arose to avoid it being subjected to a range eil potentially 
different interpretations. For this reason, delegates at the Chicago) Convention took 
special care to provide it precise dclinition of'the word. An aircraft accident is (Mined 
by I('AO as: - 
-Ml nc"Ctrrv"c'rrc"c' u. cs'OL"icrlc'd with lhc cr/)c'rcrlinrt u/ crrt crir'c i a/i which lokc. v place 
helirc'Crr Mc lime crnv l)Cr"Snrr hncn (I Ihc (rir"rrofi with /he irrlc'nlinn o/ /1i, i, 'hl until 
srrrlr a lime as all such pc'r"s"oiix hure disembarked irr which (u) a person is 
. 
lcrlnll>> or sc'r intrsI irtjurrc'd aa rc'srlll of hc'ing in nr ulrurt Ilrc' air-c"raft, Or by 
clir"cc l c"crrtlac l with (fill'par/ of /he crir'crcif!, irtc'Itrclin, ir /ran'/5 ºi'hic"11 have become 
clc'lcrchc'cl, from Ihc aircraft . or 
dirc'ci exposure lu jc'1 hlusl; or (h) llrc' airrcrafi 
incurs clcnrrcrge or slr-rirlriral /irilui c' which crcli'c'r-sell. a//i'rls Ilrc . clr"rrclru"c' 
. siren, c, lh, per/irrmal ce or". 
/liglrl charactcr"islic". s 0J the air craft and niiich would 
rwrntcrlly require ntcrjor repair or rep/m-cen leia o/ slic cr/fi'c"lc'cl comlrc)rnerll; or (c) 
As at Ist January I995. 
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the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible" (Edwards and Edwards, 
1994) 
jk 
It should be noted that a strict distinction is maintained between the terms "accident" 
and "incident". The latter should really be used to refer to events that are less serious 
in nature, where no serious injuries result or only relatively minor damage occurs. 
Often, this can be taken to loosely mean a "near-accident" (Wells, 1991). The ICAO 
definition of an incident is (Edwards and Edwards, 1990): - 
"an occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an 
aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of the operation" ; =; 
Until recently, states have not been obliged to report aircraft incidents, 
although many have chosen to do so. In 1994, the ICAO ratified a change to Annex 
13, widening the remit for investigating and reporting procedures. This defines a new 
category of "serious incident", taken to be: - =, 
"... an incident involving circumstances such that an accident nearly occurred" 
Although this appears to be a relatively loose definition, the reporting of such events 
has now been made compulsory (Winn, 1994). 
In the case of the present study, we are concerned with both accidents and' 
more serious incidents, providing that significant fire damage occurred. Thus, for the 
sake of convenience, in the present work, the terms "accident" and "incident" are used 
interchangeably, unless specifically noted otherwise. 
Procedures for the investigation of aircraft accidents are specified in the ICAO 
Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation (ICAO, 1970). This document includes. 
information about the numerous background activities that are necessary in the event 
of an aircraft accident, such as notification procedures, general administration and the 
issuing of information. Of more relevance in the present context, however, is the 
provision of expert advice on many of the more practical aspects of accident 
investigation. All potentially significant features of an accident are covered, ranging 
from details of the site, wreckage and prevailing weather through to the possible role 
played by sabotage, maintenance actions and human factors. 
The broad coverage is intended to ensure that investigators adopt a methodical 
approach and reduce the chances of important information being overlooked. The 
latter, can be particularly important, since many crucial pieces of evidence may pass 
unnoticed or their significant not be appreciated by an untrained observer. 
Unfortunately, in spite of the general thoroughness of the Manual of Aircraft 
Accident Investigation, many ICAO member states still persist in failing to investigate 
aircraft accidents to an anywhere near adequate standard. However, the publication 
has undoubtedly served to improve the efficacy of most inquires to some extent and 
has been particularly valuable in increasing awareness of the potential importance of 
ancillary factors in many accidents. Examples of the latter relevant to the current 
study include the identification of fire induced deaths, together with the effectiveness 
of evacuation, rescue and fire-fighting actions. 
If information obtained from the investigation and reporting of past accidents 
were to constitute a significant component of the overall study, it was essential to 
ensure that the data was accurate. This would obviously be impossible to demonstrate 
conclusively and so we are forced to rely on the competence, general objectivity and 
independence of the investigatory body. When organisations conform closely to 
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ICAO recommended practises; these virtues may usually be taken for granted. If this 
is not the case, then it is usually plainly apparent from the character of the accident 
report. This is a direct consequence of the overall purpose of undertaking an aircraft 
accident inquiry, defined in the ICAO investigation manual'as being (ICAO, 1994b): - 
"The fundamental purpose of inquiry into an aircraft accident is to 
determine the facts, conditions and circumstances pertaining to the accident 
with a view to establishing the probable cause thereof, so that appropriate steps 
may be taken to prevent a recurrence of the accident and the factors which led 
to it. An equally important purpose is to determine the facts, conditions and 
circumstances pertaining to the survival or non-survival of the occupants, and 
crash-worthiness of the aircraft. The nature of the inquiry into an aircraft 
accident should not be accusatory as the object is to take remedial rather than 
punitive action; similarly the assessment of blame or responsibility should not 
be included in the duties of the accident investigation authority since this 
function is normally the prerogative of the judicial authorities of the State 
concerned. Nevertheless, it is unavoidable that acts or omissions, by individual 
persons or organisations, are sometimes clearly revealed and in such instances 
it is the duty of the inquiry to say so. Any such statement should not confuse the 
purpose of the aircraft accident investigation which is primarily to indicate 
what caused the accident rather than who caused it: this should be rightly for 
others to decide" 
The prominence attached to the no-blame status of the accident investigation is readily 
apparent. Thus, when the outcome of an enquiry serves to resolutely condemn one or 
more of the involved parties, immediate scepticism is called for. In these 
circumstances, the focus of the investigation is commonly directed at the contributory 
actions of individuals, such as the flightdeck crew, an air traffic control officer or a 
maintenance engineer. Usually associated with this is the omission of any 
examination of the possible role played by operating procedures, training, regulation 
and organisational infrastructure. 
In a similar vein, instances where investigators possess inadequate experience 
are reasonably straightforward to identify. In many cases, reported information may 
often be accurate, although usually incomplete, but its interpretation may be omitted 
or perhaps leave much to be desired. A good example of the latter is the mis- 
attribution of bone fractures frequently encountered in fatally injured crash victims. 
These breakages can sometimes occur post-mortem, when corpses are exposed to 
extreme heating, but then erroneously ascribed to result from the effects of impact 
forces (Hill, undated). This may be sometimes be connected with the fact that 
authorities may feel obliged to indicate that accident victims died instantaneously 
rather subjected to a torturous death, for humane reasons. 
When errors in official interpretation and judgement are generally perceived to 
occur, particular accidents may gain a certain air of notoriety. This can often produce 
intense speculation and re-examination of the event by safety researchers, legal 
experts, government committees and the media. Even if no general consensus can be 
reached on all facts and conclusions, more obvious oversights will be corrected, or at 
least, reasons for possible doubt highlighted. 
In some circumstances those responsible for undertaking the investigation of 
an accident may not be able to issue an accident report without it being subjected to 
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governmental approval. The official. vetting -process may result in significant' 
information, conclusions or recommendations being suppressed in the published 
version of a report (Prince, 1990). Often, in these circumstances, the imposition. of " 
such omissions leaks to the media, perhaps via members of the investigatory . team, 
from witnesses or even through alternative official channels. For those concerned with 
the compilation accident data, the net result of official interference in the reporting 
process may be similar to cases involving inexperienced investigators., The 
implication of this is that, for some accidents, the degree of acceptance of the official 
report in the wider air-safety community and media may need to be examined. Where 
controversy has arisen, use can often be made of secondary information sources, 
findings of follow-up investigations and expert opinions. 
Three potential sources of inaccuracy in the investigation and reporting of 
aircraft accidents have been outlined. These consist of the desire to compound blame 
onto individuals, the inexperience of investigators and the distortion of official 
reports, respectively. In all three cases, the factual evidence that is reported' will 
generally be accurate. Problems will more usually manifest themselves in' the 
omission and/or distortion of pertinent information, in order to bolster a particular 
interpretation of events. It is rarely feasible to fabricate or deny the occurrence of - 
factual events without the deception becoming apparent in the longer term; half-truths 
being easier to sustain than outright falsifications. This implies that the major 
challenge of interpreting past accident data lies not with the validity of obtained 
material, but rather with the incompleteness and unavailability of more detailed 
information. 
4.1.2 Aircraft Accident Reports '. 
Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention requires the publication of accident 
reports in connection with the undertaking of any accident investigate. Four separate 
formats of report are required; in chronological order of preparation these are (ICAO, 
1970): - ' 
1. The Preliminary Report 
2. The Final Report 
3. Summary of the Final Report 
4. The Accident/Incident Data Report 
The purpose of the preliminary report is to forward information to all 
concerned as soon as practicably possible after the occurrence of an accident. Basic 
factual and circumstantial information is usually available within the first three to four 
weeks of an investigation and so it is stipulated that a preliminary report should be 
issued within 30 days of the date of the incident. 
The final report constitutes a complete, accurate and finalised record, 
documenting all aspects of the accident investigation. It is a synthesis of the report 
complied by the head investigator and the reports published by the specialist groups - 
within the accident investigation team. To help ensure thorough and complete 
reporting, ICAO provides a detailed description of the layout required for a final 
accident report. This structures the account of an investigation into five sections; 
namely factual information, analysis, conclusions, safety recommendations and 
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appendices. These sections are sub-divided into further categories, for each of which 
standardised paragraph numbering and guidance notes are provided. 
The publication and distribution of the final report are only undertaken after 
consultations have held with other nations that possess a legitimate interest in its 
contents. In addition to the state conducting the investigation, these could include the 
state which instituted the investigation (if it had delegated the whole of the 
investigation to the "conducting" state), the state of the aircraft's registry, the state of 
the aircraft's manufacture and any state providing information relevant to the 
accident. This consultation process can sometimes lead to disagreements over 
analysis, conclusions and safety recommendations contained in the report. If these 
prove impossible to resolve, then the existence and explanation of the dissent may be 
noted in the final report. 
The summary of the final report provides a synopsis of the investigation in a 
convenient and uniform format. They are only required to be produced in cases where 
information contained in the final report is of exceptional value to the promotion of 
aviation safety. This might involve instances showing how new investigative 
techniques having been successfully employed, or where there is a need for significant 
preventative action. The summary is not intended to replace the main report, but 
rather to be of smaller size by cutting down on details that. are unnecessary for 
understanding of the accident. This enables the summary to be incorporated into the 
ICAO Aircraft Accident Digest (ICAO, 1980), thus permitting dissemination to all 
ICAO member states world-wide. 
The accident/incident data report is compiled from the final report and, 
together with the preliminary report, is required for inclusion in the ICAO Accident 
Data Reporting System (ADREPS) (ICAO, 1995). Given that this system is 
computer-based, the format of the provided information is required to be computer 
compatible. This allows for the monthly publication of a "Summary of Preliminary 
Reports", an annual "Digest of Accident Statistics" and for the provision of an 
accident information retrieval service. 
These four categories of accident' reports together provide both a convenient 
and systematic method of distributing information about aircraft accidents. Aspects of 
particular value to the researcher in air safety are the translation, standardisation of 
content and the general availability of the publications. These points are invaluable 
when attempting to collate and understand the implications provided from accident 
investigations of varying standards. 
In most cases, it proved impractical to obtain copies of final accident reports. 
These documents are often quite large, typically ranging from 100 to 200 pages and 
could only be retained for a limited period once accessed via inter-library loans. In 
addition, only reports involving significant British or US national interests were 
readily obtainable. Thus, full accident reports were only acquired in cases of 
important British or American accidents where alternative information sources proved 
unsatisfactory. This represents around ten percent of the 216 accidents included in the 
main round of data collection and analysis. 
The largest contribution of information was obtained from the ICAO Aircraft 
Accident Digests. As indicated above, these publications provide extended summaries 
of final accident reports, grouped together and published annually. In most incidents, 
the sections of the main report that deal with the fire, rescue and occupant survival 
aspects are reproduced in full. This means that, for the purposes of investigating 
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aspects of fire safety, the Digests are of comparable value to main accident reports. 
Typically, they might comprise five to ten pages of condensed text or significantly 
more in the case of more significant incidents. The quantity of information provided 
was found to be highly suitable for the purposes of the study. An additional advantage 
of using the Aircraft Accident Digests was that these publications were readily 
available at Cranfield. 
Use was also made of data obtained from the ADREPS system. This provides 
a computer-based information retrieval service, albeit with a significantly lower level 
of information than the ICAO Digests or full accident reports. Printouts were acquired 
for accidents and serious incidents involving significant fire damage to the aircraft 
(ICAO, 1995). Several preliminary accident reports were also obtained, but " these 
proved to be of negligible value, given that more recent information was available for 
all accidents occurring up to and inclusive of 1993. 
4.1.3 Other Sources of Accident Data 
The starting point for the data gathering study was the UK Civil Aviation 
Authority's World Airline Accident Summary (WAAS) (CAA, 1996). This provides 
basic details and a short summary of all accidents involving commercial passenger 
aircraft in revenue service. A typical WAAS entry is shown in Figure 4.1. The main 
18.4.72 SVC10 EAAC Addis Scheduled 107 Crew 821 Destroyed ". a 
Ababa Passenger pig 35 13 48 
The aircraft was taking off from Addis Ababa for a flight to London via Rome. Just prior to 
reaching Decision Speed (V1), a nose wheel tyre was punctured by a light aircraft jacking pad, lying on the runway. The crew immediately initiated the appropriate abandon take-off procedure 
but were unable to stop the aircraft before it reached the end of the runway. The aircraft 
dropped heavily on the lower ground and broke up on impact. A severe fire ensued and the air-' 
craft was completely destroyed. 43 passengers and crew were killed; 15 were injured and 
49 were unhurt. 
The report concludes the accident was due to a partial loss of braking effort arising from the incorrect reassembly of a part of the braking system, as a result of which the aircraft 
could not be stopped within the runway and stopway distance remaining. (Imperial Ethiopian 
Government Report No Al 11/72). 
Figure 4-1: Example Entry from World Airline Accident Summary 
value of the publication is its systematic coverage of all incidents occurring world- 
wide since 1946. To enable this to be achieved, a loose bound format is used, and 
supplementary updates provided annually. The information provided in the WAAS 
entries is insufficient to allow for anything but the most rudimentary analysis of the 
incident. For example, it was found that in many instances the occurrence of 'a 
significant fire was not recorded and thus it could not be immediately determined if, a 
given incident would be relevant to the study of fire safety. 
The main value of the publication was therefore in the provision of a large 
listing of accidents which were known to have, or could potentially have involved a 
significant fire. This list contained approximately 2000 entries, the vast majority of 
which would be discarded as the survey work progressed. The most common reasons 
for the dropping of accidents from further consideration were that they were non-' 
survivable, involved a piston-engined aircraft, or no significant fire damage had 
occurred. The formulation of these inclusion criteria is discussed in the next section. 
Other researchers have already undertaken numerous studies of the fire-safety 
aspects of past aircraft accidents. Perhaps the leading independent authority in the 
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field is Taylor, who has constructed a comprehensive computer database, logging 
details about many thousands of incidents. This has been achieved by the 
accumulation of accident reports and numerous other types of source. material over a 
period of some thirty years. Some of the wide-ranging areas to have been addressed 
by Taylor include: - 
" The relative safety of wide-cut aviation fuels (Taylor, 1975) 
" Duration times of passenger exposure to the effects of in-flight fires in 
past accidents (Taylor, 1990a) 
" The proportion of passenger deaths that may be, attributable to the 
effects fire (Taylor, 1975; Taylor, 1990b) 
" Historical trends in the nature of aircraft fire accidents (Taylor, 1986) 
" Estimation of the potential utility of passenger protective breathing 
equipment in past accidents (Vant, 1990) 
These studies have involved the surveying of large numbers of aircraft and were found 
to be invaluable for positively identifying many of the incidents suited for inclusion 
within the database. Acknowledgement must also be given to Taylor for making 
significant quantities of source material available to the author. 
Other individuals have also performed useful research into particular aspects of past 
accidents. For example, Hill has undertaken important studies in the area of aircraft 
accident pathology, helping to clarify the role played by fire in numerous incidents 
(Hill, undated). Private consultants have also regularly produced surveys of accident 
data, often directed towards the identification of long-term trends in safety (Kapustin, 
1993). 
. 
Substantial use was also made of safety studies published by regulatory 
authorities and aircraft manufacturers. The Federal Aviation Authority has undertaken 
research of past accidents in an attempt to establish the potential benefit of 
introducing anti-misting kerosene (FAA, 1981) and the provision of passenger smoke- 
hoods (Speitel and Hill, 1988). Similarly, the UK Civil Aviation Authority has 
performed historical analyses when addressing the issues of passenger survivability in 
aircraft fires (CAA, 1991) and in benefit studies of cabin water-spray system (CAA, 
1993). 
The former Fokker aircraft company was also very active in the analysis of 
airliner accidents, sharing information readily and maintaining its own independent 
database. The manufacturer made an important contribution to the research of 
passenger exit usage in past airliner accidents (Schaefers, 1990). 
4.1.4 Inclusion Criteria for Aircraft Accidents 
It has already been seen that the initial survey of aircraft accidents yielded a 
total in the region of 2000 events that could potentially have been relevant to the 
study. The performing of a detailed analysis on this number of incidents was 
obviously not feasible within the available time frame. It was therefore necessary to 
choose some inclusion criteria in order to severely reduce the number of accidents 
under study. This would enable effort to be concentrated on those incidents that were 
of most relevance to the analysis of aircraft fire safety. 
The most fundamental requirement was that the accident needed to have 
involved fire to a significant extent. This would obviously have been the case if 
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passengers happened to be killed or injured by the effects of fire and all such incidents 
were therefore included. However, many accidents happen to involve substantial fires 
that represent an immediate threat to the safety of passengers, but fortunately; ` the fire 
does not actually harm the aircraft's occupants in any way. A substantial number of 
these cases provide useful information concerning many aspects of fire safety and -thus 
needed to be included in some way. The most obvious approach to quantifying the 
threat posed by fire in an accident is to look at the extent to which the passenger cabin 
may have been damaged; if substantial destruction by fire had occurred then the 
occupants must have been in danger. The following criterion was formulated to 
identify the occurrence of afire accident: - 
"Involved, or probably involved passenger fatalities due to the direct 
effects of fire, or, the passenger cabin was destroyed or severely damaged 
by the effects of fire. " 1 
This definition was very close to the one subsequently found to have been used in an 
FAA fire study (Speitel and Hill, 1988). 
Another basic requirement for the relevance of an accident to the study, of fire 
safety was that it must have been survivable. Many incidents involve all of 
the 
aircraft's occupants being killed instantaneously by extreme impact forces, ` after 
which a severe crash fire usually ensues. Given that there exists no potential for, the 
saving of life, these cases provide minimal information for the study of fire safety. 
The terms "survivable" and "partially survivable" accidents have been widely used 
air-safety researchers in order to differentiate incidents where all or at least one of the 
aircraft's occupants survives any occurrence of an impact. 
A slight departure from the "survivable" criteria of Taylor was made in that accidents 
caused by in-flight fires are not automatically included if the aircraft is subsequently 
involved in a non-survivable crash. 
The size of aircraft to be included in the study also had to be prescribed. Most 
commercial passenger flights involve medium or large sized aircraft, with two or 
more engines. Some of the smaller aircraft types currently in service were not 
designed specifically for revenue passenger use and thus they cannot be classed as 
airliners. More generally, these aircraft may differ considerably from higher capacity 
types in terms of their safety features, construction, configuration, performance and 
mode of operation. This very probably affects the nature of their accidents. It was 
therefore decided to exclude smaller aircraft designs from the accident data survey. 
Two logical options existed when setting the aircraft size limit below which accidents 
would be rejected. In terms of aircraft design, types with 20 or more seats are 
certificated under FAR/JAR 25 "Large Aeroplane" rules. Alternatively, in operational 
terms, types with more than 30 seats can only be used in the US by licensed -air 
carriers. The 30 seat limit was eventually adopted for two reasons; to further reduce 
the number of accidents under consideration and to guarantee that the aircraft was in 
airline (as opposed to possible air-taxi operator) service. 
The type of engines used in the aircraft was considered to be relevant the study 
of fire safety. Turbine (i. e. jet and turbo-prop) engines are generally more reliable than 
reciprocating piston engines and they use significantly less volatile grades of fuel. The 
latter were in universal use before the advent of the jet age, but now tend to be 
restricted to smaller or specialist aircraft types. Because of the growing obsolescence 
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and significant differences in the safety characteristics of piston-engined types', it was 
decided to eliminate them from the study. It should be noted that this decision 
automatically excludes all aircraft accidents occurring before the - advent of the first 
jet-engined airline services on the 2nd May 1952. Analogous reasoning was used to 
exclude helicopter and other non-fixed wing types from consideration in the study. 
The final criterion for inclusion within the accident survey was that the aircraft 
must have been involved in commercial passenger operations at the time of the 
incident. Different safety standards and operating procedures apply, for example, to 
cargo, training, positioning and military flights. This can often adversely affect safety 
levels and the nature of accidents that occur in these types of operation, making them 
unrepresentative of typical passenger services. A few special cases may require some 
clarification: - 
"A commercial aircraft has been chartered by military authorities for the 
transportation of service personnel; inclusion was dependent on the use 
of an airline flight crew and the allotment of commercial flight code. 
" An aircraft was being used in passenger-cargo "combi" operations2. All 
such cases were excluded if the configuration required a separate type 
certification, implying that some aspect of safety may have changed 
significantly. 
Other researchers have used additional criteria to exclude specific types of 
accidents. Examples include the occurrence of extreme impact damage, the 
involvement of aircraft from former Eastern Block countries and fires resulting from 
mechanical failures in flight. These criteria were carefully considered for application 
to the current study, but in all cases their adoption would have involved the discarding 
information from some important accidents. Therefore, their inclusion could not be 
warranted. 
4.2 Initial Analysis & the Formulation of an Accident Database 
4.2.1 Data Requirements 
In the initial stages of the study, historical information was required primarily 
to indicate the general nature of aircraft fire accidents and to provide a statistical basis 
for determining what direction the work should take. This would then allow for the 
identification of a research need and perhaps suggest the most suitable approach to be 
adopted for the study. 
There was obviously a requirement to compile a substantial quantity of 
accident data in a short a time as possible, because no substantial planning could be 
undertaken in the interim. This immediate need could be best fulfilled by performing 
a preliminary survey, to be followed, if necessary, by a more extended data gathering 
effort. As has already been mentioned, the initial survey encompassed over 2000 
Average fatality rates of 32% for piston-engined aircraft types and 21% for turbine-engined aircraft 
types have been reported as occurring in accidents world-wide in the period 1955-1974 (Taylor, 1975). 
2 "Combi" or combined passenger and cargo aircraft are designed to carry both passengers and cargo in 
the main passenger cabin. Changes necessary for this include the addition of side cargo doors, cargo 
handling equipment and local structural strengthening. 
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accidents. When the inclusion criteria had been finalised, it became possible to reduce 
this total down to 217 cases for inclusion within the study. 
The large number of incidents under consideration and the provisional nature 
of the initial analysis meant that only relatively basic information could be retained in 
each case. Because of this, at first it was decided to place the emphasis firmly `with 
determining whether or not each incident met the inclusion criteria described in the 
previous section. However, as the number of accidents under consideration' was 
progressively reduced, it became feasible to record more details in each case. 
The first priority was to include sufficient information to enable each incident 
to be readily identified with the possession of only the minimum of details. Thus, 
although the accidents were numbered and sorted by their date, the aircraft ; type, 
location of the accident and airline details were also noted. This then ? made : it 
straightforward to allocate fragmentary pieces of information, as often obtained from 
miscellaneous sources, to the appropriate incidents. 
The opportunity was also taken to include additional data describing the 
general nature of the scenario and indicating the role played by fire in each case. In 
most instances, this information consisted of basic numerical or categorical variables 
that were simple to interpret and might later prove relevant to the study of fire safety. 
However, limited provision was also made for the inclusion of some descriptive text, 
allowing pertinent observations to be noted. The simplicity of the data ensured that it 
would be straightforward to handle in a computer spreadsheet and be readily 
amenable to statistical analysis. 
The preliminary data-gathering stage thus resulted in the production` of a 
simple database containing 200 or so accidents that were thought to be relevant to the 
study. The individual records provided basic information covering a number of 
different aspects of each accident. This data can be conveniently grouped into five - 
categories, as shown in Figure 4.2. 
Identification Occupant General Fire and Impact General 
Details Fatalities Scenario Parameters Notes 
" date " killed " phase of flight " fire type e. g. 
" aircraft type " seriously injured " airport distance " fire fatalities " cause of accident 
" accident location " minor/unharmed " visibility/weather " significant impact " nature of egress 
" airline " terrain " fuselage damage " crash details 
" airline nationality " extent of fire 
Figure 4.2: 
- 
Information Categories Used for Initial Data Survey 
The definitions of the various information fields, together with reasons for choosing 
them, are given in the next section. 
It should be noted that it was not possible to find out all of the information 
required for the preliminary database, even by the time that the end of the study was 
reached. Thus some entries were filled with a "? ", signifying that the data could not be - 
determined. In other instances, data entries might have been uncertain or conflicting 
information was obtained from differing sources. Attempts were therefore made to 
indicate possible discrepancies in the general notes and the associated data flagged 
with a question mark e. g. "2-5 miles? " or "burnthrough fire? ". 
At the end of the data gathering effort, one final check of the preliminary 
database was made, using all the gathered information sources. Increased familiarity 
with the accident reports and cross comparison of different sources made it reasonable 
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to estimate some dataithat had still not been confirmed: This information consisted 
primarily of the accident fire type and the occurrence of significant fuselage 
destruction. Both of these could require subjective judgements to be made in some 
circumstances and thus discrete categorisation was not always possible without the 
possession of very detailed information. However, fire type and presence of fuselage 
damage were judged to be key variables in characterising the nature of aircraft 
accidents by statistical means. Their estimation was therefore thought to be justified in 
the limited number of cases where absolutely definite indications could not be 
obtained. 
4.2.2 Definitions for Categorical Classifications 
The preliminary database contained predominantly categorical or numerical 
information about each accident. Before embarking on the task of encoding the data, it 
was necessary to decide what categories of information and accident variables would 
be recorded. The previous section outlined the two key requirements for the initial 
survey; the positive identification of the 200 or so accidents under consideration and 
the provision of a basic statistical indication about the general character of aircraft fire 
accidents. Given the provisional nature of the survey and the necessity that the 
information be generated in as short a period of time as possible, it was only feasible 
to include data that would be directly obtainable from the accident reports. These, 
then, were the primary considerations when deciding the various classes of 
information to be included. A brief description of each of the information categories 
now follows. 
The details necessary for the definite identification of each accident were 
reasonably straightforward to ascertain. They consisted of the date, aircraft type 
involved, airline and the location of the accident. Although this information was 
seemingly elementary, care needed to ' be exercised in some circumstances. For 
example, slight discrepancies in the specification of an accident date have sometimes 
occurred between several information sources. These anomalies usually consist of 
plus or minus a single day and stem from differences in time zones, or cases in which 
an accident may have occurred soon after the local midnight. 
Confusion over the identification of an accident from inadequate data sources 
can also arise in many other circumstances. For example inconsistencies can often 
result when an aircraft type has been incorrectly designated, multi-national airlines are 
involved, certain types of aircraft leasing arrangement were used or the accident has 
occurred in a defunct country. Thus, in almost all instances, standard ICAO 
interpretations of accident identification details have been used, as contained in the 
CAA World Airline Accident Summary. 
The one exception has been in the separation of multiple aircraft incidents. In 
some circumstances more than one aircraft could be involved in a single accident, as 
in, for example, the infamous collision of two Boeing 747's on the island of Tenerife 
in March 1977. When (as with this case) the aircraft involved qualify independently 
for inclusion within the survey, they have been listed in separate entries. Justification 
for this is given on two accounts; the accident can be considered in more detail and, 
secondly, occupants of different aircraft may often be subjected to significantly 
different conditions for survival. 
The occurrence of occupant injuries and fatalities are obviously highly 
relevant in any study of air safety. It should be noted that the term "occupants" 
RZ 
includes the crew of the single aircraft under consideration, but not those aboard any 
additional aircraft involved that might be involved. Bystander- and emergency 
personnel on the ground were also excluded from the figures. 
The casualty figures are based on the standard ICAO criteria: for example, 
fatalities must occur within 72 hours of the incident, otherwise they are regarded as 
serious injuries (that happen to result in death in the longer term). Serious injuries are 
defined as those that require overnight hospitalisation. 
The phase of flight in which an accident occurs has been considered in several 
air safety studies. In terms of aircraft fire safety, the phase of flight gives a reasonable 
indication of the aircraft's fuel load. Thus, for example, incidents occurring during 
takeoff or the initial climb will involve significantly higher fuel loads than those 
Occurring in final approach or landing. The various stages of flight in commercial 
passenger operations are illustrated in Figure 4.3. Note that standard classifications 
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Figure 4.3: Stages of a Typical Airline Flight 
have been Used in defining the nine phases of flight. Thus, for exampl final approach 
is taken to be the period before landing when the aircraft has passed the outer ILSI 
marker, but has still not reached the airfield perimeter fence. 
The flight stage can also provide a general indication of the state of readiness 
and awareness of the aircraft's occupants. Passengers and crew are likely to be most 
prepared for emergency action during more stressful parts of the flight, such as in 
takeoff and the final approach. This is probably related to the fact that almost three- 
quarters of the accidents surveyed were found to occur in the takeoff, final approach 
or landing stages of flight. 
When an aircraft crashes some distance away from its intended landing point, 
more severe accidents tend to result. This is because the aircraft may have been 
uncontrollable, or else the crew were unaware of the close proximity of the (round. In 
addition to airport distance, the prevailing weather or visibility and the type of terrain 
present at the accident site may also relate to the expected severity of incidents. Thus, 
all three of these parameters were recorded in the initial survey. 
It is notable that the airport distance, visibility/weather and terrain each 
directly influence the deployment and subsequent effectiveness of emergency fire- 
lighting and rescue services. For example, an accident site 30 nautical miles from an 
airport, located on a mountain side in blizzard conditions and darkness, might require 
several hours to locate, whilst a landing overrun stopping just through the perimeter 
Instrument Landing System. 
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fence wiII usually he attended within Illirlutes. It was intended to pay close attention to 
examining these relationships at a later stage in the study. 
The classification of' the accident fires into categories has already been 
discussed in section 3.2.4. "there, it was related hove the fires were initially perceived 
as beim.! suited to grouping into 1,01 11- distinct types, namely iii1er"rral, inijnu"t, 
hrrrn1h, 'otrgh and exler, m/ fires. Ilowever, the possession of'more detailed infi0rnnation 
and the undertaking, of' further analysis showed that differentiation between these 
various classes of, fire might not necessarily be clear cut in many instances. 
Nevertheless, it was decided that a categorical breakdown of, lire types \\()111(1 be ()I' 
enormous value to the study, even if' it were necessarily approximate. I'Iºus the effort 
into classifying the fires by type was niaintailled and the results included in the 
prel11111Ilary database. 
Particular attention was paid to examining the relationship bet\\cen the cl'fects 
of' any impact and the severity of' the Iirc. Most of' the more serious accidents on 
record involve substantial structural disruption of' the aircr l't's l iselage and tile 
immediate ignition of* large quantities of' fuel. The implication ººI' this is that a 
relatively severe Impact must have occurred in such incidents, both to create 
significant f'ISC1,1gc daºma`ge and to rupture the main fuel tanks. Occupants of' tile 
aºircral't are in especial danger in such circumstances fier three reasons.. 1'hese are the 
fiºcts that substantial crash disruption and injuries are likely to luve occurred, Iire 
growth is ol'ten extremely rapid and the fact that the I'usclage structure m ay afford 
little or no effective fire protection liºr the aircraft occupants. 
As argued in Chapter ;, fier a number of' reasons, these circumstances appear 
not to be addressed satisfactorily in most aircr. ºIi fire-safety research undertaken to 
elate, yet they have occurred very often in past accidents. For this reason, the 
definition of' an ''impact' fire was developed, in order to highlight the Frequency at 
which these types ol, incidents occur. This definition, as well as those used liar 
idcntifj ino the three other fire types, are as IioIlows: - 
" 1/11c'r17c(l Fire, where the lire Starts inside the cockpit/cahin pressure 
shell. 
" 1: '. v-/c'rnal leire; where the lire starts outside the cockpit/cahin hrL'ssurc 
shell and no Significant lire penctrat loll occurs hebre all occupants are 
able to egress. 
" B! 11 /1ll1rOrrgh Fire; where fire starts outside the cockpit/alpin pressure 
shell and sionilicant lire penetration Occurs heliore all occupants are able 
to egress. 
" 11171)UrcI Fire, where significant alpin structural disruption takes place 
and fire occurs adjacent to a ruptured ill'ea, So that IIIIII)ecliate f II*C 
penetration is able to occur. 
In º»any of the accidents exaºnincd, significant nunihcrs of casuaItics Ii. ºvc 
resultcd prinuºrily Cron the effects of lire, rather than from the sustaining of crash 
trauma injuries. Some reports provide an indication of' how maºnv of these lire 
fatalities are thought to have occurred. In other cases it is possible to clrcluce the 
number car obtain estimates From alternative sources. 't'hese figures are of key interest 
primarily because they show the lethality of fire in aircraft accidents. As such, they 
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indicate the theoretical potential for the saving of lives through the introduction of fire 
safety improvements. -...:.:. It should be noted that accident deaths frequently result from a combination of 
injuries, including for example, acute shock, multiple fractures, severe burns. and - 
narcosis. Accident pathologists are instructed, however, to note all contributory 
factors and also indicate the ultimate cause of death wherever possible (ICAO, 1970). 
This necessitates that some caution be exhibited when attempting to assess the relative 
frequency of fire deaths, as distinctions between fire and impact trauma deaths may 
not always be clear-cut. It has been suggested previously in this chapter that when the 
primary cause of death cannot be determined conclusively, investigators are likely. to 
err towards declaring the occurrence of an impact fatality, rather than a fire victim. 
This may be for reasons of compassion, or else through inexperience in aircraft 
accident pathology. In consequence, the fire fatality rates obtained in the preliminary 
survey should probably be regarded as conservative estimates. 
The term "crash" was judged to be inappropriate for classifying the aircraft 
accidents because, in general usage, it implies that a violent collision and severe 
destruction have occurred. However, in reality many "crash" accidents have involved 
the aircraft coming safely to a stop with nothing more than a series of modest jolts. 
Often, the undercarriage may collapse, but deccelerations remain relatively mild, with 
the fuselage structure being left essentially intact. For this reason, the terms 
significant impact and significant fuselage disruption were formulated classify 
whether or not the aircraft same to a stop in a catastrophic manner. 
Impact denotes whether or not a significant impact was judged to have 
occurred to the aircraft during the incident. This must have involved one or more of 
the following: 
" Significant cabin structural disruption (e. g. crushing, 
ruptures or fuselage dislocation) 
" The aircraft coming to rest off a runway or off paved airport 
surfaces 
" The aircraft coming to rest in an unusual attitude 
" The occurrence of substantial fuel spillage S_ 
" Occupant deceleration injuries 
It should be noted that accidents in which an aircraft comes to rest off a runway or 
where passengers are exposed to large deccelerations almost always result in the 
collapse of the aircraft's undercarriage. This stems simply from the fact that aircraft 
landing gear are designed to withstand the same or lower forces than the rest of the 
airframe. Also, they are obviously one of the first parts of the aircraft to strike the 
ground or to hit obstacles in the event of an impact. Thus, with onset of any form, of 
significant structural damage, the undercarriage will almost always be amongst the 
first structural items to fail. Consequently, it was found that the most convenient way 
of establishing the occurrence of a significant impact was to ascertain whether or not ' -_ 
the aircraft remained standing on its undercarriage when it came to a rest. On this 
basis, significant impacts were found to have occurred in 86 percent of the accidents 
surveyed. 
Significant fuselage structural damage was found to occur in many of the more 
serious impact accidents. This was thought to be relevant in terms of occupant, 
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survivability and the ingress of fire into the cabin. Thus, the presence-of significant 
fuselage damage was defined by the occurrence of structural disruption (e. g. crushing, 
ruptures, seat distortion or door jamming) in cabin or cockpit areas. This was present 
in 63 percent of, the aircraft accidents under study. It was found to be significant that, 
in the absence of significant fuselage damage, almost all occupant deaths tended to 
occur primarily as. a result. of the effects of fire. Also, the fires were found to have 
slower growth rates and be generally less intense in accidents not involving severe 
impacts. 
The final section of information held in the database consisted of general notes 
and observations. These did not contain any categorical information and, being of an 
informal nature, tended to vary considerably in content from incident to incident. 
They are therefore not discussed here. 
4.3 Treatment and the Use of Data in Modelling 
4.3.1 Determining the most Relevant Accident Parameters 
The data obtained in the early stages of the survey ' was kept deliberately 
simple, for speed and convenience. As described above, this resulted in -two types 
information forming the basis of the initial database; categorical variables and 
numeric variables respectively. These two classes of information were fundamentally 
different in nature (the former resulting from discrete classifications and the latter 
being scalar quantities); thus they required contrasting methods of treatment. Some of 
these differences will be covered in the next two sections. 
However, before any of the information could be incorporated into the 
computer model, some exploratory work was necessary. It was desired to structure the 
data within the computer programme in a form that would enable statistically 
representative accident scenarios to be stochastically generated. This implies that the 
existence of any key interdependencies must be discovered and then incorporated as 
appropriate into the computer model. 
These statistical relationships within the accident data can be classified into 
two types; logical dependencies and latent dependencies. The former mainly exist 
between categorical parameters and stem directly from the definitions used in the data 
encoding. Logical dependencies are usually self evident; obvious examples in the 
present context include the fact that impact fires can only occur in the presence of 
significant fuselage disruption, or that if no impact occurs then all fatalities will be 
caused by the effects of fire. For a model to be internally valid, basic logical 
dependencies must be maintained in all circumstances. 
Latent dependencies are considerably more difficult to determine, as they 
result from the complex interactions that often occur in many accidents. Given that 
many the parameters involved occur randomly and are impossible to isolate, most of 
these relationships are poorly understood. Examples of latent dependencies might 
include the fact that fires are more likely to start on the right hand side of the aircraft, 
or the possibility that different types of fire are likely to occur in takeoff (as opposed 
to landing) accidents. A primary challenge in most forms of risk assessment 
modelling is the quantification of key latent dependencies that exist between model 
parameters. 
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The first task to be undertaken in analysis of the historical data was thus to 
discover the most important latent dependencies in the accident data. Given that we 
are concerned with fire safety, this involved determining which simple aspects or 
features of the accidents most closely corresponded with the occurrence of high fire 
fatality rates. In order to achieve this, an independent variable was needed, for 
representing the fire fatality rate of each incident. Thus, a figure of demerit (or more 
accurately, a fire lethality index) was defined: 
Fire Lethality = 
Number of Fire Deaths 
Total Number of Occupants Aboard Aircraft 
The use of this lethality index allowed the severity of each accident to be quantified in 
terms of the proportion of occupants who died as a result the fire. - 
The next step was to examine each of the accident parameters recorded in the 
initial accident database and discover which ones correlated closely with high 
incidences of fire deaths. This was achieved by coding the parameters for analysis 
with SPSS CHAID' software, a commercial computer application designed to 
facilitate segmentation modelling of statistical data. The variables found to be most 
closely associated with high rates of fire fatalities, together with the associated levels 
of confidence, are shown in Table 4.1. 
Ranking Accident Parameter x2 Significance Level 
(1) Fire Type 99% 
(2) Fuselage Disruption 95% 
(3) Phase of Flight 90% 
(4) Airport Distance 90% 
Table 4.1: Parameters Associated with High Fire Fatality Rates 
y 
ýl 
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It can be seen that fire fatalities depend closely on the type of fire involved, together 
with the presence of significant fuselage disruption. Less definite correlations were 
also obtained with the phase of flight in which the incident occurred and the distance 
of the accident site from the airport. 
It was desirable that the computer model generate these four parameters 'in 
order of their dominance. This is because when each successive parameter is decided, 
we are left with a smaller sub-set of historical cases with which to determine the next 
parameter. Consider, for example, the case of generating an accident scenario 
involving a burn-through fire without fuselage disruption, occurring after a significant 
impact on takeoff. This requires the setting of five variables, using the following 
logic: 
1. For determining the fire type, we have a total of 217 cases with which 
to work from. The historical probability that a burn-through fire has 
occurred is 60/217. 
Chi-squared Automatic Interaction Detector. 
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2. Assuming that a burn-through fire has been found to have occurred, we 
are left with 60 cases with which to work from. The historical 
probability that no significant fuselage damage has occurred is 42/60. 
3. Assuming that no fuselage damage has been found to have occurred, we 
are left with 42 cases with which to work. The historical probability that 
a significant impact has occurred is 31/42. 
4. Assuming that an impact has been found to have -occurred, we are left 
with 31 cases with which to work. The historical probability that the 
accident has occurred during takeoff is 10/31. 
5. Assuming that the accident has been found to have occurred during 
takeoff, we are left with 10 cases with which to work. This is only just 
sufficient enough to create a probability distribution for determining the 
distance of the accident site from the airport. 
It will thus be apparent that the numbers used in determining accident scenario 
parameters become progressively less accurate as smaller branches of the probability 
tree are reached. This underlines the importance of setting variables in a suitable 
order, to avoid having to rely on sparse data for determining highly significant 
interdependencies. Care must also be taken to ensure that logical dependencies are 
always satisfied in any scenario generation process. 
4.3.2 Use of Categorical Data 
The categorical information that was gathered mainly consisted of key facts 
describing the general nature of each incident. Examples include the type of aircraft 
involved, terrain present at the accident site, phase of flight in which the accident 
occurred and the type of fire involved. Given both the simplicity and the fundamental 
importance of this information, it was destined to form the basis for the first round of 
analysis and enable the first steps to be taken towards formulating the simulation of 
aircraft fire accidents. 
The discrete nature of categorical data lends itself to statistical analysis 
methods. However, before such techniques could be applied, it was necessary to deal 
with missing values that existed in some of the information categories. In most cases, 
data was found to be lacking in only a small number of the 217, incidents that were 
being studied. In these circumstances, the values of missing entries were assumed to 
be split in proportion to the breakdown of the data that had been obtained. This then 
enabled all subsequent analysis to be undertaken with a sample of 217 cases, 
simplifying calculations and facilitating cross-comparison of results between different 
information categories. 
The only exception to this occurred with the type of terrain present at the 
accident site. Here, it was found that this information could not be determined in 
almost a quarter of the accidents being studied. It was known that most of these 
incidents had occurred a significant distance from the airport. This implied that their 
terrain details would not be statistically consistent with the other three quarters of the 
accidents, the vast majority of which had occurred in the immediate vicinity of an 
airport. It was therefore inappropriate to assign missing values in accordance with 
data that had been obtained. 
As has already been seen, it transpired that the three accident scenario 
parameters that correlated most closely with high fire fatality rates were all categorical 
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in nature. Given that categorical information is comparatively straightforward to deal 
with, this greatly simplified the task of generating the more fundamental details of 
accident scenarios in the risk assessment model. The approach taken in this aspect of 
the analysis was to utilise a probability event tree, structured to determine the fire 
type, occurrence of impact and phase of flight for the accident being simulated. The 
construction of this scenario event tree is described in Chapter 6. _- 
Overall, it can be seen that, although categorical information about past 
accidents is inherently simple to deal with, it formed the foundations of the entire 
simulation analysis. When analysed with care and presented in an appropriate form, 
this type of data can yield important and often under-appreciated insights into accident 
safety. 
4.3.3 Obtaining Numerical Data 
Most accident reports provide a significant quantity of quantitative 
information about the events they describe. Whenever it is possible for investigators 
to make measurements or accurate estimations, such data is supplied in numerical, 
rather descriptive form. Examples of accident variables recorded directly from this 
type of source included: - 
" Date on which the event occurred 
" Number of people involved 
" Number of fatalities and injuries incurred 
" Distance of the accident site from the airfield 
" Number of emergency exits used 
" Wind direction and strength 
In addition to data that can be defined explicitly with numbers, other important 
features of accidents, although quantitative in nature, can only be described by verbal 
or pictorial means. Examples of this type of information include the level of structural 
damage sustained by an aircraft, the extent to which a fire eventually spread and the 
delay encountered before an exit could be opened. In order to simulate these aspects 
of aircraft accidents, it is usually necessary to translate descriptions of quantitative 
parameters into numerical form. When undertaking the accident survey, all such 
material was recorded fully in its original verbal or pictorial form, wherever practical. 
The analysis techniques then used to quantify this descriptive information into 
numbers are covered in Chapters 6,7 and 8. 
4.4 The Accident Data 
4.4.1 Two Stages of Information Gathering 
The survey of past accidents was effectively undertaken as a continuous 
process over a period of approximately two years. However, it has been seen that the 
analysis was performed in two distinct stages, leading to the production ofa 
preliminary and a main database, respectively. These two resources of information 
were implemented in different forms and designed for the collation of contrasting 
`3 
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types of data. Thus, the two databases complemented each other in use and, as a result 
both were utilised extensively through to the completion of the research. 
Brief details of each now follow. 
4.4.2 Preliminary Database 
The preliminary database was implemented in the form of a computer-based 
spreadsheet and contained basic summary information on each of the 217 events 
processed. This made it most suitable for processing of categorical and numerical data 
and screening out incidents that were not suited for inclusion within the study. Thus, 
the preliminary database originally encompassed over 2000 accidents; these were 
gradually reduced in number as more information on each event was obtained, until 
the final total was arrived at. The primary uses made of the spreadsheet data during 
model development were: - 
" Recording and resolving instances in which conflicting 
information about an incident had been obtained 
" Sorting accidents by different criteria 
" Grouping and counting similar categories of accident 
" Performing statistical tests 
" Plotting graphs 
A simplified version of the preliminary accident database is provided in Appendix A. 
4.4.3 Main Database 
The main accident database was recorded in the form of a paper filing system. 
Entries were accompanied by copies of original source material wherever this was 
feasible. An extensive summary was prepared for each of the accidents. Figure 4.4 
illustrates a typical example of one of these documents. This procedure enabled 
information from a wide variety of sources to compiled and recorded in a consistent 
format. Source locations were also noted, in case they became required for future 
reference. 
The primary use of the main accident database was in recording descriptive 
information about the incidents. Separate text fields were used to record scenario, 
impact, fire, cabin thermo-toxic environment and evacuation details. The information 
contained in each of these categories could then be collated across all 217 database 
entries and used to focus on specific aspects of accident scenarios. Some of the results 
of these activities will be examined in subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
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Chapter 5: Model Construction and Development 
5.1 Conceptualisation of the Risk Assessment Model 
5.1.1 General Requirements for the Computer Programme 
The aim of the research essentially involved the implementation and use of a 
computer based risk assessment model for the purpose of analysing issues in aircraft 
fire safety. The central task in this undertaking was the development of a 
comparatively large computer programme, which was to act as a 'tool for integrating 
the considerable quantity of information available on aircraft fire safety. This 
programme would simulate aircraft accidents and enable investigative studies to be 
performed into many aspects of air safety. It was thus apparent that conceptualisation 
of the computer model would play a pivotal role in determining the overall success of 
the study. 
However, before any substantive programming work, could begin, it was 
necessary to give some careful thought as to how the model would be implemented. It 
had to be ensured that the direction and scheduling of the computing activities were 
actually matched with the true needs of the research, rather than being left to emerge 
during the coding process. When the latter approach is taken, there is a significant 
danger that a loss of direction might occur. This can often manifest itself when 
computer programming becomes an end unto itself and sight is lost of the primary 
reason for undertaking the activity. Therefore, in order to avoid this possibility, it had 
to be determined exactly what was required of the model and what it would be 
feasible to achieve in the time available. This would then help to ensure that all 
computing activities were fully justified and that they were regulated on a pre-planned 
basis. 
5.1.2 Matching the Level of the Analysis to Data Quality 
One of the primary requirements for the tool was to accommodate the large 
amount of information obtained from a comparatively wide range of different sources. 
This data would come in many forms, encompassing crash, fire, evacuation and 
miscellaneous aspects of aircraft accidents. In some of these areas, the available 
information was of a very high quality, whereas in others, knowledge could often be 
relatively sketchy or perhaps incomplete. 
An important consideration in the computer modelling was that the overall 
accuracy of the analysis would be determined by the weakest links in the chain of 
knowledge used. This implied that the development of individual sub-models to a 
high degree of sophistication could not be justified whilst other parts of the analysis 
were still relatively, approximate. Thus, efforts needed to be directed towards 
improving the weakest parts of the overall risk analysis, before detailed refinements 
were added elsewhere. For example, no information was found to quantify the effect 
of impact injuries on the mobility of evacuating survivors and yet this linkage may 
play a fundamental role in determining fire casualties in many aircraft accidents. 
Influential mechanisms like these may be omitted or treated inadequately in 
many sophisticated computer simulation models, because they are inconvenient to 
address with computer methods. Conversely, excessively detailed methods are 
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commonly applied in other areas that happen to be more amenable to computational 
techniques. This may often be despite the fact that adequate data may ; never . 
be 
available to enable the full calibration of these complex models. 
Consequently, the development of the risk assessment model clearly needed to 
be undertaken in close conjunction with the analysis of the information from past 
accidents and scientific research. This would enable the level of the modelling to be 
matched to the quality of information that was actually available. Efforts would need 
to be focused in areas where knowledge was relatively poor or computer methods had 
not yet been established. Modelling techniques could then be optimised to make 
maximum use of limited information and "over simulation" avoided in other areas of 
the work. Therefore, in comparison with existing computer simulation models, weaker 
aspects of the overall analysis would be strengthened and areas of excessive resolution 
simplified to be more consistent with data availability. This should produce a greater 
level of consistency between the various sub-models and thus provide a' more 
balanced analysis overall. 
5.1.3 Linking of Sub-Models 
'The computer ' simulation model was required to deal with a number of 
dissimilar aspects of aircraft accidents, such as the occurrence of structural damage, 
fire growth and passenger evacuation The most logical way of implementing _this level of functionality was to structure the programme in the form of a' series of 
individual modules. For example, these sub-models might handle crash effects, fire 
and evacuation parts of the analysis respectively. This would then provide a basic 
structure for the programme, allowing specific parts of the model to be isolated and 
worked on independently, thus easing the task of development considerably. //,, 
However, as has been pointed out previously, many of the key processes in 
aircraft fire accidents comprise interactions occurring between different aspects of the 
incident. Consider, for example, the role of fuselage structural damage in facilitating 
the rapid ingress of fire, or the detrimental effects of smoke on occupant evacuation. 
These interrelationships may often play a large role in characterising the nature of an 
accident and thus they had to be incorporated into any risk analysis. This obviously, 
implied that there needed to be a significant degree of communication and interaction 
between the various sub-models of the computer programme. 
In practical terms, this meant that a substantial quantity of information would 
need to be accessible by more than one part of the programme. This shared data might 
need to be accessed in one of two ways; by "read-only" access or "read-write" access. 
In the former case, a sub-model would look up information in a passive manner and 
make no modifications to it. For example, a value for smoke density inside a cabin 
might be referred to when calculating the speed of a passenger's movement. 
In contrast, some sub-models might require read-write access toshared 
information. This allows a model to look up data, update it and then re-save it for 
other parts of the programme to work with. Obviously, this involves a bi-directional 
flow of information and as a result this process may be significantly less efficient or 
even impossible to implement in some modelling environments. As an example, the a 
need for read-write access might occur when incrementing the temperature of a 
section of fuselage structure that is adjacent to a fire. The current temperature would 
be looked up, used to estimate a level of radiative heat absorption and then a new 
temperature value stored in place of the old one. 
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-ý The existence of an adequate level of cross communication between sub- 
models would be of paramount importance to the success of the overall programme. 
The most obvious way of achieving this would have been to play safe and connect 
"everything" with "everything" throughout. However, this is a mistake frequently 
made by inexperienced or undisciplined computer programmers and it usually results 
in an impenetrably complex programme. Clearly, care would need to be exercised 
over the implementation of the model, if this type of "tangled spaghetti" structure 
were to be avoided. Z 
ne way of achieving this was to clearly define the inputs and outputs of each 
sub-model and restrict the numbers of these parameters to the absolute minimum. This 
tactic can be extended further by gathering together sets of related information into a 
data group or structure and handling them as if they were a single entity/ example 
of this technique is shown in Figure 5.1, which shows, for the sake o clarity, a one- 
person #1's sex 
EVACUATION person #1's weight INCAPACITATION 
SUB-MODEL person #1's metabolic rate 
SUB-MODEL 
person #1's current dose 
(a) passing unstructured data 
EVACUATION 
(PERSON] 
#1, sex, weight INCAPACITATION 
SUB-MODEL metabolic rate SUB-MODEL 
current dose 
(b) passing structured data 
Figure 5.1: Model Simplification Through Structuring of f Data 
way flow of information between two sub-models. This data consists of a number of 
characteristics describing the passenger under consideration. Rather than being 
communicated between sub-models individually, these separate attributes could be 
grouped together into a "person" and treated as a single object, of pre-defined 
structure. This then greatly simplifies (and usually speeds up) communication of 
passenger information between the two sub-models. 
5.1.4 User-Interface Requirements 
The overriding purpose of the risk assessment was to enable the systematic 
demonstration, exploration and analysis of the events that occur in aircraft fire 
accidents. This task had to be achieved in the context of a PhD study and thus it 
would need to include the definition, planning, researching and writing up of the 
work. All of these tasks had to be completed within the three year period. It was 
therefore apparent that the modelling work would have to be directed primarily at 
meeting the needs of the research. There would be little opportunity for adding 
extensive refinements or accommodating the requirements of other potential users. 
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Thus, the end product would consist of a prototype research tool, possibly quite basic 
and utilitarian in appearance, but with rather more emphasis placed on functionality, 
adaptability and in-built analysis capabilities. 
The first impression provided to an observer when using or demonstrating any 
computer programme is derived from the qualities of the user-interface. This interface 
is usually required to perform three main tasks: 
1. provide some degree of control over the programme 
2. indicate the current status of the activity being undertaken 
3. store and convey the values of any results obtained 
In the case of the present study, all three of these functions would be desirable fdr 
incorporation into the risk assessment tool. However, because of the 'research' 
emphasis of the work, rather different levels of priority would be afforded to' each'of 
these requirements for the user-interface of the envisaged simulation -- tool. 
Accordingly, each of these three aspects will now be considered in turn. 
There was obviously a need to provide some form of control over the 
programme. This would be necessary, for instance, to allow specific types of 
aircraft 
accident to be set-up and sensitivity studies or verification work to be undertaken. The 
most satisfactory way of achieving this would be to have provided an interactive 
control interface, operating as part of the overall model. This might consist of a series 
of menus, data entry dialogues or even an advanced windows-based point and click, 
environment. 
Alternatively, it was possible to effect control over the programme by, directly 
modifying its source code and the values of input data read from pre-stored files. For 
example, this could involve fixing decisions, event paths or the values of probabilistic 
variables, and editing the values of parameters read from input data files. F These 
activities could only be undertaken by a user that was reasonably familiar with 
internal workings of the model and the language or modelling environment used in its 
construction. Although this might prove to be unsatisfactory in a more general 
context, it would be perfectly adequate for the purposes of the PhD study. In the end, 
time limitations were to force the adoption of the second approach. The inclusion of a 
comprehensive control interface would have made the tool rather more convenient to 
use. However, the time required for its construction was better invested in improving 
other aspects of the programme, as will now be detailed. 
The second function performed by the user-interface of many simulation 
programmes is to show the current status of the simulation process. This allows 
progress to be monitored and can help to establish how the final outcome of a run was 
reached. The status of a model may be conveyed by displaying the values 'of 
numerical variables, by plotting time-history graphs or perhaps via some form, of 
pictorial animation. The latter can be especially useful for illustrating the role that 
dynamic behaviour might play in a model, for showing spatial relationships, or in 
situations where the values of many parameters are changing continuously. 
Precisely these kinds of requirements were expected to be encountered in the 
analysis of aircraft fire accidents. The most obvious case in point is with the 
simulation of passenger evacuation, where perhaps hundreds of individuals might be 
moving through a complex arrangement of seating, aisles, galleys and exits. 
Predictably, many of the evacuation models to have been produced by other -. 
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researchers have - made use of graphical displays for illustrating the movements of 
evacuees (Galea 1993; Potel, 1995; Cagliostro, 1984). 
Other aspects of the accident simulation could also benefit from presentation 
in graphical format. For example, fire position and size, the location of cabin 
wreckage and the cabin thermo-toxic environment each consist of spatial distributions 
and are thus are probably best conveyed in diagrammatic form. All these different 
outputs of the analysis model could represent a considerable quantity of information 
and it was anticipated that it might be difficult to portray all of them simultaneously in 
a single display. Graphical computer interfaces can frequently appear cluttered, 
gimmicky or confusing when too much information is provided ý without a clear 
structure. It now appears to be widely appreciated that over-complicated displays are 
rarely acceptable, even if a computer application is to be used exclusively by trained 
specialists (Helander, 1987). 
In the case of the current study, it was expected that the computer model 
would be presented to people from a diverse range of disciplines, such as academics, 
engineers, psychologists and government officials. Thus it would be necessary to take 
especial care when designing any graphical display for the model and restrict the 
information presented to the minimum necessary. 
The final, and perhaps the most important, task performed by a simulation 
programme's user-interface is to display or record the end result of a run. In terms of 
the current study, these results might consist primarily of the number of occupant 
fatalities and injuries sustained in an accident, together with their causes and other 
pertinent details of the accident. This data is relatively concise and could be provided 
in the form of a text output, written either to the screen or a results file. 
At a second level, it would be desirable to obtain causative information, 
indicating how and why casualties were predicted to have occurred in an accident 
simulation. This was obviously a far more challenging task, as it would involve the 
examination of all aspects of the incident, including the roles played by impact 
disruption, fire growth, exit availability and the progress of the evacuation. One way 
of achieving this might be to record a series of snapshots from an animated display of 
the accident simulation. Alternatively, if no graphical display was constructed, then 
time histories of important parameters, such as fire size, cabin conditions and 
evacuation rate, could be recorded during the course of a run. These would then be 
plotted alongside the predicted casualty figures and used to provide a greater insight 
into the development of events and the factors influencing casualty rates. 
In the end, it was decided not to spend too much time pre-planning how the 
final results of the simulation programme would be presented to an observer. It was 
anticipated that the user-interface would have to show the progress of a run in 
reasonable detail, even if only for the purpose of facilitating model development. Thus 
extensive information would be available throughout the simulation process and it 
would be relatively straightforward to store whatever data that might be required for 
analysis purposes. Results could then either be looked up manually, or some form of 
automatic formatting and presentation could be added, if desired. 
Overall, the main requirement for the user-interface of the programme would 
be to clearly demonstrate the progress and outcome of the accident simulation 
process. This would essential for undertaking the detailed analysis of accidents, 
investigating issues in aircraft fire safety and for programme development purposes. 
Other aspects of the interface, such as convenience of model use and the provision of 
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automated analysis and presentation of results were judged to be of only secondary 
importance. 
Thus the final programme would consist of a prototype simulation tool, 
intended for undertaking exploratory studies in the context of a research environment. 
It would not be suited to use by non-expert users, or for semi-commercial distribution 
to interested parties. 
The task of communicating the simulation process to observers required much 
consideration. The model could easily be constructed to produce an impenetrable 
mass of abstruse output data. This information might be decipherable to a computer 
specialist, but would probably prove meaningless to those possessing a, different 
background. The only alternative to this would be to utilise some form of graphical 
display for conveying the working of the model, perhaps utilising computer animation 
techniques. 
The primary aim when building the user-interface was therefore to enable 
ideas to be clearly demonstrated and results presented in a form that would be 
straightforward to comprehend for a general audience. 
5.1.5 Perceived Customers for the Work 
It has been stated that the output of the computational work was expected to be 
a prototype simulation and risk assessment tool, tailored primarily for, meeting 
academic needs. However, given that the study was based upon the analysis . of 
historical information and scientific findings, it was apparent that the tool could 
potentially be used outside of academia. As a result of this, it was wanted to ensure 
that the model was capable of being used directly for addressing real-world problems, 
rather than just for the analysis of theoretical issues that might have been contrived for 
purely academic purposes. Thus, on occasions, it was found helpful to think in terms 
of an end "customer" for the risk assessment model, when this was practicable within 
the constraints of the PhD programme. This could sometimes help to strengthen the 
sense of direction possessed by the study and assured that the work being undertaken 
was also relevant in the context of air and fire safety. 
Those most immediately involved with the study were the author and the 
supervisory staff overseeing the research. Although the interests of these individuals 
were essentially of an academic nature, their scope might well have extended beyond 
the boundaries of a PhD study. For example, there was a possibility that the ,. work 
could form the basis for a larger project, be used to complement existing programmes '. 
of research, or be continued by other students. In fact, midway through the study, a 
background agenda evolved, directed towards the securing of further funding- to 
enable continuation of the work beyond the duration of the PhD. This had little direct 
effect on the direction of the research during the three year study, but it certainly 
served to focus the mind at times. 
In the longer term, customers outside of academia might possibly exist for the 
work being undertaken. Most obviously, these would comprise those concerned with 
the analysis of fire safety in passenger aircraft. In addition, it would be comparatively' 
straightforward to extend the study to encompass other modes of passenger 
transportation, such as coaches, trains and ships. Ultimately, almost any type of 
enclosed environment that possessed a fire risk could be simulated; for example off- 
shore platforms, mines, factories, auditoriums or other constricted buildings. 
"mot 
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For the purpose of model development, it was assumed that the work would only be 
applied within the context of commercial aircraft operations. Even with this 
restriction, potential users existed in a number of different areas and at several levels 
within the air transport industry. For example, each of the following groups posses 
responsibilities or significant interests in matters of aircraft fire safety: - 
" Regulatory authorities 
" Air safety researchers 
" Accident investigation bodies 
" Airport Emergency Services 
" Transport safety groups 
" Aircraft insurers 
" Airlines 
" Cabin interior outfitters 
" Aircraft manufacturers 
During the course of the study, presentations were made to individuals representing 
the first two categories in the list. The detailed questioning that was received from 
these experts was found to be of invaluable help in refining many aspects of the work. 
5.2 Utilisation of the Model 
5.2.1 Developmental Usage and Performing Formal Runs 
The simulation model would eventually be used in two distinct ways. The first 
of these consisted of developmental and feasibility testing, undertaken to establish the 
basic functionality of the tool. This work was performed in conjunction with the 
analysis of accident and experimental data, and it comprised most of the day-to-day 
activity in the second and third quarters of the PhD. These runs played a fundamental 
role in programme development and they constituted the core knowledge building and 
encapsulation process within the research. 
The envisaged use of the completed model was as an-integrated tool suitable 
for undertaking risk exploration and formal risk assessment studies. This was only 
achievable once all sub-models had been implemented (even if only in a very basic 
form) and it enabled the overall calibration of the simulation model to be verified. The 
programme was used in this manner during the second half of the study, usually when 
giving demonstrations, making final adjustments and obtaining formal results. This 
mode of operation can be interpreted as a knowledge refinement and exploration 
process. 
The use of the early versions of the model in developmental testing was found 
to be extremely valuable when interpreting the historical accident records and 
analysing findings of experimental research. When attempting to integrate this data 
mentally, it was found to be possible to overlook or, underrate the importance of some 
types of information. This was liable to occur when the material in question was 
found to be uninteresting, or appeared to be insignificant in the overall analysis. This 
could potentially have lead to a degree of complacency or under-appreciation 
developing in some areas of the work. However, when attempting to implement and 
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link certain sub-models, the existence of information gaps and inadequacies, rapidly 
became apparent. These forced a return to the accident database and gathered 
literature, sometimes with a "shopping list" of data that was actually required for 
modelling purposes. Often, it was impossible to obtain the level of information that 
was needed. Sometimes, however, it was found that significant data had been 
disregarded, or else was possible to derive by some other means. Using the model in 
this way also forced past accidents and scientific results to be dissected and analysed 
in a systematic manner. This then helped to ensure that maximum use was being made 
of all the information resources that were available. 
The fact that the data desired could not always be obtained was, in many cases, 
a significant finding in itself. Some of the weakest areas in current knowledge were 
observed to be critically important; for example in rates of fire growth, the effects of 
smoke on evacuee behaviour, or the role of crash disruption in accidents. One 
particular use of the model in these instances was in testing the sensitivity of findings 
to variations in the estimated values of missing data. If the influence of these 
parameters was found to be significant, then efforts could be directed towards 
maximising the accuracy of estimates used. This might involve resorting to the coding 
of qualitative information, the factoring of data obtained in a different context, or even 
to making use of educated guesswork, if circumstances dictate. Although these types 
of approach might appear crude, acceptable results may often be obtained in cases 
where it is unfeasible to apply more formal methods of analysis. 
5.2.2 Probabilistic Methods and Monte Carlo Simulation 
The probabilistic character of aircraft accidents means that a single set of 
initial circumstances generally has the potential to produce a range of different 
outcomes. The development of a scenario may often be determined by seemingly 
insignificant- details and through the interactions of many complex phenomena: - The 
paths that events can take may often be very sensitive to the influence of these factors. 
This can lead to the nature of an accident undergoing a complete change in a very 
short space of time. 
For the purpose of risk assessment, it is usually impossible to quantify or 
predict these types of characteristics in a deterministic manner. Thus, the behaviour of 
such a system cannot be accurately established by examining individual incidents in 
isolation. It is therefore necessary to analyse a range of events, sufficient enough_ in 
number to ensure that a representative spectrum of potential outcomes have been 
considered. Then, in areas where discrete quantification is not practicable or where 
understanding might be poor, the observed characteristics of a sub-system can mbe 
encapsulated in the form of a probability distribution. 
In all but the most simple of cases, it is impossible to solve for the effects Of 
these probability functions analytically. However, if the risk analysis is implemented 
in the form of a computer model, it is possible to run multiple trials and explore the 
role of probabilistic parameters. Random number generators can be used to initialise 
values for these parameters automatically from their probability distributions. This 
then allows a computer model to perform a series of simulations, each one of which , 
produces a different outcome. `- -_ Monte Carlo simulation techniques use this type of procedure to numerically 
solve for the characteristics of probabilistic systems (Kalos and Whitlock, 1986; '- 
Kritzman, 1993). They involve the continued repetition of a probabilistic process and 21 
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recording of the outcomes obtained. If enough trials are undertaken, the behaviour of 
the system under study can be mapped out in a systematic manner. The results of 
Monte Carlo simulations are commonly plotted in the form of frequency or 
probability density distributions. These show how the relative likelihood of a 
particular outcome can be dependent on the values of key parameters. Figure 5.2 
shows an example of output data obtained from a Monte Carlo simulation of a fire 
evacuation from a building (Phillips, 1994). Note that, because the method produces 
results in the form of a discrete series, data fitting and smoothing techniques can often 
be appropriate. 
Typically, hundreds or perhaps thousands of runs might have to be performed before 
statistically reliable results begin to emerge, even for simulations that only involve a 
modest number of probabilistic variables. This stems from the fact that the number of 
trials (and thus computational time) needed to obtain an adequate solution increases 
exponentially with the "degrees of freedom" present in the system (Chorafas, 1965). 
In consequence, variance reduction techniques and adaptive solution procedures are 
commonly employed to significantly reduce the number of runs that need to be 
undertaken (Rubinstein, 1981). 
However, it should be noted, that systems of practical interest frequently 
involve too many probabilistic variables for it to be practical to obtain global solution 
sets to a high order of accuracy. A factor that is also relevant is that it can very 
difficult to visualise relationships in more than three or four dimensions. Thus, Monte 
Carlo techniques tend to be employed either for the purpose of undertaking relatively 
approximate exploratory studies at a global level, or in locally optimising the values 
of a few key parameters (Phillips, 1994). 
It can be essential to perform global exploration in cases where a system has 
the potential to behave in a non-uniform or otherwise unexpected manner. One 
example of this in the context of air safety is in the emergency evacuation of aircraft. 
Figure 5.3 shows an approximate frequency distribution for escape times achieved in 
44 past aircraft accidents. It can be seen that about ninety percent of the evacuations 
were completed within a period of four minutes. However, a distinctive "tail" exists in 
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Figure 5.2: Multiple Regression Analysis of Monte Carlo Output 
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Figure 5.3: Historical Aircraft Evacuation Times 
the distribution, centred at around the five minute interval; perhaps hinting at the 
occurrence of a specific type of difficulty in some of the incidents. Monte : 
Carlo 
techniques are capable of faithfully revealing this type of anomaly, provided that 
global exploration is undertaken. In contrast, the use of a deterministic analysis would 
yield no more than a mean value for a given parameter, perhaps with the provision of 
estimates for likely error bounds or statistical variance. 
5.2.3 Intended Use of the Model 
When completed, the simulation model was expected to constitute an 
integrated risk assessment tool, suitable for the examination of many different aspects 
of aircraft fire safety. As has been stated previously, the primary customer's for this 
capability were envisaged as being those directly concerned with ensuring the future 
safety of air transport operations. However, the approach adopted in the simulation 
analysis would mean that the work would be meaningful to individuals working in 
specialised aspects of fire safety or perhaps those with a more general involvement in 
airline operations. Examples of these groups might include researchers in disciplines 
such as fire modelling, combustion toxicology, behavioural psychology and aircraft 
crashworthiness, together with aircraft designers, aircrew members and air travellers. 
This could imply that there might be a requirement for the model to be interpreted on 
a number of different levels. These could range from stimulating an interest shown by 
a lay observer, through to the provision an expert with a specific insight into one 
particular aspect of safety. Although facilitating this range of usage lay outside the 
formal 
In the broadest sense, it would be capable of communicating the true nature of 
aircraft fire accidents to those concerned with issues in aircraft fire safety. At , 
an 
intermediate level, the model could be used to examine safety trends and then help to 
identify and explore areas suited to more detailed analysis. The ultimate use of the 
tool would be to investigate specific safety issues and the possible effects of 
introducing new safety policies in an attempt to deal with them. This would almost 
certainly require the provision of results in a quantitative form and the documenting of 
all assumptions made, for predictions to possess adequate credibility. Some examples 
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of the types of topic that could be addressed in this manner are provided in the next 
section. 
5.2.4 Current Issues in Air Safety 
Many issues within the area of aircraft fire safety could potentially be 
addressed by the work undertaken. Currently, some of the more prominent of these 
include: - 
" Quantifying the effects of recent improvements in cabin and 
fire safety legislation 
" The utility of passenger protective breathing equipment (or 
"smoke-hoods") 
" Fire safety concerns in future Very Large Aircraft (VLA) 
designs 
" The potential for aircraft fire hardening 
" The role of emergency services in aircraft fire accidents 
" The potential effectiveness of cabin water spray systems 
" Training of aircraft crew to deal with fire emergencies 
" Fire hazards of new aircraft materials 
5.3 Choice of Modelling Environment 
5.3.1 Requirements for the Programming Environment 
Before embarking on the implementation of the risk assessment model, it was 
necessary choose the computer environment to be used. The adoption of an 
inappropriate simulation application or programming language could seriously 
handicap the programme development process and reduce the utility of the final 
product. Given that the model was expected to constitute a reasonably large computer 
programme and that it had to be constructed within a limited time scale, considerable 
attention was paid to the choice of computing environment. This involved the 
evaluation both software and hardware aspects of the various options available for 
consideration. 
Excellent computer facilities were provided at the host institution, comprising 
of at least four different classes of computer platform, each with their associated 
operating systems and several types of modelling software. Although this range of 
choice was obviously welcome, it meant that there were up to a dozen or so potential 
computing environments available. Each of these possessed its own particular set of 
relative advantages and disadvantages and none could be excluded from consideration 
immediately. Thus, it was necessary to determine the key priorities in computing 
needs and then use these to arrive at the most appropriate choice of modelling 
environment. 
Perhaps the predominant computing requirement was a need for ample 
processing speed. It was anticipated that some parts of the analysis would require 
many repetitive calculations to be performed, involving different types of 
mathematical operation. For example, modelling of a cabin's thermo-toxic 
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environment might require iterative multiplication to an accuracy of many decimal 
places. In contrast, the simulation of passenger evacuation could entail simple integer 
pattern matching procedures, although these would probably need to be undertaken 
many thousands of times. The rate at which these types of calculations - could; be 
performed would determine the speed at which the overall risk-assessment model 
would operate - the "run-time" performance of the tool. 
A related, but separate, consideration was the speed at which a computer can 
interpret or compile programming instructions and create a runable (model - 
the 
"compilation" speed. This would be very important in the development process, as it 
determines the time delay between the making of a change to a programme's code and 
execution of the programme in order to test the effect of the modification. However, 
the compilation time has not effect when actually using the tool. 
With some of the computing environments under consideration, there was a 
significant imbalance between these two aspects of processing speed; - 
in some 
systems, a model could be modified very quickly, but then would , only run - at 
relatively slow speed (or vice versa). Clearly, performance needed to judged on the 
basis of both the run-time and compilation speeds achieved. 
A second aspect of the computing needs was the necessity for a flexible and 
convenient development environment. Ideally, it should be possible to construct the - 
risk assessment model in the form of a series of separate modules, '-with clearly 
defined interactions occurring between them. This would help to ensure 'that" the 
programme would be clearly structured, thus aiding the development process and 
making modification more straightforward. Other features that would make model 
construction more convenient included the provision of ý adequate de-bugging; ' error 
handling and programme editing facilities. There was a need for adequate 
functionality at a lower level, in terms of numerical handling, availability. ' of 
mathematical functions, data structuring capabilities and file reading/writing facilities. 
The potentially large size of the risk assessment model was recognised as 
being a significant issue when assessing computing development needs. For example, 
the, evacuation of Boeing 747 aircraft might involve the simulation of over 600 
passengers and crew. Each of these individuals might posses many attributes, such äs 
speed, position, direction, chosen route, incapacitation level, etc., which represents a 
significant quantity information. The aircraft's cabin configuration would, also be -- 
relatively complicated and its geometry obviously needs to be represented somehow. 
All of this information had to be instantaneously accessible have to be stored within 
the computer's memory, or alternatively, looked up from a data storage device as it 
was needed during the course of a simulation run. The latter option would be certain, 
to slow down execution of the model to an unacceptable degree and thus could not be . 
used. Therefore, there was a requirement for the chosen computing system to possess 
ample memory capacity, or RAM', in order for it to cope with the analysis of larger . 
aircraft types. 
A growing number of computer programmes now utilise graphical displays to - 
present their outputs. These may range from being indispensable aids for conveying of 
complex results, through to being gimmicky or even utterly indecipherable 
distractions. Consequently, this aspect of the modelling activity would need to ' be 
approached with clear foresight and disciplined restraint. However, given the potential 
Random Access Memory. '- 
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complexity of the evacuation modelling -work, the use of' some form of, animated 
display could well prove to be essential, even if only for the purpose of programme 
development. Thus, it was considered that the availability of graphical output 
capabilities should constitute one of the primary requirements in the choice of 
modelling environment. 
The final factor governing the choice of programming environment was the 
ability to use the risk assessment model on a range of different computers. For 
example, some of the languages and simulation software packages were only 
compatible with one particular type of computer platform. Whilst this might not prove 
to be critical for the undertaking of the PhD study, a requirement for moving the tool 
to different platforms might arise in the longer term. 
5.3.2 Computer Platform Considerations 
Three different classes of computer were available for constructing the risk 
assessment model. In ascending order of capability were IBM compatible Personal 
Computers (PCs), UNIX workstations and a mainframe supercomputer. The technical 
characteristics of the machines available from each of these three families are 
summarised in Table 5.1. 
Machine 
P 
Type - _, _ º ____ 
PC PC Workstation Workstation Mainframe 
486DX Pentium Alpha Alpha 'Cray J (x4) Processor 66MHz 75MHz 150MHz 175MHz 240MHz 
Peformance 41 0 0.83 5.2 7.7 10.6 Index . 
Memory 8Mb 16Mb 64Mb 128Mb 512Mb 
Graphics 
Capability yes yes yes yes no 
Table 5.1: Computer Platforms Available for Use 
It can be seen that there was a large range in the capabilities of the machines on offer. 
The performance index provides an approximate guide to the relative processing 
speed for a typical numerical simulation programme. As outlined in the previous 
section, the installed memory indicates the size of problem that can be handled 
efficiently. 
Although the Cray mainframe computer appeared provide the best overall 
performance, it was ruled out of contention for the purpose of model development for 
several reasons. These included the restriction to usage of the Fortran programming 
language, the inability to run programmes interactively and the lack provision for 
graphics display facilities. Thus, effectively, the choice of platform lay between PCs 
and workstations. Both of these machines ran on desktops, possessed a wide-range of 
software for model development purposes and provided excellent graphics 
capabilities. Although PCs are in far more widespread use outside of a research 
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environment, workstations appeared to provide significant advantages in' terms of 
processing speed.: The Pentium PCs available possessed adequate, run-time 
performance, but their, compilation speed and limited memory capacity might' have 
become marginal as the work progressed. 
In consequence, it was decided to perform the development of the programme 
on a workstation, as this -appeared to be by far the best option for, meeting the 
requirements of the research. However, it appreciated that it would be 5wise try to 
preserve the option of moving the simulation tool across to the rapidly developing PC 
environment at some stage in the future. 
5.3.3 General Purpose Simulation Software 
Many types of computer software have been developed specifically to 
facilitate the construction of simulation and analysis models. Problems encountered in 
widely differing contexts can sometimes posses a surprisingly similar set of features. 
In such cases, it may be possible to analyse certain aspects of an issue with the use of 
a generic computer simulation tool. Examples of frequently encountered simulation 
software include GPSS, SIMAN, SIMSCRIPT and SLAM (Law and Kelton, 1991). 
These tools must obviously posses sufficient functionality and flexibility to deal with : 
a considerable range of potential analysis requirements. Features typically provided 
include: - -- 
" Automated random number generation "-- 
" Handling of probability distributions 
" Simulation clock facilities 
" Decision and control functions 
" List or queue handling 
" Data collection, analysis and presentation 
" Error detection 
These built in capabilities can often make model construction more straightforward 
that with the use of a lower level programming language, such as Basic, Fortran or C 
For example, far less (or even no) computer code has to be written, models tend to be 
automatically structured, changes can be implemented more rapidly and results' are 
easier to interpret. This can result in a more productive work environment, where a 
greater proportion of efforts are directed at exploring of ideas, rather than struggling 
directly with a computer's operating system. 
The use of general purpose simulation software can also impose some 
significant disadvantages on the model development process, however. The. most 
significant of these is that simulation software packages are diverse and many, in 
number. This means that knowledge of their proprietary languages are far, ' less 
widespread than in the case of common programming languages. Also, models tend to 
possess no stand alone demonstration capability; for a particular machine to run: a 
model, it usually requires the simulation software to have been fully installed on it. 
High licensing costs tend to inhibit the achievement of wider acceptance in this way. 
From a technical point of view, general purpose simulation environments are usually 
less efficient in their use of computing resources (i. e. speed, memory and graphics)' 
than a programming language, providing that the latter is optimally utilised. 
The use of a general purpose simulation application was not given prolonged - 
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consideration when planning the modelling -activities. The essential reason for this 
was that no suitable software was installed on any of the computers available for use 
and no funds available to enable its procurement. However, some time was spent 
discussing and exploring the two simulation packages in use with other fire safety 
researchers (Phillips, 1992; BRE, 1995). These were running on computer platforms 
that were not available for use at the host institution and were called STELLA and 
NeXTStep Objective C respectively. In spite of the short time spent on active hands-on 
testing, it was possible to gain many insights about the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of these tools. For example, they were very convenient for constructing 
visually appealing models in a very short time, but ultimately could be restrictive in 
terms of functionality, the use of computer resources and lack of widespread 
availability. One particular danger was that too much attention could be paid to 
graphical presentation aspects and on the provision of a comprehensive user interface, 
often to the detriment of real modelling activities. Thus, it was possible to create, a 
model that appeared to be very impressive on first impression, but which, in fact, 
incorporates very few rigorously detailed workings behind the graphical displays. 
A series of simple models was constructed in STELLA in order to explore its 
capabilities. This tool was found to be suited primarily, for the simulation of 
continuous systems, represented by building blocks such as "stocks", "flows" and 
"converters". Figure 5.4 shows an example of how a type of continuous flow analogy 
can be used to determine the type of fire scenario present in aircraft fire accidents. The 
AIRCRAFT A FIRE 
START ACCIDENT FLIGHTS OCCURS 
IMPACT YES has an NO NON 
Impact IMPACT 
ACCIDENT occur d? ACCIDENT 
MAJOR YES Is the NO CABIN 
FUSELAGE Impact a IS STILL 
DAMAGE big ono? INTACT 
IMPACT YES Is the NO ANOTHER NO is ! ra YES INTERNAL 
FIRE HAS fire TYPE OF Inside the FIRE HAS 
OCCURRED nearby? FIRE cabin? OCCURRED 
FINISH FINISH 
BURNTHRO' YES does tho NO EXTERNAL 
FIRE HAS fuse/ape FIRE HAS 
OCCURRED mak7 OCCURRED 
FINISH FINISH 
Figure 5.4: Schematic of STELLA Fire Scenario Model 
model processes a series of aircraft accidents and, for each of them, traverses the 
branches of a probability tree and arrives at one of four possible fire scenarios. 
Ironically, perhaps, this constitutes a discrete decision making process, represented in 
the form of a continuous system. This serves to illustrate how in-built limitations of 
"general purpose" simulation software can, sometimes be circumvented by using 
utilising existing capabilities in an innovative way. However, other restrictions in 
STELLA could. not be overcome so easily, such as the inability to deal with multi- 
dimensional arrays and the limited size of problem that it was able to handle. 
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These types of simulation environments could well have proven --useful 
for 
development and integration of small scale sub-models or for prototyping the logic of 
new ideas. However, they were fundamentally unsuited for the task of building of a 
large multi-module simulation tool. 
5.3.4 Programming Languages: Basic, Fortran and C 
Many types of computer simulation models are constructed with the use 'of 
common computer programming languages, such as Ada, Basic, C,, Fortran' and 
Pascal. These-languages generally provide a lower level of functionality than general 
purpose simulation environments, requiring rather more effort to achieve a given task. 
In the context of the present research, three standard programming languages were 
available for use, namely Basic, C and Fortran. It would have been possible to 
construct a satisfactory simulation model with either of these options. However, each 
language possesses its own particular set of relative advantages and disadvantages; 
thus it was worthwhile making a careful choice between the three. 
Basic is perhaps the most straightforward of the languages to learn and is 
reasonably flexible, provided that large quantities or complex structures of data do not 
have to be handled. The time required for programme development is, short, and 
widely used extensions to the language enable graphical displays and user-interfaces 
to be constructed with ease in PC operating systems. Limitations of Basic include its 
poor numerical efficiency when compared with conventional (i. e. compiled) 
languages and unavailability on many types of computer platform. 
C is becoming the most widely used computer language for general purpose 
development. It is flexible, efficient and used across almost all platforms. C++ 
extensions have been created to enable object-oriented code design, which can 
potentially simplify some types of programming tasks. The primary disadvantages of,, 
the language are that graphics and user-interface functions have not been standardised 
and that it is generally perceived to be difficult or unforgiving for learners. 
Historically, Fortran has been the pre-eminent language in scientific and 
engineering research communities. It is numerically efficient, straightforward to learn 
and available on almost all types of computers. Before the introduction of the Fortran 
90 standard, flexibility was limited and, as with C, establishing graphical displays and 
constructing user-interfaces can be problematic. 
It was decided to adopt the use of the C language when implementing the risk 
assessment model. The main reasons for this were its flexibility, efficiency and 
common usage on all types of computer platform. This decision effectively ensured 
that it would not be possible to create a user-interface for the model in the time 
available for the study. However, given that this was a comparatively low priority task 
in the research, the dis-benefit was acceptable. An area of potentially greater concern, 
however, was ensuring the ability to use animated graphics in the model. This topic is 
discussed in the next section. 
5.3.5 The Need for an Animated Graphics Display 
Graphical displays are now frequently encountered in many types of computer 
simulation modelling (Law and Kelton, 1991). Although these facilities', can - 
sometimes be abused, it has been seen how they can be essential when attempting to 
analyse complex processes. The use of graphics enables large amounts of information, - 
to presented and continuously updated on-screen in a quickly readable format. 
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Although this can obviously be of great benefit to a programme developer, 
potentially, it can also aid presentation of work to unacquainted observers and convey 
dynamic features in a models behaviour. 
The type of work being undertaken in the current research suggested that the 
use of graphical displays would be highly desirable. The envisaged tool would 
comprise a number of complex sub-models, between which many sorts of interaction 
could occur. For example, the modelling of passenger egress was required to be 
capable of representing the movements of hundreds of individuals. Possessing the 
ability to communicate this aspect of the analysis to psychologists who were currently 
performing experimental aircraft evacuation trials was likely to be of great benefit to 
both parties. 
However, incorporating graphical capabilities into the model could also have 
introduced some significant problems. The large computational overheads usually 
demanded by such features held the potential to slow down the operation of the 
programme drastically. There was thus a requirement for the ability to switch-off 
displays when simulating large numbers of accidents. 
In terms of programming effort, the creation of displays would also demand 
significant time. Finally, the graphics routines available for use with C on a 
workstation would not be portable to other computer platforms. 
It was decided that the apparent benefits of using graphical displays for the 
model would outweigh these potential drawbacks. Thus, it was ensured that adequate 
graphics facilities were provided in the chosen programming environment. The 
importance of this decision would come to be underlined when model development 
was started in earnest. 
5.4 Strategy for Model Development 
5.4.1 Structuring of the Programmc 
The range of accident features being represented in the simulation model 
required careful structuring in order to ensure that programme development remained 
manageable. This practice would also help to facilitate experimentation and the use of 
appropriate styles of programming in different parts of the model. A conventional 
approach taken to this aspect of the work, with key variables, processes and 
interactions being established in that order. Each of these stages in the conceptual 
design of the programme will now be examined. 
An initial set of simulation variables was straightforward to isolate. ' The 
preliminary accident database contained more than sufficient information for a basic 
description of accident scenarios to be defined. The 'chosen parameters were then 
gathered into logical groups (or structures); examples of these included accident 
scenario features, fire details, aircraft cabin configuration and passenger attributes. In 
the early stages of programme development, it was not critical what variables were 
actually contained within each these structures. The point of the exercise was to 
establish a series of logical groupings which could then be extended, modified, re- 
arranged or deleted as needed in the development of the work. 
The identification of the main processes that required representation within the 
simulation analysis has been described in Chapter 3. The model would be formulated 
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to generate aircraft accident scenarios and then determine their outcome in terms of 
occupant fatalities. The latter can arise from two causes; i. e. from trauma injuries 
sustained in a crash and from the effects of fire ingress before all occupants are able to 
evacuate to safety. Consequently, the simulation procedure could be divided into five 
key processes. These are as follows: - 
1. Create an accident scenario for the simulation 
2. Determine the effects of any crash impact 
3. Model development of the aircraft fire 
4. Determine effects of fire ingress into the passenger cabin .S' 
5. Simulate the escape of survivors from the aircraft 
The basic programme structure used to undertake these procedures is illustrated in 
Figure 5.5. It can be seen that each of the tasks was assigned to a dedicated module. 
SCENARIO IMPACT 
GENERATION EFFECTS 
MODULE MODULE 
FIRE 
MODULE 
EVACUATION THERMO TOXIC 
MODULE ENVIRONMENT MODULE 
Figure 5.5" Structure of the Simulation Programme 
The first two of these, the Scenario Generation and Impact Effects modules are only 
utilised once per accident simulation. This is because, effectively, they only serve to 
define starting conditions for the event being analysed and these are not modified by 
the ensuing calculations. In constrast, the Fire, cabin Thermo-Toxic Environment and - 
occupant Evacuation modules depict a development of events. As a result, these three 
sections of the programme operate in an iterative manner, regulated by a simulation 
clock. Thus, these processes can be envisaged as being advanced in a cyclical manner, 
as indicated by the circular arrows in the figure. 
A more detailed version of the above diagram is provided at the end of the 
thesis in Figure 10.1 (page 240). There it can be seen that a considerable amount of 
development would be undertaken in each of the five programme modules. A diverse 
range of techniques was also utilised across the various parts of the programme, 
ranging from the use of probability trees, tabular look-up, thermal radiation analogy, 
potential flow theory, finite difference methods and discrete event simulatior, 
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The representation of interactions occurring between different aspects of 
aircraft accidents was a fundamental requirement for the research. However, such 
functionality was established progressively as the model development work 
proceeded. This then enabled the functioning of modules to be verified in isolation 
and then again as each linkage was subsequently added. As a result, the only 
preparation required for incorporating interactions between modules was to ensure 
that the appropriate variables could be accessed by each part of the programme, where 
required. 
5.4.2 Development in the Longer Term 
From very simplistic beginnings, the model eventually evolved into a complex 
and comparatively large computer programme. It was therefore essential to maintain 
programming discipline and verify that the various parts of the model functioned 
correctly at all stages. The use of a structured approach to programming helped 
greatly in the achievement of these tasks. For example, it was usually only necessary 
to make changes in one or two small sections of C code at any time. This enabled 
errors to be isolated quickly and allowed for incremental compilation of the 
programme, both of which resulted in significant reductions in the time required for 
model development. In addition, this style of programming enabled different variants 
of a single module to be developed. As a result, the effects of updates or alternative 
versions could be directly ascertained simply by re-inserting the original code. 
However, division of simulation processes into separate programme modules 
could potentially have resulted in some difficulties. There was a continual danger that 
excessive effort could be spent in developing one area of the model and, as a result, 
the overall simulation might become unbalanced. Specifically, in the middle phase of 
the work, care had to be taken not to divert too much attention to the refinement of the 
passenger evacuation model. This was perhaps a consequence of the fact that the 
depiction of evacuation was the most visually appealing and quickly comprehended 
aspect of the model when seen by casual observers. This possibility was avoided by 
undertaking the programming progressively, in three separate rounds of development. 
In each of the rounds, all parts of the model were brought up to an approximately 
equivalent state of advancement, thus ensuring that no modules became "left behind". 
Finally, one extremely important aspect of the development activities was the 
necessity to ensure that back-up copies of the programme were made at regular 
intervals. A total of 18 different versions of the model was retained, forming a precise 
record of progress made at each stage of the work. 
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Chapter 6: Accident Scenario Generation and 
Modelling of Impact Effects 
6.1 Analysis of Accident Scenarios 
6.1.1 Dealing with the Diversity of Aircraft Fire Accidents 
It had been found from the study of historical records that past aircraft fire 
accidents could potentially involve many different types of scenario. These could 
range from a catastrophic night time crash, occurring a large distance from an airport, 
though to an uncontained engine failure on takeoff, or, say, an in-flight toilet fire. 
Usually, many of the features present in a particular incident could be influential in 
determining the nature of its outcome. Significant contributory factors may be 
encountered in impact, fire and evacuation aspects of an accident. Typically, these 
different features will interact and combine in their effects to exacerbate the fire 
survival problems faced by potential survivors. 
The inherent complexity and variability of aircraft fire accidents meant that it 
would be impossible to define a small but representative sample of "typical" events to 
base a risk analysis on. Thus, it was concluded that safety issues could only be 
assessed adequately within the context of real accident scenarios. In computational 
terms, these scenarios define the starting conditions, internal parameters and external 
constraints necessary for each accident simulation. However, more generally, this 
information could be regarded as providing the story lines of possible accidents that 
might be expected to occur in the near future. 
The task of creating the representative details of accidents is undertaken by the 
scenario generator module of the model. The approach taken was to produce the 
details of incidents stochastically in the form of a Total Accident Scenario. The latter 
was defined in Chapter 3 as the "combination of all accident parameters and 
circumstances that significantly influence the survival prospects of accident victims". 
This scenario effectively characterises the situation that exists immediately after an 
accident has occurred and sets in place the processes that determine the eventual 
outcome of the incident. The creation of suitable accident scenarios for the simulation 
model to process thus forms the very basis of the risk analysis. 
The key to constructing a satisfactory scenario generator was to identify, 
classify, and model the parameters that fundamentally influence survival prospects in 
aircraft accidents. Obviously, it was only possible to consider accident features that 
were readily quantifiable and for which adequate historical data was actually 
obtainable. Many types of information fell into this category and so it was found to be 
advantageous to sort the gathered data into five different areas to facilitate the 
undertaking of a methodical analysis. As outlined in Chapter 4, these were: - 
1. General Scenario Information 
2. The Effects Resulting from any Impact 
3. Fire Growth and Fire Fighting Intervention 
4. The Cabin Thermo-toxic Environment 
5. Evacuation Details 
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Although the grouping of information into these categories proved to be convenient 
for gathering, recording and collating historical data, it was not necessarily. the, best 
starting point for generating accident scenarios. This was because, in many incidents, 
significant areas of overlap and interdependency could possibly have existed between 
the five areas of information. For example, might the type of terrain present. at an 
accident site have influenced the spread of fire?, or did the existence of fuselage 
impact damage hasten deterioration in the cabin thermo-toxic environment? ;;, Consequently, it was apparent that treating separate categories of information 
independently from each other did not always accurately reflect the complex nature of 
real accidents. In general, the outcome of an incident is largely determined by the, 
events that result when crash, fire and evacuation features happen to interact'-' (See 
Figure 6.1) 
CRASH FIRE 
EVACUATION 
Figure 6.1: The Complexity of Aircraft Accident Scenarios 
. ýý" s 
.ý}1 
ý 
ý: ". f 
The implication of this was that some parameters of accident scenarios could 
not be decided independently of each other. A major task in the formulation of . the 
scenario generator was to decide in what order the details of an incident should, be 
constructed and to incorporate the more significant relationships that were present in 
the historical data. Obviously, it was not intended to reproduce all correlations,, 
precisely, because the only way to guarantee this would have been to store all details 
of the 217 accidents studied and then retrieve a sequence of these real scenarios in a 
random order. What was really needed was a method of generating new accident 
scenarios that were statistically consistent with past events in all important aspects" 
and yet which varied stochastically in content. 
The most obvious way of meeting this requirement was to base the analysis on 
a "probability event tree" approach. This would serve to structure the information 
obtained from past accidents in a logical manner and ensure that key statistical 
relationships were preserved in the scenarios provided. Decision points in event paths 
are resolved by comparing values of randomly generated numbers with fixed 
probability thresholds. This obviously necessitates the provision of a uniform random 
(or "pseudorandom") number generator, but this is straightforward to achieve on 
modern computers (Kalos and Whitlock, 1986). The primary drawback of the method 
is the fact that calibration data becomes progressively more sparse as smaller branches 
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of the tree are reached. This meant that, with 217 cases to work with, only three or 
four levels could be included in the tree before data classifications became statistically 
insignificant. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the consequences of this can be 
minimised by ensuring that events are processed in order of their importance. 
Regardless of this, no concise or comparably efficient alternative to event tree 
analysis appeared to exist for dealing with the type of conditional probability analysis 
that was being undertaken'. Thus the method formed the basis for deciding the most 
fundamental features of accident scenarios. 
The process of determining more detailed accident scenario parameters was 
conceptually more straightforward to accomplish. Most of these could be defined 
independently of each other, usually as functions of fundamental scenario parameters 
(e. g. degree of cabin disruption present was related to the overall severity of an 
impact). It was found that some kinds of variables could be treated as being totally 
independent of all other accident features (e. g. wind conditions and time of day, at 
which the accident occurred). Values for these parameters could be obtained simply 
by sampling the historical frequency distribution. 
To recap, the procedure used in the construction of the accident scenario 
generator involved the following steps: - 
1. Identify which scenario features were most significant in deciding the 
outcome of an incident, in terms of fire survival. 
2. Determine where statistical or logical relationships existed in the 
occurrences of these "primary" features and quantify the former. 
3. Construct a probabilistic "event tree" incorporating these relationships; 
this could then be used to generate a series of accident scenarios whose 
primary features would be statistically representative of those occurring 
in past incidents. 
4. Determine "secondary" scenario features independently of each other, 
based on their historical probabilities and the primary scenario features 
present. 
These activities will be examined in greater detail in subsequent sections of this 
chapter. 
6.1.2 Structuring of the Scenario Generation Module 
Conceptually, the scenario module appeared to be relatively straightforward to 
implement. It was simply, required to calculate the values of a set of parameters that 
together, completely define an accident scenario. However, if all of the processes 
necessary to achieve this were undertaken successively in a linear fashion, a very long 
and unmanageable piece of code would have resulted. This eventuality was avoided 
by dividing and sorting the various scenario generation tasks into a series of discrete 
routines, each of which can be called upon in sequence if or when needed. These then 
help to ensure that the code possesses a clear and logical structure and provide 
significant improvements in computational efficiency in some areas. 
1 Some advanced statistical methods for multi-variate data analysis were examined briefly, but were 
found to be unsuited to the task in hand. These included Analysis-of-Variance (ANOVA) procedures, 
together with Cluster and Probit Analysis techniques (Norusis, 1993). 
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As will be seen, the scenario generation module would only come to include 
three routines that dealt with general accident parameters. The remainder, of the 
initialisation tasks involve more specific types of information, such as calculation of 
cabin airflow, details of cabin disruption or evacuee characteristics. The routines that 
handled these parameters were not grouped together within the scenario generator 
because they are too involved and influence only one of the main simulation modules. 
Therefore, they have been left as separate components, albeit, for reasons of 
programming convenience, loosely associated with the main fire, TTE or evacuation 
simulation module, as applicable. These specialised initialisation routines are 
described in the following two chapters, in the context of their respective simulation 
modules, rather than being covered here. 
Given that the primary features of an accident scenario were linked by their 
statistical dependency, they needed to be determined with a single pass through a 
probability event tree. This process was self-contained and different in nature to the 
remainder of the calculations being performed in the scenario generation module. 
Thus it was logical to place this first stage of the scenario analysis in its. own 
dedicated section of code. This part of the model was named "SCENARIO_GEN" and 
it constituted the first of three components that together comprise the scenario 
generation module. 
The parameters that are set by the event tree process inside SCENARIO GEN 
describe whether or not there was a significant impact; the overall magnitude of any 
such impact; the type of fire present and the phase of flight in which the incident 
occurred. In addition, the type of aircraft involved and its cabin configuration are 
chosen independently of the event tree. Although these parameters are few in number, 
they serve to define the fundamental characteristics of the incident being simulated 
and form the basis for the calculation many of the more detailed aspects of the 
accident scenario. 
In the early phases of model development, the effects of crash damage were 
represented by very simple probabilistic functions. The overall magnitude of the 
impact was chosen from a uniform probability distribution and was defined on "an 
arbitrary scale of 0.0 - 1.0. Values for specific types of impact damage, such as cabin 
disruption or occupant injuries, were simply set to equal the overall magnitude of the 
impact, but with the addition of a small (plus or minus) component of random 
; deviation. These values were truncated to remain within the allowable range of 0-0.. 
1.0, where necessary. Although this procedure was admittedly rather arbitrary, - it 
served quite adequately to represent the loosely coupled variations in different aspects 
of impact damage encountered in past accidents. Descriptively, severe impacts tend to 
produce catastrophic consequences, whereas more modest crashes tend to lead to less 
serious effects. However, significant deviations from these apparent norms can 
frequently occur. 
Subsequently, it was found that the task of setting values for impact damage, 
disruption and injuries became too involved to perform conveniently inside- 
SCENARIO 
- 
GEN. Furthermore, these functions did not need to be evaluated in the 
fourteen percent of incidents where no significant impact would be found to have 
occurred. Therefore, it was decided to assign the detailed calculation of impact effects 
to a second component of the scenario generator. This section of the module was 
called "IMPACT" and would only be called upon in the event of a significant impact 
occurring. Parameters that are set here include fuselage structural damage, levels Of 
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cabin' disruption,, exit availability and occupant injury levels. Strong dependencies 
exist between many of these effects e. g. exit availability is determined by the degree 
of fuselage structural damage present. 
The third and final component of the scenario generation module has' been 
provisionally named "MISC_EFFECTS". This deals with other miscellaneous aspects 
of the incident under consideration. At the time of - writing, these included the 
determination of wind conditions, distance of accident site from the airport, type of 
terrain present, and the time of day at which the accident occurred. The values of all 
these variables are generated independently of each other, although some arc derived 
from primary scenario parameters, such as the type of fire present or the phase of 
flight in which the accident occurred. 
The structure of the scenario generation module is illustrated schematically in 
Figure 6.2. Note how primary accident parameters are determined first with the use of 
the event tree inside SCENARIO_GEN. This information is then fed (if required) into 
IMPACT in order to obtain more detailed information about the likely effects of any 
Scenario Generation Module 
SCENARIO GEN IMPACT 
(primary parameters) Hasa yes 
(secondary parameters) 
" Occurrence of Impact slgnin ant impact " Fuselage structural damage 
" (Overall severity of impact) occurred? " Cabin disruption 
" Fire type " Exit availability 
" Phase of flight " Occupant Injury levels 
" Aircraft type & cabin layout no 
MISC EFFECTS 
(seconda_ry parameters) 
" Airport distance 
" Type of terrain present 
" Wind speed & direction, 
" Local time of day 
Initialisation of Module Specific Parameters 
FLOW 
(calculate airflow in & around cabin) 
FIRE_INIT TTE_INIT 
(initialisation fire of properties) (set cabin thermo-toxic environment 
BREAKUP EGRESS INIT 
(fill in details of cabin disruption) L(initialisation of evacuation details) 
Figure 6.2: Creation of Accident Scenarios 
crash impact. Then, other more miscellaneous features are generated by 
MISC_EFFECTS. Many of these are calculated by taking into account the values of 
primary accident parameters that have been established previously. 
It can also be seen that five other initialisation routines exist outside of the 
main scenario generator module. These components of the model fill in details of an 
accident scenario in specific areas, such as cabin airflow, fire properties, the cabin 
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thermo-toxic environment, cabin impact disruption and data necessary for the 
simulation of occupant evacuation. 
6.1.3 Treatment of Historical Trends in Airliner Fire Safety 
Enormous progress has been made in the design and operation of commercial 
aircraft over the last fifty years. For example, since the introduction into service 
of the 
first turboprop airliners in 1953, piston engines, gasoline fuels and radio direction 
finding aids have all but been displaced in mainstream air transport operations. These 
have been replaced by turbofan and turboprop powerplants, kerosene ý fuels and 
automated flight management systems. Commensurate with these technological 
advances, much progress has also been made in the areas of crew training, aircraft 
maintenance, operational procedures and ground-based safety infrastructure. 
It is perhaps reasonable to expect that many of these changes will have helped 
to produce significant improvements in the overall safety of airline operations. Th is 
was in fact the case, up until the second half of the 1960's. Unfortunately, since then, 
serious airline accident' rates have wavered around the region of one to two incidents' 
per million departures and, in spite of the industry's best endeavours, are showing no 
consistent tendency to decrease any further (Murray, 1995). Establishing reasons for 
why this situation has arisen is far from straightforward and the task falls beyond the 
scope of this thesis. What is more certain, however, is that air travel will probably 
continue to experience a significant growth in demand in coming years. History shows 
that the number of aircraft in commercial revenue service has increased l at a 
remarkably uniform rate of about 350 per year over the last three decades. '; Airline 
departures flown world-wide have also exhibited a corresponding growth of 
approximately 400,000 movements per annum in the same period (Murray, 1995). 
It may be reasonable to postulate that accident rates experienced over the last,, 
thirty years will continue unabated into the future. If this is indeed the case, then - 
growth in the popularity of air travel will ensure that serious aircraft accidents are 
likely to occur increasingly frequently in coming years. Also, the larger passenger 
capacities of new airliner designs currently entering service will also tend to produce 
greater losses of life when they are involved in future incidents. Given that public 
perception of air safety is probably linked to the frequency at which accidents are 
reported world-wide, rather than to risk exposure for a given flight, then the air 
transport industry will clearly have to deal with a growing public relations problem. r 
These historical trends are of great significance when attempting to analyse 
future aircraft accidents. Although there can be no guarantee that past events will 
provide an accurate indication of what should be expected in the future, - they 
constitute a useful starting point from which to work. However, the extremely low 
occurrence rate of aircraft accidents in the past makes it difficult to predict the 
frequency at which incidents should be expected to occur in the future. In addition, as 
aircraft technology, aircrew training programmes and operational procedures advance, 
there is potential for the character of accidents to change significantly with ' the 
passage of time. This then leads us to question whether or not events occurring several. 
decades ago will still be generally representative of today's or tomorrow's incidents. 
Where a serious accident is taken to imply hull-loss and excludes sabotage, military action and 
former Soviet Union aircraft types. 
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If they are not, then is it feasible to quantify and take account of the differences that 
have arisen in the intervening period? 
As will be seen, it is very difficult to provide definite answers to these 
questions. Given the complex, random and infrequent nature of aircraft accidents, 
clear indications cannot be derived from historical records alone. In order to obtain a 
greater insight into these matters, we must also rely on postulation, reasoning and 
scientific experimentation. It is precisely the undertaking of these kind of activities 
that the analysis model was intended to support. 
Thus, the main challenges of predicting future trends in air safety are 
essentially twofold. The first issue lies with establishing at what frequency accidents 
will be expected to arise in the future. Secondly, it is necessary to ascertain the likely 
nature and resulting lethality of these incidents when they occur. Thus, we are 
concerned with estimating both the expected quantity and quality of future accident 
scenarios. The remainder of this section examines how these difficulties were dealt 
with during the formulation of the scenario generation module. 
The prediction of future aircraft accident rates from past events has always 
been problematic because of the sparse and erratic quality of the data available for 
analysis. In the present context, we are concerned primarily with survivable or 
partially survivable accidents involving a significant fire risk to the occupants of a 
turbine engined aircraft. On average, these incidents have occurred at a rate of around 
6.0 per annum, as measured over the last three decades. This compares with a mean 
annual hull loss' rate of about 15 aircraft per year in all categories of accident during 
the same period. It should therefore be noted that the fire accidents that have been 
studied form only a comparatively modest subset of all commercial aircraft losses. 
Obviously, therefore, the findings obtained here cannot necessarily be taken to apply 
to other types of accident or airline incidents in general. 
With a sample size of around 200 fire incidents available for analysis, it 
should be reasonable to expect that some form of trend in the number of incidents 
occurring each year should have begun to become apparent. However, this is not the 
case, as the annual accident rate has fluctuated wildly since 1958, as indicated in 
Figure 6.3. It can be seen that the mean rate of 6.0 events per year cited previously is 
only of limited value when it is associated with a standard deviation of 3.4. The value 
of the latter corresponds almost exactly to that of a uniformly random distribution. 
Some other summary statistics about the accidents show rather more 
consistency. On average, each of the incidents analysed has involved 91 people 
onboard the aircraft. Although this figure has increased slightly in recent years, rather 
surprisingly, perhaps, it has not changed substantially through the decades. This may 
be because, up until comparatively recently, the introduction of new widebody 
designs has been balanced by a proliferation of feeder-airline and commuter aircraft 
types. The mean seating capacity of aircraft involved in the accidents was found to be 
slightly under 130, which implies an average passenger load factor in the region of 65 
to 70 percent. 
Researchers have made use of a number of analysis methods in an attempt to 
identify long term trends in the number of aircraft accidents occurring each year. 
These techniques usually involve smoothing or coalescing data in order to reduce the 
1 Taken here to mean the complete destruction of an aircraft in an accident, or the occurrence of 
damage that is too extensive or not economically viable to repair. 
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Figure 6.3: Annual Frequency of Airliner Fire Accidents 
influence of short term fluctuations. Given that the statistical variance found, in 
accident occurrence rates are effectively eliminated, it was not intended to use the 
results of any such analysis directly in the scenario generator. Any long term trends 
revealed would need to be modified by reincorporating the random year on year 
fluctuations that have been so apparent in the past. Thus, the aim is not to predict how 
many incidents will actually occur in the future, but rather to determine changes in the 
likelihood of their occurrence. In the context of aircraft accidents, the most commonly 
employed trend analysis techniques are probably moving average methods and 
analytical curve fitting; both of these were used on the fire accident data gathered. : 
It was found that the five year moving average for the annual accident 
frequencies still showed wide variations from year to year and no clear trend was 
revealed. In order to obtain a reasonably consistent curve, it was necessary to resort to 
aggregating data over a nine year interval. Consequently, because of the necessity for 
a four year leading sample, this technique could not be used to produce any. 
meaningful results beyond 1989. Thus, it was thus judged to be unsatisfactory for the 
purpose of predicting future (or even current) trends. 
The use of curve fitting techniques to reveal trends in the annual accident 
occurrence rates appeared to offer more potential. Figure 6.4 illustrates the results of 
applying three different types of "least squares" curve fit to the annual rates. The 
quadratic approximation appears to offer the best fit to the data, at least in terms of 
overall statistical deviation. This curve suggests that annual accident rates -have 
peaked in the mid eighties and are now declining steadily. However, it should be 
noted that correspondence with the last five data points is poor and thus the quadratic 
fit is in fact rather misleading over the last decade. 
The linear and exponential curves indicate a very different trend and suggest 
that annual accident rates might be increasing steadily, or even rapidly becoming 
worse. Although their level of fit is less satisfactory overall than with the quadratic 
curve, they are both more representative in the region of the final 5-10 years of data. 
Ironically, however, it is apparent that simply assuming that the mean rate of 6.0 
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Figure 6.4: Annual Frequency Trends in Airliner Fire Accidents 
incidents per year applied during this period would probably prove just as satisfactory 
as utilising any of the three analytically derived curves. 
In the end, none of the curve fit methods investigated were judged to be 
satisfactory for the purpose of representing overall trends in accident occurrence rates. 
It can be seen from the three examples given that seemingly contradictory results can 
easily be obtained when applying such techniques to data that is essentially random. 
Theoretically, choices of sample intervals, data grouping, numerical smoothing and 
curve fitting methods can be manipulated to yield almost any trend desired. 
Clearly, the performing a thorough investigation into frequency trends in aircraft fire 
accidents demanded much more time than was available in the current study. 
These findings held significant implications for the construction of the 
scenario generation module. Realistically, over the last two decades, no real trend is 
apparent in the annual occurrence rates of serious aircraft fire accidents. These events 
appear to occur randomly between one and fourteen times a year, at an average rate of 
six events per annum. ' This pattern has been maintained since the first widebody 
aircraft were introduced into service in the late 1960's. 
It was felt that simulating fire accidents on a year by year basis, assuming a 
mean occurrence rate of 6.0 incidents per annum would be unsatisfactory. This was 
because such an approach would not be consistent with the highly erratic variations 
that exist in the occurrence rates of real accidents. Alternatively, incorporating the 
probabilistic nature of these events within the model in its formative stages would 
create substantial overheads. All parameters would need to be analysed in terms of 
probability intervals or expected frequency distributions. Obviously this would add 
significantly to the internal complexity of the model and severely restrict the scope of 
the work that could be undertaken in the time available. 
The solution eventually adopted was to base the analysis of accidents on levels 
of risk exposure present per individual incident. Thus, issues would be considered in 
terms of mean loss of life per accident, rather than, say, loss of life per year or decade. 
This avoids having to deal explicitly with the difficult task of predicting future trends 
in accident occurrence rates. If necessary, the implications of these "per accident" risk 
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levels can be quantified simply by factoring them by an appropriate estimate of future 
accident frequencies. Also, the processing of continuous frequency distributions 
analytically, in order to calculate the cumulative effects of different types of accident 
scenario, can be avoided. Instead, continuos probability distributions can be obtained 
from the simulation of discrete events by Monte Carlo methods. As explained in 
Chapter 5, this technique involved processing results obtained from many simulation 
runs to generate probability distributions for various types of outcome. 
The strategy for dealing with historical trends in the scenario generation can be 
summarised as follows: - 
1. The scenario generation module was required to produce a series of 
aircraft accident scenarios. 
2. The details of these incidents would vary randomly, but when summed, 
they still be statistically consistent with past (and probably future) 
events. 
3. The other components of the risk assessment model would then' 
simulate the outcome of these accident scenarios and allow safety 
implications to be studied. 
4. Levels of risk exposure for all types of accident scenario can, bei"", _ 
,'. obtained systematically 
by undertaking many accident simulations and__,, 
making use of Monte Carlo analysis techniques. 
5. Predictions of actual casualty levels in fire accidents may potentially be 
obtained by multiplying risk levels found to be present in individual, ' 
incidents by estimates of their future rate of occurrence. 
1 1; - As well as dealing with the issue of predicting future accident rates, it was also 
necessary to consider whether or not the nature of aircraft fire accidents has changed 
, with time. In spite of the vast changes that have occurred in airline operations over the last forty years, the most fundamental aspects of aircraft fire accidents appear to have 
altered very. little. Airliners still operate at comparable speeds, contain large quantities 
of fuel in relatively fragile wings and carry many passengers in aluminium fuselages. 
Thus, at first sight, we might expect the events that occur when airliners crash' and 
burn to have remained relatively consistent in past decades. 
. 
However, during this period, many new regulations have been introduced 
relating to the areas fire and cabin safety. These include changes in aircraft fuels, 
improved fire detection and suppression equipment, more severe crashworthiness 
requirements, better provision for passenger evacuation and increased crew training. It 
has been argued that the cumulative effects of these changes have significantly 
increased passenger survival prospects in aircraft accidents (CAA, 1995). If this 
assertion is correct, then it would be necessary to take account of the effects of these 
safety improvements when generating and analysing aircraft accident scenarios.: -, ., The most obvious method of quantifying the survivability of past accidents 
was to ascertain what proportion of those involved in each incident were seriously 
injured or killed. Because we are particularly concerned with fire safety aspects of - 
these events, an attempt was also made to establish how many fatalities result from 
the effects of fire, as opposed to the effects of impact or other causes. 
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The results of this activity were discussed in Chapter 3; briefly, it was found that the 
proportions of casualties caused by the effects of fire and impact were almost exactly 
equal and that total fatalities averaged 44 percent of those onboard. Figure 6.5-shows a 
year by year breakdown of these figures since the occurrence of the first turbine- 
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Figure 6.5: Historical Fatality Rates in Airliner Tire Accidents 
engined airliner accidents in 1958. The first point to note is the erratic nature of the 
occupant fatality rates mirror those of the accident occurrence rates discussed 
previously. In spite of this, it can be seen that, up until 1986, fire deaths accounted for 
approximately half of all recorded fatalities. Since then, however, the proportion of 
fatalities that have succumbed to the effects of fire appears to have dropped 
dramatically to a level of around one in ten. At the time of writing, this finding had 
not been published by the author, or as far as can be ascertained, any other safety 
researcher world-wide. 
The reasons for this dramatic change are not immediately obvious. 
Improvements in fire and cabin safety legislation have been introduced progressively 
throughout the last three decades (Hill and Blake, 1996). Thus it would be reasonable 
to expect a gradual reduction in fire fatality rates during this interval, rather than the 
occurrence of any step change. In addition, it should be noted that many regulations 
apply only to new aircraft types, certificated after a rule change takes effects, or only 
have to be implemented when an aircraft undergoes major servicing. This lead to a 
significant time delay before changes are effected in a significant proportion of the 
world's airliner fleet. 
Another relevant factor might be the increasing awareness throughout the 
airline industry of the threat posed by fire in aircraft accidents. This might especially 
be the case since the widely publicised incident involving a Boeing 737 at Manchester 
Airport in 1985, where 55 of the aircraft's occupants were lost due to the effects of 
fire (King, 1989). However, it might be argued that an increased safety awareness 
would serve to reduce the likelihood of accidents occurring, rather than altering their 
lethality significantly. 
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It is also apparent that, in recent years, the proportion of airline accidents occurring in 
the Asia-Pacific region and former Eastern Bloc countries has increased rapidly. At 
present, these incidents tend not to be reported as thoroughly as those occurring in the 
USA or Western Europe. In effect, this reduces the number of accidents for which 
publicly available information actually makes a distinction between deaths due to fire 
and deaths due to impact. Thus, figures for total occupants fatalities are almost always 
published, but many recent occurrences of fire deaths may be going unreported. 
For the purpose of generating accident scenarios, it was decided that no 
account would be taken of the apparent reduction in fire casualty rates in recent years. 
In part, the change might be spurious or perhaps attributable to factors that have not 
yet been identified. However, until the shift in fatality statistics from 1986 onwards 
could be fully explained, it was considered to be difficult to justify discarding the 
previous 28 years of data. The scenario generation module was therefore calibrated to 
reflect fatality rates that have occurred in all the accidents studied. 
Similarly, quantifying and taking account the effects of fire- safety 
improvements was judged to be unfeasible on the basis of past fatality rates alone. No - 
obvious relationship appears to exist between the reduction in accident lethality and 
the years in which changes have taken effect. The inadequate quality of the data 
available meant that it would only begin to be practical to explore the significance of 
this issue once the analysis model was in place. 
The data output by the scenario generation module may therefore be slightly 
pessimistic in that it does not differentiate the effects of safety improvements and 
other changes that have been implemented in the past three decades. Thus the 
scenarios produced can be only be guaranteed to be consistent with incidents 
occurring over the last forty years, as opposed to those that can be expected to occur 
in the present time or near future. However, until we can ascertain what role new 
safety legislation has made in contributing to the observed reduction in fire fatality 
rates, no account of them could be made. The passage of time may provide the answer 
to this question. 
6.1.4 Modelling of Occupant Fatalities 
The focus of the study lay primarily with establishing how and why casualties 
occur in aircraft accidents as a result of fire. However it has already been highlighted 
that approximately half of fatalities in the past incidents studied resulted from impact, 
trauma injuries. It was therefore necessary to take account of casualties resulting from 
the effects of both impact and fire in any fire accident survivability analysis. .: '1'1 In general, impact injury and fatality levels are predetermined by events that 
occur during a crash sequence, before the effects of fire become critical. In contrast, 
fire injuries may take several minutes to arise, during the period in which survivors 
are usually attempting to escape from aircraft. Thus, for the purpose of analysis, 
impact casualties can essentially be regarded as playing a passive role in *. fire 
accidents, while fire casualties form an active part of the simulation process. 
It was therefore logical to assign the calculation of impact injuries to , the 
scenario generation module. Injury levels could then be related to the degree ° of 
fuselage damage or cabin disruption present after an impact. It was possible to obtain 
approximate measures of these impact damage - occupant injury relationships, from 
the historical accident data. Although this type of correlation approach was relatively' 
basic, it was probably unfeasible to establish a more elaborate analysis in the time that 
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was available. Given that past accidents have shown that the issue of `impact 
survivability is just as significant as that of fire safety, - much more effort could 
justifiably be applied to this aspect of the analysis. 
Simulating the occurrence of fire casualties constituted one of the most 
fundamental tasks of the analysis. They needed to be determined dynamically as a 
result of interactions occurring between the fire and evacuation modules of the 
programme. Levels of fire injuries and fatalities are the most logical measures for 
assessing the severity of occupant exposure to the effects of fire. As such, they would 
obviously form the one of the most important quantitative outputs of the accident 
simulations. 
6.2 Implementation of Scenario Generator: Primary Parameters 
6.2.1 Primary Accident Parameters 
The first task to be performed by the scenario generation module is to 
determine the most basic features of the incident being simulated. As explained earlier 
in the chapter, these variables determine the overall nature of an accident and form the 
basis of calculations undertaken in the remainder of the scenario generator. It was 
therefore essential to ensure that key statistical relationships existing between primary 
accident parameters were faithfully reproduced in the output scenarios. The most 
direct way of achieving this was to utilise a simple form of probability event tree. The 
only real point of concern when adopting such an approach was to ensure that 
parameters were determined in a logical manner and in order of significance. 
Numerous variables were assessed for inclusion within the scenario event tree. 
Eventually, four parameters were identified; each of these was straightforward to 
quantify and could potentially play a highly significant role in determining fire 
casualty rates. In order of their importance, the primary accident parameters were: - 
1. Type of fire involved 
2. The occurrence of a significant impact 
3. Presence of fuselage structural disruption 
4. Phase of flight in which incident occurred 
It was also necessary to define the type of aircraft to be involved at some point in the 
scenario generation process. The size and characteristics of aircraft were not found to 
possess a major influence on fire survival rates in past accidents. and so it was 
assumed that the aircraft type could be set independently of other scenario details. 
However, in general terms, the aircraft type involved was obviously a very 
fundamental item of information and it needed to be decided at a comparatively early 
stage the analysis. Therefore, the task was performed immediately after the scenario 
event tree and the type chosen was effectively treated as a primary scenario parameter 
throughout the remainder of the simulation. 
6.2.2 Prerequisites for Establishing the Category of Fire Present 
Given that the study was concerned primarily with evaluating fire survivability 
in aircraft accidents, the most obvious place to start the definition of an incident was 
to choose the type of fire present. It has already been seen in Chapter 3 that four 
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categories of fire had been defined for the purpose of evaluating past accidents. These 
were Internal, Impact, Burnthrough and External fires respectively. Furthermore, it 
was then established in Chapter 4 that the type of fire involved correlated more 
closely with high fire fatality rates than any other scenario parameter tested. However, 
when we start off by attempting to pick one of the fire categories, a problem arises. 
This is stems from the definition used for the impact fire type, which incorporates the 
prerequisite for "significant cabin structural disruption" to have taken place. , 
The 
logical. implication of this was that the relative likelihood of a given fire, type . 
occurring was critically dependent on the degree of impact damage present. Put more 
simply, it would be impossible for an impact fire to occur without an impact. 
It was therefore apparent that, in order to generate a consistent accident 
scenario, basic details of the any impact needed to be established before the type of 
fire could be chosen. Effectively, this changed the order in which the three' most 
influential primary scenario parameters would be evaluated. Once these had then been 
established, the phase of flight in which the incident occurred could then be decided.,, 
The level of detail required on impact damage before the fire type could be set 
was comparatively modest; merely establishing the presence of sufficient, fuselage 
structural disruption was adequate. In fact, this task was split into two steps; firstly 
determining whether or not any type of impact occurred and then deciding whether 
any such impact would have resulted in gross structural damage. More specific 
information describing the probable effects of any impact could then be filled in at a 
later stage in the scenario generation process. :., .'. Similarly, the primary parameter "Fire Type" only indicated the,, broad 
category of the fire present. Details such as the size, position and growth rate of the 
fire would be decided at a much later stage. In fact, unlike the impact details, these 
fire parameters were set outside the main scenario generation module. This stemmed 
from the fact that they were closely allied with the fire modelling rather than with 
other aspects of the scenario generator. 
6.2.3 Phase of Flight in which the Accident Occurs 
The fourth and final scenario parameter that was found to play a significant 
role in determining fire survivability was the phase of flight in which an incident 
occurs. For the purpose of correlating with accident lethality, four stages of flight 
were delineated, namely ground operations, takeoff, cruise and landing. These had 
been reduced down from the nine categories utilised in the accident database. 
The reasons for why phase of flight may be of significance were interpreted as 
being twofold. Firstly, when an airliner takes off from an airport, typically up to one' 
third of its total mass will consist of fuel. As the flight progresses, this fraction 
gradually decreases until, on landing, only a small proportion of the original fuel load 
remains. This then implies that accidents occurring during preparatory ground 
operations or takeoff will be likely to involve larger fuel fires than incidents where 
r f:. smaller fuel loads are present . 
Also, the severity and consequences of crash impacts may be related to'the 
phase of flight in which they occur. Landing accidents tend to involve more severe 
impacts than incidents occurring during takeoff or those arising during cruise. This' 
Taking this argument to extremes, there have been several instances where aircraft have force landed 
after running out of fuel. In these cases, comparatively little or even no fire damage usually results. 
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may be because landing accidents are more likely to involve an unchecked rate of 
descent, higher impact speeds and less occupant awareness. When an aircraft is 
involved in ground operations, crashes are extremely rare and unlikely to be serious 
when they do occur. 
6.2.4 Construction of Scenario Event Tree II 
The implementation of first section of the scenario generation module in the 
form of a probability event tree was straightforward to achieve. Once a suitable 
sequence for setting the primary scenario parameters had been decided, the 217 
scenarios contained the accident database could be broken down in the corresponding 
order. The resulting figures are listed in Figure 6.6. Note that line widths of various 
branches have been made proportional to the numbers of events involved in each case. 
The tree is traversed from left to right by choosing four random numbers. At each 
successive junction, the path to be taken is decided by comparing the value of a 
random number with threshold probabilities derived from the relative frequency of 
each branch. Once this process has been followed to the right of the tree, one of forty 
possible accident scenarios will be obtained. 
Two points should be made concerning the derivation of values for probability 
thresholds from the historical data. Firstly, in cases where complete data could not be 
obtained, missing values are implicitly assumed to correspond with the known data. 
Thus, for example, it was established that an impact occurred in 187 of the incidents, 
but the presence or absence of significant fuselage disruption could only be verified in 
177 of these events. Consequently, there is no "fuselage disruption unknown" 
category and the remaining branch probabilities are assumed to be "r and Vii- as 
opposedto-197-andil 'S 97 respectively. 
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Figure 6.6: Probability Event Tree for Primary Scenario Parameters 
The other issue of concern was how to deal with types of scenario that could 
potentially exist, in theory at least, but for which a precedent has yet to occur. These 
cases are shown as dashed lines in the figure. Two alternatives were possible; it could 
either be assumed that these scenarios will never in fact occur, or else they could be 
assigned a small (but arbitrary? ) probability of occurrence. It was decided to adopt the 
former approach and restrict the scenario types to those actually present in the 
accident database. However, code was put in place to enable all scenario combinations 
to be generated, in case this became desirable at a later stage. 
6.2.5 Ty pc and Configuration of Aircraft Involved 
Many parts of the analysis model required information that related specifically 
to the aircraft type involved in the accident being simulated. For example, these 
details included fuselage dimensions, exit positions, cabin configuration and 
passenger numbers. Obviously, these parameters can vary enormously across different 
designs of' aircraft. Thus it was necessary to acquire detailed information for a 
representative selection of airliner types currently used in passenger service. Then, a 
specific aircraft type could he chosen by the scenario generator and its design details 
made available for other parts of the model to access, as they are required. 
In general, particular classes of aircraft may tend to be involved in specific 
kinds of accidents, or he involved in accidents more often. Mean accident rates per 
departure are generally dependent on the size, age and type of aircraft concerned, as 
well as the operator and the type of sectors being flown. For a given aircraft type, the 
expected frequency of accidents will also be directly related to the number of 
departures being flown by the in-service fleet world-wide. The configuration of an 
aircraft can also make it particularly susceptible to a particular type of accident'. Thus 
engines are more likely to detach if they are wing mounted and fuselaoe fires are more 
prevalent in aircraft with that possess underfloor cargo holds. 
For the purpose of constructing the scenario generation module, it was not 
J)ossihle to quantify these types of relationships in the time available. This stemmed 
chiefly from the fact that there are currently over seventy different aircraft types in 
service with the world's airlines. With only 217 incidents available for analysis, on 
average, we possess only three accidents per airliner type with which to identify any 
safety trends that are specific to a particular design. Therefore, aircraft types would 
need to be grouped into categories, differentiated by age, configuration, operators, 
types of sector flown, etc. before meaningful trends could be obtained. This task was 
considered to he beyond the scope of the current thesis and it may not yet have been 
undertaken in a systematic manner, even by major airline insurance underwriters. 
Thus, all aircraft types have been treated equally and are implicitly assumed to 
he involved in comparable accident scenarios, regardless of their configuration, size or 
age. As a result, this then enabled efforts to be directed towards the more pressing 
requirement for representing the details of airliner cabin configurations within the 
sin'tulation analysis. "These configurations comprised data such as passenger numbers, 
cabin dimensions, seating layouts and exit positions for each aircraft type that was to 
he analysed. This information is utilised by all three of the main programme modules 
and was thus an essential prerequisite for undertaking fire survivability analysis. 
I-ur example, the McDonnell Douglas DC-9 series of aircraft appear to be especially prone to "back- 
hreakin " in hard landings; at least five such incidents were encountered in the accident survey. 
-128- 
The task of' representing cabin contigurations was dealt with in three distinct 
phases in the course of the model development. Initially, two simple cabin sections 
ere used, possessing a single aisle and a double aisle reshectivel\. These are 
illustrated in Figure 6.7. It can he seen that the cabins Contained positions of seats. 
EXIT EXIT EXIT 
EXIT EXIT 
EXIT EXIT EXIT 
Figure 6.7: Cabin Configurations used in Initial I)cveiopmcnt 
aisles, walls and exits, but were not intended to he representative ý)I' anv particula 
aircraft types. The configurations did not include any scale dimensions and lacked 
features such as overwing exits, cabin divides, toilets and galleys. Fsselltially. the t\\() 
initial layouts served only for the purpose of'preliminary programme development. 
'Ehe next step taken was to analyse details ofall turbine engined airliner types 
that have been used in service over the last lorty years. This resulted a total ()f' I _'O 
different aircraft. each of' which could utilise many different cabin configurations 
when in passenger service. Rather than attempt to represent the details of ntaný 
hundreds of configurations explicitly, a single typical in-service seating la\out was 
assumed for each airliner type. Similar cabins were also grouped together here 
feasible and then treated as a single generic aircraft. I bis resulted in 34 
"lhomogenised'' cabin configurations fier use in the analysis. I'ach generic layout 
consisted of cabin dimensions. seat spacing across the cabin, nuniher 01' seat F0\\ S amid) 
exit positions. I licctively, the preliminary two cabin layouts had been scaled and 
extended into 34 dif'ftrent configurations, which are representative of' those used in 
airline service world-wide. 
The final stage of'refining the definitions of aircraft cabins involved ntººdelline 
aircraft types explicitly. In order fier this to be achievable, the 126 aircraft considered 
previously were reduced down to 72 types currenllt' being used fier revenue passenger 
services in significant numbers. Combined passenger and cargo configurations. 
together with most types possessing less than thirty passenger scats were also ignored. 
Cabin drawings for each aircraft type were obtained and closely exan'iined. I'he 
configurations were translated into a grid format and plotted with a computer-based 
drawing package. The rationale för using a grid based representation of c; ihin 
geometry is covered in Chapter 8. Figure 6.8 illustrates a typical mdehodv cabin 
configuration coded in this way. The scale of'the cabin grid is drawn uniformly. but in 
ftact varies between I5O and 200 millimetres. Note also that many details are included, 
such as wider first class seats, toilets, galleys, section divides , ºnd c,, hin crc%\ 
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Figure 6.8: Airbus A310 Widebody Cabin Configuration 
positions. Appendix B includes diagrams of all 72 aircraft types analysed in this 
manner. 
The first section of the scenario generation module assigns the aircraft type to 
be used in the analysis at random, or alternatively, can be configured to choose a pre- 
specified design. In order for the appropriate information to be utilised by the 
remainder of the programme, it was necessary to store and read data describing each 
of the 72 cabins in a computer compatible format. The performing of this task is 
described in Chapter 8. 
6.3 Impact Classification & Disruption Modelling 
6.3.1 The Nature of Aircraft Crashes 
The survey of past accidents showed that almost 90 percent of the incidents 
analysed involved a significant impact. This meant that the vast majority of survivable 
fire accidents result in aircraft coming to a stop off a runway and resting on their 
undersides. Consequently, many of these incidents will result in the aircraft being 
subjected to considerable deceleration forces, resulting in occupant injuries, structural 
damage and more general disruption. In addition to producing casualties, these effects 
will often determine the nature of any subsequent fire and serve to undermine the 
evacuation efforts of survivors. 
One particular feature stood out in many of the accidents that had been 
analysed. This was that, often, large variations could exist in the consequences of a 
crash between accidents that outwardly, at least, appeared to be very similar. An 
aircraft's fuselage can remain relatively intact, even in cases where the majority of 
occupants may have been killed by impact forces. At the other extreme, on some 
occasions, survivors have emerged totally unscathed from completely disintegrated 
wreckage. Thus the overall magnitude of crash forces do not provide a reliable 
indication as to the extent of structural damage and passenger injury levels. 
For the purpose of undertaking a study in fire survivability, we are not 
concerned with the mechanisms through which impact damage and injuries take place. 
It was merely required to represent these features at a level of resolution sufficient 
enough for the requirements of fire and evacuation modelling. This implied that the 
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past accident data could be quantified at an empirical level for incorporation into the 
accident simulation. These parts of analysis were grouped together under the label of 
"impact effects" and dealt with in the second section of the scenario generator. 
6.3.2 Research into Aircraft Crashworthiness 
Most of the research that had been located in the area if aircraft 
crashworthiness and impact survivability involved direct simulation, using either an 
experimental or a computational approach. Whilst these studies were undoubtedly of 
value for the purpose of investigating complex crash phenomena, they did not fulfil 
the requirements of the present research. This was due mainly to the Iact that the 
research has been directed towards reproducing the effects of impact forces on aircraft 
structures, rather than aircraft occupants. Computer based dynamic analysis methods 
enable physiological forces to be established with a reasonable degree of accuracy. 
However, it was found to be difficult to relate these findings to real aircraft accidents 
or establish what level of incapacitation they would correspond to. 
A more relevant approach is to study the consequences of'past aircraft crashes. 
This allows the effects of impact forces to be studied in a real environment, including 
the repercussions for human victims. The primary drawback of undertaking this kind 
of analysis is that it may often only be possible to estimate the magnitude of impact 
forces to an approximate degree of accuracy. Nonetheless, it' we are concerned only 
with representing the general effects of aircraft crashes, rather than quantifying the 
mechanical performance of aircraft structures, this need he of little consequence. 
I listorical crashworthiness studies were known to have been undertaken by the aircraft 
manufacturer Airbus and by consultants working under contract to the UK Civil 
Aviation Authority. However, the results of these investigations were unavailable at 
time of writing. Consequently, FAA crashworthiness programmes constituted the only 
literature obtained in the area. 
The complex nature of aircraft crash scenarios means that it is usually only 
feasible to classify impact damage on a descriptive basis (Bottcri et al., 1979). In 
terms of fire survivability, the most significant aspects of aircraft crashworthiness are 
probably engine/undercarriage separation, rupturing of' wing tanks and fuselage 
crushing or disintegration. This is because these are the primary mechanisms for fire 
initiation, fuel release and entrapment of occupants, respectively. Thus, the study of' 
aircraft crashes usually involves attempting to quantify disruption from these 
viewpoints. Work published by Boeing has defined the föllovving scale for the 
purpose of quantifying the severity of aircraft crashes (I Ioreff; 1982): - 
l. Minor impact damage - includes engine/pylon damage or separation, 
minor lower fuselage damage and minor fuel spill. 
2. Moderate impact damage, gear separation or collapse - includes higher 
degrees of damage of type I and includes gear separation or collapse. 
3. Severe impact damage - includes major fuel spillage due to wing lower 
surface tear and wing box damage, but no fuselage break. 
4. Severe impact damage - includes severe lower fuselage crush and/or 
Class 1 or Class 2 fuselage breaks, may have gear collapse, but no tank 
rupture. 
5. Extreme impact damage - includes Class 1 or Class 2 fuselage breaks 
with wing separation or breaks, may have gear and/or engine separation. 
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6. Aircraft destruction - includes Class 3 fuselage breaks or destruction 
with tank rupture, gear and/or engine separation. 
where fuselage breaks are: Class 1- sections break but remain together 
Class 2- sections break and open ', 
Class 3- sections break and move off 
These classifications were judged to be unsuitable for use in the present study without 
modification. They appeared deal adequately with consequences of a crash on an 
aircraft's structure, as seen from a purely engineering perspective. However, it was 
considered that more emphasis needed to be placed on how impact forces", affect 
aircraft occupants and their perception of the cabin environment in the immediate 
aftermath of an accident. From the study of past incidents, it had been concluded that 
features such as passenger disorientation levels, presence of cabin debris and loss of 
seat or floor integrity need to be considered in any quantification of crash effects. -, As has been stated in the introduction to this section, these "human" aspects of 
a crash scenario often show little correlation with levels of structural damage present. 
The implication of this was that the use of two measures for the assessment of impact 
effects should be used. These were differentiated as "Fuselage Structural Damage" 
and "Cabin Disruption" respectively. The approach taken was to develop a simple 
rating scale for both measures. These could then be used to classify impacts that have, 
occurred in past accidents and then generate probability functions for representing 
these effects within the accident simulation. The difficulties inherent in attempting "to 
quantify the severity aircraft crashes ensured that, in many respects, this would be a 
subjective exercise. However, the intent was to facilitate the incorporation of impact 
effects within the overall analysis. Even the most basic of data would suffice for, this 
purpose. 
Thus, it can be seen that the research located in the area of aircraft 
crashworthiness provided a valuable insight into how to approach the problematic task - 
of analysing aircraft crashes. However, the methods that were actually utilised, while 
essentially being based on existing work, were probably new in many significant 
respects. It was apparent that the area of research is still relatively undeveloped and 
potential still remains for much progress to be made. 
6.3.2 Fuselage Structural Damage 
Before any attempt was made to construct a rating scale for the purpose. of 
assessing structural crash damage, the details of all the incidents held in the accident 
database were collated and reviewed. It was found that adequate information on 
impact details was held for 98 of the 187 accidents in which a significant impact was 
known to have occurred. One outcome of this exercise was to decide that a five point 
damage scale would provide the best compromise between resolution and ease of 
implementation. A value of one on this scale would need to correspond with little or 
no significant effects, whereas five would be used to represent total destruction of an 
aircraft's fuselage. Thus, effectively, only three intermediate levels of damage were " ". 
open to definition. 1. . Also, during this preliminary scanning of the accident data, one other . important conclusion was reached. Previous studies of this kind had utilised only' a ,., 
single value for representing the degree of structural damage present in each accident. ', 
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However, in over a quarter of the 98 cases being assessed, it was apparent that the 
aircraft's fuselage had completely separated into two or more sections. The level of 
structural damage (as well as injuries and cabin disruption) present in these different 
parts of the wreckage could sometimes differ markedly. Thus it was decided to assign 
individual impact damage ratings to separated sections of fuselage. 
The position(s) at which an aircraft's cabin breaks up was judged to be very 
significant in many of the incidents examined. These locations determine exit 
availability and risk of immediate fire exposure for groups of occupants remaining in 
the sections of wreckage. Time was therefore spent recording the position of the 
fuselage breaks present in the accidents. These locations could then be used to 
generate probability distributions suitable for determining fuselage dislocation in the 
impacts effects section of the scenario generation module. 
Investigation revealed that, with only a single exception, the portion of an 
aircraft's fuselage containing the passenger cabin had always split up into either two 
or three separate sections. There were 16 cases where only a single break was 
encountered and 10 cases in which two breaks occurred. For reasons of simplicity, it 
was decided to analyse these two groups of accidents separately. Figure 6.9 shows the 
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Figure 6.9: Probability Distribution for Determining 
the Position of a Single Fuselage Break 
distributions of breakage positions for cases involving a single fuselage break. The 
locations have been determined as a fraction of the overall cabin length of the aircraft 
involved. This distance was defined as running from the cockpit/cabin divide back to 
the rear pressure bulkhead. It can be seen that fuselages are most likely to split in the 
region between the rear of the wing and the tail of the aircraft. 
The corresponding distribution for cases involving breaks in two or more 
positions is indicated in Figure 6.10. Here it appears that dislocations occur on either 
side of the wing position (typically at around 0.4 - 0.5 of the cabin length). 
Once it had been chosen to analyse each segment of fuselage on an individual 
basis, it was possible to finalise the definitions for the categories of structural impact 
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Figure 6.10: Probability Distribution for Determining 
the Positions of Two Fuselage Breaks 
damage. As stated previously, these were graduated into five levels, each of which 
comprised a brief verbal description of associated damage levels. The five categories 
were as follows: - - 
1. None/negligible - no significant structural damage from a survival 
viewpoint. 
2. Modest - gear collapse or engine separation. Some fuselage distortion or 
localised underfloor crushing possible, but pressure shell remains intact. 
Small fuel leaks. 
3. Extensive - splits, gaps or significant crushing present at cabin level, but 
fuselage structure remains largely in place. Clean breakages possible. 
Rupturing of wing tanks or outer wing separation may occur. 
4. Severe - large holes, crushing or fuselage break-up present. Some 
sections may be totally destroyed, but structure still remaining largely 
in place elsewhere. Separation or destruction of wings likely. 
5. Complete - Little of fuselage remains intact, with multiple break-up or 
large-scale crushing. Wreckage likely to be contaminated with fuel and 
virtually unrecognisable. 
The structural impact damage present in each of the accidents was graded on this 
scale. As indicated previously, this was in - some respects a subjective process. 
However, it was found that restricting the number of categories available to five, as 
opposed to six or more, eased the task considerably. _"_ The results of this activity are provided in Appendix C. Curve fits were 
obtained from the data were used directly in the scenario generation module for 
establishing structural damage levels. Note, that for programming purposes, the 1-5 
rating scale used to code impact damage was translated into a "Structural Damage 
Factor", with values . 
between 0.0 and 1.0. Predictably, these distributions show that 
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damage levels are more likely to be high in cases where a fuselage breaks into two or 
more sections. In more severe crashes, there appears to be no significant difference in 
the effects of impact between front and rear sections of an aircraft's fuselage. 
However, in cases where a fuselage breaks into three, the central cabin area may 
sometimes experience lower levels of structural damage. 
6.3.3 Cabin Disruption 
The process used to quantify levels of cabin disruption in the accidents was 
very similar to structural damage analysis. However, as stated previously, there was a 
need to integrate both physical and psychological factors when assessing the degree(s) 
of disruption present in each incident. As a result, the task of differentiating between 
different levels required rather more interpretation and was thus rather less 
straightforward to achieve than the grading of structural damage. The five categories 
of disruption used were defined as follows: - 
1. None/negligible - apparent normality (most passengers oblivious to the 
occurrence of any accident) 
2. Slight - comparable to hard landing, with significant jolting (something 
out of the ordinary is apparent, crying infants, some confusion present) 
3. Moderate - minor injuries and personal possessions scattered. Cabin 
crew struggling to control events (accident is obvious, widespread 
screaming, panic, jostling and confusion). Emergency exits may be 
overcrowded or neglected by passengers. 
4. Serious - seats distorted or stowage bins burst open. Serious injuries 
present and some of cabin crew may be incapacitated. (Loss of 
consciousness, disorientation, often with little concern for fellow 
passengers). Frequent jamming of exits. 
5. Total - seats and stowage bins detached. Serious injuries and trauma 
fatalities widespread. Overall loss of control. (No clear recollection of 
events, behaviour likely to be determined by instinct, even neglecting of 
spouse or own children). Exits may often be jammed or completely 
obstructed. 
The results of the cabin disruption survey could have been collated and plotted 
in the same manner as the structural damage data. However, in general, we can 
obviously expect a strong correlation to exist between the levels of fuselage damage 
and cabin disruption present in a given incident. Thus, catastrophic fuselage damage 
tends to be associated with high cabin disruption levels, and similarly, less severe 
impact damage generally corresponds with a lower degree of cabin disorder. This 
implied that, for the purpose of generating accident scenarios, impact damage and 
impact disruption levels could not be treated as independent variables. In 
consequence, it was decided to prioritise the fuselage damage estimates ahead of the 
cabin disruption data. This was because the former provided a more direct measure of 
crash effects and could be estimated more accurately. 
The cabin disruption results were therefore analysed with respect to the 
structural damage present in each case. Figure 6.11 shows the correlation that exists 
between the two (again, note that the original 1-5 ratings have been translated into a 
0.0 - 1.0 scale for the purposes of analysis). It can be seen that, on average, cabin 
-135- 
1.00 
0.7 5 
Cabin 
Disruption 
Factor 
0.50 
0.25 
0.00 
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 
Fuselage Structural 
Damage Factor 
Figure 6.11: Cabin Disruption as a Function of Fuselage 
Structural Damage Present in an Incident 
disruption and structural damage factors are approximately equal. For more severe 
crashes, disruption values tend to be slightly lower. In contrast. small levels of 
disruption (0.02 - 0.03) tend to be present even when no significant structural damage 
has occurred. 
For a given level of structural damage, it appears that cabin disruption factor 
can vary from the structural value by up to plus or minus 0.2-5. The extent of these 
deviations is illustrated by shaded envelope in the figure. The resolution of the data 
obtained does not allow meaningful distributions of these variations to be derived. 
lowever, it is probably reasonable to assume that they are distributed symmetrically 
above and below the mean curve, as far as the 0.0 - 1.0 data limits allow. 
The simplicity of this relationship implied that levels of impact disruption 
could be determined directly from the degree of structural damage present in an 
incident. This process was implemented within the impact effects section of the 
scenario generator with the use of simple straight line approximation. Random 
deviations were applied, assuming an even ±0.25 distribution, corrected to within the 
illustrated envelope. 
6.3.4 Cabin Orientation and Exit Opening Delays 
Additional aspects of cabin disruption to be analysed included cabin 
orientation, together with the functionality and utilisation of emergency exits. It was 
observed from past accidents that unusual cabin attitudes can sometimes be 
detrimental to evacuation or rescue efforts'. The orientation of a cabin (or particular 
section of cabin) was classified into one of four categories, as followw-s: - 
"I his can be especially so when emergency lighting systems fail to activate at night. In at least one of 
these cases, passengers have struggled to vacate an aircraft without being amare that it was completely 
iI Vcrte(I 
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" level - no tilt mentioned 
" upright - up to 45° of tilt 
" sidc - 45° < tilt < 90" 
" inverted - tilted by over 90° 
Also, in incidents where sui aircraft's fuselage broke into separate sections, an attempt 
was made to record the relative positions of'the portions of wrecka e. I lowever, time 
constraints prevented this data from being analysed and incorporzited within the 
scenario generation module. It was therefore assumed that all cabin sectiOn5 renl: ºin 
upright and. if breakages occur, adjacent sections will be positioned r ndonllý within 
,t distance of five meters from each other. 
The results of' the cabin oriental ion survey 
flº'C summarised in Appendix C. 
Exit Usage in emergency situations is critical for determining the line required 
for an aircraft to he evacuated. The number of' passengers that utilise a given exit is 
obviously dependent on the time required for it to be opened, and then, on the rate of' 
egress it is capable of' supporting once in use. We can derive values fier exit Ihm rates 
from experimental trials and by interpolating evacuation times achieved in past 
accidents. However, obtaining accurate estimates of' opening tinter required fier 
individual exits is considerably more problematic. Numerical valucs fier these delays 
are given relatively infrequently in accident reports, presmilably because they can 
often be difficult to estimate f'ronl conflicting eyewitness reports. 'I lierefore, ;l need 
was perceived to exist for translating verbal descriptions of' exit openin diltiýulties 
into corresponding time delay estimates. 
The approach adopted was to assign reported difficulties to one of live exit 
delay fäctors. The levels of'these ranged from one (exit opened intnºedialelV) through 
to live (exit not used). The approximate time correlations assumed for the delay 
fäctors are given in "fable 6.1. It should be noted that no distinction was made 
between different types of exit, such as double-width doors ('lope A). overmiin . 
hatches (Type Ill), tailcone or ventral stairway exits. The time values obtained were 
Exit Delay 
Factor 
Time to Open 
(seconds) 
Description 
(1) t< 10 Immediate 
(2) 10 <t< 30 Quick 
(3) 30 <t< 60 Some delay 
(4) t> 60 Considerable difficulty 
(5) not opened Impossible to open or overlook 
Table 6.1: Exit Opening Delay Factors 
ýýýi 
used to generate probability intervals for exit ohcning delays at d fierest levels Of 
fuselage structural damage. These are provided in Appendix C. Predictably, it was 
t, Ound that high levels of impact disruption tended to produce greater exit opening 
delays. Full use of all an aircraft's exits is rarely made, average utilisation rates appear 
to lie somewhere in the region of fifty percent. Typically exits remain unopened 
because they are either ignored, rendered unusable by the effects of fire, or 
blocked/jammed as a result of a crash. 
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A thorough investigation of exit usage in aircraft fire accidents has been 
performed by Schaefers (Schaefers, 1990). This study provided excellent data on exit 
availability and usage, including the role of aircraft configuration (i. e. the presence of 
wing, or tail mounted engines). However, although passenger utilisation figures per 
exit were reported, numerical estimation of exit opening times , vas not undertaken. 
11 Ihus, the current survey of'opening time delays formed a valuable complement to the 
results ol'Scaeffer's study. 
0.3.5 't'rauma Injuries and Fire Survival 
It has already been seen that occupant fatalities in aircraft fire accidents occur 
just as frequently as a result of crash injuries as from the effects of fire. Impact trauma 
injuries can also serve to slow down or even prevent the evacuation of survivors. This 
can often produce greater levels of fire injury and fundamentally change the nature of 
an egress process. Thus, the prediction of impact fatality and injury rates for the 
accident simulations constituted an important requirement for the scenario generation 
module. The probability functions used to obtain estimates for these figures would 
have a major role in determining accuracy levels of the survivability analysis. 
The modelling of impact fatality rates was relatively straightforward to 
implement. Casualty figures were available for all of the accidents covered in the 
historical survey and a large proportion of these cases, causes of death were either 
Lnoww'n or possible to estimate with reasonable accuracy. Intuitively, we might expect 
the proportion of occupants that succumb to the effects of impact injuries to be 
strongly dependent on crash severity. As shown in Figure 6.12, this is indeed the case. 
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Figure 6.12: Impact Fatalit}, Rates 
I Io\vcver, it is apparent that two distinct classes of crash accident might exist. The 
17rst of these occurs more frequently and involves high impact lethality rates for a 
riven degree of structural damage. In contrast, accidents in the second category only 
involve low or moderate levels of damage, and result in far fewer impact deaths. The 
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different distributions of these "lligh Fatality" and 1 ow I atality" incidents are 
highlighted with the use of shading in the figure. 
Re-inspection of the accidents failed to reveal any clear-cut explanation for the 
existence of these two classes of crash. The higher lethality cases perhaps might have 
tended to involve significant crushing of the passenger cabin or greater longitudinal 
deceleration forces. Alternatively, llie apparent differences in impact liitaality rates 
might, to a large extent, be spu riocus. Nonetheless, it two zone probability distribution 
was implemented in the scenario generation nmodule. This generated levels of impact 
trauma fatalities as a function of the fuselage structural ciannage present. 
Variations were assumed to be randomly distributed throughout the two 
fatality envelopes, apart from cases in which fuselage break-up had occurred. I lere, 
lethality rates were biased to reflect the 1äct that trauma deaths are lair more nLill )CMUs 
in the Front sections of the wreckage, as shown in Table 6.2. 
Impact injury levels were bound to he considerably more difficult tu quantify 
than impact fatality rates. Very fc\V accident reports clililerentiate between serious 
injuries resulting from impact forces and those causal by the eiiCe1s of lire. 'I here lore, 
it was provisionally assumed that all injuries were, in part, impact related. 
Mean Rates 
Impact Scenario 
Structural 
Damage 
Cabin 
Disruption 
Impact 
Fatalities 
Serious 
Injuries 
One fuselage section 0.44 0.44 0 10 0.16 
Two fuselage sections (front) 0.84 0.78 0.50 0.06 
Two fuselage sections (rear) 0.80 0.75 0 25 0.22 
Three fuselage sections (front) 0.93 0.90 0 (33 0.09 
Three fuselage sections (centre) 0.85 0.88 0 37 0.23 
/7 Three fuselage sections (rear) CEO( 0.85 0.90 0.36 0.43 
Table 6.2: Impact Casualty Rates 
In general, serious injury levels did not appear to correspond with either lire or 
impact fatality rates. however, significant diflcrcnces were lOund in accidents where 
fuselage break-up occurred, as shown by the figures in 'fahle 6.2. In these incidents, a 
higher proportion of' occupants seated in the rear sections of an aircraft were likely to 
be seriously injured, rather than killed, by crash forces. 
It was decided to analyse the prevalence of' serious injuries in term s the total 
fraction or survivors present in each accident. Ilowcvcr, individuals vvho are killed by 
the c1-iccts of lire will often have sustained impact injuries as wwcll: these cases are 
obviously not included in reported injury figures. It was tlicreforc necessary to factor 
the rates obtained to take account of these "hidden'' injuries, lire-victims were 
assumed to posses the same impact injury rates as accident sivivrs, although. in 
läct, they may be significantly higher. 
Probability intervals were derived liar serious injury rates at different levels of 
fuselage structural damage. Cases involving one, two and three fusclagc sections were 
analysed separately. Both impact f Italitics and impact injuries were applied at random 
to passengers seated throughout the cabin (or section of cabin). 
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6.3.6 Psychological Considerations in Aircraft Crashes 
The psychological effects of a crash appear to vary widely in different 
individuals. Accident victims frequently report that they felt stunned, confused' or 
disoriented immediately after an incident had occurred. Aircraft crew members, along 
with a significant proportion of passengers are usually able to clear their senses and 
act coherently the instant an aircraft come to a stop. In contrast, other individuals are 
frequently unable to control their actions in unfamiliar circumstances and panic, 
inappropriate conduct or even behavioural inaction may commonly result. 
Wide variations in behaviour are generally exhibited by individuals, ' even 
when they have been subjected to the same accident circumstances. This suggests that 
these types of issue are related more closely to the personal characteristics of those 
involved, rather than to details of the events that occur in aircraft accidents. However; 
psychological effects are unlikely to occur spuriously. Thus, some basic measure of 
accident "distress" or "unfamiliarity" was needed in order quantify the likely nature - 
and extent of passenger reactions. 
As explained previously, the assessment of cabin disruption levels in `past 
accidents was intended, in part, to address this requirement. This survey = was 
undertaken in order to gauge the nature of passenger perceptions about their local 
cabin environment, as distinct from the degree of physical damage that was actually 
present. These types of subjective observation were not easy to interpret for many of 
the accidents and even more difficult to make practical use of in the safety analysis. 
However, it was felt that the activity could potentially form a useful contribution for a 
more extended investigation into the subject of aircraft accident psychology. At the 
very least, cabin disruption levels would provide a basis for determining the 
occurrence of unpredictable passenger behaviour in the evacuation module. 
6.4 Miscellaneous Accident Parameters 
6.4.1. The Significance of other Scenario Features 
The final section of the scenario generation module was constructed to specify, 
accident details that did not fall under the category of primary scenario parameters or 
impact effects. In some instances, the role that these variables played in contributing 
the outcome of an incident could not be quantified from past the accident data. This 
was due to one of two reasons; either the parameter in question appeared to be 
relatively insignificant, or else time, time constraints only permitted the undertaking 
of a brief analysis. Consequently, only four of these miscellaneous accident 
parameters were considered in detail for incorporation into the scenario generator. 
These were: - 
1. Distance of the accident site from the airport 
2. Wind conditions 
3. The type of terrain present at the accident site 
4. Hour of day in which the incident occurred 
The analysis undertaken with each of these variables will now be covered. 
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6.4.2 Determination of Airport Distance I 
The distance at which an accident occurs from an airport may provide some 
form of indication about the time required for emergency rescue services to arrive on 
the scene. As discussed in Chapter 3, no correlation was found between delayed fire 
fighting intervention and the sizes or extinction times of fires. Also, in a high 
proportion of accidents, all survivors are able to escape from the aircraft before the 
arrival of external help. As a result, the role of emergency services in off-airport 
accidents is likely to be relatively small. 
The analysis of airport distances was broken down by phase of flight in which 
the crash occurred (i. e. takeoff or landing) and the type of fire experienced. Distances 
were measured from the appropriate runway threshold, in nautical miles. The resulting 
distance distributions are, provided in Appendix C. Some clear patterns were revealed; 
for example landing/approach accidents tend to occur at about three times as far from 
the airport as takeoff/climb accidents. In terms of fire type, burnthrough fires are 
typically encountered at half the airport distance of impact fires. Although these 
distributions were incorporated into model and used to generate airport distances for 
off-airport accidents, this parameter had no influence in the simulation. However, 
some of the analysis undertaken in this part of study may have important implications 
for the deployment of airport fire and rescue services. 
6.4.3 The Nature of the Accident Site 
The type of terrain present at accident sites was recorded in the preliminary 
data survey. In approximately 90 percent of the cases examined, aircraft came to a 
stop on runway surfaces, or grass fields on or around the airport. As a result, 
emergency services are usually able to access accident sites without difficulty. For the 
remainder of the cases, however, locations tended to vary greatly. Trees and 
mountainsides are encountered reasonably frequently, but examples of more unusual 
accident sites include residential buildings, a petrol station, a ravine, swamps, jungle 
and a car park. In many of these instances, it was impossible for effective intervention 
to be provided. 
The role that prevailing terrain might play in accident survival was briefly 
explored. However, no clear patterns emerged; fatalities appeared to be determined 
predominantly by more fundamental features of the accident scenario, such fire 
ingress time or crash severity. Interestingly, no significant differences were found in 
fire properties (such as size and extinguishment time) between runway, grass or 
miscellaneous accident sites. Consequently, details of accident sites were not 
incorporated into the simulation analysis. 
6.4.4 Effects of Wind and Weather 
Wind direction and strength are known to have played a crucial role in fire 
development in some past aircraft accidents (King, 1989). As a result, the effects of 
ambient wind conditions needed to be represented in the fire and cabin thermo-toxic 
environment modules of the simulation programme. For initial purposes, wind 
direction was chosen randomly and wind strengths were set to vary between 0.0 and 
10.0 m/s. However, because information on wind conditions is included in many 
accident reports, it was feasible to investigate how representative these provisional 
assumptions were. 
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Figure 6.13 shows a radial vector plot of wind conditions reported in 54 past 
aircraft accidents. As far as it was possible to ascertain, no significant correlations 
existed between wind directions or strength. The fact that vectors are, distributed 
goo. 
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Figure 6.13: Radial Plot of Wind Velocities 
in Past Aircraft Fire Accidents 
evenly around the plot implied that the assumption of a random wind direction was 
acceptable. However, wind strengths clearly vary up to a speed of about 30 knots (15 
m/s) and are not evenly distributed. Consequently, a probability function was derived 
for winds and incorporated into the scenario generator. 
6.4.5 Time of Day at Which Accidents Occur 
The local times at which accidents occurred are plotted in Figure 6.14. These 
hourly frequencies appear to correspond closely with traffic levels experienced: at 
most airports, i. e. peaking during morning and early evening rush-hours. The local 
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Figure 6.14: Variation in Accident Frequency with Time of Day 
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time obviously provides an indication of the level of light present at an accident site. 
Visibility is known to have had an important effect on the efficiency of evacuation 
and rescue operations; however, time constraints prevented this influence from being 
modelled in the simulation analysis. 
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Chapter 7: Fire and Cabin Thermotoxicity Modelling 
7.1 The Nature of Aircraft Fires 
7.1.1 Introduction 
Commercial passenger aircraft carry large quantities of highly flammable 
fuel in their comparatively fragile wing structures and operate at high speeds. Thus, 
all commercial flight operations inevitably involve a risk of incurring catastrophic fire 
accidents. These events can be initiated even before an aircraft has left the ground. 
Engine failures, static discharges, overheated brakes, electrical faults, dangerous cargo 
and irresponsible passenger actions have all resulted in serious accidents in the past. 
However, it has been seen that the vast majority of severe aircraft fires stem directly 
from the occurrence of a significant crash impact, usually in the takeoff or landing 
phases of flight. 
The nature of aircraft fires varies widely. Crash forces tend to release and 
spread fuel in an unpredictable manner, and can render an aircraft's wreckage 
distorted beyond recognition. Often, cargo and cabin furnishings will become 
involved in a conflagration, creating complex chemical reactions which can produce a 
multitude of toxic fire products. The effects of melting structures, passenger actions, 
weather, local terrain and fire-fighting intervention can also serve to influence the 
properties of a fire substantially. 
When all of these factors are considered, it is apparent that we face an 
extremely challenging task in attempting to analyse and quantify real aircraft fires. 
For this reason, perhaps, little research appears to have been undertaken in the area. 
Scientists have tended to focus on more tractable classes of fire problem or restrict the 
scope of their analysis to cover only a small subset of real aircraft fire scenarios. This 
situation is certain to be rectified in the longer term, as experimental and particularly 
computer-based modelling techniques are advanced. However, given current growth 
trends in the air transport industry, fire accidents appear likely to occur increasingly 
frequently in the future. Consequently, there is a need for an analysis capable of 
delivering usable results in the present time scale. 
As has been argued previously, the undertaking of a risk assessment study in 
aircraft fire safety requires that the challenges of dealing with truly representative fire 
problems are tackled head on. With the limited time available in the current study, this 
would mean that the fire modelling analysis could only be undertaken at the most 
basic of levels. However, this was commensurate with the fact that no previous work 
of this type could be located within the field of aircraft fire safety. 
7.1.2 Categories of Fire 
The varied nature of aircraft fires created problems when attempting to 
analyse and classify past accidents. In the early stages of the research, as recounted in 
Chapter 3, four different categories of fire were eventually identified, namely internal, 
impact, burnthrough and external fires. At the time of the preliminary data gathering 
activities, these fire types were regarded as being mutually exclusive. However, as a 
greater understanding of the incidents was gradually developed, it became apparent 
that the assumption of discrete fire categories could not always be applied 
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satisfactorily. In some cases, fire characteristics appeared to span more than one 
category. This discovery then lead to the re-appraisal of the fire classification process. 
It was concluded that aircraft fires could be interpreted more accurately by classifying 
them in terms of time required for fire ingress after an aircraft comes to a stop. This 
parameter was comparatively straightforward to obtain for most of the incidents 
studied and served to link all fires on a continuous scale. 
The most prevalent class of fire was found to be the impact type, which was 
present in 52 percent of the accidents researched. By definition, impact fires enter the 
passenger cabin area at around about the time that the aircraft stops. This is possible 
because fuselage structure has been damaged to the extent that it no longer constitutes 
a barrier to heat, smoke or flames. 
Burnthrough and external types were the next most frequent classes of fire, 
accounting for 29 and 11 percent of incidents respectively. In burnthrough scenarios, 
sufficient fuselage structure remains in place to significantly delay the ingress of fire. 
This interval may vary from as little as 30 seconds up to several minutes, depending 
on details of the structure and fire involved. In instances where a more prolonged 
delay occurs, such that all occupants are able to escape safely, or the fire fails to 
penetrate into the cabin at all, an external fire was defined as having occurred. "-. 
Conceptually, no sharp delineation's exist between impact, burnthrough and 
external fire categories. Together, these three classes of fire form a continuous scale, 
along which incidents can be positioned according to how they correspond with the 
fire definitions involved. This implied that it might be feasible to construct a single 
type of model for the purpose of representing over 92 percent of aircraft fires. In the 
majority of these cases, the aircraft's fuel supply would play a dominant role in 
feeding and sustaining the fire. The size of fire present thus depends on the area over 
which the fuel is spread and the rate at which flames can propagate across this'region. 
Because of this, it appeared that an open pool fire analogy might be highly applicable 
for most accident scenarios. This involves fires being treated as a radiating flame 
envelope, arising from a circular area of hydrocarbon fuel situated in an open space. 
As revealed in Chapter 2, much work has been undertaken by the fire protection 
industry to quantify and model this class of fire. 
The fourth category of aircraft fire consists of internal fires. These were 
defined simply as originating from inside the pressure shell of the aircraft. ' Internal 
-fires usually involve cargo, toilets, galleys, hydraulics or electrical systems, rather ," 
than an aircraft's fuel supply. Consequently, fires of this type tend to have relatively, 
low levels of heat output, but they have the potential to produce complex and highly 
lethal mixtures of combustion products, especially when oxygen levels diminish. 
Also, most internal fires arise when a flight is in progress, thus preventing occupants 
from effecting an escape until the aircraft can be landed and brought to a standstill. 
Effectively, this positions internal fires at a negative position on the fire ingress time 
scale discussed above. However, other similarities with impact, bumthrough and 
external fire types end here. In general, internal fires radiate only limited amounts of 
heat during the period that cabin conditions remain survivable and tend not to involve, '- 
significant quantities of aircraft fuel. The hazards of internal fires stem primarily from 
the fact that heat and combustion products are contained in a closed volume, in close, 
proximity with aircraft occupants. Thus, internal fires constitute a separate class of 
problem to fires originating on the exterior of the cabin. As such, their representation 
requires the use of a dedicated model in any simulation analysis. _. ; 
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Given that internal fires comprised only 8 percent of the accidents surveyed 
and have become increasingly rare in the last decade', it was concluded that they 
could only be afforded a relatively low priority in the study. Time constraints were to 
prevent the development of two separate classes of fire model. Thus it was necessary 
to focus the fire analysis to deal predominantly with impact, burnthrough and external 
fire scenarios. As a stopgap measure, internal fires would only be represented in terms 
of small fuel fires located within an aircraft's cabin. As will be seen from the 
information presented in the next two sections, this approach should only be regarded 
as a very provisional solution to the requirement for dealing with internal fires. 
7.1.3 Open Liquid Fuel Pool Fires 
When a pool of flammable liquid ignites, a continuous 'vaporisation and 
combustion process is established. The thermal energy produced heats liquid at the 
surface of the pool, which then vaporises and breaks down into a series of pyrolysis 
products. These are capable of reacting with oxygen, releasing large quantities of 
energy to sustain the fire process. 
Fire produces heat in two main forms; thermal radiation and kinetic energy 
present in smoke/gaseous fire products. The former can pose a significant hazard and 
even lead to the spontaneous ignition of materials at large distances from a fire. 
Gaseous fire products emit thermal radiation at a number of discrete frequencies in the 
infra-red band. In contrast, radiation by soot particles is continuous over the entire 
range of the spectrum where heating considerations are significant. 
Heat from moderately hot smoke and gases is transferred by convection or 
conduction processes, involving direct physical contact. Adiabatic flame temperatures 
for hydrocarbon fuels lie in the range of 1200-1600 K, which are sufficient enough to 
destroy most aircraft structures in a matter of seconds. Even dense black smoke may 
possess temperatures in excess of 800 K and thus can pose a major threat to life 
through burning effects alone. 
Fires in open spaces entrain large quantities of surrounding air, some of 
which is used to burn gases evolving from the fuel source. Most of the air entrained 
(typically about 90 percent) serves only to dilute combustion products, rather than 
participating in the chemistry of fire reactions (Delichatsios, 1988). However, given 
that the entrainment process governs oxygen supply to flammable gases, it effectively 
regulates the combustion characteristics and burning rate of a fire through physical 
means. 
The air entrainment mechanism is driven by the buoyant upward flow of hot 
gases, which are replaced by cold ambient air drawn into the fire column. Mixing of 
flames and air occur as large turbulent eddies emanate from the base of the fire and 
then role over to engulf fresh ambient air into the fire. Consequently, the flame 
envelope tends to oscillate at a natural frequency that decreases with increases in fire 
size. In general, the comparatively low convection velocities possessed by fire gases 
mean that the shape and direction of flames are, influenced heavily by ambient wind 
conditions. 
The unsteady nature of air entrainment into large pool ' fires means that 
oxygen-fuel ratios undergo large fluctuations. This ensures that regions of incomplete 
1 Probably as a result of improvements in automated fire detection and suppression equipment, together 
with increased crew training and better emergency procedures. 
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combustion exist at regular intervals throughout a hydrocarbon fuel fire. These result 
in the production of large quantities of carbonaceous smoke, , vhich can serve to 
obscure most of the flames present. The presence of thick black smoke around the 
periphery of a large pool fire can lead to the absorption of a large proportion of the 
thermal radiation produced in interior regions. Figure 7.1 shows ho« the proportion of 
70.0 
Percent of Total 
60.0 
Fire Energy 
Radiated to 50.0 
Surroundings 
40.0 
30.0 
20.0 
10.0 
0.0 
0123456789 10 
Pool Diameter (m) 
F gore 7.1: Proportion of Energy Radiated from Gasoline Pool Fires 
cncrgý radiated to the surroundings drops as the size of a gasoline fire increases 
(Mudan, 1989). Once a pool fire exceeds a size of about 5 metres in diameter, it 
appears that only around 10 percent of its total heat output will be released in the form 
of' thermal radiation. 
7.1.4 Internal Fires 
The fuselages of most modern airliners are designed to provide a sealed, 
pressure-tight environment, for ensuring the comfort and safety of the aircraft's 
occupants. During the course of a flight, pressurisation of the cabin means that 
potentially hundreds of passengers effectively become locked inside a closed 
environment. In the event of an emergency situation developing, there is no 
possibility of escape until the aircraft can be landed and brought safely to a stop. 
In normal operations, adequate cabin conditions are only maintained through 
the carefully regulated application of air conditioning. Consequently. the outbreak of 
even a small fire inside the pressurised portion of an aircraft can lead to potentially 
disastrous consequences. This may especially be the case when the point of initiation 
lies in an inaccessible area, such as in underfloor cargo bays, avionics compartments 
or behind cabin trim. These types of fire may go undetected for a significant time and 
he impossible to isolate or suppress effectively whilst an aircraft remains in flight. 
Fires occurring in closed compartments have been the subject of considerable 
research world-wide, particularly in the context of buildings. Much of the work to 
have been undertaken is probably directly applicable to fires occurring inside aircraft. 
For example, loam based seating, electrical wiring, plastic fittings and sealed glazing 
units, directly comparable to those used in aircraft cabins, are likely to be present in 
most modern domestic sitting rooms. Thus, many of the concepts used in the analysis 
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of'closed room fires can he extended to aircraft cahill fires, Or indeed, tu many other 
types of transportation We scenario. (The IoII(owing paragraphs have been adapted 
from a Building Research kstablislhment I)igest publication (I3RI':, 19')1). ) 
Fires usually start from a small loocalised source, such as a cigarette car 
electrical fault. Initially, they tend to grow relatively slowly and this call mean that 
they may go undetected Or a considerable period of time. I lo"v%v , once 
flames take 
hold, thermal radiation heats surrounding materials and area oof fuel burning may 
increase rapidly. This, in turn, increases the rate of release of pv 1-()I\ sis products li'mnº 
the fuel. The hot, buoyant products of combustion rise away Irunº the fuel and, in 
doing so, entrain air li-onm the surroundings. This mixes with coýluhuslio ll I)rOulucls, 
both diluting and cooling them, but, as a consequence, also increasing considerately 
the volume of' smoke produced. 'I'hr destination Or the combustion pl-mlucts plays a 
crucial role in what follows. 
In the open, hot smoke and gaseous fire proulucts will usually rise harmlessly 
away from the source. But, if' they are contained within a restricted enclosure, 
combustion products will threaten any (occupants present and potentially cause a 
dramatic further acceleration in development or the fire. 'Mir latter process call often 
occur suddenly, and consequently is known as ``I1ashowcr,.. 'I his phon..... oii usually, 
results when the products cif combustion collect in the Arm td' a hot, huo Vent layer of 
smoke and gases under the cciliug, of the enclosure. An example of (Iris type oof 
situation inside an aircraft cahill is illustrated schematically in Figure 72. IAvenlually, 
Fi ýre 7.2: Stages in the Devel uent of a ('lose(! (_'ýºnýýºarliuciºt I"'ir-c 
the hot layer radiates sufficient heat to flammable material remote Ilonl the original 
lire so that it can all ignite almost simultaneously. Irv now, the lire i,, likely to require 
more oxygen fier complete combustion than is available. I litis. a large rise in Ilse 
production of partially oxidised chemical species, such as carbon monoxide occurs 
and the flames lengthen as unburnt fuel travels outwards toi burn in areas where 
sufficient oxygen is available. The lire is now capable of spreadiu p large distances in 
a short time. The greatly enhanced kinetic energy in the products of co mbustion now 
poses all extreme threat to human survival. 
The occurrence of flashover can thus be attributed to a tlleruiual instability, or 
to the rapid ignition of exposed materials when the level of radiation I dhing on than 
reaches a level sufficient fier ignition. Flashover is not just an appcmaucc of flank' or 
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the attainment of a particular temperature, but the passing of a fire from one mode of 
physical behaviour (excess air) to another one (excess fuel) (Thomas. 1985). 
There exists some controversy over the relevance of fire flashover to the 
assessment of' occupant survivability in compartment fires. It is generally accepted 
that downward-directed radiation fluxes become life-threatening when smoke layer 
temperatures reach the order of 500 K, or heat flux levels reach the order of 2.5 
kW/m2 (Cooper, 1988). However, in these conditions, radiant energy feedback is 
insufficient to have a significant effect on fire growth and spread. Indeed, the potential 
for flashover to occur only develops once ceiling layer temperatures reach 600-700 K, 
i. c. well in excess of those deemed to be survivable for those exposed. Consider, for 
example the tact that in the King's Cross underground fire, few of those who observed 
the lire flashover survived and most of those who did were seriously injured (Fennell, 
I988). Also, in the Manchester accident, conditions were deemed as being 
unsurvivahle once flashover had developed (King, 1989). Therefore, the analysis of 
flashover might be of more significance in the study of fire spread mechanisms and 
lire control techniques, rather than for assessing the potential for the saving of life in 
cabin sited enclosures. 
In the case of fires occurring inside aircraft, occupants are often forced to 
endure the cabin thermo-toxic environment for a significant period before they are 
presented with the opportunity for escape. This can mean that the rate and manner in 
which lire products spread through the passenger cabin are critical in determining 
survival prospects for those trapped inside. 
Modern airliners typically employ high density seating arrangements, 
resulting in occupant/enclosure volume ratios perhaps an order of magnitude higher 
than those encountered in most buildings. This ensures that even a relatively small fire 
can expose large numbers of people to dangerously high concentrations of smoke and 
fumes. Given the toxic and dehabilitating nature of these fire products. occupants are 
likely to be incapacitated a matter of minutes, before most fires are able to grow to a 
substantial size. Consequently, the primary hazard represented by internal fires is 
exposure to irritants and toxic substances, as opposed to the danger of thermal injury. 
Thus, analysis of fires occurring inside aircraft cabins tends to place more emphasis 
on predicting the movement and properties of smoke layers, than on the quantification 
of heat production and fire spread. 
The basic characteristics of fires in closed compartments hold some 
important implications in terms of fire survivability. Firstly. before the onset of 
flashover, the majority of' fire products are restricted to a comparatively stable ceiling 
layer, which gradually descends to fill the compartment. This stratification effect is 
due to the natural buoyancy of the hot smoke and gases. Consequently, many aircraft 
accident reports contain accounts of how survivors found cabin conditions more 
lävourahlc when crouched down low near to the floor. 
In reality, some mixing and decay of a buoyant smoke laver will generally 
occur, as it result of cooling, turbulence and diffusion effects. Nonetheless, sharp 
delineations in local conditions (especially temperature levels). are generally 
encountered at diflcrent heights in a cabin fire (Ilill and Sarkos, 1985). Figure 7.3 
graphically illustrates the presence of stratification effects in the Boeing 737 accident 
at Manchester in 1986 (King, 1989). Note how the roof structure and overhead cabin 
bins were completely destroyed by the fire, even though ventilation was sufficient to 
prevent a sudden flashover occurring. In contrast, the scat covers are only scorched 
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(a) vicvv looking aft 
L, tirc 7.3_ Effects of' Fire Stratification 
and the floor has remained almost unscathed in most areas. I he sl)i ad 01' IIºi.; ilairºagc 
was relatively consistent throughout the Forward hall of the cabin. 'T'hese 
circumstances are typical cif a "leaky" (i. e. partially ventilated) coýnipartnucnt Iirc, even 
though, in Tuet, the accident actually involved a large hurnthrough lire at the trailing 
edge ofthe port wing. 
The stratification of the cahitl atmosphere had important consequences fir 
some of those unfortunate enough to he involved in the incident. Whilst vvaºiting or 
struiggling, to leave the aircraft, they were enveloped by ýº rapidly advancing, "wall" of 
thick black smoke. After being quickly overcome, tlicv collapsed to the floor in a 
semi-conscious state. IIowever, it was found that sonic degree of recovery was 
possible in the clearer conditions present at a lower level, beneath the most dense 
smoke layers. This enabled some to make renewal escape attempts and eventually 
lind their way to safety. 
In general, even if victinis clo not regain consciousness of their own accord, 
they may at least remain alive long enough fir there to be a significant chance of 
rescue by emergency Scrviccs. 't'hus, the stratification of an internal tiro atiiiosp ere 
may potentially play an important role in accidents vvhere conditions become 
mart incl. 
7.1. E Miscellaneous Firc Types 
Most aircraft fires involve the i nition 01' large f'ud sf ill, iýýýs. OF, to 1 lauer 
lesser extent, the combustion of, solid materials inside the hrýýtiiu isýýI none oI' all 
aircraft's fuselage. Ilowcvcr, many Other classes of lire eist that do not Iit 
rungenicntly into either of these two categories. For example, SOiiLc lire iiicideiits 
m ight involve the liýlIovv in : 
" º)nhº)'n-ci oxygen systems 
" fully contained engine fires 
" fuel tank explosions 
" over-heating of' wheel brakes 
" ignition of ground-basal Curls 
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(Iý) viC%% look ill'. 1,01- wards 
" fires located in an unpressurised section of the fuselage 
Obviously, it was not possible to deal with each of these cases on an individual basis. 
Thus, realistically the only option available was to analyse such miscellaneous fire 
scenarios in terms of approximately equivalent fuel spill fires. Consequently, this 
implied that specific features that might be present in some cases would have to be 
neglected. The primary justification for this was that either these types of incident are 
very rare, or else, they tend not to represent a critical threat to life. 
7.2 Computer Modelling of Fires 
7.2.1 Emergence of Computational Fire Analysis 
The need to accurately predict the properties of combustion processes has led 
to the development of numerous theoretical models that attempt to describe the 
process or effects of fire. These techniques now encompass an enormous number of 
approaches, ranging from simple "rule of thumb" estimation methods through to 
highly elaborate computer simulation methods. However, fires in general, and 
particularly accident fires, involve highly complex chemical-physical interactions. 
Many of these phenomena can only be represented adequately by theoretical analogy 
in certain straightforward and well-defined circumstances. As a result, the analysis of 
many classes of fire remain well beyond current capabilities and even relatively 
straightforward problems may require many hours of computer processing to solve. 
Thus, achievements made to date still only represent a comparatively small subset of 
what will almost certainly be achieved in the future. 
Initially, most fire models had to be implemented with the use of and 
calculations and thus they tended to consist of analytical approximations to physical 
processes. This approach is generally known as "zone modelling". The necessity for 
'relatively simple calculations meant that only certain types of problem could be dealt 
with the use of this approach. Processes represented in zone models have to be 
predictable, reasonably well understood and of clearly defined applicability. Typical 
examples of these kinds of fire include closed compartment fires, torch flames, open 
pool fires and industrial furnaces. Note that the application of a classical zone-based 
analogy appears to require that the roles played by the fire environment geometry, fuel 
source and oxygen supply to the fire can each be accurately quantified by ., 
experimental means. In cases where it is possible to confirm that such features can be 
modelled independently of each other, a fire can be treated in the form of several 
'separate zones. For instance, in a closed room fire, delineations are often made 
between the fire plume, ceiling smoke layer and the surrounding air (Cooper, 1988; 
Zukowski, 1978). This then enables a comparatively simple zone model to be derived 
by empirical means alone. .S' .` Often, however, strong couplings exist between different aspects of a fire 
problem. For example, surrounding structures will absorb heat and often be destroyed 
by the fire, the availability and composition of fuel can change as a fire spreads and 
fire fighting intervention, wind or oxygen depletion may affect fire growth rates. 
Thus, in many practical situations, the fire environment, fuel properties and oxygen 
supply cannot be treated as being independent of each other. Generally, therefore, a 
series of differential equations must be used to represent the effects of the more 
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important interactions that occur- between the various "aspects of fire development. 
Thomas states that the main difficulties faced by fire modellers are as follows 
(Thomas, 1985): - 
1. Coupling between fuel and fire 
2. Heat radiation from smoke 
3. Chemical factors that control the combustion process 
Returning to the example of the closed room fire, effects of heat loss to the 
surrounding structure, air leakages and radiant ignition of remote materials might be 
incorporated into the model. Often, the magnitude of these secondary effects will be 
predicted with the use of analytical techniques, rather than by direct experimental 
measurement. This effectively results in a "semi-empirical" zone model (BRE, 1991). 
In the past, many of these relationships were obtained from engineering guides and 
data handbooks. Increasingly, however, developed zonal models are becoming 
computer-based, which enables calculations to be performed repeatedly for initial 
scoping purposes. 
The move to computer-based implementation also allows more complicated 
types of fire scenario to be addressed. For instance, the case of a closed room fire can 
now be extended to cover all room on a single floor, or even an entire building. 
Alternatively, the computer can be used to provide an increased resolution of analysis 
for a given problem. This is achieved by splitting previously homogenous fire zones 
into a series of individual elements, each of which can be solved iteratively in the 
form of a "miniature" fire zone. An example of this type of approach to dealing with 
the spread of aircraft cabin fires is provided by DACFIR (Poulios, 1986). Here, zones 
are segmented along the width, length and height of the cabin and the spread of 
combustion products from element to element is calculated at a series of time 
intervals. This' represents perhaps the ultimate extension of the zonal fire modelling 
method and many of the techniques employed are directly analogous those found in 
CFD based field models (Thomas, 1985). 
The analysis of fire with the use of Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) 
techniques is now a rapidly developing field. Most of these numerical methods were 
originally conceived for the purpose of predicting aerodynamic or other fluid flows. 
However, advances in the representation of combustion phenomena and enormous 
performance gain in computer hardware have ensured that the CFD modelling of fires 
can now be regarded as a separate field in its own right. 
Almost all computational flow methods are based around simplifications of 
the classical Navier-Stokes equations (Allen, 1986). These describe the most 
fundamental physical-mathematical formulation of fluid flow in terms of velocity, 
internal energy, shear stress and heat flux. Although the Navier-Stokes equations 
appear, deceptively simple, applying them to problems of practical interest and then 
obtaining their solution is `usually very difficult. Firstly, all but the most simple of 
geometries are impossible to solve analytically. Consequently, it is necessary to 
discretise the fire domain into a large number of cells and apply the equations 
individually to each of these. Typically these "meshes" or "grids" may require tens or 
hundreds of thousands of elements in order to provide an adequate representation of 
the geometry under consideration. Then, arriving at a global solution that is consistent 
across all cell boundaries requires that an iterative solution procedure be adopted. 
1c 
hose tend to be numerically intensive and thus may require hours to converge on 
even the most powerful of computers. 
The second major challenge in applying the Navier-Stokes equations to the 
modelling of fires consists of dealing with the non-homogenous nature of most of the 
properties being modelled. Parameters such as turbulence, heat evolution, viscosity, 
pressure, velocities, chemical composition, etc. can all vary with time and position 
throughout the fire domain, often down to a molecular level. For instance, the 
combustion of' kerosene is known to involve at least sixteen different chemical 
species, each of which possesses their own distinct set of physical properties (Allen, 
192{6). 
"I'he solution, or even just the representation of such effects in a numerical 
harm lies far beyond current capabilities. Thus, a series of simplifying approximations 
has to be made in order to represent the gross effects of many phenomena. The most 
frequently employed of these include the assumption of steady-state (time-averaged) 
conditions, dynamic viscosity models, single-phase flows and point sources of heat. In 
specific applications of combustion modelling, these approximations can be refined 
until they enable an accurate solution to be achieved. Areas in which the use of this 
approach has yielded significant results include engine combustion, chimney flows, 
industrial furnaces and stable gas flames. However, such methods are rarely robust 
enough to be applied to more general types of fire modelling problem without 
considerable simplilications being made (Fennell, 1988). Cases in which successes 
have been achieved tend to involve closely controlled, efficient combustion processes, 
in a precisely defined environment. These conditions are absent in many fires that are 
ofpractical interest, most notably so in the case of aircraft fire scenarios. 
7.2.2 Development of Fire Modelling; Approach 
The examination of research undertaken in the field of computational fire 
modelling revealed that substantial achievements had been made across many areas. 
Vinhiricailly based techniques appeared to offer efficient solutions for certain, well- 
detined types of fire problem. 'these models have the potential to be extended by 
addition of analytically derived relationships, usually in order to address particular 
variations in a standard Fire scenario. The utility of these empirical or semi-empirical 
techniques can be greatly increased by implementing them in computer form. For 
dealing with more general types of fire problem, however, a computational fluid 
dlynamics-based approach may be required. Although CFD techniques are subject to a 
number of significant limitations, they constitute the only practical method of 
analysing many types of phenomena, short of recourse to large-scale fire experiments. 
Ilowever, on returning to the information obtained in the accident data 
surve\, it was far from clear which path forward should be taken. Obviously, it was 
desirable to integrate the features of real accident fires within the fire modelling 
an, ilysis, where possible. Generally, however, it was perceived that a gap existed 
between the capabilities of available fire modelling techniques and the features that 
were usually present in aircraft accident fires. When taken at face value, established 
empirical tire models require the application of' many assumptions, some of which 
would he difficult to justify in the context of an aircraft accident. In addition, 
published empirical methods appeared unable to represent several of the mechanisms 
or characteristics that can potentially be of overriding importance in aircraft fires. 
Some examples of these features are illustrated in Figure 7.4. With the exception of 
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Figure 7.4: Basic features of Airc. raft. 1' rc Scenarios 
wind effects and the influence OF open doors, none of' the factors \\ (. 1-c- deaºII in ally of 
the fire modelling studies examined. 
Nonetheless, in spite of their inherent limitations, tlºe cyistill ý analysis 
methods were the only real basis from which to start. It vva' Ihercfiºrr ººccessarv to 
identify a way in which one or more of'the fire modelling tcclºººi&lues stud led could Inc 
modified or built upon to be more representative of' aircraft Iires. Witlº this objective 
in mind, the attributes Of' the various methods were re-cx, ºniined in turn, toi ascertain 
precisely what their fundamental strengths were, irrespective OI' the It"aºtºnres that they 
might happen to lack. It was apparent that the latter would need toi Irr at, ldressed with 
the addition of, ncw modelling work, whichever lire model Iiii method was ntiliscd. 
Essentially, it was possible to represent the rffcct. s OF lire within the accident 
analysis on one of' three levels. "These options would involve cnºpiric. ºI, scnºi-. 
empirical and ('I"I) field modelling approaches respectively. I.:, ºc"Iº OI the three 
alternatives represented a ditTerent compromise in terms OF model resolIll iOýn, (fata 
needs and computational processing requirements, as shown in 'fahle 7. I. 
Method Empirical Semi-Empirical CFD Field Model 
Resolution low low - medium high 
Data Input Needs low medium high 
Computational Time <1 second seconds minutes - hours 
Usage rule of thumb" scoping purposes 
optiniisýetion 
studies 
'fahle 7.1: Categories of Eire Model Available brI NV 
It was known from the very start 0l the study llm; it a ('I' I) lidd nnodk'l would 
he tin feasible to into rate within the wide-ranging analysis beine undertaken. 
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Primarily, this was because the computer calculation times that would be required to 
deliver even the absolute minimum of results would be in the order of many minutes. 
More realistically, a moderately complex problem, involving the prediction of smoke 
and heat transfer, say, would require solution times of several hours'. In more extreme 
cases, the modelling of complex effects, such as cabin water spray systems can require 
several weeks of computation on even the most powerful computers, currently 
available (Hadjisophocleous et al., 1995). Clearly, a fire model , 
involving- 
computational overheads of this magnitude could not be employed in the simulation 
of multiple accidents on an event by event basis. An alternative approach might have 
been to pre-calculate and store a series of fire results for recall and incorporation 
within the accident simulations. However, as has been revealed in Chapter 3, the 
configurations and properties of aircraft fires are simply too diverse for this to be 
practicable. 
A second factor also removed the use of a CFD based approach from 
consideration at an early stage. A major task to be performed in any CFD analysis is 
the generation of a grid that accurately represents the geometry of the' fire 
environment being studied. This process would be reasonably straightforward to 
automate for the interior of intact aircraft fuselages. However, in the present study it 
was deemed to be necessary to model the effects of fire occurring both inside and 
outside the aircraft cabin, including cases in which rupturing, or structural break-up of 
the fuselage had occurred. These features could only be represented adequately with 
the use of an extremely complex three-dimensional mesh geometry, which would 
require days, or perhaps weeks of work to construct by hand for a single accident. The 
only obvious way of automating this task would be to utilise unstructured triangular 
cells, as opposed to an ordered quadrilateral mesh topology. However, unstructured 
meshes impose significant penalties in terms of flow solution time and this area of 
CFD is still at a comparatively early stage in its development. 
The insurmountable difficulties associated with the implementation of a field, 
modelling technique effectively restricted the choice of fire model to some form of 
empirical method. These were potentially capable of providing the basic fire data 
required for the analysis of aircraft accidents with minimum of computational 
processing. Most significantly, perhaps, the relative simplicity of an empirical 
approach would enable fire characteristics to be calculated automatically and made to 
interact with other modules of the simulation programme. However, as has been 
described, it was not immediately clear whether or not the features of aircraft fires 
could be interpreted and translated into processes capable of being represented with 
empirical modelling techniques. No previously reported activity of this kind could be 
located in any area of aircraft accident analysis. , 
It has been seen that simple zonal modelling techniques have been widely 
utilised to represent the effects of fire in closed compartments. Most of these efforts' 
have been directed towards the analysis of fire safety in buildings, specifically for 
modelling fire development inside sealed rooms. Given the many similarities 
involved, it was anticipated that these methods could form the basis for modelling fire 
spread in the interior of aircraft cabins. The type of analysis envisaged was typified by 
For instance, Galea and Markatos have reported 12 hours needed to solve 4200 cells and 62 hours for 
20 328 cells in this type of fire analysis (Galea and Markatos, 1991). 
-156- 
DACFIR (Poulios, 1986), where the interior of an aircraft is divided into a moderately 
large number of cells and conditions are updated in an iterative manner. 
However, one very important feature would have to be incorporated into the 
closed compartment analogy if it was going to be used for the representation of 
aircraft fires. This needed to take in account the fact that the fuselage of an aircraft 
almost never remains sealed once it has been involved in an accident. Thus, the 
opening of doors and emergency exits, together with the possible existence of crash 
damage will often introduce significant ventilation effects. Fuselage structures also 
tend to melt rapidly when exposed to intense fire, creating additional paths through 
which air can flow. These factors mean that the cabin environment can often be highly 
dependent on ambient wind conditions (Quintiere and Tanaka, 1983). Typically, 
modest levels of ventilation may serve to delay or even prevent the build-up of fire 
gases that lead to the onset of flashover conditions. Thus, the nature of fire 
development can be completely changed and thermo-toxic fire products can be spread 
rapidly throughout a cabin. 
Effectively, this meant that cabin fires would be modelled in the form of 
"ventilated" as opposed to "leaky" enclosures. The latter approach is provided for in 
some existing models, but is reliant on the assumption of constant static pressure 
(Zukowski, 1978), which, in turn, implies negligible airflow velocities. In contrast, 
conditions inside aircraft cabins may be highly influenced by ventilation effects 
induced by even the lightest of winds (King, 1989). This implied that internal' airflow 
velocities would need to be considered an integral part of the cabin fire model. 
The use of 'a compartment fire model alone would not fulfil the task of 
representing fire effects within the simulation analysis adequately. The majority of 
aircraft accidents involve fuel spillage fires, which start outside the fuselage and then 
usually ingress into the cabin area. Thus, conditions on the inside of the aircraft are 
usually determined by the growth and properties of a fire initially- located on the 
exterior. It has already been seen that external fuel fires differ fundamentally in nature 
from those developing inside a fuselage. Thus, it would not be feasible to analyse both 
the interior and exterior aspects of a fire with a single fire model. The implication of 
this was that separate interior and exterior fire models would be required in order to 
represent most frequently occurring fire scenarios. 
The branch of empirical fire analysis most closely related to external aircraft 
fires is that of open pool fire modelling. In general, pool fire theory is intended to 
address problems involving accidental spillages of hydrocarbon-based fuels in open 
spaces. Thus, they are precisely applicable to the analysis of most large-scale aircraft 
fires. The modelling of open pool fires essentially consists of predicting the size and 
properties of flames present above an approximately circular expanse of liquid fuel. 
This flame envelope is then used to derive levels of conductive and radiative heat 
transfer to surrounding objects by analytical means. Thus, the techniques involved fall 
into the category of semi-empirical fire modelling. 
Perhaps the most fundamental parameter in any pool fire analysis is the 
diameter of the circle that used to represent the area of a fuel spill. The theory has 
been developed on the assumption of a fire base that is approximately circular in 
shape. Obviously, real fires almost never perfectly circular, and so have to be analysed 
in terms of their equivalent pool fire diameter. Once an appropriate value for this 
dimension has been decided, the remainder of the fire calculations are comparatively 
straightforward to perform. Therefore, the main challenge in attempting to apply an 
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open pool fire analogy to the analysis of aircraft accidents was to interpret past 
accident fires in terms of their effective pool fire areas. If this translation process 
could be achieved in a satisfactory manner, then external fire properties could be 
derived with the use of published theory and standard fire data. 
At this stage, it appeared that the task of representing fire properties both 
inside and outside the passenger cabin in an approximate manner was feasible. 
I lowever, there were still some significant problems to be overcome in coupling the 
compartment and pool fire models together, such that they would come to depict the 
effects of a single ingressing fire. These linkages were a fundamentally important 
aspect of the entire risk analysis, as they determine how a fire starting outside the 
I'uselage penetrates into the interior to become a critical danger to those inside. The 
approach taken was to examine the mechanisms through which fire ingress had 
occurred in past accidents. Then, these basic processes could be quantified and 
incorporated within the programme in order to link internal fire development to the 
properties of the external fire. Given the complex nature of fire growth, it was 
apparent that many approximations would have to be made when attempting to 
quantify fire spread rates. However, the main purpose of the exercise was to 
demonstrate that it was perfectly feasible to link two very different empirical models 
by incorporating the primary modes of fire spread that take place between them. With 
further development, these intermediary processes might then be refined to a level at 
least comparable to that of the standalone compartment and pool fire analogies. 
lt was possible to confirm from the accident reports that most aircraft fires 
were likely to have spread in a combination of three ways. These were as follows: - 
1. Direct flame contact with combustible materials 
2. Convection of hot fire products into cabin area 
,. I leating of surroundings by thermal radiation 
These mechanisms can be interpreted as manifestations of the three fundamental 
modes of heat transfer; i. e. conduction, convection and radiation respectively. These 
are shown diaoranu-naticaly in Figure 7.5. 
'I he extent of fire spread occurring, as a result of direct flame contact is 
dependent on the spatial relationship that exists between the fire geometry and 
aircraft's structure. In most instances, a fire must melt or destroy significant portions 
of' the fuselage before flammable cabin materials are exposed to heating effects. This 
effectively constitutes a thermal conduction/thermal inertia problem, for which a 
simple analogy could be developed. Often, however, flames are able to access the 
cabin interior directly, via open exits or through areas where extensive structural 
damage has occurred. In such circumstances, delays are minimal and fire spread is 
likely to he extremely rapid. 
Most aircraft fires emit a substantial proportion of their total energy in the 
fbrm of beat radiation. This is absorbed by surrounding objects, which, as a result, 
increase in temperature and often become spontaneously involved in the fire. This 
process can play an active role in the spread of both external fuel fires and fires 
involving the cabin interior, as well as contributing to occupant burn injuries. 
In the case of external fires, humid atmospheric conditions can serve to 
attenuate radiation levels significantly over modest distances. Ilowever, the infrared 
frequencies involved are able to penetrate water vapour at least as well as visible light. 
-159- 
) 
Figure 7.5: Primary Ms clmidsms oaf Fire Spread 
Thu'; 
' 
fire lighting personnel have reported On one occaSiun tll, ºI, iii iiiHtv eemidilion'.. 
they were able to lccl the heat from a large lire before I)eing able toi see lll'' flames. 
H re spread by thermal radiation cam is dependent oii three Factors; the inteºlsity of 
radiation produced by a fire, the attenuation of this energy by the altia spIºere and the 
proportion of the heat absorbed by surrounding materials. 'I IºL"se rf frets are readily 
quantifiable for the case of objects in the vicinity ()f an open pool il-c. I Iýýýýý vei, Illýir 
role in the growth elf cabin fires is less certain (I'utºlius, 1986). 
It has been seen that, in all but the sniallest or I)O()1 fires, the majority OI'the" 
thermal energy produced is contained in the siiiokc and lire gaseous products evoly edi. 
When a fire occurs in open surroundings, all of this cncrev is vented to the 
atº11ºýsphere in the form of a buoyant smoke plume and it plays no, role in lire spread. 
In contrast, when a lire Occurs adjacent to, or inside, an aircraft, a proportion of these 
Iirc products will usually flow into the passenger c. ºhin. 'I'ltis inevitably leads to a 
rapid deterioration in conditions inside, wwitll a reduction in visibility ; lila (potentially 
lethal concentrations of' toxic or highly irritant substances. 'I Ile boi' v ºncy uI tllr 1º<, t 
gases means that cabin thernlo-toxic environments tend to he Ili;, tllv stratiried. Thus' 
lire spread occurs chictly in the upper region or the cabin, fier ex, ºnlllle via ceiling 
panels, cabling ducts and overhead stowage hins. 
This mechanism of fire growth is essentially a convection driven process, i. e. 
it is dependent on the movement of air. These air currents can result from a ººunlher of 
different causes, for instance ambient wind, air rºltraintncnt into flaiiies, fire gas 
production and buoyancy enacts. ('onsequently. the transport of lire products by 
convective means can elften constitute highly co1111plex phcºuººnena. In . ýncrcll. 
Iirc 
flow fields can only be predicted to a moderate level elfaccuracy 'it I1 the Inc of ('I I) 
or full scale experimental testing, techniglues. 
In particular. prevailing wind conditions are known to have a potentially 
Important role in fire cdeveloplllcllt_ in the case of pool fires, fl, lnlcti and lire (pontes 
can be drawn considerable distances in a domiwind direction. 'I his obviously 
modilics flame impingement and radiation levels liar surrounding objects. 
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The task of incorporating the fire spread linkages between the internal and 
external fire models appeared rather less daunting when considered in terms of these 
basic conduction, convection and radiation mechanisms. Fire burnthrough and direct 
ingress could be dealt with by modelling the impingement of pool fire flames on a 
fuselage geometry. Much data was available from both experimental fire tests and 
past accidents to support the development of this part of the fire analysis.; Similarly, 
heat radiation effects were judged to be comparatively. straightforward to implement 
by adopting existing models. 
In contrast, however, the representation of fire convection and smoke flow 
effects would be rather more difficult to establish, even at the most approximate of 
levels. Clearly, the use of an aerodynamic flow model of some form or other was 
required to represent smoke spread. However, it has been seen that established CFD 
field methods currently used for this type of modelling are completely unsuited to the 
task of analysing multiple types of fire scenario. A far simpler approach was needed, 
where flowfield estimates could be obtained in perhaps a second or two and were 
calculated at a resolution that matched the pool fire and cabin fire zonal modelling 
approach being used. 
The only feasible way of fulfilling this requirement appeared to be the use of 
a potential flow analogy. Potential flow methods utilise analytical functions to 
represent the most fundamental aspects of fluid flow. The most commonly used flow 
primitives include a unidirectional flows, flow sources, sinks, doublets and vortices. 
Some of these basic building blocks are illustrated in the left hand side of Figure 7.6. 
,. 't. 
freestream flow source 
* (M 
sink vortex 
a) different types of flow element 
2 freestream+source +sink 
= Inviscid flow around a circular cylinder 
b) superposition of flow elements 
Figure 7.6: The Potential Flow Analogy 
Because these functions are all linear, they can be superimposed on each other to, 
build up more complex flow fields. Figure 7.6 shows how three flow elements can be 
used to represent inviscid flow around a circular cylinder. With larger numbers of 
flow primitives, it is possible to represent airflow around objects of arbitrary shape. 
The task of resolving this type of flow problem simply reduces down to that of 
solving a set of simultaneous equations (one for each flow element being used). Thus, 
reasonably complex potential flow fields can be calculated in a matter of seconds on a 
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modern desktop computer'. However, solution times increase with the cube of the 
number of equations (i. e. flow elements) present and so care needs to be taken to 
ensure that excessive flow resolutions are avoided (Press, 1992). 
The primary drawback of potential flow methods is that they are unable to 
represent the effects of viscosity in fluid flow. This means that features such as flow 
detachment, re-circulating eddies and the existence of a sluggish boundary layer on 
solid surfaces are not catered for. In general, such effects tend to be far more 
significant on the downstream side of an object. Consequently, this is where we can 
expect the greatest errors in a potential flow solution to occur. Fortunately, 
downstream flow areas are of little consequence in the current study, as we have no 
interest in the path that fire products take when they are flowing away from the 
aircraft. Thus, potential methods were judged to be adequate for the purpose of 
predicting approximate flow patterns upstream and throughout the interior of an 
aircraft's fuselage. Although predictions of airflow velocities in the downwind 
direction might prove to be spurious in some circumstances, they would not be 
utilised in the fire modelling. 
7.3 Representation of Cabin Thermo-toxic Environment 
7.3.1 Formulation of the Modelling Approach 
The rational for modelling cabin thermo-toxic conditions was to determine 
the effect that fire might have on the victims of aircraft accidents. It would have been 
possible to create a highly sophisticated fire spread model for the purpose of 
achieving this, based on established numerical CFD techniques. However, it was 
judged that this would be inappropriate for the type of study being undertaken for a 
number of reasons: - 
" It would be difficult to set up a complex model to run 
autonomously 
" Computing calculation times tend to increase exponentially 
with model size 
" The level of calibration data needed was only available for a 
few types of fire 
" The data provided would be too detailed for other parts of 
the risk analysis 
What was really required was the simplest possible cabin fire model that was capable 
of providing the required resolution of data. Given that the cabin fire model would be 
created soley for the purpose of determining evacuee incapacitation levels, data needs 
were effectively defined by the parameters used in published Fractional Effective 
Dose (FED) incapacitation models. As recounted in Chapter 2, the physiological 
effects of fire atmospheres can 
be grouped into main five areas: - 
1. High ambient temperature levels 
2. The presence of dense smoke 
1 For example, a set of 100 simultaneous equations might require somewhere in the region of 0.5 - 1.0 
seconds to solve on a typical engineering workstation computer. 
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3. Toxic and narcotic gases 
4. Low ambient oxygen levels 
5. Highly irritant fire products 
Fire tests have shown that toxic, narcotic and irritant substances, together with oxygen 
depletion are generally associated with the presence of smoke. Obviously, the 
chemical composition of a smoke layer can vary enormously, according,. to_ fire 
properties and types of material involved. However, the complexity of the reactions 
occurring in fires means that combustion product mixtures are difficult to measure by 
experimental means and virtually impossible to predict analytically in all _but . 
the 
simplest of cases (Krause, 1996). As a consequence of this, when undertaking fire 
modelling, the composition of fire gases is either approximated with the use of simple 
empirical models (Hadjisophocleous et al., 1995), or fixed proportions are assumed., 
It was concluded that the latter approach would suffice for the current study, . at least . 
for the initial stages of development. Thus, oxygen depletion levels, and, 
concentrations of toxic, narcotic and irritant substances could then be, assumed to be 
proportional to local smoke intensity. Effectively this meant it would be necessary 
only to obtain predictions of how ambient cabin temperatures (including associated 
thermal radiation levels) and smoke intensity varied throughout an aircraft' s"cabin 
with time. 
It was decided at a comparatively early stage in the work that, initially, a 
two-dimensional (2-D) approach would be used for the cabin fire modelling. Thus 
values of heat and smoke would be calculated on a plane located at 1.5 m above cabin 
floor level. This taken to correspond with the average chest height of evacuating 
passengers and thus be indicative of the air conditions that people would be breathing 
when standing in an upright posture. In comparison with the 2-D approach, a full 
three-dimensional analysis would require an order of magnitude more computer 
calculations to be performed and involve a corresponding increase in the quantity of 
data being processed. As a result, calculation times would almost certainly be 
unacceptably slow when attempting to undertake multiple accident the simulations. 
However, there were substantial issues that needed to be resolved when 
attempting to represent complex three dimensional fire phenomena in only two 
dimensions. It has already been seen that stratification of fire products usually results 
in the formation of a hot buoyant smoke layer near the ceiling of a compartment. This 
layer spreads in a horizontal direction and then gradually descends until the possible 
onset of fire flashover. Thus, the key to the successful modelling of cabin conditions 
is to encapsulate the basic properties and dynamic behaviour of smoke layer 
development. 
A 2-D fire model would be capable of calculating the growth of a smoke 
layer in a horizontal plane with little difficulty. This could be achieved-by 
implementing numerical analogies of convection, diffusion and radiative fire spread 
mechanisms. Effectively, this would then provide a map that shows the extent of the 
smoke layer, as measured at passenger chest height. The main drawback of attempting 
this kind of simplified 2-D approach was that no information would be generated on 
conditions above or below the plane in which calculations were performed. : This 
would prevent the modelling of effects such as evacuees crouching down or crawling 
on the floor in an attempt to remain below a descending smoke layer. 
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In spite of the difficulties, involved, it was judged that the advantages of 
obtaining estimates of the cabin thermo-toxic environment in real time far outweighed 
the limitations inherent in the use of a 2-D analysis. Thus, it was decided to adopt a 
highly simplified approach to the modelling of cabin fires. It was recognised that there 
would be much potential for further improvements to be incorporated in this area of 
the work, once other priorities had been dealt with. 
In the short term, the consequences of passengers moving below a smoke 
layer could be allowed for in the evacuation modelling, if necessary. At a later stage, 
it would be comparatively straightforward to add stratification effects to the 2-D cabin 
fire model. One way to achieve this would be to integrate the accumulation of smoke 
in each section of the cabin over time. Such an approach would involve calculating 
smoke spread at ceiling level and converting excess concentrations into a smoke layer 
height, i. e. in the form of an inverted stacking process This information could then be 
used to calculate variations in ceiling layer depth throughout the passenger 
compartment. Because smoke depths would be derived from existing information, this 
procedure could be implemented extremely efficiently and would not slow the 
operation of the fire model significantly. In essence, the "extrusion" of 2-D data in 
this manner constitutes what is sometimes referred to as "2V2-D" modelling. 
7.3.2 A Note on the Measurement of Smoke Intensity 
It is perhaps worthwhile noting here that smoke levels will be referred to in 
terms of their Optical Density per metre (OD/m). This is a dimensional measure of 
light transmissivity per unit of length of smoke. Predictably, in American and British 
fire research literature, smoke intensities are usually quoted per foot (OD/ft). 
Both of these measures are proportional to another frequently used measure, the 
extinction coefficient. This is defined as follows: - 
Extinction Coefficient K=L logo 
1 
(7.1) 
where 
Thus: - 
L= light path length 
Io = Intensity of incident light 
I= Intensity of transmitted light 
K 
Optical Density /m=23 (7.2) 
and 
Optical Density / ft =K (7.3) 7.55 
7.3.3 Choice of Cabin Fire Effects to be Modelled 
As discussed in the previous section, the purpose of modelling fires in the 
analysis was to determine how they affected the escape and survival of accident 
victims. Thus, effectively, the only parameters required from the fire simulation 
module were those necessary for establishing levels of thermo-toxic incapacitation for 
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individuals still remaining in the aircraft. These fire effects can be categorised into 
five areas; namely temperature, smoke, narcotic gases, oxygen depletion, and irritants. 
Each of these aspects of the fire environment will now be considered in turn: 
The high temperatures present in the vicinity of fires can -° possess a 
debilitating effect on 'those exposed. Purser makes a distinction between heat 
convection and thermal radiation when assessing heat incapacitation levels (Purser, 
1995). However, the effect of the latter on humans is extremely difficult to quantify 
and can vary to a large extent from individual to individual (Purser, 1988). Therefore, 
it was decided that modelling thermal radiation levels in the cabin interior with 
anything but the simplest of approaches would be unjustifiable. Thus, 'thermal 
radiation intensities were assumed to be a direct function of ambient temperature and 
were not stored explicitly. Consequently, the thermal characteristics of ý the cabin 
environment were defined by a single distribution of ambient temperature: - This was 
recorded in the range of 0 to 250 °C or over, on the basis that complete incapacitation 
by thermal means alone can be expected to occur at a temperature of around -190 °C 
(Purser, 1995). 
The accumulation of smoke in the cabin also plays an 'important, role in 
determining occupant survivability. Research has suggested that when people are 
exposed to the effects of irritant smoke, their speed of movement slows, stress levels 
rise and they may turn back rather than continuing to move forwards (Jin annd 
Yamada, 1989). Movement speed may be reduced to that in complete darkness at 
smoke optical densities in the region of 0.20 /m. Studies of building fires have shown 
that, on average, people will turn back to look for an alternative escape route at optical 
densities of 0.33/m. In case of aircraft fires, however, people may be forced to move 
through considerably higher concentrations of smoke in order to reach an exit. Thus, it 
was decided to be conservative and model cabin smoke distributions at levels of up to 
1.0 OD/m. Given both the extremely toxic properties and the high temperatures 
associated with cabin smoke at these concentrations, complete incapacitation will 
occur almost immediately in such conditions. 
The most important narcotic gases produced by fires are carbon monoxide 
(CO) and hydrogen cyanide (HCN). The presence of carbon dioxide (C02) in- high 
concentrations induces hyperventilation, which tends to multiply the effects of any 
narcotic gas concentrations present. As stated previously, the concentrations of these 
types of fire products were simply assumed to be proportional to local smoke density. " 
However, it was decided to store individual distributions of cabin CO, HCN and CO2 
concentration. This would facilitate the addition of an empirical smoke composition 
model at later stage, if so desired. The units used to define these gas concentrations 
were parts per million (ppm). 
Fires consume large quantities of oxygen and, as a result, cabin oxygen levels 
can often drop significantly in the course of a fire. This induces low oxygen hypoxia' 
effects in those exposed. Oxygen depletion was therefore modelled, albeit at a rather 
basic level, by assuming depletion levels were proportional to local smoke density. ' 
Again, it was chosen to store values explicitly, both for reasons of computational 
efficiency and because they would be required for any implementation of a smoke 
composition model. 
The final component of the cabin thermo-toxic environment was the level of 
irritant substances present. The most important irritant gases present in aircraft fires in 
significant concentrations include hydrogen chloride (HC1), hydrogen bromide (HBr), 
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hydrogen fluoride (HF), sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2). However, 
in reality, thermal decomposition products evolved in aircraft fires are extremely 
complex and thus prohibitively difficult to analyse on an individual basis. Thus, an 
approach involving gas concentrations defined in terms of materials mass loss per unit 
of cabin volume may be more appropriate, as this avoids the need to identify the 
composition of the fire products involved. For example, the mass. of cabin furnishings 
decomposed in each cubic metre of air is more straightforward measure to deal with 
than the equivalent spectrum of HCl, HBr, HF, SO2 and NO2 concentrations. 
Nonetheless, difficulties can arise when attempting to account for the wide range of 
materials present in aircraft cabins. Another significant factor that has to be taken into 
consideration is that gases evolved under non-flaming conditions can be more irritant 
than products arising from flaming combustion by a factor of ten or more (Purser, 
1988). Consequently, rather than attempting to deal with these complexities in an 
explicit manner, irritant concentrations were represented on a generic level with the 
use of a single cabin irritancy variable. This was defined in terms, of a Fractional 
Incapacitating Dose, where a value a 1.0 represents complete incapacitation by irritant 
effects. The local degree of irritancy present in the cabin was assumed to be 
proportional to the prevailing smoke density. 
In summary, the fire modelling was designed to generate distributions of 
seven key parameters that define thermo-toxic survivability levels throughout the 
passenger cabin. These distributions were two dimensional, time dependent and 
described the following variables: - 
" Ambient temperature 
" Smoke density 
" CO, HCN and CO2 levels 
" Oxygen depletion 
" Irritancy level 
7.3.4 Representation of Cabin Geometry 
As recounted in the previous chapter, the cabin configurations of passenger 
aircraft were defined with the use of a coded two-dimensional grid. The resolution of 
this grid (0.15 - 0.20 m) had been determined by the requirements of the evacuation 
model. Thus, for example, gaps of these dimensions are typical in situations where 
passengers might be squeezing past each other in seat rows or narrow aisles. 
Procedures had also been developed to automatically ' separate, translate and rotate 
selected portions of an aircraft's cabin grid. These involve the use of transformation 
matrices and enable the geometric effects of fuselage break-up and the separation of 
cabin sections to be represented in accidents that involve severe crashes. 
The evacuation grids were the obvious starting point for modelling the 
geometry of the cabin thermo-toxic environment. However, the resolution that they 
provided was too high for representing the development and spread of fuselage fires 
with the empirical modelling techniques being employed. Consider, for instance, a 
typical Boeing 747-400 seating configuration, coded on an array measuring 325 by 40 
cells. This provides a total of 13,000 individual cells that require updating with each 
iteration of the cabin fire calculations - obviously rather excessive for a "simple" fire 
model. At this level of resolution, changes in the local environment would be 
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comparatively small over the distances involved. Thus, realistically, cabin conditions 
could he modelled perfectly adequately with perhaps an order of magnitude fewer 
data points. This would also provide the advantage of significantly reducing the time 
required to perform fire model calculations and to look up local cabin conditions. 
The method used to obtain a lower resolution cabin geometry for the thermo- 
toxic modelling was to sample the evacuation grid co-ordinates at a fixed interval. 
Thus, fier example, cell vertices could be obtained by looking up the co-ordinates of, 
say, one in three cells of the evacuation grid. This concept is illustrated in Figure 7.7. 
ýýr 
(a) cabin evacuation grid 
(resolution 0.15 - 0.20 m) 
(b) cabin fire & TTE grid 
(resolution 0.45 - 0.60 m) 
- -- ---------------- = - .. - evacuation grid 
cabin fire & TTE grid 
1 in 3 evacuation 
grid nodes used 
(c) "1 in 3" grid sampling scheme 
Figure 7.7: Use of Different Grid Resolutions to Represent Fuselage Geometry 
Note how obtaining the a low resolution grid in this manner ensures that fuselage 
breakages and distortion are automatically incorporated into the fire model geometry. 
It should also be observed that information can be referenced between the evacuation 
and 'I'II: grids simply by multiplying (or dividing) cell indices by 3. Thus, for 
instance, a passenger located (n, m) in the evacuation grid will experience the 
conditions at cell (n/3, m/3) in the cabin TTE model. This feature was used 
extensively in the simulation programming, for example, to determine levels of 
thermo-toxic incapacitation in evacuating passengers and to set up the cabin airflow 
model. 
In general, it was found that a grid sampling ratio of 1 in 3 provided the most 
suitable cell size For the purpose of modelling cabin fires. However, any integer 
sampling ratio can be used, allowing cabin conditions to be modelled at a higher or 
lower resolution, il' future requirements dictate. 
7.3.5 Calibrating Levels of Fire Effects 
As stated previously, degradation in cabin conditions Nvas assumed to be 
proportional to local smoke density. Most of the results obtained from large scale 
aircraft fire tests indicated that this would be a reasonable first approximation in 
situations where cabin ventilation was sufficient enough to prevent the occurrence of 
sudden flashovers. Thus, in spite of the fact that the composition of fire atmospheres 
could vary widely from experiment to experiment, concentrations of the tire products 
tend to increase fairly consistently with ambient smoke levels. 
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Cabin conditions were calibrated with a series of tire test results reported by 
the FAA (Sarkos et al., 1982). These experiments involved the use of a complete 
aircraft fuselage, fitted with cabin furnishings representative ol, those in use in the 
early 1980's. Exits were lelt open and a large (8' by 10') fuel lire as located outside 
an opening intended to be representative of a fuselage rupture. Measurements were 
taken at a height of' 5'6" in the all cabin area. 
The test results indicate that a flashover had hcguu toi develop utter 
approximately two minutes. Mid-way through this process, smoke levels exceeded 1.0 
UI)/foot for the first time. At this point, cabin conditions were estimated toi he as 
shown in "Table 7.2. 
Parameter 
Measured value at smoke 
OD of 1.0/foot 
Scaled value at sn 
OD of 1.0/m 
Ambient Temperature 260 °C 122 °C 
CO 10,000 ppm 3,000 ppm 
HCN 20 ppm 6 ppm 
CO2 60,000 ppm 18,000 ppm 
Oxygen Level 13.0 % 18.6 `%, 
Irritants 
2000 ppm 
(e. g. HF: 1000; HCI: 600) 
600 ppm 
coke 
'I'aI) Ic 7.2: Scaling of Ca I) in (_iºn(Iitions Present I)uriiºg Firn. I, LISIIovº'r 
Vic values in the right hand column have been scaled to c(lrrctipoiikl %\ith conditions , 11 
a smoke optical density or 1.0/metre. "I'hese are the Figures that vvcrc innpicincnted in 
the cabin fire model. Note that the scaled temperature value was actuailly c, ilcul, iled toi 
he 92 °C'. I lowever, cabin temperature rises were generally thi precede increases 
in smoke density by about 10 - 15 seconds during the We cxperinncnts. I, Iil'cctively, 
this smoke hysteresis eflcct meant that rises in ambient tenlpcrailure were 
approximately 30 °C higher than might be predicted with a linear tcilipcraturc : smoke 
relationship. Thus, in reality, a smoke level of' 1.0 OI)/m could be expected to 
correspond with an ambient temperature of around 122 "C. 
Also, the concentration assumed for irritant fire products was dcrivcd Irunn 
the levels of 1-11' and I1C'1 present. 'T'hus, 600 ppm of' irritants present at a smoke 
density of 1.0 OD/m would include 300 ppm of Ill and ltiO ppm or II('I, with the 
remainder comprising miscellaneous lire products. 
7.4 Modelling of External Pool Fires 
7.4.1 Empirical Quantification of Olen Pool Fires 
Aircraft fires usually involve the release 01' Dirge volumes of furl, , is a result 
of damage sustained by win, tanks. Typically, th erefore. most accidents entail laºrgge 
open tires, characterised by large, rapidly spreading turbulent Ilanºcs, thick black 
smoke and intense thermal radiation. 't'his type of pool lire is also encountered in 
many industrial environments where there is a requirement to sture large volumes or 
liquid hydrocarbon fuels. Consequently, open pool fires have been the subject of 
much research by fire safety engineers world-wide. 
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The primary hazard represented by a large liquid fuel fire is the extremely high 
intensity of thermal radiation emitted. It has already been seen earlier in the chapter 
that, for large fires, most of the heat produced will be released in the fire plume. 
Ilowever, if the fire occurs in the open, the majority of these high temperature 
products will rise away and have little effect on the surroundings at ground level. As a 
result, radiative heat transfer and direct flame impingement are usually the 
predominant mechanisms of fire spread. Thus, the modelling of open pool fires by 
empirical means essentially consists of modelling fire geometry and estimating the 
levels of heat that are radiated to surrounding materials. Two different approaches are 
possible when representing heat emissions from a fire; these involve the use of point 
suite ce and solial flanne radiation models respectively (Mudan, 1987). 
At a simplest level, a fire can be considered as a point source of thermal 
radiation. This implies that heat is emitted uniformly in all directions from a single 
point and, if the effects of atmospheric attenuation are ignored, heat intensity 
diminishes with the square of distance. For a given fuel type, the power of the 
radiation source will he primarily a function of the area of fuel undergoing 
conlhustion. 
In contrast, the use of a solid flame radiation model enables the effects of 
flame geometry to be included within a pool fire analysis. This can be particularly 
signilicant when flame size is comparable with the distances of surrounding objects, 
as is obviously the case in most aircraft fire accidents. Flames are represented in the 
Conn of a cylindrical envelope, positioned above a circular pool of fuel. Figure 7.8 
c linder 
diameter 
tilt 
angle 
cylinder 
height 
wind speed 
and direction 
circular fuel pool 
flame envelope 
1'iurc 7.8: Cylindrical Model of Flame (eometrti 
shows how the effects of' wind can be catered for by tilting of the cylinder axis. It is 
assumed that this flame geometry comprises a uniform grey body emitter of thermal 
radiation. This then enables the radiative heat intensity at surrounding points to be 
obtained by a process of geometric integration. The effects of atmospheric attenuation 
and the surface orientations of exposed objects can also play a significant role in 
determining levels of heat transfer. Thus, these considerations are frequently 
accounted fier in solid flame model calculations. These and other aspects of the 
method are covered more fully in Appendix D There it shown that empirical 
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relationships, derived from the results of fire experiments, and theoretical modelling 
techniques can be applied to simplify the task of' implementing a solid flame model 
considerably. As result, thermal radiation fields can be obtained with knowledge of 
comparatively fcw fire parameters. The data that is typically required consists of the 
fuel pool geometry, wind conditions, fuel type and atmospheric humidity level. 
The preliminary accident data survey had indicated that it was probahly 
feasible to obtain or estimate approximate values for this information in a substantial 
number of' the incidents being studied. This eventually turned out to he the key to 
establishing a workable pool fire model within the simulation arºalysis. 
Thus, it was discovered that the fundamental Characteristics of' large open 
furl fires can be modelled at an approximate (hut, in the Current context, perfectly 
adequate) level by empirical means. Essentially, the analysis required could he broken 
down into three stages, regardless of' the radiation Model beim; used. 'I Iºese are aS 
lollovvs: - 
" geometric characterisation of the pool lire 
" determination of the radiative hrohrrtics 
" calculation of radiant heat levels at required (positions 
In the case of aircraft fuel tires, the second and third of these tasks are comparatively 
straight1i0rwarcl to per1i0r11m with the use of published data and established tire 
modelling techniques. Ilowever, the major difficulty in itteniptini, toi est, ll)lislh a 
feasible external fuel fire model was to determine the geometric properties of Has that 
occur in aircraft accidents. Put simply, data needed to be obtained to fines out how 
large aircraft fuel has actually are; whereabouts, in relation to the f-usefaCe. they tend 
to start and also, how quickly they are likely to spread. 
Seemingly. in spite of the large amount of research to have been undertaken 
into aircraft fires world-wide, this f-uncfanientally important tall. had vet to he 
undertaken by anybody. In general, researchers involved in experimental lire testing 
or computational lire modelling tend to work with "standard" lire sources, vvIloSCC 
properties have been set for experimental convenience. C'omparativcly little attention 
hals been paid towards determining how We procedures compare with the fires that 
actually occur in aircraft accidents. 
Consequently, it was decided to devote a significant proportion of the time 
available for the the analysis to the study and quantification of I-) ast aircraft fires. It 
was noted that, whatever techniques were employed in the lire modelling, the 
accuracy of the results provided would effectively be limited by the (lu, llity of lire 
data obtainable from past accidents. "There would be little point in incorporating .1 
solid flame radiation model into the simulation if- the basic data necessary fier its 
calibration had not been obtained. Thus, a simple point source radi itioll model was 
used and the resultant time saving used to derive appropriate input data fiOnl past 
accidents, to enable the model to be utilised effectively. 
Once this had been achieved, the detailed calibration data would he sufficient 
to drive almost any type of fire model. Thus, Or example, it would be very 
st aightforvvand to implement a standard solid flame fire model at a later stage, should 
this he required. 
Much of the information about fires that was obtained from the examination 
of past accidents was almost certainly unique in nature. Therefore, it vV; ºS : Ittrnipted to 
keep the analysis as simple and clear as possible, so that results could readily he 
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reproduced, augmented and utilised with confidence by other fire safety researchers. 
Given that, in many instances, numerical data would have to be derived from 
essentially descriptive information, all interpretations made about the accident fires 
were carefully catalogued on an individual basis. This then enables the existence of 
any misinterpretations or points of contention to be identified and, if possible, 
real lied with better information that might come to light. 
7.4.2 Fire Geometry Analysis: Equivalent Pool Fire Areas 
The basis of using a liquid pool fire analogy in the analysis of external fires 
was that the vast majority of aircraft accidents involve large fuel spill fires. In general, 
empirical models treat these fires in terms of a continuous circular (or rectangular) 
area of burning fuel, located in an open area. Obviously, in reality, real fires are 
unlikely to exhibit this degree of uniformity. Fuel will tend to form irregularly shaped 
pools, the ground may patchy or undulating, objects may be present in or around the 
fire and flames may be intermittent. As a result, in empirical modelling, fire sizes tend 
to be quantified in terms of an equivalent pool fire area. This concept attempts to take 
into account deviations in fire properties and provides a common unit of measurement 
with which to compare different fuel fires. The assignation of values for equivalent 
pool fire areas is, to a certain degree, a subjective process, requiring the application of 
reasoned judgement and common sense. "Therefore, the accuracies that we can expect 
to achieve will be poor. Consider, for instance, that if we are able to estimate the 
linear dimensions and flame consistency of a fire to within plus or minus 10 percent 
each, it will only be possible to derive the equivalent pool fire area to an accuracy of 
plus or minus 30 percent. I lowever, if we are able to study a large number of fires, the 
effects of any errors are likely to be averaged out to a point where they prove to be 
acceptable. With this in mind, the assignment, where possible, of equivalent pool fire 
areas to the aircraft fires was used to form the first stage in the fire geometry analysis. 
With information obtained from the accident data survey, it was felt to be 
Icasible to undertake this type of estimation for 72 of the 217 incidents studied. In 
each of these cases, it was possible to determine where the fire had started and to what 
proportions it eventually grew to, with a reasonable degree of accuracy. For the 
purpose of' analysis, this information was recorded for each of the 72 accidents in 
question with the use of an area plot. Typical examples of these plots are shown in 
Figure 7.8. Note that the aircraft configurations shown are generic and thus should not 
he taken to be representative of the actual aircraft types involved. 
The shaded ellipses represent the estimates of the maximum area over which 
lire spread in each incident, i. e. equivalent pool fire areas. The use of elliptical fire 
shapes provided a greater degree of' flexibility (and thus accuracy) than attempting to 
interpret fires as circular areas. From a theoretical standpoint, elliptical pool fires can 
he analysed by linearly ºnapping circular pool fire modelling theories. 
lt should be noted that the fire areas indicate the extent of fire at cabin level. 
'thus, the masking effect of low set wings was taken into account when estimating fire 
shape functions. In most instances, fires were able to spread over the top of the wing 
area, either as a result of wing detachment, the presence of fuel tank rupturing or the 
effects of wind. Similarly, the estimates of fire areas also include the effects of 
intervention by fire lighting services, in cases where these were significant. 
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of fire spread fuselage break 
Figure 7.8: Plotting of Fire Location mid Spre; i_d 
The size of' the aircralt involved was of' relevance in many or the incidents 
analysed; larger aircraft carry greater quantities of' Fuel and thus tend to he 
accompanied by larger fires in the event of'an accident. ('onscyucntly, this inllucnce 
was f'actured out 01' the analysis by factoring all distances by the cabin Icnttlº or tlºLe 
aircraft involved. Ibus, the scale Uf the grids shown in the diagrams is one tenth ortlºe 
cabin length. Also note that the positions of any f'usclagc breakages were recorded in 
the diagrºms. to aid interpretation with accident reports. The 72 lire spread diagrams 
are provided in Appendix F. 
7.4.3 Modelling of Fire Geometry and Growth Rate 
The classification of past aircraft fires in terns or elliptical pool fire areas 
enabled a systematic analysis of fuel lire characteristics to he prrli, rºýºýýi. the 
inli)rn1ation obtained troll] this study was of fundamental importance in ensuring that 
the details of' lire scenarios being modelled were both realistic and statistically 
representative of those encountered in actual aircraii accidents. Without data of this 
sort, fire properties could only have been prescribed in an arbitrary manner and thus 
the entire nature of simulated outcomes might have been changedi. 
The approach taken in the analysis of' the 72 fire spread diagrams was to 
cluaºitilj, the various parameters that were required for specifying the pool firc niodcl. 
Probability distributions were derived for each of the fi6llowing variahles: - 
" Location of' ire starting point(s) 
" Variation in fire sizes 
" Dependency of fire shape on position 
" Movement cif fire centre 
" Fire growth rate 
'I'hr procedures used in the analysis and the results they delivered are provided in 
Appendix F. Probability distributions were obtained in a number of'dil'Ierent formats, 
some of' which involved moderately karge quantities Of data. '1'Iºus, there was a need to 
incorporate this information into the initialisation routines OI' the fire model 
(collectively' labelled F! R1; INIT) in the most efficient manner possible. 
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Single dimensional parameters that were smoothly distributed, such as fire 
size and growth rate, could be approximated very efficiently with the use of curve 
fitting techniques. For example, a cubic spline fit enabled the distribution of 72 
individual data points to be encapsulated by storing only three or four spline 
coefficients. 
Other parameters, however, were found to exhibit a significant degree of 
scatter, or else were defined in two or more dimensions. These had to be analysed 
with techniques that involved the use of scatter envelopes and area plots respectively. 
An example of the latter was in the encoding of fire starting positions. The type of 
two-dimensional probability contour map that was obtained from the fire analysis is 
illustrated in Figure 7.9. These spatial distributions were incorporated into FIRE_INIT 
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x location 
Figure 7.9: Probability Contour Map for Fire Starting Position 
in the form of a two-dimensional array of probability values. Fire starting positions 
are chosen by moving a random distance down and across the array and interpolating 
between the values of surrounding entries. The use of relatively coarse (14 by 12) 
arrays in conjunction with data interpolation enabled spatial probability maps to be 
stored with the use of' only 168 integer numbers. 
The change in fire size with time was modelled with a generic growth curve. 
As shown in Figure 7.10, this possessed a classic exponential growth, peak and decay 
distribution, typical of that encountered in many types of fires. The shape of the curve 
was defined with cubic polynomials, passing through three control points. Potentially, 
the positions of these points can be modified to represent effects such as the 
occurrence of a significant time delay before fire start, fire fighting and sudden fire 
expansion resulting from explosions. Ilowever, for the purpose of model 
development, a fire growth curve of fixed proportions was assumed, with peak fire 
size occurring at one quarter of the time required for fire extinction. 
Fire areas were comparatively straightforward to derive from probability 
distributions obtained from the equivalent pool fire analysis. In contrast, the study of 
fire growth-time histories required a second round of analysis. This involved 
-172- 
1.0 2 
0.9 
Fire 
0.8 Fire Growth Control Points Area 
Fraction () start time 
0.7 
peak time fraction 
& maximum lire area 0.6 
0) extinction time 
0.5 
tpeak 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 1 , -----+- 3 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 (ýtt 09 1.0 
Time Fraction (t) 
Figure 7.10: Use of Generic Firc('rovilb Curve 
estii atinu, wherever possible, the b. 1lowine time points litr etch ()I' tile accidcllt 
fires: - 
" start time (alter/before) aircraft comes to a stop 
" time required for fire ingress in to cabin area 
" point at which maximum fire size was reached 
" time required for fire extinguishment 
The lire start tines and lire ingress times obtained are listed in Appendix k. in most 
cases the information available mºs insufficient fier all Four time points to be estimated 
with any accuracy. However, in spite of' the incomplete data, the patterns of lire 
behaviour observed appeared to lit the exponential growth, peak and decay Model 
remarkably well. In general, the fire extinguishment tines tended toi be reported the 
most accurately and these were obtained for 30 or the 72 incidents studied. I Inas, 
these endpoints were used to create probability distributions for the purpose of sealiººtý, 
the horizontal axis of the fire growth curve. This procedure is elaborated upon in 
Appendix F. 
7.4.4 Ileat and Smoke Production 
Once the geometric properties of' the pool fires had been established, file 
resulting thermal characteristics were comparatively straight Forward to model. 'I he 
parameters that needed to be derived from the pool lire geometry consisted of flame 
temperature profile, fire radiative power and levels orsmoke production. 
1-lame temperatures at the centre of large hydrocarbon Fires are generally in 
the region of 1400 K, although the intermittent nature of fires means that average 
temperatures may be somewhat less (Madan and ('race, 198M). "I elilperatººres . also 
tend to decrease towards the edge of' a lire, where flames are smaller in sine. 
Consequently, a simple temperature profile was developed toi represent 1l. ºn1e 
temperatures in the pool tires. "I he temperature at the lire centre was assumed to he 
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1 000 °C', this figure dropping off exponentially to 500 °C at the fire edge. This radial 
flame temperature prolile is illustrated in Figure 7.11. 
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Iý: i rc 7.11_ Implementation of External Fuel Fire Model 
I'Iºcorctically, defining the external fires purely in terms of analytical functions would 
have enabled conditions to calculated at arbitrary times and positions, as and when 
required by other parts of the simulation model. I lowever, in order to ensure adequate 
computational el f iciency, it was decided to discretise fire temperature distributions 
and store pre-calculated values in a two-dimensional array. This enabled local fire 
temperatures to be simply looked up, rather than having to be re-calculated from 
scratch every time they were needed. This fire temperature array is illustrated in the 
lower hall of Figure 7.11. Note that a small amount of random noise (+100 °C) has 
[)cell added to the cell temperatures, in order to represent fluctuation of flames. The 
resolution at which fire temperatures are stored and the frequency at which they are 
updated can be set arbitrarily. Typically, fire temperature distributions were calculated 
at 10 or 15 second intervals when running accident simulations. 
The use of a point source thermal radiation model required that the radiative 
povver of the pool fires be derived from their geometry. The approach taken here was 
to estimate the effective flame area of a fire and multiply this value by the thermal 
radiation intensity of'the flames present. 
'I he effective area of radiative flames, as seen from any viewpoint, was 
simply assumed to be equal to the base area of the fire. If a cylindrical flame model 
analogy was being used, this would correspond with a flame height to fire diameter 
ratio of 7t/4 and large distances from the fire. Although the former figure might appear 
to be rather low, it should be remembered that no account was being taken of 
atmospheric attenuation effects and flame view factors. As indicated in Appendix D, 
taking the latter into consideration can serve to reduce effective flame areas markedly 
at close proximity's to a fire. The radiative power of fire flames was assumed to be 
given by: - 
Radius 
Fraction 
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1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 
E= 140x1We oizn+20x10'(1--C oiznl (7.1) 
where: - 
F_ Average surläce emissive power of flames (kW/ii) 
1) = Equivalent lire diameter (m) 
(See Appendix 1) fier details about the derivation of this equation) III tlºc case of 
elliptical fires, the equivalent fire diameter was taken to he the mean o1'tlºe major and 
minor axes lengths. "Thus, the total radiative power output of'the external pool fire was 
obtained simply by multiplying the eliirctive flame area by the average surface 
emissive power of the 11anmes. 
Smoke production by an external fuel lire was only modelled in areas where 
flames were impinging directly on the aircrafi's l iselage. Thus, smoke levels were tint 
around the periphery of open T'I', cells. 'I hose were locations at vv1ºiclº smoke front 
the external fire might enter the passenger cabin, e. g. places where firc hurra-through 
had occurred, open exits were present or at fuselage breakages. 
Smoke production was assumed to start "fen local robin Wnºper, ºtures 
exceed 122 °C. At this point, smoke levels are increased linearly over ýº period of' 15 
seconds to 1.0 Oh)/Ill in cabin cells that are exposed to the external fire. I)ensities are 
then set to rise in conjunction with cabin temperature up ººntil flashover rondilio ras nee 
reached (3.3 01)/m at 260 °C'). 
7.5 Cabin Airflow Model 
7.5.1 The Requirement to Model ('aI)in Air Flows 
The modelling of'airflow in and around the aircraft's cabin Col-IlIC(I one or (Ile 
essential linkages between the cabin and external pool lire models. The rate at which 
smoke and gaseous lire products spread through a hassenger cabin has .º critical role 
in determining how quickly conditions become unsurvivahlc lot tla sc inside. The 
presence of dense smoke can also serve to block potential escape routes and have ,º 
large influence on passenger behaviour. 't htºs, attliuq.; h factors such as these are 
extremely difficult to model to any, degree of accuracy, their importance demanded 
that at least a basic representation of' smoke spread was incorporated into the 
simulation analysis. 
It has been seen that the only Feasible wy of incorporating the nit'ni "Iling of 
cahin airflow within the simulation aºn. ºlysis was to use a potential tluýý method. In 
order to make this task Feasible within the time available, it ýý, ºti necessary toi restrict 
the flow modelling to two dimensions. The main implication of ti iui this approach 
was that conditions on the downwind siele 01' the aircraft would not he predicted 
satisfactorily. I lowever this was of' little consequence, as the only airllovvs being 
utilised wert' those on the cabin interior. 
Also, all airflow calculations were undertaken separately From the fire 
analysis. This implies that flow fields are determined entirely ti-onº ambient wind 
conditions, with no account being taken of' lira cntruinnient eflee"ts that might he 
present. 'F'lic latter can be significant in calm wind condition,, (Qninticrc and Tanaka, 
198 3)-, thus it was necessary to ensure that the analysis Could he eytLended to deal willº 
these envets at a later stage, it, required. 
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The primary advantage of using a method based on potential flow analogy 
was that results could be obtained in real time. This was essential if the objective of 
integrating the cabin thermo-toxic modelling with other parts of the simulation 
analysis was to be achieved. Also, fundamentally important aspects, such as the 
effects of crash damage, burnthrough of fuselage structure and the opening of exits 
could be dealt with in a reasonably straightforward manner. Thus, it was possible, to 
automate the flow modelling process for all the types of accident scenarios being 
analysed.;;. 
7.5.2 Potential Flow Modelling: The Panel Method 
It has been seen earlier in the chapter that the potential flow methods are 
based on the superposition of a series elementary flow elements. These flow elements' 
consist of simple analytical functions, whose coefficients are determined by enforcing 
a set of boundary conditions. Flow elements are positioned and boundary conditions 
chosen such that the primary features of the flow problem being analysed are 
accurately reproduced. For a flow solution to be valid, values must be found for all 
"influence" coefficients that enable all of the boundary conditions to be satisfied 
simultaneously. Once this solution set has been obtained, flow parameters can be 
derived at arbitrary positions throughout the flow domain. 
Thus, the calculation of a potential flowfield involves three main tasks. 
Firstly the geometry of the flow problem has to be defined, using suitably chosen flow' 
elements and boundary conditions. Then, this information is used to derive and solve 
a set of simultaneous equations. Finally, these results are used to scale the 
contributions of the various flow elements and enable the required flowfield 
information obtained. 
The airflow analysis needed to model flow both inside and outside a hollow 
body (i. e. an aircraft's fuselage). This task could be achieved with the use of two types 
of flow element; a single freestream flow and a series of panel sources. The two 
elements are illustrated in Figure 7.12. The concept of a freestream flow function was 
briefly introduced earlier in the chapter. It can be used for representing a 
unidirectional flow at an arbitrary angle i. e. a mean ambient wind velocity. 
The source panel element consists of a line, from which flow emanates 
perpendicularly on both sides. The speed at which the flow moves is defined in terms 
of flow strength per unit of panel length. Note that source panels may have positive 
(outwards) or negative (inwards) flow strengths, as indicated in the diagram. 
Source panels can be used to manipulate freestream flow conditions, either by 
repelling or "sucking in" flow in their immediate vicinity, until the desired flow 
pattern is achieved. The utilisation of potential flow theory in this manner constitutes 
what is widely known as the Panel Method. 
Figure 7.12(d) shows how source panels can be used to approximate inviscid 
two-dimensional flow around a square. With the use of only 8 panels, the flow pattern 
obtained is comparatively crude. However, as panel numbers are increased, the flow 
solution rapidly converges towards an exact analytical representation of the problem 
being modelled. A point of some significance to the current study is that the flow field 
inside the closed square is not, as might be expected, predicted to be stationary. This 
is because the angular sign convention used for evaluating flow contributions from 
individual panels is only able to enforce compliance with flow boundary conditions 
on one side of a panel. The implication of this is that we can set sign conventions to 
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Figure 7.12: The Panel Method 
correctly evaluate flow conditions either on the interior or the exterior walls of a 
closed object, but they cannot be made valid on both sides simultaneously. Thus, the 
illustrated internal flow pattern is a direct result of boundary conditions on the internal 
walls of the square being left unsatisfied. As such, this "virtual" flowfield is a 
mathematical idiosyncrasy that has no correspondence with physical flowfields. In 
order to obtain the real internal flow pattern, panel contributions must be evaluated 
twice, applying interior and exterior wall boundary conditions in turn. 
Apart from its application to internal flow problems, the Panel method 
implemented was completely standard. The code itself was written from scratch, 
based on theory widely available in aerodynamics textbooks (Anderson, 1985; Kuethe 
and Chow, 1986). The source strength equations were solved by calculating matrix 
determinants and the application, of Cramer's Theorem (Kreyszig, 1988). Although 
this method was straightforward to understand and quick to implement, it is very 
inefficient in comparison with more advanced solution techniques, such as Gaussian 
Elimination or Lower-Upper Decomposition. It was anticipated that the latter method 
would be introduced at some time in the future, providing a reduction in flow solution 
times by approximately a factor of three (Press et al., 1992). 
7.5.3 Initialisation of Panel Geometries 
For cabin airflows to be calculated it was necessary to represent the shape of 
the aircraft concerned with a series of source panels. These panels needed to define 
the geometry of the aircraft's fuselage in a horizontal plane, located at a height of 1.5 
metres above floor level, as shown in Figure 7.13. This would mean that both door 
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Figure 7.13: Panel Model of Aircraft Fuselage 
and overwing hatch exit types were incorporated the panel geometry and ensure that 
Ilow solutions could he integrated seamlessly into the cabin TIE modelling. 
The most obvious approach to creating the fuselage geometries was to derive 
the positions of panel end points using co-ordinate data obtained from the evacuation 
grids. The simplest way of achieving this would have been to calculate panel positions 
by land and store panel co-ordinates for each aircraft type being analysed. However, 
the resulting panel distributions would have been of a fixed resolution and difficult to 
tailor in order to reflect features such as fuselage break-up and the opening of exits. 
Therefore, a series of' routines was written to automatically produce optimised panel 
configurations directly from evacuation grid data. The implementation of these 
enabled fuselage panel models to be generated and updated for all aircraft types 
during programme run-time. 'T'ypically, the panel geometries produced were similar to 
the generic configuration illustrated in lower half of Figure 7.13. 
Some of the considerations that were dealt with in the construction of 
Iuselagc panel models included: - 
" Clustering or "zooming" of panels into areas where flow properties 
needed to be modelled at a higher resolution (e. g. open exits, corners 
and apexes) 
" Avoiding the waste of clustering panels around exits that still remain 
Closed 
" Provision of the ability to vary the overall density of panel distributions, 
enabling flow solution time to be traded off against solution accuracy. 
" Addition of panels to represent fuselage nose and tail cones at either end 
of passenger cabins, as these have a large influence on the external 
Ilowfield. 
" In cases where impact damage was severe, panels needed to track around 
separated sections of fuselage, possibly in random positions and 
Orlentatlons. 
-178- 
The flow patterns inside an aircraft's cabin are, to a large extent, determined 
by the size, position and number of emergency exits that have been opened during 
passenger evacuation. Therefore, it was essential that the effhcts of exit opening were 
incorporated within the airflow analysis. This was achieved by omitting flow panels 
located in the positions of open doors and escape hatches, thus creating a series of' 
gaps or holes in the cabin periphery. Air passes through these open exit positions, 
establishing a ventilation 1lowlicld in the cabin interior. ('akin flow patterns are 
determined by the geometry of opened exits and the velocity at which air moves 
through tllelll. 
In order to implement the calculation of' internal airflows, it was necessary to 
take account of the sequence in which exits were activated. Normally, at the start ofan 
accident simulation all exits are closed and cabin airflows are negligible. When 
alrcrall occupants begin to evacuate, exits irre opened in all 1Irhltrilrv sl'IIIICIICe, 
typically over ýI time period of'30 to 60 seconds. The activation of each additional exit 
produces a shift in the pattern of' cabin airflow, sonletinles even resulting in 11 
complete reversal in the overall direction of' air nlovenlcnt. 'I'llese ventil, ltioon eF ects 
are thought to have been very significant in some past accidents (King, I989). 
Consequently, it was apparent that cabin flow patterns needed to he obtained not just 
once, but possibly every time an exit was opened in the course ol' an accident 
simulation. This would then ensure that the effects of' transient flow coýn. litions are 
accounted tör within the analysis. 
The significance of shifting cabin airflow patterns is illustraltcd ill Figure 
7.14. The diagrams show a series of cabin flow solutions fier ,1 typical widcbody 
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Figure 7.14: Cabin Airflow Vectors Resulting from I "Nit Opcnin" 
aircraft, with diflcrent combinations of open exits. The vvind is Irene the IcIt, at a 
speed of 5.0 m/s and internal now vectors have been inagnilied Or clarity. (We (a) 
shows how no internal flows are present when all the exits remain closed. Cases (h) 
and (c) reveal the changes that can occur when emergency exits are progressively 
opened. Note how internal flow patterns change markedly when different 
combinations ofexits are activated. 
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Theoretically, internal flows needed to be re-calculated each and every time 
an exit was opened in the evacuation simulation. However, in practice, frequently., it 
was found that two or more exits would be opened near simultaneously. Potentially, 
this meant that intermediate flow patterns might only exist for a short space of time, 
and, effectively, the computational effort required to determine them would'. be 
wasted. Therefore, cabin flows were not automatically re-calculated each time an exit, 
was opened. Instead, whenever an exit had been activated, a check was run : to' 
determine whether or not any other exits were also just about to be opened (i. e. within 
a period of three seconds, say). If this were the case, then the flow update would be 
postponed in order to enable effects of the imminent changes to be included. Typically; 
this procedure was found to halve the number of times that cabin flow fields were 
calculated and the loss of fidelity was inconsequential. 
7.5.4 Impact Damage and Destruction of Cabin by Fire , .; 
Cabin airflows may stem from causes other than open exits. In' accidents that 
involve severe crash impacts, significant rupturing or even complete break-up-of of 
fuselage may occur. For the purpose of modelling internal flowfields, holes and gaps 
resulting from structural damage can be treated in the manner of open exits: 
Obviously, however, these features will be present from the very start of an accident 
simulation, rather than being introduced as a result of the passenger evacuation 
process. 
It was ensured that the routines used to create panel geometries were able to 
deal with fuselages that had been broken into several sections as a result of an impact. 
The exposed ends of separated fuselage sections were assumed to be fully open; 
through which air could flow completely unimpeded. Predictably, perhaps, the 
presence of such large gaps in the fuselage structure was found to exaggerate the 
effects of exit opening, with much higher internal flow velocities tending to occur. 
Some example flow distributions around broken fuselages are given in Figure 7.15. In 
case (a), it is interesting to note that, in spite of the fuselage severance, internal flow 
velocities are very small until, as shown in (b), exits are opened. This is because the 
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quantity of air flowing into an enclosure is limited by the size of the outflow paths 
available. The effects of small scale structural damage, such as rupturing and 
perforation of the fuselage, was not incorporated into the flow analysis. These features 
would be straightforward to introduce if information about likely damage distributions 
is obtained. Time constraints prevented this data from being derived during the of past 
accident data survey. 
Similarly, the destruction of fuselage structure by fire also serves modify 
cabin airflow patterns locally. However, the modelling of this effect was not afforded 
a high priority, because, arguably, conditions in the vicinity of these "melt-through" 
areas are already well beyond being survivable. Thus, changes in now patterns 
resulting from the melting of a fuselage were expected to have only a small influence 
on fire fatality rates. This issue, together with other aspects of fuselage fire hardening, 
could form the subject of further investigation. 
7.6 Cabin Fire Development 
7.6.1 Fire Ingress 
The primary mechanism of fire spread into the cabin interior in past accidents 
appeared to be through direct flame contact with the aircraft's materials. In the most 
extreme of circumstances, fires are capable of penetrating intact fuselage structures in 
a matter of seconds (King, 1989). More generally, damage resulting from a crash 
impact can often leave cabin materials directly exposed to the effects of flames and in 
these circumstances, fire ingress effectively occurs immediately. 
Once cabin furnishings become involved in a fire to a substantial extent, the 
smoke and toxic gases produced quickly result in cabin conditions becoming 
unsurvivable. Thus, the magnitude of any delay in fire ingress effectively determines 
the time available for occupants to evacuate from an aircraft. As a result of this, fire 
ingress times play a major role in determining the overall survivability rates in aircraft 
accidents. 
The use of an elliptical pool fire analogy in the modelling of external fires- 
meant that determining the extent of flame impingement on a fuselage was 
straightforward to achieve. External temperatures for wall cells in the cabin TTE grid 
could be obtained by referring to the appropriate entry in the external fire temperature 
array. In cases where fuselage break-up had occurred, cabin temperatures along the 
edges of exposed breaks were assumed to be equal to external fire temperatures. 
Similarly, conditions in cabin cells located adjacent to open exits could be assumed to 
be the same as those present outside. 
In cases where flames impinged on intact fuselage wall structure, a burn- 
through mechanism needed to be used. This was based on a simple thermal inertia 
analogy, where heat is progressively absorbed by the wall cell until the temperature 
reached is sufficient for melting to occur. A melt-through temperature of 250°C was 
assumed; this value was intended to take into account the mixture of materials 
typically used in aircraft fuselage construction, including, for example, light alloy 
skins, plastic windows, composite panels and fibre glass insulation. 
The rate at which wall temperatures increase depend on heat absorption 
levels and heat capacities of the materials involved. These two aspects were difficult 
to quantify with any degree of certainty. As a start, conductive heating rates were 
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L: 
assumed to be proportional the temperature difference between the wall and external 
flames and radiative heat transfer dependent on the levels of thermal radiation 
intensity present. 
However, in reality, many other factors are influential in determining burn- 
through rates for wall structures. For example, significant complications can include 
variable material thicknesses, increased heat absorption due to soot blackening, 
conduction of heat away from heated areas and presence of cargo bay liners. The role 
of such influences is extremely difficult to ascertain, either by experimental or 
analytical means and thus very little detailed data was found to be available in this 
area. ----w 11 
Consequently, it was decided that the only meaningful way to calibrate 
fuselage burn-through rates was by utilising historical accident data. Estimates of the 
time required for fire ingress were obtainable for 53 incidents in the accident database. 
These times were grouped into intervals and the resulting distribution is shown in 
Figure 7.16. Note that, in almost half of the incidents, fire was observed in the cabin 
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Figure 7.16: Variation in Time Required for Fire Ingress 
area immediately after the aircraft came to a stop. It can be seen that the average time 
required for fire to enter the passenger cabin is 49 seconds. The fire burnthrough 
mechanism was calibrated to this figure over a series of simulation runs. 
7.6.2 Fire Spread inside the Passenger Cabin 
Once a fire has entered an aircraft's passenger cabin, smoke and toxic fire 
products tend to accumulate and rapidly make conditions unsurvivable for those 
remaining inside. The primary hazard to aircraft occupants in these circumstances is 
incapacitation by the narcotic and highly irritant effects of smoke, rather than the 
threat of thermal injury. Thus, the primary task in the fire analysis was to establish the 
rate at which smoke spreads through an aircraft, as opposed to modelling the extent to 
cabin materials become involved in the fire. Nonetheless, in order for smoke 
distributions to be modelled with sufficient accuracy, it was necessary to construct a 
reasonable approximation of fire development within an aircraft's fuselage. 
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It has been seen that fires propagate by transferring heat to surrounding 
materials in three ways, namely by convection, conduction and thermal radiation. The 
basic physical characteristics possessed by each of these spread mechanisms could be 
represented within the cabin fire grid with the use of a simple numerical scheme. As 
with the modelling of fuselage burnthrough, however, the main difficulty in 
implementing any such analysis lies with establishing the level of the contributions 
made by the various mechanisms involved. At present, analytical theories can only 
represent the processes that comprise fire at the simplest of levels. In reality, cabin fire 
development is controlled by complex interactions that occur between a vast number 
of physical and chemical phenomena, most of which are still not understood or remain 
unaccounted for. As a result of this, fire modelling techniques must inevitably involve 
a combination of analytical and empirical approximation. 
The approach used to model fire spread within the cabin was to employ 
iterative cell diffusion scheme across the TTE grid. A simple first order method was 
used, equivalent to MacCormack's Predictor Step (Anderson, 1995). Numerical 
procedures of this type constitute the basis of computational fluid dynamics and 
further details concerning their implementation can be obtained from a number of 
standard textbooks (Abbot and Basco, 1989; Peyret, 1996; Shaw, 1992). Initial 
conditions of 20 °C and zero smoke density were assigned throughout the cabin. All 
areas were treated as being homogeneous; i. e. seats, aisles, galleys, etc. were 
approximated as being a continuous material, through which fire would attempt to 
spread equally in all directions. 
Ingress of the external pool fire was modelled by calculating temperature 
increases in cells lying around the periphery of each cabin section present. These 
boundary conditions were usually updated at 5,10 or 15 second intervals of 
simulation time. Four distinct penetration scenarios were possible for edge the cells; 
details of these are given in Table 7.3: 
Heat Transfer Burnthrough Resulting Edge Case Mechanism Time Constant Cell Temperature 
Pool fire Conduction: 10 s at 1000 K external flame impinging on 
a t1 -t q 
temperature temperature intact fuselage J differential 
Pool fire 
on i i i 
Conduction: 0s external flame mp ng ng 
cabin break q oc t1- tj 
temperature 
Pool fire remote Radiation: 10 s at 100 2 250 °C --> external from intact 
ata-to q 
kW/m radiative flame temperature fuselage l heat intensity 
Pool fire 
remote from 
Radiation: Os 250 °C -+ external 
cabin break q Oc tja -to J 
flame temperature 
Table 7.3: Pool Fire Penetration into Passenger Cabin 
The spread of heat from perimeter cells into the cabin interior through conduction, 
convection and radiation mechanisms was then calculated. Heat fluxes were assumed 
to occur only across directly adjacent cell boundaries, with no influence from cells in 
diagonal positions. These and other cell variables are illustrated in Figure 7.17. 
The fire propagation scheme implemented modelled the spread of heat from 
cell to cell with three terms. The first of these, convective transfer, only spreads heat 
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Figure 7.17: Use of Cell-Vertex. Cell-Boundary 
and Cell-Centred Cabin Fire Parameters 
in the direction of the local cabin airflow. Heat transfer rates were made proportional 
to the temperature differential and the perpendicular component of air velocity present 
at cell boundaries. Note that cabin grids were not necessarily perpendicular. 
In contrast, diffusive transfer could potentially be applied outwards in four 
directions from hot cells. The magnitude of diffusive heating effects was assumed to 
he proportional to the temperature difference between two adjacent cells. Similarly, 
radiative heat emissions were applied to surrounding cells in proportion to the 
difference in cell temperatures raised to the power of four, i. e. (t14 - t, 
4), in accordance 
with Planck's Law of radiation (Mudan and Croce, 1988). A term was also used to 
represent heat radiating from cabin smoke, when the latter was present. 
No mechanism was provided for decrementing the temperatures of hot cells 
in the cabin fire array. Thus, temperature in a given cell increases until equilibrium is 
established, either with adjacent cells or the with the external fire, at a mean 
temperature of 1000 °C. This effectively implies that combustion of cabin materials 
always occurs at a rate that is at least sufficient to maintain a cell's current 
temperature and that no depletion of the fuel supply occurs as a result of combustion. 
Obviously, if cabin fires needed to be modelled over extended periods of time, or the 
effects of fire fighting intervention represented, fuel accounting procedures and 
mechanisms for cell cooling would need to be incorporated. 
Cabin temperature distributions were usually set to be updated every 5,10 or 
15 seconds of simulation time, depending on the trade-off between simulation speed 
and accuracy desired. Regardless of the update interval used, iterations were 
performed with 0.5 second time steps. This ensured that CFL numbers were kept 
below unity (and thus numerical stability retained) for cabin airflow velocities up to a 
maximum of approximately 1.0 m/s. 
These types of heat transfer mechanisms are practically impossible to 
calibrate to any degree of accuracy in aircraft fires (Poulios, 1986). Fire behaviour is 
often dependent on factors that are difficult to isolate; thus wide variations in fire 
characteristics can occur in seemingly identical conditions. In general, results from 
cabin fire tests appeared to be very sensitive to details of the test set up used and 
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ambient wind conditions. Similarly, large differences in fire spread rates were noted 
during the accident data survey. Consequently, it was necessary to set diffusive and 
radiative transfer rates on a rather arbitrary basis; values were chosen to produce a fire 
growth speed of 1.0 m/min. This figure appeared to be generally consistent with mean 
rates observed in past accidents, up until the point at which fire flashover occurs. 
Beyond this, fire spread rates are of little consequence, as cabin conditions are 
effectively unsurvivable. However, 1.0 m/min is a somewhat faster growth rate than 
suggested by the results of most aircraft cabin fire experiments. 
The propagation of a burn-through fire inside the cabin of a widebody airliner 
is shown in Figure 7.18. Note that the fire grows slowly across the width of the 
_25 
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150 
100 
so 
0 
temperature t= O to 30 t= 60 t. 120 to 180 
VC) fire bum time t(s) 
Figure 7.18: Fire Burnthrough and Internal Fire Development 
aircraft, but is more extended in the lengthwise direction, as a result of cabin wall 
involvement. Mean temperatures in the centre of the cabin fire are likely to be 
approaching 1000 °C, well off the scale illustrated. Because there is no forced 
ventilation in the cabin, the fire growth illustrated is entirely attributable to the 
numerical heat diffusion and radiation schemes employed. The role of air movement in 
the spread of cabin fires is addressed in the next section. 
7.6.3 Effects of Airflow on Cabin Fire Development 
The development of fire inside enclosed compartments is known to be 
sensitive to forced ventilation effects. Air currents usually serve to dilute and disperse 
hot fire products over wide areas, significantly delaying or even preventing the 
development of flashover conditions (Quintiere and Tanaka, 1983). The rapidity with 
which smoke can engulf an aircraft cabin means that the primary danger to aircraft 
occupants is usually incapacitation through toxic and irritant effects, rather than the 
threat of thermal injury. However, the high temperatures of smoke layers can still make 
a significant contribution to the total incapacitation levels in those exposed. In 
addition, considerable quantities of thermal radiation are emitted from hot smoke, 
resulting in pre-heating of materials in the surrounding environment. This mechanism 
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is known to play an important role in speeding up the rate of a fire's development and 
it usually constitutes the trigger for the occurrence of fire flashover (Cooper, 1988). 
In consequence, it was concluded that the role of cabin airflow on the internal 
fire model was essentially twofold. The first and most important aspect that needed to 
be modelled was the transport of smoke and around the aircraft's interior. This 
information was needed in order to determine evacuee visibility, toxic incapacitation 
and irritation levels in the evacuation model. Secondly, it was necessary to represent 
the heating effects of the smoke dispersed around the cabin. This was because elevated 
temperatures also contribute to passenger incapacitation and facilitate the spread of 
fire under hot smoke layers. 
The movement of smoke was effected by propagating smoke levels in the 
direction of local cabin airflows. This involved an iterative diffusion scheme, biased in 
accordance with the local flow components present, but otherwise similar to the fire 
spread modelling described in the previous section. As a result, smoke is transported in 
a downwind direction and spreads outwards as it proceeds. 
The later phenomenon was an unavoidable consequence of the numerical 
diffusion process being used. However, conveniently, the presence of this effect was 
actually desirable for representation of cabin smoke flows. This was because, in reality, 
smoke will always tend to diffuse outwards in a horizontal direction, as a result of 
turbulence and eddy currents generally present in moving air. However, these 
aerodynamic effects were not captured in the inviscid, irrotational potential flow solver 
being used. Therefore, it would have been necessary introduce artificial diffusion into 
the analysis, even if the derivation of a diffusionless smoke transport scheme had 
actually been possible. 
The radiative heating effect of smoke on cabin materials was represented with 
by integrating smoke concentrations over time. Thus, the rates at which cabin 
temperature increase are dependent on local smoke density and smoke temperature. 
The latter was assumed to be proportional to optical density, reaching 122 °C at OD 
1.0 /m. Figure 7.19 shows the smoke flow and associated cabin temperature 
iý: . 
1 
Figure 7.19: Effects of Cabin Airflow on Fire Saread 
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distribution resulting from a typical burnthrough fire. Note how smoke is carried up 
the left hand side of the cabin by the internal airflow, away from the area of lire 
ingress. Diffusion of the smoke stream occurs, before it re-converges and lluws out of 
the forward right exit. The temperature within the denser regions of the smoke layer 
approach 122 °C. 
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Chapter 8: Passenger Evacuation Modelling 
8.1 Modelling Approach 
8.1.1 Conceptualisation of the Evacuation Process 
The review of fire evacuation models in Chapter 2 revealed that two basic 
approaches were available for representing the egress of survivors from aircraft. These 
involved representing people either as discrete entities or as a homogenous ensemble. 
After considering the relative advantages the two approaches, it was decided to adopt 
the former strategy in the current research. This was simply because study of past 
accidents had indicated that the process of passenger evacuation tends to be governed 
by actions performed.. on an individual level, rather than by group behaviour. For 
example passengers seated adjacent to each other may often choose different escape 
routes or exhibit contrasting types of behaviour. These factors possess a fundamental 
influence on the likely outcome of the evacuation process, and cannot be 
accommodated if an homogenous analogy is used. 
In addition to the representation of evacuees, the two other features necessary 
in any eyacuation model are some form of geometrical environment and a simulation 
clock. In the present study, the escape of people from aircraft cabins needed to be 
represented. These structures constitute a very convenient evacuation geometry, for 
they can be-treated as being two dimensional, are compact and essentially regular in 
configuration. These factors suggested that the use of a two dimensional rectangular 
grid would be appropriate for the evacuation analysis. The process of passenger 
movement could then be effected by moving individuals from grid node to grid node, 
in a series of discrete steps. The order and rate at which these moves are undertaken 
needed to be carefully regulated by simulation clock. These basic elements were 
sufficient to form the starting point of the passenger evacuation analysis. 
At a higher conceptual level, other features needed to be introduced into the 
evacuation process. Human beings are capable of displaying very complex patterns of 
behaviour, and typically, computer algorithms struggle to represent even some of the 
simplest characteristics involved. However, it was necessary to formulate at least an 
acceptable representation of evacuee decision-making processes in order for the 
simulation to function in the desired manner. Many other factors could potentially 
come to influence occupant evacuation. Most aircraft accidents involve crashes, which 
result in structural damage, injuries, jamming of exits and even complete dislocation 
of the fuselage. Fire is also likely to enter the cabin during an evacuation, blocking 
escape routes and incapacitating those who are exposed to its thermo-toxic effects. 
Thus, it can be seen that three main issues needed to be dealt with in the 
evacuation modelling. Respectively, these were the creation of a suitable evacuation 
domain, representing the actions and behaviour of individuals and incorporating the 
wider influences of the fire accident scenario. 
8.1.2 Integration of the Evacuation Model within the Analysis 
The modelling of passenger evacuation, together with the representation of fire 
growth and calculation of the cabin-thermotoxic environment effectively constituted 
the engine of the accident simulation model. If there were no external influences on 
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the evacuation process, the results provided would be similar to those obtained in 
aircraft certification trials. It was therefore necessary for the three programme 
modules involved to communicate and interact with each other in order for the 
outcome of accident scenarios to be predicted with any accuracy. For example, the 
opening of exits would be controlled by parameters from each the modules. 
To ensure the provision of this capability, the fire. cabin environment and 
evacuation modules were designed, constructed and tested in parallel. All accident 
parameters and simulation variables were made fully accessible to the three modules 
at any stage of a simulation. Accident features were initialised simultaneously within 
each module by the Scenario Generator. Fire growth. the resulting cabin environment 
and passenger movements were also all calculated with a single simulation clock. 
Consequently. the evacuation process was integrated totally with all other aspects of 
the analysis from its very conception. 
8.2 Spatial Representation of Aircraft 
8.2.1 Aircraft Cabin Grids 
In order to model the evacuation of aircraft occupants involved in the accident 
simulation, it was necessary to possess a detailed knowledge of the cabin 
configuration of the aircraft type involved. The information required covers many 
areas, including, for example overall dimensions, seating distributions, positions of 
aisles, exit details, and the existence of constrictions within the cabin. Data at this 
level of detail is essential for defining the spatial aspects of the evacuation process, 
i. e. the numbers, distances and relative positions of evacuees with respect to the 
features that are present in their surroundings. These geometrical criteria play a 
fundamental role determining in how evacuees interact, both with each other and with 
their immediate environment, throughout the course of an evacuation. 
At the simplest level, an aircraft's interior can he analysed as a collection of 
objects, many of which possess regular geometries and occur in repeated patterns. In 
general, modern aircraft cabins possess floor-plans that are approximately rectangular 
in shape, and the objects within them tend to be densely clustered together. In the 
context of computer modelling, the most efficient way of' encoding this type of 
information is in the form of a two-dimensional (2-D) rectangular grid. Positions of 
objects can be defined by coding the contents of individual cells within the grid. 
Given the regularity of seating patterns, aisle positions, exit locations. etc.. very little 
approximation is necessary when encoding a cabin in this way. providing that an 
appropriate resolution of grid is used. An example of this translation process shown in 
Figure 9.1, fier a typical section of cabin. It can be seen that the use of a rectangular 
grid with dimensions in the range of 150 - 200 nlm enables cell positions to coincide 
almost exactly with objects inside the real aircraft. Consequently, grids of these sizes 
were chosen for the purpose of encoding aircraft cabin configurations. 
When full advantage is taken of regularity, pattern repetition and symmetry, a 
highly accurate representation a cabin can be generated with the storage of the 
absolute minimum of information. Consequently, it was not necessary to store large 
quantities of data in an explicit form for each cabin configuration being analysed. 
Instead, a simple programming language was created for the purpose of defining and 
storing cabin geometries with a relatively short sequence of commands. These could 
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Seat Rows 
Fuselage Wall 
(a) Actual Cabin Configuation (b) Cabin Grid Representation 
Figure 8.1: Cahin (: _id App roºxint; atioºn 
he stored in files and interpreted at programme run tinºc in order I''m the rL"gluircd cahiºº 
configuration to be generated. More details of this procedure are provided in Section 
8.2.5. 
'I'Ihc rctiultin ; "map" ref' the cabin clTectively contains t%w distinct types or 
inform atioºn for each cell. "These consist of' cell vertex co-ordinates, (. v, i'), and .º 
numeric code Or depicting the cell contents, c", respectively. When pioi-, ran lining the 
evacuation model, it was 1`0uncl to he advantageous to keep these itch is oI' cahin data 
separate. This stemmed from the Iact that they were used in two dif'fe'rent ways. ('ell 
contents contained categorical information and needed to referenced repeatedly whilst 
performing the logic and searching operations that were used toi fi)rniulýttc evacuee 
escape tactics. Consequently, they were stored as a contiguous 2-I) arr'ay oI'integers: a 
very compact and efficient data type. 
In contrast, co-ordinate data comprised two continuous variables per cell, diel 
not need to he searched and would only be utilised relatively inf'rc(luc"ºttIv, fier the 
purpose of calculating physical distances. Consrclucntly, cell co-ordinates were best 
stored in the form ofa 3-1) array of floating point numbers. 
Ile details of cabin configurations dil'fcr markedly with aircraft type, sind even 
with different operators cif the same type. As a consequence of' tlºis, it vvas perceived 
to be necessary to represent specilie aircraft types on an individual basis v%ithin the 
evacuation model. It was seen in Chapter 6 that 72 dif'fcrcnt cabin configurations were 
analysed and coded into a grid-basal format, fier use within the evaciratioll 11 odelIiru . 
Obviously, this limited selection could never reflect all configurations used hy the 
world's airline industry. However, the member used was cnouglº to allow typical itº- 
service Coll 1-1 1u-atioils to be analysed all major aircraft types current I\ in service. It 
was anticipated that this would he more than suflicicnt to reveal the si,. nilicance or 
aircraft type in determining accident sure ival rates and serve as it s; tnºIdc Kopulation 
against which new aircraft types could he compared. 
8.2.2 (: rid Dimensions 
The first stage in defining a cabin coil figurltion was to specit\, its Overall 
(III11ciisioils and the individual sizes of all cells \V'Itlllil the grid. (ilV'CI1 that cabin grill", 
were assumed to he truly rectangular, effcctivrly this meant ddeIiniiw cell intervals in 
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the x and y directions, i. e. across the width and down the length of the. cabin 
respectively. These two sets of spacings could then be used to allocate (x, ý y) co- 
ordinates to all cells at programme runtime. Grid origins were placed at the front left 
corner of the cabin and all distances were defined to the nearest millimetre. 
4'Tt was obviously impractical to obtain a fully detailed set of dimensions for 
each of the cabin configurations analysed. Therefore, the approach taken` was to 
assume standard proportions and spacings for seats, aisles, toilets, galley units, `etc. 
and set cell sizes accordingly. When these dimensions were used to map out an entire 
seating configuration, the resulting overall cabin sizes were generally within ±5 
percent of actual aircraft dimensions; sufficiently accurate for undertaking initial 
modelling studieVHowever, in some circumstances, greater levels of precision were, 
required, for example when reproducing results of evacuation certification trials. In 
these cases, cabins constructed with standardised dimensions were scaled in size to 
correspond exactly with the real cabin width and length of the aircraft type concerned. 
8.2.3 Cell Contents 
Integer numbers were used to specify the contents of individual cells within 
the cabin grids. By default, all areas of the cabin were initialised as comprising empty 
floor space. Details of the cabin configuration were then built up by coding individual 
cells to represent one of the following cabin features: - 
" Fore or aft bulkhead 
" Fuselage wall 
" Cell on the exterior of the fuselage 
" Exit 
" Passenger seat 
" Cabin divide, internal wall or void area 
" Toilet compartment 
" Stowage compartment 
" Galley unit 
" Aisle-way 
" Exit traverse row 
Once the configuration of the aircraft had been defined, passengers could be assigned 
to vacant seats. They were distributed randomly across the aircraft, with the 
probability of any one seat being occupied being equal to the load factor. Cabin crew 
were not represented in the evacuation simulation. However, the positions of their 
stations were incorporated in the cabin configurations in many instances, as they 
would probably be utilised if the model were to be developed further. 
8.2.4 Treatment of Exits 
//The 
characteristics of doors and emergency exits can often have a fundamental 
influence over the process of evacuation from an aircraft. Thus, it was necessary to 
provide detailed information about the size and operability of each individual exit, so 
that events in their vicinity could be represented accurately. This information 
comprised exit dimensions and a time estimate for exit opening delay. The latter was 
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used to represent the time that passes between exit activation and the point at which it 
first becomes usable, in ideal circumstances, ' 
In the case of door exits, the opening delay consists of the time required for the 
inflation and deployment of the emergency escape slide. Evacuation trials have shown 
that this interval is typically around 10 seconds (Airbus, 1995) and thus this value was 
used for all floor level exits/ 
For emergency escape hatches, time is required for the hatch to be manhandled 
away from the exit and stowed safely. Given that the speed of this operation is largely 
dependent on the efficiency of the exit operator, it was difficult to specify a 
representative time delay. A value of 7 seconds was chosen, on the basis that hatch 
exits could be utilised more quickly than door exits, in favourable circumstances. 
These exit opening delays were assumed to represent the absolute minimum 
times in which exits could be expected to be utilised. The values were factored in the 
scenario generation module, to ensure that they corresponded with the delays actually 
observed in past accidents. In cases where an exit was determined to have been 
jammed, as a result of damage sustained in a crash impact, an opening delay of 999 
seconds was assumed. 
8.2.5 Programming of Cabin Data 
A large quantity of information was required to define a typical cabin grid 
configuration in an explicit manner. Consider, for example, the cabin of a Boeing 777 
aircraft in a three class seating layout. This required an array measuring 36 by 268 
entries to depict in detail, corresponding to a total of 9648 individual cells. Each of 
these cells possesses x and y co-ordinates, together with an integer code for 
representing its contents. This means that 28,944 numbers have to be defined in order 
to completely describe the cabin of a single aircraft type. Whilst modern computer 
technology might be able to accommodate these quantities of data with ease, the task 
of deriving and entering the values for cabin grids by hand would have been 
prohibitively time-consuming. 
/Consequently, it was decided to construct a simple programming language and 
command interpreter for the purpose of creating aircraft cabin configurations. The 
commands were formulated to allow large series of cell co-ordinates or cell contents 
to be initialised in a single operation. For example, a single command might be used 
to create an extended row of wall cells, an 11 by 5 cell galley unit, or a large array of 
passenger seats. Then, instead of storing cabin layouts as tens of thousands of 
numbers, they could be defined with a comparatively short sequence of commands. 
The command interpreter can then be used to read in this list of commands at 
programme runtime and process them to construct a full numeric description of the 
aircraft's cabin layout. On a modern desktop workstation computer, this interpretation 
and re-construction process can be achieved in fractions of a second, for even the 
largestýf aircraft types, involving over 15,000 cells. // 
The use of this approach enabled complex aircraft cabin configurations to be 
encoded and tested with the evacuation model in comparatively short time intervals. 
Returning to the, example cited above, the Boeing 777 layout was converted into a 
grid format, drawn and then programmed in a total time of approximately three hours. 
The definition of the 28,944 cells was achieved with the use of only 165 commands. 
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The implementation of a typical command is shown in Figure 8.2. The 
function of "seats2" is used to create a rectangular array of business or economy class 
COMMAND 
seats2( c, r, 
RESULTING GRID 
reference cell at 
grid coordinate (c, r) 
2 seat rows 
Figure 8.2: Example Grid Construction Command 
seats. The parameters that need to be specified by the command are the position of the 
forward left-hand seat, number of seat columns, number of seat rows and the colours 
to be assigned to the seats. Each business or economy seat occupies a space of 3 by 5 
cells; thus the example shown defines 150 cells in the cabin array with a single 
command. 
A total of eighteen commands was created in order to define all aspects of 
aircraft cabin configurations. Most of these were used in a manner analogous to 
"scats2". One notable exception was the "wings" command which specifies the 
position of the wings with respect to the aircraft's cabin, by providing a series of co- 
ordinates. The use of this and all the other commands necessary for the specification 
of a complete cabin grid for a small airliner type is illustrated in Figure 8.3. It can be 
seen that the use of 'a command interpreter simplifies construction of cabin grids to the 
extent that a non-specialist would be capable of performing the task. Commands are 
entered into plain text files, with the use of any word-processing package and then 
checked by testing them in the simulation programme. The resulting cabin 
configuration files were collated to form a library of aircraft types for use as required 
within the modelling analysis. 
8.2.6 Structural Disruption & Fuselage Breakages 
"l'he cabin grids were constructed to represent aircraft in an intact state, 
without distortion or breakages that might be present after a crash impact. Before 
these types of accidents could be analysed, it was necessary to introduce the effects 
structural disruption into the evacuation model. 
It was seen in Chapter 6 that the method used to specify levels of impact 
damage in the scenario generator involved fuselage segmentation and damage ratings 
on a 0.0 - 1.0 scale. The latter was straightforward to code into an additional sub-layer 
of the cabin evacuation grid. I lowever the break-up and separation of a fuselage 
obviously held iär greater implications for the evacuation modelling. As a result, a 
name of command: create an array of businessleconomy class seats 
starting co-ordinate of forward left-hand seat 
5,2,3,1 ) 
- seating colour scheme: 3,1,3,1,3 across seat rows 
number of seat columns and rows to be constructed 
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5 seat columns 
n5 to 15 
15 
m 
20 
25 
30 
PEP 
]Eq 
40 
a5 
5fl 
55 
HO 
Yakolev Yak-40 
grid eize(0,0,14,72) 
grid_x dim( 0,0,200) 
gridxdim( 1,13,176) 
grid x dim(14,14,200) 
grid_y_dim( 0,0,200) 
grid y_dim( 1,71,162) 
grid 
_y 
dim( 72,72,200) 
bulkhead(l, 0,13,0) 
bulkhead(3,72,11,7:. ) 
wall( 0,0,0,64) 
wall(14,0,14,64) 
wall( 1,65,1,70) 
wall(13,65,13,70) 
wall( 2,71,2,72) 
wall(12,71,12,72) 
exterior( 0,65,0,7: ) 
exterior(14,65,14,12) 
exterior( 1,71,1,72) 
exterior(13,71,13,7) 
exit pos(l, 0,1,0,4) 
exit pos(2,0,45,0,47) 
exit pon(3,14,45,14,47) 
exit 1-o)4,6,72, H, '/: ) 
-it dat(1,1016.0,10.0) 
, "xit dat(2,432.0,7. u) 
, "xil. dat(3,432.0,7. u) 
ý. xitdat(4,914.0,1' U) 
e., "., tn2 1,4,1,8,1, 
n2( 8,4,2,8,1,3) 
.., "., ts2( 1,45,1,1 1 3) 
n, "., tu2( 8,45,2,1, I, t 
(livIdn( 1,50,3, "U) 
Jivide( 8,50,13,1. U) 
tvl(lo( 2, bb, 4, t, ) 
ýi let( 8,52,19,64) 
- l)ot( 8,65,12,66) 
nt ýw. ige( 8,51,13, r. l 
1e( 4,1,7,6'. 
lr( 5,66,7,67) 
l 6,67,8,71) 
t ., v row( 1,2,13,4) 
1v row( 1,44,11,41, 
wiu. )a( 1,0,6900) 
wfile( 2,2000, '1200) 
wi-In 3,2000,10.1 
w, n, 7o( 4,0, In', {") 
Figure 8.3_I)ctinition_of ('alpin (_rid for a tinnallAirlincr 
dedicated section oI, code, entitled BRI-AKI II, as created to jljcorporatc tile 
necessary effects into the cabin grids. 
'l he main task that needed to he achieved was to split an aircraft's cabin into 
two or three sections and then rotate and translate these pieces into arhilrary positions 
with respect to each other. [Ilectively, as f al. as the evacuation Illodc1li1q, was' 
concerned, this involved breaking a single cabin up into a number of' separate units 
and adding new "exits" at the positions of the severed edges. 'Mir cl, ºssifir, ºtiun of 
these edges as additional exits was prompted by tlºe fact that significant numbers OF 
survivors were known to have escaped by these means in past accidents. 
Splitting of'a fuselage section in two was achieved by inserting live additional 
rows of'cells at the break positions, as shown in Idgure K. 4. It was observed from past 
accidents that passenger scats located in the vicinity ref a fuselage break do not split in 
two along the break line, but rather, remain attached to One of time fuseln e sections, 
often with a considerable overhang. Two rows of'cells were allocated to represent this 
el'lcct on each fuselage section (rows 1,2 and 4,5 respectively). Aislcway cells in 
rows 2 and 4 were defiled as new exits and allocated a slow traverse rate (S. O 
seconds), to represent the erects of passengers scrambling across twisted debris. 
The central row (number 3) was left to bridge the gap between tue fuselage 
sections and cells were coded as being on the exterior of the aircr, ºIt. As such, they 
played no role in the evacuation simulation and were necessary only fier gr, ililiical 
purposes. 
Functions were created to translate and rotate separated sections oV f'usel, ºge 
into arbitrary positions with respect to each other. 't'hese involved simple ºimtria 
t ansFormations being applied to grid co-ordinates, introducing a shift (dx-, 6 i) and an 
angular rotation (0) around the centroid of the section fuselage concerned. A similar 
procedure was used to update the locations of external fires, vvItoýsc positions were 
defined on the basis cif' local fuselage orientation. Note that the actual contents of 
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grid 
" co-ordinates 
............ 
," overhanging 
" seats "". 
" arbitrary rotation "r"""""""""'"' & translation of '''''''''''" 
.............. " cabin sections , 
.............. 
"±45 
front half of 
3 
rear half of 
original cabin 12 original cabin 
5 additional rows 
of cells inserted 
l ure 8.4: Insertion of Fuselage Breaks into Cabin Grid 
cabin cells were left untouched by these operations, thus the evacuation simulation 
would work with cell vectors defined in directions up/down and across the cabin, 
regardless of'the actual physical orientation of the fuselage. 
In some instances, fuselage breakages would bi d sect emergency exits an 
doors. Given the reinforced structure present in these areas, exits usually remain with 
one half of' the aircraft, rather than being split in two. No correction was applied to 
represent this effect, as the exits concerned would be likely to have been jammed as a 
result ofstructural distortion. 
Once the dispositions of cabin sections were known, it was possible to 
calculate the total envelope of the wreckage and determine an appropriate scale for the 
plotting ofevacuation graphics on screen. 
8.3 The Simulation Clock & Passenger Movement 
8.3.1 Event Driven Simulation Methodology 
The passenger evacuation model was implemented with the use of an event 
driven simulation process. This involved evacuees performing their moves 
independently of each other and at any point in time, as opposed to a cell-based or 
simultaneous movement scheme. To start the process, a completion time for the next 
movement or action to be performed by each individual is calculated. These events are 
then sorted into a chronological list, with the most imminent placed at the top. The 
simulation programme then implements passenger movements based on the order of 
their occurrence on this list. 
When an action is to be effected, the simulation clock is advanced to the time 
of the event concerned, the action is removed from the event list and implemented. 
Next, the individual involved chooses their next move in the evacuation and the time 
required for its accomplishment is calculated. This new completion time is then used 
to insert the evacuee back into the chronological event list at the appropriate position, 
ct'tectively making the individual "wait" until it is their turn to move again. 
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Some important points should he noted about this type of simulation 
procedure. Firstly, the simulation clock is driven by the occurrence Of events. "thus, 
the process does nol involve time being advanced in f ixcd increnicrits, intervening 
events determined and then executed. Instead, actions are impl oriented in order in 
which they occur and the simulation clock is incremented soy tllat it corresponds 
precisely with the timing of each individual event. As a result, the simulation clock 
may appear to advance in all erratic or uneven ºllanner. 
Another fundamental point is that evacuees move independently at dil'lt"rent 
points in time and need not necessarily take it in turns to move. For instance, a last 
individual may be able to advance two or three positions in the time required fier a 
slow person to move a single cell. 't'his point will be amplified in time next section. 
Also, because an evacuee is at the top of the chronological event list, it does 
not imply that they will make the next move in a simulation. Italic individuals pat is 
blocked (for example by another passenger or a closed exit), limey vv ill be held 1ºp and 
forced to wait as evacuees further down the list make their stoves. 'I I11ºs, the time of 
an evacuee's next action may fäll behind the evacuation clock, until, o11 their path 
becoming clear, they jump back into synchronisation with time latest events. 
Finally, the number orevents occurring per second of'simulation time can vary 
dramatically. At the start of the evacuation ofa large aircraft, thousands of Iwswnger 
movements might need to be processed each second. In contrast, vvI1en the last person 
is leaving the aircraft, perhaps seriously injured or in dense smoke, IL'* than one titt"f) 
might he occur per second of'sinmulation time. Thus, if the cornlputcr I, rogranllue is left 
to run naturally, processing events at a fixed rate, the evacuation clock will appear to 
progressively speed up as fewer and Icwer passengers remain inside the aircraft. No 
attempt was made to synchronise the simulation clock to real time in order to hide this 
"snowballing" ef'lect. 
8.3.2 Movement at Different Speeds 
As mentioned in the previous section, it was ensured that individuals vvCR 
capable öl moving at different rates within the evacuation silliulatioll. Variations ill 
speed can result from differences in passenger attributes, thcrnto-toyic incapacitation 
levels, inter-personal spacing, visibility and the presence of cabin disruption. In 
conscquencc, evacuees would be starting off at a range or dil'lcreut speeds and then 
their rates öl movement would fluctuate in accordance with the prcv, ºiling co iiditioýns. 
These speed variations were known to be potentially important in detcrntining, 
egress dynamics; for example, a slow person holding up it queue of faster- p, ºssenrers 
will result in a significant reduction in the mean rate of progress. 'I (tose positioncdl 
towards the rear ACa slowly moving queue would he murr likely to seek an alten ialive 
escape route, perhaps causing distribution öl»exit usage too he modified. ('onsequenlly, 
variation in the speed at which evacuees ºnoýve not only inlluenccs the rate at an 
evacuation takes place; also the overall pattern ul movenient may be dependent on the 
ntat11nitucle of the variations present. "I'hus, in order to obtain it faithful representation 
of the egress process, it was essential liar evacuees to be able to nºove at their (mil 
rates, rather than being b reed to synchronise their movements with the fixed cycle of 
a simulation clock. I1'luctively, this imposed the requirement liar ill) event driven (as 
opposed to it clock driven) simulation methodology. 
Controlling the rate at which evacuees moved was it task of fundamental 
importance within the egress analysis. Ile approach taken was to calculate llte liºnc 
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required fir an individual to traverse a cabin cell, based on their current maximum 
rate of movement. In practice, this speed would rarely be sustained, as evacuees are 
likely to he slowed in the presence of each other and restrictions in the cabin. 
All passengers were assigned a maximum egress speed at the start of the 
simulation, chosen at random from probability distribution. The later provided values 
evenly distributed between 0.75 and 1.25 m/s i. e. with a mean of 1.0 m/s and a 
variation of up to -t 0.25 m/s. This speed range corresponded approximately with the 
rates observed in video recordings of evacuation trials undertaken by Muir (Muir and 
13ottomly, 1992). It should be noted that these figures apply to motivated young male 
volunteers moving through empty aisles; thus they probably represent the upper 
bounds of passenger speeds likely to be encountered in real accidents. 
During the course o1' an evacuation, the maximum rate at which aircraft 
occupants can move he may be reduced by a number of factors, for example thermo- 
toxie incapacitation, poor visibility and cabin disruption. It was assumed that the 
influences of' these various effects were independent and multiplicative. 'T'hus speeds 
were factored in turn by parameters such as Fractional Effective Dose, smoke optical 
density and cabin disruption levels. In reality, the role of these influences is obviously 
far more complex than assumed; for example, exposure to light smoke has actually 
been l und to make volunteers move more quickly in experimental tests (Jin and 
Yamada, 1989). 
As has been already seen, the requirement to model evacuees moving at 
arbitrary speeds was accommodated with the use of an event driven simulation 
procedure. This aspect of the evacuation modelling is illustated in Figure 8.5. The two 
evacuees start at the bottom of the grid and progress upwards at different speeds. Note 
that the scale of the grid has been enlarged for clarity. Passenger A moves at a rate of 
one cell per second and will thus cause the simulation clock to be incremented at 1.0 
second intervals. In constrast, passenger 11 only moves at two thirds of this rate and 
Movement Speeds 
passenger A: 1.0 cell per second; passenger B: 2/3 cell per second 
(A) (B) (A moves) (B moves) (A moves) (A &B move) (A moves) 
t=0.0 t=1.0 t= 1.5 t=2.0 t=3.0 t=4.0 
lip 
Simulation Time t (seconds) 
fý igure R. 5: Event Driven Simulation 
-of 
Evacuee Movement 
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will thus require the clock to be advanced every 1.5 seconds. Driving the simulation 
clock in accordance with these events produces a repeating pattern uf, I. () and U. 5 
second time-steps i. e. a variable time-step process. 
It is worth noting that, at a clock time of 1.0 seconds, the movements both 
evacuees happen to precisely coincide, implying that they both lime equal priority the 
chronological event list. Generally, in this situation, both pass ligcrs will he able to 
snake their move in the same time step, with the individual that chances tee be in the 
upper position in the event list getting moving first. Although this eventuality was 
accommodated for in the simulation programming, in practice it is ýtrý nip Iti tintikel) 
to occur. "I'his is because the timings of all evacuee mmoveinents involve least one 
randomly determined component and calculations are performed tu an 1Cetnacv Of 
sixteen significant figures. 
8.3.3 Passenger Crossing and Overtaking 
There are occasions during the evacuation of an aircraI I \\11('11 p, ºtitiý ºItý. ý rý nº. ºv 
wish to pass each other in confined spaces. It is possible toi (listiný, uisli 1m) type" oI' 
passing manoeuvre; evacuees may wish to pass in opposite directions, or else they 
may be attempting to move in the same direction. "I Iºcse two cases were classified as 
cv"ossing and overtaking respectively. 
From a simulation standpoint, both of"these interactions could he inlpleine"nted 
in a similar manner, as shown in Figure 8.6. Note that the only difference between 
crossing and overtaking is the direction in whirl) the two passil uý pcºýtiý1º;. rý are 
hieing at the start and finish of the procedure. For the purpose ()I clarity, tlºe" to 
processes have been illustrated in seven stages. In reality, 
Our of th"t: are actually 
undertaken simultaneously, which results in a comparatively simple three StaLk, c "turn. 
pass and turn" procedure. 
It was decided not to introduce evacuee overtaking ill the accident sinnºIlations. 
This was because the manoeuvre was difficult to calibrate and nlnºIe it ý1 nrtg. lit. JhIe 
Crossing 
Overtaking 
time 
Figure 8.6 : Crossing and Overtaking in a Narrow ; S. islcwa)' 
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difference to the outcome of simulations; evacuees just tended to emerge from the 
aircraft in a slightly different order. In contrast, the use of the crossing manoeuvre was 
found to be useful for enabling passengers to pass each other when heading in 
different directions along a modestly wide aisle. This action was assumed to impose a 
delay of one second on the participants. 
8.4 Passenger Decision Making & Behaviour 
8.4.1 Representation of Passenger Characteristics 
When people are involved in an aircraft accident, they can behave in a number 
of different ways, some of which contrast strikingly. Reactions can vary from what 
might appear to be frenzied panic, through to calm purposeful responses or even to 
complete inaction. Some of these behavioural differences may stem from variations in 
the circumstances and the local conditions that survivors are exposed to. For instance, 
several accidents have indicated that individuals located near to a large external fire or 
fuselage rupture are particularly prone to behavioural inaction. However, the fact that 
passengers in adjacent seats often react to a situation in completely different manners 
suggests that behaviour is highly dependent on the characteristics of the individual 
concerned. As a result of this, it was obvious that provision needed to be made within 
the evacuation analysis for modelling the attributes of passengers on an individual 
basis. 
A study of evacuations in past aircraft accidents was undertaken, in an attempt 
to gain an insight into the role of personal characteristics and behaviour in these 
events. Even with a database of over 200 events to work from, ý passenger 
characteristics were specifically cited on only 36 occasions in the accident reports and 
summaries surveyed. Thus, most of the material was only anecdotal in nature and it 
was not feasible to determine a statistical significance level for any of the 
observations made. However, in spite of this, it was least possible to identify a 
number of passenger attributes that are likely to have been relevant in past accidents. 
In approximate order of significance, these were: - 
" Familiarity with aircraft operations or military training 
" Off-duty crew-members 
" Children 
" Sex 
" Presence of family or friends 
" Old age 
" Linguistic & cultural differences 
" Large size/obesity 
" Physical handicap 
Given the inherent difficulties involved in modelling the effects of these 
characteristics and limited information available, it was decided not to allocate 
significant time to this aspect of the evacuation analysis. Thus, the approach taken 
was to differentiate between passengers on the simplest possible basis. As a result, 
only two attributes were used; these were passenger reaction time and maximum rate 
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of movement, respectively. These measures, were simple to define, measure and 
calibrate, as well as being straightforward integrate directly into the -evacuation 
analysis. 
It was found that using this minimal set of passenger attributes was sufficient 
to produce a satisfactory representation of evacuation dynamics. This was because, 
essentially, the factors noted in the study of past accidents only serve to modify 
behaviour amongst individuals on very a local scale - for example, the rapid opening 
of one exit, or the creation of a slow moving restriction in one area of the cabin. Consequently, the net effects of these factors could be accounted for quite adequately 
by modifying the reactions and rates of movement possessed by certain passengers in 
the simulation. 
Obviously, this means that localised processes - arising from detailed 
differences in passenger characteristics will not be modelled explicitly. However, if 
the resultant effects on surrounding passengers and the evacuation process as a whole 
are reproducible by simpler means, this need not concern us. An example of this can 
be found in the case of handicapped passengers. Trials suggest that, regardless of 
whether they are blind, paraplegic, obese or mentally deficient, these individuals 
effectively constitute a slow moving obstruction, behind which faster evacuees are 
detained (Blethrow et al., 1977). Differences in the rates of movement achievable by 
these passengers range from 0.82 to 0.19 of those exhibited by unimpaired passengers. 
It would have been very straightforward to expand the list of passenger 
characteristics to encompass almost any conceivable physical or psychological trait. 
However, without any substantial quantitative information on how such factors might 
influence behaviour in emergency situations, this exercise would have been 
meaningless. Although physical parameters, such as age, weight, height and sex are 
straightforward to measure, determining their significance in realistic evacuation 
scenarios is, far from easy (Jin and Yamada, 1989; Muir et al., 1989). Psychological 
characteristics, such as patience, aggressiveness or propensity to panic are even 
difficult to define satisfactorily, short of measuring or making practical use of. These 
considerations lead to the conclusion that, until a greater level of understanding has 
been established in the area of behavioural psychology, the characterisation of 
individual behaviour in computer simulation models should be kept as simple as 
possible. 
8.4.2 Escape Strategy 
The primary aim of passengers involved in an aircraft accident should be to 
escape to a safe distance in a short a time as possible. Perhaps the most obvious way 
for a'passenger to achieve this objective is to leave their seat, move up an aisle to the 
nearest available exit and vacate the aircraft, accommodating the needs of others 
where necessary. This simple strategy was to provide the basis for controlling the 
movements of passengers in the evacuation model; consequently, it will be examined 
in more detail in this section. 
However, when past aircraft accidents are examined, it is apparent that 
passengers may sometimes utilise less rather straightforward methods of escape. 
Factors such as exit availability, queuing, novel escape paths and the influence of 
other passengers may mean that evacuees do not make for their nearest exit. Escape 
plans and options may also be altered as cabin conditions deteriorate or the 
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functionality of exits becomes apparent. Some these issues are examined in 
subsequent sections. 
In order for an evacuee to head directly to their nearest exit. it was necessary 
them to assess the relative distances of the various exits available and choose the 
shortest. "]'his was achieved within the simulation by making the locations of all 
emergency exits available to the passengers. Exit choice could then simply be 
determined by looking up the positions of each exit in turn and calculating the 
distance involved. There were two possible options for measuring exit distances; they 
could be evaluated in a straight line i. e. "as the crow flies", or as the total path lengths 
that would have to be traversed in order for the exit to be reached. In some situations, 
significant differences can result from these two options. This point is illustrated in 
Figure 9.7, which shows a passenger seated in the rear of a DC-9 cabin together with 
Relative 
Exit Vector Distance 
1 (-15,2) 1.00 
2 (-15, -17) 1.50 
3 (12, -17) 1.38 
(a) distances measured "as the crow flies" 
Exit Path length 
Relative 
Distance 
1 1 (9+15+11) 1.17 
2 (9+15+8) 1.07 
3 (9+13+8) 1.00 
(b) orthogonal path lengths 
I' figure 8.7: Method of Measuring Exit Distances 
distances to the nearest three exits. Note how exit 1 appears to be the nearest when 
straight line distances are compared. I-lowever, this exit is actually the furthest away 
from the passenger when true path lengths are evaluated. 
lt was not known which of these two possibilities was the better representation 
of low passengers judge exit distances in reality. Both methods were coded, but the 
latter tended to be used more often, if only for the reason that path lengths could be 
evaluated more quickly. 
Once the evacuee has chosen an exit, their next move will be dependent on the 
nature ol' their current location. This could be one of six cell types; seat, seat row, 
aisle, exit traverse row, exit or outside the aircraft. The actions that were performed in 
each of these positions are shown in Table 8.1. 
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Location Action 
seat Undo seat belt, stand and move into seat row 
seat row Find and move towards aisle, exit row or exit 
aisle Head in direction of chosen exit, avoiding obstructions. In 
a widebody aircraft, change aisles if necessary. 
exit row Head towards chosen exit, or else find way out of wrong 
exit row 
exit Move forwards when clear below 
outside of 
aircraft 
Remove from simulation 
Tahle R. 1: I: v acucý Actions 
lt should he noted that, in reality, the task of deteni inin n passeººgcr's next nºuvc is 
considerahly more complicated than this list might appear to indicate. In mdehodv 
aircraft, I'Or instance, ii' an evacuee needed to change aisle, they would he rC(IIIIied Io 
move from an aisle back into a scat row. For this to Occur, they must he , war Ilhat a 
second aisle exists, know which side it is on and determine \\Iºetlher or mint it is 
advantageous to move across toi it. TO illustrate this point. I igure 8.8 sl1()ys ,º Ivpic, ºI 
forwards 
heading __,.. - .. 
away from 
exit 
EXIT 
31 
longitudinal 
exit distance 
EVACUEE 
Fi ur 8.8: Choosing Between Nhilliple I; sc p Roii 
Cahill configuration in the vicinity cal-a mimber two exitI in a I, -I UI 
I Itititar aircraft. 
Passenger approaching the front or the first class scating in the IeFt hand aisle \\'oiikl 
be likely to cross scat rows as they neared the exit. This option was progrunnnned into 
the evacuation model-, however, with no source of data to work with. it was assumed 
that this action niieht occur at up to live seat rows from the exit. "I he probability of 
aisle crossing was made inversely proportional to exit distance, as measured in the 
1 i. e. the first door on the starboard side ol'the aircraft. 
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longitudinal direction. Thus passengers would be approximately twice as likely to 
take route 2 as opposed to route 1 when crossing to the exit. 
The figure also illustrates another problem that needed to be dealt with in 
some aircraft cabin configurations. Occasionally it was necessary for passengers in an 
aisle to actually move past and head away from the chosen exit before turning across 
the cabin and to moving towards it. This possibility is labelled as route 3 in the 
diagram. These kinds of difficulties were dealt with by making passengers perform a 
series of search patterns when they approached the vicinity of exits. In a manner 
analogous to playing a game of chess, these search routines enabled all movement 
options to be explored and "dead-ends" or less favourable routes avoided. 
8.4.3 Exit Choice 
From both past accidents and evacuation trials, it is known that passengers 
frequently do not utilise their nearest exit when escaping from an aircraft. It was 
possible to identify three types of scenario in which this situation might occur. Firstly, 
there might be a very fundamental reason for not making use of a particular exit; it 
might have been jammed as a result of impact damage, or blocked by the presence of 
fire immediately outside. Secondly, evacuees may be unaware of the precise location 
or even the existence of their nearest exit, particularly in conditions of darkness, 
smoke or panic. For example, there have been instances where passengers have 
walked past open door exits and accidentally stumbled into an aircraft's cockpit in 
heavy smoke. Finally, evacuees may make a positive choice not to use a functional 
exit because they anticipate that a better escape route is available. 
assenger exit choice within the evacuation model was determined with the 
use of a pseudo effective exit distance. This effective distance comprised the actual 
geometric (or physical) distance of an exit from the individual in question, plus 
additional factors to account for conditions that might be present in the above three 
scenarios. Passengers then chose exits based on their effective distance, rather than 
purely on the basis of their physical proximity. Thus, if an exit was perceived to 
require 30 seconds to open, this might add 20 metres to its effective distance. 
In cases where an exit was blocked by fire or jammed as a result of damage, 
effective distances were incremented by 999 metres, removing them from 
consideration by passengers. Occurrences of exit jamming and opening delays were 
determined by the IMPACT section of the scenario generation module. For partially 
damaged or obstructed doors, each additional second of activation delay was assumed 
to add 1 metre to exit distance. The presence of fire outside exits was established 
when updating the cabin thermo-toxic environment. The critical point was assumed to 
occur when the exit lay within 1.5 mean fire radii from the fire centre. At a later stage, 
this part of the analysis could be expanded to incorporate the effects of external 
radiation intensity, smoke levels and wind direction. Theoretically, it would also be 
possible to predict when escape slides would be likely to have burst as a result of 
exposure to the effects of fire. 
When conditions around an exit become crowded, passengers who are still 
located at some distance away will usually seek to avoid the congestion and look for 
alternative escape routes. As a result, evacuees may attempt to distribute themselves 
more evenly between the available exits, even if this involves traversing greater 
distances inside the aircraft. Evacuation trials suggest that active encouragement of 
this behaviour by assertive cabin crew may increase evacuation rates significantly. In 
-204- 
order, for this effect to be modelled, it was necessary to compute exit queue lengths 
and the positions of passengers within these queues. The evacuees were ranked in 
terms of their path length and only included in the queue of their chosen exit. Each 
person ahead of the evacuee in an exit queue was assumed to add 1.5 metres to the 
effective exit distance. This figure was found to produce comparatively responsive 
passengers, who will attempt to maintain well-balanced exit queues, as might be 
expected to occur with effective intervention by cabin crew. Reducing the disincentive 
to values of less than 0.5 metres per queue member produced greater levels of exit 
crowding. This could be used to depict a breakdown in the objectivity of passengers, 
perhaps reflecting the absence of cabin crew or onset of panic in deteriorating 
conditions. As a further refinement, effective exit distances could also be incremented 
to take account of prevailing passenger flow rates; for example, long queues are likely 
to be less significant if they are moving rapidly. 
The thermo-toxic environment and visibility levels in the vicinity of an exit 
are also likely to be a significant factor in passenger decision making. The principle 
variables influencing an evacuee's decision to move through smoke appear to be 
recollection of the exit location and ability to estimate the distance that needs to be 
travelled (Bryan, 1988). However, no data or theory was available to quantify the 
relationships involved. Evacuee behaviour in past accidents shows wide variations; 
from passengers blindly feeling their way for considerable distances, through to 
retreating from advancing smoke until becoming trapped in dead end. As a result. of 
this uncertainty, these influences were not modelled in the evacuation analysis. 
One possible approach to implementing the effects of exit obscuration would 
be to integrate smoke densities along a line running between the position of an exit 
and the evacuee. The level of exit visibility (or invisibility) obtained might then be 
used to factor the effective exit distance., 
In accidents where break-up of a fuselage had occurred, the open ends of the 
cabin sections were treated as being new exits. This was intended to allow for the fact 
that breakages and ruptures are known to have been utilised by a significant 
proportion of passengers in past accidents (Schaefers, 1990). The main problem 
encountered when attempting to represent these escape routes was to determine 
whether or not breakage area would be passable for evacuees, and if so, how inclined 
passengers would be to use them. Time constraints prevented these issues from being 
explored when undertaking the accident data survey. Thus, the compromise adopted 
was to assume that all breakage areas were passable, but then only let evacuees utilise 
them when no other means of escape were available. As stated previously, the rate at 
which passengers were able to traverse breakages was set at one person every 5 
seconds. 
A small (but important) point was that, in'crash accidents, it needed to be 
determined if exits would be unreachable for evacuees as a result of them being 
positioned on the other side of a fuselage break. In these cases, 999 metres was added 
to the effective exit distance, thus removing it from consideration. 
8.4.4 Effecting Changes in Escape Evacuee Plans 
Initially, evacuees were programmed to re-consider their choice of exit and 
formulate their next action every time they made a move. Whilst this procedure was 
straightforward to implement and reasonably effective in operation, it was far- from 
being an optimal representation of passenger planning. For example, if the individual 
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is moving freely through an uncongested area, exits will be re-assessed and their 
escape plan updated around five times every second. This results in unfeasibly fast 
passenger reactions and represents a waste of computational resources. 
In contrast, when waiting in a large queue, a passenger might be able to move 
only once every 15 or 20 seconds, meaning that exits are only re-checked at these 
intervals. This could lead to a scenario where some passengers at the rear of a queue 
would spot a newly opened exit and, as a result, attempt to change their direction of 
travel. I lowever, they would frequently be blocked by passengers who remain 
unaware of new route and are still attempting to move in the original direction. 
As it result, evacuee behaviour routines needed to be modified in order to 
ensure that escape paths were re-checked at more consistent intervals. Realistically, 
we might expect passengers to become aware of changes in exit status at a rate 
between extremes in the cases illustrated previously; perhaps at a frequency of every 
few seconds, or so. Thus, in order to prevent overly delayed reactions, all slowly 
moving or stationary passengers were made to re-assess exit availability at regular 
periods throughout an evacuation. The value of this "exit update interval" was set to 
he once every five seconds since the passenger was last able to make a move. 
Nothing was done to slow down the reactions of rapidly advancing evacuees, 
as any changes would have virtually no effect on the evacuation process. If 
computational efficiency of the evacuation model needed to be improved, exit 
scanning could be restricted to a maximum frequency of, say, once per second. 
8.4.5 The Role of Passenger Behaviour 
Aircraft cabin arrangements are designed to provide all occupants at least one 
clear path to nearby exits. IIowever, when accidents occur, these routes may not 
necessarily constitute the most effective means of escape for some passengers. Exit 
paths may be obscured by damage resulting from a crash, by the effects of fire or be 
subject to over-crowding by other evacuees. Consequently, accident survivors can 
often be forced to search for alternative ways of leaving the aircraft, or else face 
considerable delay. 
In these circumstances, passengers may perceive different levels of urgency, or 
react to a given set of circumstances in dissimilar ways. At the simplest level, it is 
possible to classify the resulting behaviour into three basic categories: - 
1. Passive; integrate with other evacuees and queue to leave the aircraft by 
a conventional route, in a co-operative manner. 
2. Proactive; adopt own plan of action, perhaps escaping by an unusual 
route, or actively attempting to influence the actions of others. 
3.: Iggi"essh, e; escape as quickly as possible, usually by the most direct 
route, intcrlering or displacing other passengers if necessary. 
The differences between these three modes of behaviour are illustrated in Figure 8.9, 
together with some examples of the possible implications for the escape tactics of a 
hassenger. The individual concerned is positioned in a seat row behind a crowded 
door exit in a Hoeing 757 aircraft. 
If the person were to behave in a passive manner, they would choose to take a 
conventional route (1) out of the aircraft, in the prescribed way. Here, this possibly 
involves waiting to enter the aisle and integrate politely into a queue of' passengers. 
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_... . 
-ý- - 
EVALUATION OF ESCAPE OPTIONS 
1. Passive: take conventional path & wait in 
line behind others 
EXIT 2. Proactive: e. g. scramble across seat 
backs & bypass exit the queue 
3. Aggressive: make progress by forcing 
others out of the way 
Figure 8.9: Determining Evac ice F cape Options 
Adopting this option in crowded cabin conditions would he likely to result in 
considerable delay. 
Alternatively, ii'the evacuee wished to escape in a shorter tiº>>c, Ihey night he 
more proactive and seek an alternative route to the exit. Other passengers could 
possibly he bypassed, or perhaps encouraged to use a different ºººethod oI*escape". For 
example, this might consist of' clambering over seat hacks, opening the door On the 
left hand siele of, the aircraft, or moving to an exit located at the real- of the aircr, ºIt. 
The first option is illustrated in the diagram. 
I'Inally, in some circumstances, evacuees i nay resort tot the use of agi, iessive 
behaviour. This may he a consequence of them loosing control Over their actions, or 
even result from a calculated decision. Other passengers nua} he Iorccd out of the way 
or their escape impeded. In the example sho\an, utilising route (; ) could potentially 
involve displacing two other passengers in adjacent seats and .º cabin crew nºenºhcr 
stationed at the door. 
In the evacuation model, evacuees had effectively been programmed to act in a 
passive manner in most circumstances. This type of behaviour as reasonably 
straightforward to represent, as processes can he defined with a series of logical rules 
and simple physical characteristics, such as spacing and speed of' reaction. Passengers 
were found to be particularly likely to act in this w, ºv when they are closely 
supervised in conditions of minor or moderate danger. 'I hu,, even though cabin crew 
not being modelled in the initial stages of' programme development, it can he argues 
that, implicitly, their effects were partially represented in the model ling of passeng r 
behaviour. 
In a small number of situations, proactive passenger characteristics were 
introduced in order to increase the realism of the evacuation nmodelline. I': ý, ºnýpleS Of' 
this included passengers changing aisles in widebody aircraft, opening closed exits, 
moving through galley areas and taking account of' exit queue sines. ('onIiict 
resolution and parallel (lucuing, as detailed in the next section, can also he categorisc(l 
as being proactive behaviour. Ilovw, ever, these behaviour patterns tend to involve 
decision making processes that are subjective, rather than those that are precisely 
definable physical criteria. As a result, even though proactive pass nger behaviour 
was known to occur frequently in past accidents, many of' the relationships involved 
were, difficult or impossible to calibrate from the data sources avaiLlhle. I his nie, ºnt 
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that most of these behaviour modes could only be quantified on the basis of 
estimation and face validity. 
For this reason, overtaking, seat climbing, and other more aggressive evacuee 
behaviour were not incorporated into the analysis, in spite of the fact that their 
mechanics were comparatively straightforward to programme. It was difficult to 
ascertain from past accidents how frequently these actions actually occur, let alone 
what leads to their initiation. Climbing over seat backs, for instance, was only cited 
specilically in four of the incidents studied, but is almost certainly far more prevalent 
than this in reality. 
8.4.6 Conflict Resolution and Parallel Queuing 
In some circumstances, passengers heading in different directions, would 
inevitably meet face to face in a confined area. It has already been seen that evacuees 
were programmed to co-operate and pass each other amicably in these situations, if 
space allowed. I lowever, in narrower aisles (less than 0.45 m in width) or in seat 
rows, it was usually not feasible to perform a crossing manoeuvre. Thus, during the 
early stages of the evacuation programming, it was found that these circumstances 
usually lead to a stalemate, with both individuals locked together waiting for each 
other to make the next move. This situation would then persist until one of the 
passengers decided to reverse their direction of escape, perhaps as a consequence of 
fluctuations in exit queue lengths or other exits being opened. 
'these "conflicts" were dealt with by making the opposing passengers re- 
consider their exit choices immediately upon meeting. When exit options were 
compared, a consensus would usually result and one of the individuals would then 
turn around. As a result, the situation would be resolved, with both passenger moving 
off in the same direction. 
I lowever, in some instances (for example, where speeds of passenger 
movement were highly dissimilar). agreement might still not be reached after exit 
options have been reconsidered. Effectively, neither passenger wishes to back down, 
corresponding with the occurrence of an argument. In this eventuality, the faster of the 
two evacuees was assumed to be the more domineering, meaning that the second 
passenger would be forcibly turned around under protest. As a result of this, the later 
would he slowly hustled in the reverse of their intended direction until, either, they 
changed their mind, the faster person turns off in another direction, or a less 
constricted area of the cabin is reached. 
Another feature of evacuee behaviour that needed to be refined at an early 
stage was the tendency for them to remain in uniform single-file queues when moving 
into less constricted areas of the cabin. This prevented the build-up of passenger 
congestion to realistic levels and generally meant that double-width door exits were 
left under-utilised unless they were led by two separate queues of passengers. 
In constrast, it was observed first hand in competitive evacuation trials that 
evacuees tend to congregate and squeeze two or more abreast whenever wider areas 
are reached. This behaviour often involves a significant proportion of passengers 
turning and shuffling sideways in their direction of movement. Frequently, these 
tactics lead to jamming in situations where passengers reach an exit or narrow 
bulkhead opening. Consequently, it was judged to be necessary to incorporate side- 
stepping movements and "parallel queuing" into the evacuation analysis. 
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In a similar vein, when evacuation trial participants move alone narrow aisles, 
they tend to position themselves to the opposite side of tile person in directly in (runt, 
rather than remaining exactly in line. This appears toi be done suh-consciously, 
possibly in order to obtain a greater sense of personal space and hotter field of kiC\\ 
ahead. Queue staggering frequently results in alternating sequences of IeIl/right biased 
passengers. 
(liven, the close relationship between parallel yuetIine and queue staggering, 
these two types cif behaviour could be created with the same mechanism. All that was 
required was to make passengers move out of line once they 11; IVC been presented with 
the opportunity of doing so fir a few seconds. "I Ile process lotloweol was analogous t 
the crossing manoeuvre described previously, except that the passen ors involved 
Would usually be heading in the same direction and reheated sideways nlovenlents 
were allowed in aisle ways. 
In constricted spaces, this behaviour results in the shwPCHng of passenger 
lines and intermittent shilling from We to siele in a realistic Iilshion. idle effect 4this 
enhancement can be seen by comparing the distributions of pas. tien;, ers shown vvaiting, 
in aisles of an A310 aircraft in Figure 8.10. Sinlila ly, vollen 111o1-e space is available 
passengers 
merge in a 
robotic manner 
under-utlllsed 
111 double-width 
exits & aisles 
passengers 
always face 
direction of 
movement 
BASIC PASSENGER MOVEMENT MODEL 
rualist Ic 
passongor 
conpustlan 
lull ulillsatlon 
of doublo-WIdth 
exits & aisles 
passonpors are 
able to shufflo 
sideways In 
narrow areas 
DEVELOPED PASSENGER MOVEMENT MODEL 
Figure 8.10: Refinement ýºf_I'; ýssc_n ý ýliiý cnýý it_(': ºýi; ºIýiliticti 
for evacuees, successive sideways movements Icad to the (IL"velol, nºent OI' I)ar, ºIlcl 
queues and sideways oriented passengers. These Icatºu-es produce a more realistic 
depiction of congestion in exit areas and ensure that doºihle-width cºi'les and exits are 
more lolly utilised. The greater passenger densities that result Trani the introduction of 
these improvements can be seen in the diagram. 
8.5 Exits & Stairways 
8.5.1 Exit Types 
For historical reasons, aircraft exits have not been StandaardiscdI across difterc"nt 
airframe manufitcturers. As a consequence of this, the means I. escape frone aircraft 
encompass a wide range of different shapes and forms. I'hrce basic categories oI' exit 
exist; floor level doors, escape hatches and ventral/taileone, each of ' ww hich can present 
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uniform 
aisle queues 
staggered 
aisle queues 
quite dissimilar characteristics in an emergency situation. Even within a single 
category of exit, major variations can exist. For example, a door exit may possess any 
combination of the following attributes: - 
" designed to be operated by cabin crew or by passengers 
" positioned amongst cabin seating or in a partitioned off area 
" single-width or double-width 
" possesses an escape slide or situated above a wing 
" symmetric or staggered configuration about aircraft centreline 
An 
an attempt to deal with these complexities, airworthiness requirements 
classify all cabin emergency exits as being equivalent to one four types, namely Type 
I, II, III and A Exits (JAA, 1994). For certification requirements, ventral exits "must 
allow at least the same rate of egress as a Type I exit with the aeroplane in the normal 
ground attitude, with landing gear extended". The configuration and the minimum 
sizes stipulated for each of these is shown in Figure 8.11. Note that Type A exits are 
used exclusively on widebody aircraft and allow for the passage of evacuees two- 
abreast. Most other airliner types utilise combinations of Type I exits for normal doors 
and Type III hatches in overwing positions. There are many rules governing the 
design and operation of aircraft exits; for these, the reader is referred to the relevant 
aircraft airworthiness requirements (JAA, 1994). /4 or the purpose of modelling the exits in the evacuation analysis, the 
distinctions between exit types were kept as simple as possible. Thus, all exits were 
represented as being either doors or hatches and evacuee flow rates were calculated as 
a function of their width. The approach taken is. outlined in the . 
following two 
sections, / 
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Figure 8.11: Categorisation of Aircraft Exits 
8.5.2 Door Exits 
Door exits were classified as being placed at, or near floor level, i. e. Type I, II 
or Type A exits. In general, doors were assumed to possess inflatable escape slides. 
This assumption is obviously incorrect in cases of ventral and overwing door exits. 
However, the additional time allowed for slide deployment would correspond 
reasonably well with the delays associated with stairway activation and 'passengers 
finding their way off the wing in these two instances. A minimum opening delay of 10 
seconds, including time required for the inflation and deployment of the slide, was 
used in all cases. 
Evacuee flow rates for door exits were calibrated with data obtained from 
evacuation trials. Variations in these rates were assumed to be dependent on the width 
of an exit, with no account being taken of door accessibility from the cabin. The 
derivation of the flow rate relationship is shown in Figure 8.12. Note that the data 
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Figure 8.12: Calibration of Exit Flow Rates 
used suggests that passenger flow rates for double-width exits are significantly less 
that might, be predicted from the figures for single-width exits. This suggests that 
some form of interference effect occurs when evacuees move side by side through a 
Type A door, perhaps, for example, pausing to jump onto the slide in alternate turn 
8.5.3 Escape Hatches 
These consist of Type III and Type IV exits, both of which are usually 
intended for operation by passengers located in adjacent seats. An obvious problem 
that occurs with hatch exits is that the hatch itself must be deal with once it has been 
removed from the exit. Passengers are instructed to throw the hatch back out through 
the open exit, but past accidents have shown that they are frequently laid down inside 
the aircraft, often forming a serious obstruction for escaping passengers. 
Another feature of hatch exits is that they are located a considerable distance 
above cabin floor level and thus require the use of a step-though action or crouching 
JAR 25 TeA Allowance 
SINGLE DOUBLE 
WIDTH 
DOORS 
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A320 Certification Trial 
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down low when standing on adjacent seats. This results in rather lower passenger flow 
rates than are achievable with door type exits. 
An opening delay of seven seconds was assumed for all hatch exits and the use 
of a maximum potential flow rate of 0.55 passengers per second was based ; on 
evacuation trial results for a typical Type III installation (Muir et al., 1989). It should 
be noted that these figures are probably representative of favourable conditions and do 
not include the effects of unsatisfactory exit hatch disposal. 
8.5.4 St irways and Double-Deck Aircraft 
Provisions 
were made throughout the evacuation modelling for the analysis of 
multiple-deck airliner designs. Egress from upper and lower levels was depicted as 
taking place independently, with no attempt being made to represent the use of 
stairways or the occurrence of interactions between exits on different levels. 
Passengers were assumed to be more prone to pausing in exits when leaving from an 
upper cabin, due to the additional 2-3 meters of height to the ground 
The use of this simplified approach was partially a cons 
quence 
of the 
extremely limited information available on evacuation from two-deck aircraft. The 
only airliner type currently in commercial service with two passenger decks is"the 
Boeing 747 series. However, experience gained with this aircraft provides little 
relevant data work with. Earlier versions of the Boeing 747 are certificated to carry up 
to 32 people in their upper cabins, representing only 6- 11 percent of the maximum 
passenger load. Because no upper level passenger exits are provided, these people are 
required to descend a spiral staircase to the lower cabin in order to leave the aircraft. ý, 
More recent 747 variants are able to accommodate up to 69 passengers in their 
upper cabins and provide a straight stairways down to the main deck. However, a 
significant difference with these aircraft is that certification, requirements dictate that 
upper-level Type A exits are provided and also that passengers could not use the stairs 
during the 90 second evacuation demonstration. 
As a result of this, Boeing 747 evacuation trials undertaken to date have never 
provided passengers with a choice between the use of upper level exits or traversing 
stairs to escape via the lower deck. Similarly, experience with evacuation tests from 
upper level exits in realistic conditions is extremely limited and also no detailed 
information was obtained from the study of past accidents. 
However, one significant point did emerge in the area of multi-deck aircraft - 
the fact that spiral staircases are unlikely to be certificated for the purpose of 
passenger evacuation again in the future. One Boeing 747 accident has occurred in 
which "Two of the flight attendants were found with the body of a very large man, 
who was reportedly drunk, alongside the collapsed circular stairway" (Speitel and 
Hill, 1988). Consequently, most projected future large aircraft designs that possess 
multiple decks illustrate the use of two or more straight stairways 
8.6 Evacuee Injuries & Incapacitation 
8.6.1 Fractional Incapacitation Approach 
An important aspect of the evacuation simulation was the representation of 
passenger injuries and fatalities. It was seen in the analysis of past accidents that 
casualties can result from both impact trauma injuries and the thermo-toxic effects of 
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a fire. Frequently, accident victims can be subjected to a combination' of these injury 
types. However, impact injuries are sustained before the aircraft comes to a stop and 
their level essentially remains constant during the course of any escape attempt. In 
contrast, the effects of thermo-toxic incapacitation are initially absent, but then tend to 
build up rapidly if any degradation in the cabin environment occurs. In consequence, 
it was logical to use two parameters for the purpose of representing passenger 
incapacitation in the evacuation analysis. These were defined as a Fractional Injury 
Factor and Fractional Effective Dose respectively. 
It was described in Chapter 3 how the thermo-toxic effects of fire progress 
from being essentially psychological at first, through to being purely physiological as 
unconsciousness is approached. In between these states, there exists a complex grey 
area, where both the mental and physical aspects of fire incapacitation are of 
significance (Purser, 1988). A similar analogy can probably be drawn in the case of 
impact trauma injuries, the effects of which can vary from mild shock through to 
complete disablement. 
In spite of these considerations, it was decided not to attempt to incorporate 
psychological aspects of passenger incapacitation into the evacuation analysis. This 
was a consequence of the challenges that had to be dealt with when attempting to 
model even the simplest facets of human behaviour. Arguably, much progress still 
remained to be made in this area of the analysis before it would be feasible to 
introduce any further complexities. Thus, for the time being, utilisation of the 
incapacitation modelling was restricted to representing degradation in the physical 
capabilities of evacuees, -i. e. reductions in their achievable rates of movement. This 
was effected by multiplying passenger's maximum speed by their current level of 
incapacitation. 
The concept of a Fractional Effective Dose (FED) has been established by 
researchers working in the area of fire toxicology. It was seen in Chapter 2, that the 
use a FED-based approach enables the cumulative effects of narcotic fire products 
quantified. More recently, this type of analysis has been extended to include the 
effects of irritant fire products and high ambient temperatures (Purser, 1995). 
The' derivation of these FED relationships inevitable involves many 
simplifications and approximations in what is a highly complex area of human 
physiology. However, the resulting equations are straightforward to utilise, appear to 
provide acceptable results and are the only method available for quantifying thermo- 
toxic incapacitation effects. Thus, Purser's FED equations were applied directly in the 
evacuation model. 
8.6.2 Irritant Effects 
Determining the effects that highly irritant chemical species have on humans is 
perhaps the most difficult aspect of a fire incapacitation analysis. Irritant substances 
cause intense pain in the eyes, upper respiratory tract and lungs, followed, after 
several hours, by lung inflammation and oedema. Difficulties arise, however, because 
the effects of a given concentration of irritant often appear to be inconsistent from 
individual to individual. Also, as noted in Chapter 2, the effects of complex mixtures 
of irritant fire products may be considerably worse that might be predicted by adding 
the effects of individual components acting in isolation. 
Given the nature of the effects of these irritant substances, it is obviously not 
possible to perform fully realistic experimental trials with human test subjects in this 
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area. Thus, the majority of information available is based on information obtained 
from victims of building fires and animal experiments, neither of which are entirely 
satisfactory. Significantly, however, Jin has managed to undertake a series of trials 
with human volunteers moving through irritant wood smoke (Jin and Yamada, 1989). 
Results from these indicate that the movement speed of test subjects tends to reduce to 
that in darkness (i. e. approximately 0.3 m/s) when they are exposed to irritant smoke 
with a density of 0.2 OD/m. 
Purser provides irritancy FED relationships for five types of gas and also for 
non-specific mixtures of organic species. The former are based on gas concentrations 
present, measured in parts per million (pmm), whereas irritant organic species are 
quantified in terms of smoke optical density OD. Table 8.2 shows highly irritant and 
lethal concentrations for each of these substances. These values can be scaled to 
obtain Fractional Incapacitation Doses (FID) and Fractional Lethality Doses (FLD) 
for a given smoke atmosphere. It can be seen that with the smoke composition 
assumed in the cabin fire modelling, optical densities of 1.0 /m are extremely irritant, 
but unlikely to be fatal. 
GAS TYPE 
Assumed level 
In smoke of 1.0 
OD/m 
Highly Irritant 
Concentration 
(FID = 1.0) 
30-min Lethal 
Concentration 
(FLD = 1.0) 
FID in 
smoke of 
1.0 OD/m 
FLD In 
smoke of 
1.0 OD/m 
HCI 180 ppm 200 ppm 3800 ppm 0.90 0.047 
HBr 40 ppm 200 ppm 3800 ppm 0.20 0.011 
HF 300 ppm 120 ppm 2900 ppm 2.50 0.103 
SO2 20 ppm 30 ppm 400 ppm 0.67 0.050 
NO2 60 ppm 80 ppm 375 ppm 0.75 0.160 
Organic 
Species 1.0 OD/m 0.5 OD/m 3.0 OD/m 2.0 0.333 
TOTALS 7.02 0.704 
Table 8.2: Incapacitation and Death from Irritant Fire Products 
The FID values imply that the smoke will become highly irritant when its density 
approaches 0.14 OD/m, a figure that compares reasonably with Jin results. 
With the assumption of a fixed smoke composition, these figures result in the 
following smoke : lethal irritancy dose relationship: - 
FED, = 0.704 " Smoke OD /m (8.1) 
This was used to obtain the contribution that irritant substances make towards the 
incapacitation of evacuating passengers. 
8.6.3 Narcosis 
The effects of narcotic fire products are reasonably straightforward to estimate 
by integrating the levels of passenger Fractional Effective Doses that are accumulated 
during the evacuation process. Purser identifies six main factors to be taken' into 
consideration when analysing narcosis effects: - 
FED,,,, =FED,,.,, + FED, ,, + 
FED,,, ) " VCOZ + FED,. or F1,02 (8.2) 
Where 
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FEDIN = fraction of an incapacitating dose of all narcotic gases; 
FED,,,, = fraction of an incapacitating dose of CO; 
FED f,  = 
fraction of an incapacitating dose of HCN; 
FED;,,. = fraction of an irritant dose contributing to hypoxia; 
VCO2 = multiplication factor for CO2 induced hyperventilation; 
FED,,, = fraction of an incapacitating dose of low oxygen hypoxia; and 
FED1co2 = fraction of an incapacitating dose of CO2. 
Each of these terms can be calculated as follows: - 
FEDI, o = 8.2925 x 10-4 " ppm 
COI036)" 3ý (8.3) 
FED j,  =t (8.4) 
e 
(5396 x 0.023 " ppm HCN) 
FED;, = fractional irritant dose calculated in Equation 8.1 above 
e 
(0.1903 "% CO2 + 2.0004 
VCO2 = 7.1 
(8.5) 
FED1o =t (8.6) 
e(8.13-0.54 
0.54(202)) 
FED1co2 =t (8.7) 
e(6.1623-0.5189"% 
CO2) 
where 
t= exposure time (minutes) 
8.6.4 Heat 
Convection of heat from air or smoke at high ambient temperatures can also 
play a significant role in fire incapacitation. At low to moderate temperatures, effects 
are predominantly irritant in nature, with progression to skin pain. Exposure to 
extreme temperatures results in burns and rapid incapacitation. The onset of the latter 
can vary widely with individual and the circumstances concerned, but Purser provides 
the following relationship for guidance. 
FEDne11, = 
e(51849-O, 0273. lcmp) 
where 
temp = ambient temperature (°C) 
(8.8) 
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The effects of exposure to high levels of radiant heat are even less certain. However, it 
is reasonable to assume that skin pain and burns occur rapidly at intensities above 2.5 
kW/m2. No attempt was made to quantify this effect in the simulation analysis. 
8.6.5 Impact Trauma Injuries ý0' 
Levels of serious injuries amongst surviving passengers were estimated in the 
impact effects model. For preliminary purposes, it was assumed that injured 
individuals would only be capable of moving at half their normal rate. It might be 
feasible to represent this aspect of accident evacuation in more detail by utilising 'a 
measure such the Injury Severity Score (Baker et al., 1974), developed for use in the 
automotive industry. 
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Chapter 9: Model Usage 
9.1 Undertaking Simulation Analysis 
9.1.1 Use of the Simulation Model 
The computer model that has been constructed is suited to analysing issues in 
aircraft safety in a variety of ways and on range of different levels., Usage could vary 
from investigating a single aspect of a specific accident scenario, through to 
performing comprehensive risk-assessment studies across a broad spectrum of 
incidents involving many different aircraft types, v 
The work that has been undertaken with the model was deliberately 
formulated to demonstrate contrasting modes of utilisation. At the simplest level, 
certification-type evacuation trials have been modelled. With the inclusion of impact 
and fire effects, the analysis was then extended to cover fully representative accident 
scenarios. Multiple runs were then undertaken, enabling outcomes of hundreds of 
incidents to be quantified in the form of probability distributions. It is then shown 
how such analyses can potentially be used to investigate issues in aircraft fire safety in 
a systematic manner. 
, 
'These various modes of operation are illustrated with the inclusion of four case 
studies in this chapter. The example runs cover the following areas: - 
1. The representation of certification evacuation trials 
2. Evaluation of a particular accident scenario 
3. Undertaking of multiple accident analysis 
4. Implications of introducing a new very large aircraft design, 
The first two studies involve the simulation of specific types of accident 
scenario. Consequently, they allow for the workings of the model to be examined in 
some detail. A contrast can also be drawn between the efficiency of passenger egress 
achieved with and without the effects of rapid fire burn-through being present. 
The third study illustrates preliminary results obtained from the simulation of 
a large number of accidents for specific aircraft types. Here, the details of individual 
incidents have been formulated to vary randomly, on the basis of historical 
probabilities built into the scenario generation module. Because outcomes are 
weighted to reflect the relative probabilities of all different kinds of accident 
scenarios, these types of results can be used for risk-assessment purposes. 
Finally, some fire safety aspects of two new very large aircraft designs are 
explored. Results of accident simulations involving an aircraft in this category of are 
compared with those obtained for aircraft types currently in service. 
Given the partially developed status of the model, these example studies 
provide only a preliminary indication of what is likely to be achievable with the 
undertaking of further development. For example, the process of performing multiple 
runs has yet to be automated. Thus, for this type of study, hundreds of simulations 
were run on an individual basis and all output analysed by hand. 
Although provisional in nature, the results presented here appear to be very 
encouraging and are consistent with characteristics noted in past accidents, from both 
a qualitative and quantitative standpoint. However, a proviso should be made that, 
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even when in possession of the best information obtainable, verification of many_ of 
the key relationships within the various sub-models is presently impossible to 
perform. Compounding this difficulty is the fact that, in many respects, much of the 
work presented in this chapter is most probably unique and being undertaken perhaps 
for the first time. Consequently, in some of the areas that the model addresses, little 
knowledge or no clear consensus exists amongst specialists in the field. Thus, it is 
usually necessary to appraise output by checking for consistency with past events , or 
experimental data where possible, as is done in the first three case studies. Only then 
is it feasible to extend to extent the analysis to encompass new areas in aircraft fire- 
safety, such that considered in the final study. 
In spite of the difficulty of many of the challenges encountered, the work 
presented here demonstrates that it is feasible and highly desirable to perform a 
holistic simulation analysis in the area of aircraft fire safety. This use of this type of 
approach enables attention to be directed towards aspects of accidents that are critical 
for establishing a true understanding of aircraft fire safety. Some of these issues 
discussed in the course of this chapter include the significance of fire location, 
thermo-toxic incapacitation, fuselage damage and levels of exit availability. The fact 
that many of these areas are difficult or impossible to analyse by alternative means has 
arguably led to their comparative neglect within the field of air-safety research. As a 
result of this, many of the insights provided are likely to be both new and of 
significant interest to those working in the area. 
9.1.2 Analysis Approach 
A large quantity of information has been encapsulated within the model during 
the process of its construction. It has been seen how this data derives from many 
areas, such as the study of past accidents, experimental research, analytical analogies 
and statistical modelling. Most of the information obtained in this manner was 
comparatively low-level or basic in form. Nonetheless, a high proportion of this 
material has not previously been published and thus its significance in forming the 
foundations of the work should not be overlooked. the 
main objective of the work, however, was to create a simulation tool 
capable of integrating and building upon these basic components of knowledge, so 
that all important aspects of accidents could be taken account of. This infers a shift in 
attention away from the representation of comparatively simple, low-level details 
towards analysing the overall outcome of complex incidents. Subsequently, the model 
might then be set up to automatically run and process the results from thousands of 
these incidents, in the style of Monte Carlo analysis. Findings could then be obtained 
in the form of probability distributions and long term trends that would be applicable 
in a global context. This progression in the scope of analysis, from micro to meso and 
then to macro levels, can be structured into the following areas of focus: - 
" specific- details, as represented by workings inside of a single sub-model 
" more general details, such as impact effects, fire development or aircraft 
evacuation, modelled on the level of a complete sub-model 
" Influences that such aspects of an incident can have on each other, i. e. 
interactions that can occur between different sub-models. 
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" The overall outcome of an incident, in terms of survivability levels, 
evacuation time, end-state conditions, etc., obtained from the analysis of 
a complete accident. 
" Trends apparent from the simulation of a large number of incidents, 
involving either similar aircraft types or a fixed accident scenario. 
" Global implications across all types of aircraft and accident scenario. 
The case studies presented in this chapter are intended to demonstrate usage of the 
model all but the last of these categories;, // 
Many trial runs and tests were performed with the model during the course of 
its development. Initially these activities were directed towards examining and 
verifying aspects of a single sub-model during any one run. As the development of the 
simulation work progressed, attention was gradually turned towards testing the 
interactions that occurred between different pairs of sub-models. In the later stages of 
programming, the effects of changes were integrated and verified across all aspects 
the analysis. Most of the runs undertaken as part of this development process did not 
produce statistically balanced results. This was because it was desirable to bias 
simulation variables to yield scenarios that would involve particular interactions being 
worked upon. Thus, for example, when developing a function to calculate passenger 
impact fatalities, accident scenarios were deliberately biased to ensure that they would 
involve severe impacts. 
As a consequence of this "scenario rigging", fully balanced runs were only 
performed extensively during the very final stages of programme development. Thus, 
the work presented in this chapter effectively represents the very first round of 
substantive output obtained from the model. This means that no adjustments or 
refinements have been incorporated into the simulation analysis as a result of 
undertaking preliminary experimentation. All results presented should thus be 
interpreted on this basis. 
9.1.3 Presentation of Simulation On-Screen 
I has been seen in previous chapters that many aspects of the simulation 
model were presented on screen with a graphical display. These graphics routines 
required substantial effort to programme; however their use was almost mandatory if 
aspects such as airflow and evacuation modelling were to be verified. Figure 9.1 
shows a typical screen display during an accident simulation and provides a key to the 
various types of information presented. 
At the top left of the display, basic details are provided about the accident 
scenario being simulated. This information consists of the aircraft type involved, how 
many passengers are present, location of the accident site, its distance from the airport 
and the phase of flight in which the accident has occurred. 
An evacuation progress plot is located immediately below the accident 
scenario details. The plot shows the number of evacuee escaping from the aircraft as 
the simulation progresses. Utilisation of individual exits, together with the total 
number of people to have left the aircraft, is shown with the use of different coloured 
lines in the graph. Note that passengers escaping through fuselage breaks are not 
plotted with a separate line, However, these individuals are included in the total 
evacuees, plotted both graphically with a white line and numerically on the y axis/ 
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Simulations are usually set to run for a period of up to 5 minutes, with the current 
simulation time being shown to right of the x axis. Both of the axes are automatically 
sub-divided and numbered to provide suitable scales. 
Above the graph, numbers of fatalities are shown. 't'hose resulting from impact 
trauma injuries (i. e. "Crash Fatalities") are pre-determined at the start of a simulation. 
In contrast, the number of fire deaths climbs when passengers are overcome during 
the course of a run. 
The development of fire and thermo-toxic conditions inside the aircraft are 
shown on the bottom left of the screen. The first diagram shows the area and 
temperature of the pool fire, together with local airflow vectors. 'T'his display is 
updated every time a new flow solution is calculated, as a result of exits being opened 
or significant areas of fire burn-through occurring. External fire temperatures are 
shown on a scale of I- 1000 °C and flow vectors are normalised with respect to wind 
speed, to ensure that they remain visible. 
The final two thermo-toxic environment plots show distributions of 
temperature and smoke levels throughout the interior of' the aircraft. As with the 
fire/airflow display, these are updated at regular intervals throughout the simulation in 
order to graphically illustrate deterioration in cabin conditions. Interior temperatures 
and smoke densities are plotted up to levels of 250 °C and 1.0 01)/m respectively. 
The remainder of the screen is assigned to the cabin evacuation display. This 
shows the cabin configuration of the aircraft involved, together with the positions of 
all those remaining onboard. Evacuee movements and events such as the opening or 
exits and deployment of escape slides are shown in animated form. Able-bodied 
individuals are shown with white bodies and those fatally injured as a result ofimpact 
injuries are plotted in red. As evacuees are progressively overcome by the thermo- 
toxic effects of fire, their colour is gradually changed from white to grey to black, and 
their movements slow to a standstill. Thus, at the end of the simulation, all fatalities 
are coloured either red or black, according to the nature of their death. 
The on-screen display of the simulation model was optimised for a monitor 
resolution of 1280 by 1024 pixels, using a total of 256 colours. Given that these are 
above average specifications for some types of computer, it was ensured that the 
graphics could readily be scaled down to match lower capability devices. 
9.1.4 Model Output and Presentation of Results 
Information about the progress of simulation runs was provided in two 
different formats. These consisted of an on-screen graphical display and text-based 
information sent to the user's terminal, respectively. 't'hese two modes of' information 
output were quite different and each possessed their own distinct advantages. Both 
were used extensively throughout the course of model development and usage. 
The design of the graphics display window was covered in the previous 
section. This form of output was suited to presenting a large quantity of' complex and 
constantly changing information. The ability to convey the effects of' interactions 
occurring between different parts of the model as they happened in real tittle was of' 
particular importance. Also, the end state of an accident could be clearly presented, 
with scenario details, cabin conditions, evacuation progress and the positions of' 
fatalities all being available in the form of a concise, pictorial snapshot. 
In contrast, only a very limited quantity of information could he conveyed 
clearly in text format whilst a simulation was in progress. I lowever, it was 
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straightforward to restrict scope of text output to obtain precisely the information 
being sought. Thus, for example, the changes in a single variable might be tracked 
over time or the occurrence of discreet events flagged (such as exits being opened, the 
occurrence of fire burn-through, passengers being overcome, etc. ). This level of 
control over text-based output was invaluable for the purpose of dissecting accident 
simulations in detail, as well as in programme development and testing activities. 
In addition, information in a text-based format could be saved to a file and 
analysed once a run (or many runs) had been completed. This greatly facilitated the 
post-processing of results for studies that required multiple simulation runs to be 
undertaken. Typically, accident parameters that were output and dealt with in this way 
included the overall time required for evacuation of the aircraft, together with the 
numbers of fire fatalities, impact fatalities and survivors left at the end of .a 
simulation. 
Frequently, the results of simulation runs needed to be presented in the form of 
a graph or probability distribution. In cases where interest lay with events in a single 
accident, the on-screen display of the evacuation progress plot could be used. On 
other occasions, however, it was necessary to construct graphs from data that involved 
the simulation of many accidents. This was achieved by importing text-based output 
obtained from individual runs into a computer spreadsheet package. Because the 
preliminary work described in this chapter only involved series of up to a 100 
accidents each, such a procedure was feasible to undertake by hand. However, if more 
extensive Monte Carlo style runs were to be undertaken, requiring the simulation of 
thousands of accidents, post-processing would need to be automated. 
Another point that should be noted was that the on-screen display of the cabin 
environment and evacuation modelling comprised five animated windows, running 
simultaneously side by side. The sheer quantity of information provided in a single 
accident simulation is thus difficult to present concisely on paper. For instance, the 
movements of smoke and passengers may change markedly as successive exits are 
opened; this can often be difficult to convey in only three or four snapshots of the on- 
screen display. The strategy adopted has been to attempt to concentrate on only the 
most important aspects of the simulations presented in detail. Also, illustrations of on- 
screen displays have been provided at standard (i. e. 30 second or one minute) 
intervals wherever possible. 
Compounding this difficulty, was the fact that it was not always feasible to 
pause an accident simulation for capture at precisely the time desired. Consequently, 
most of the time values provided in this chapter should only be regarded as valid to an 
accuracy of approximately plus or minus two seconds. 
9.2 Certification Evacuation Trials 
9.2.1 Introduction 
Perhaps the most straightforward case-study to undertake with the simulation 
model was the analysis of aircraft certification evacuation trails. As indicated in 
Chapter 2, most new airliner types must undertake these tests in order to qualify for 
use in passenger serviceAhe aim of these trials is generally perceived to be the 
provision of a common standard to which all aircraft must comply, rather that to test a 
type's performance in fully realistic "emergency conditions". Consequently, accident 
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features such as the debilitating effects of fire, extensive structural damage and crash 
injuries are not represented in certification tests. This means that, for present 
purposes, these types of evacuation trial can be simulated entirely within the 
evacuation sub-model of the programme. Therefore, the results obtained in such tests 
provide a useful check on the more elementary aspects of the evacuation modcllin4, - 
Results of certification trials are treated confidentially by certification 
authorities and aircraft manufacturers. However, information suitable for constructing 
detailed comparisons has been publicly released for two modern airliner types 
(Airbus, 1995). These aircraft, the Boeing 757 and the Airbus A320, respectively , form the basis of the simulation studies presented here. In addition, the performances 
of two newer designs are also examined; these are the Airbus A321 and the still to be 
flown Boeing 737-800 series. 
9.2.2 Model Set-up 
ch of the four aircraft's cabins was configured in a maximum density 
seating arrangement and a full passenger load assumed. Passenger attributes were 
defined to correspond with a "representative load of persons in normal health", as 
prescribed in Appendix J of the FAA/JAA certification requirements (JAA, 1994). 
Relevant parameters included a reaction time of between 0.0 and 5.0 seconds and 
maximum speed of movement of between 1.4 and 1.6 m/s, i. e. corresponding to a fast 
walking pace. 
Evacuees were made to head for their optimum exit at all times, without 
interfering with the movements of others or jumping over seat backs. Choice of exit 
was based on the geometric distance of each exit from the passenger, with the addition 
of a 0.5 metre disincentive for each person positioned in an exit queue ahead of the 
chooser. This high level of discernment might be taken to imply the presence of 
effective supervision by cabin crew members together with responsive, motivated 
passengers. 
In accordance with certification requirements, half of the emergency exits 
were made available for the passengers to use, distributed evenly on either side of the 
fuselage. Opening times of 10 seconds for door exits and 7 seconds for hatch exits 
were applied. In the case of door exits, this time delay was measured from the start of 
the evacuation process, rather than from the point at which a passenger first reaches 
the door. This was done in an attempt to take into account the fact that, in reality, 
these exits are activated by cabin crew members before they are reached by 
passengers 
9.2.3 Discussion of Evacuation Trials Results 
On-screen displays from a typical certification evacuation simulation are 
shown in Figure 9.2. In the upper half of the diagram, a cabin view illustrates the 
distribution of passengers 15 seconds after the start of the simulation. Below this, an 
evacuation progress plot provides a complete history of the run up until its 
completion, which occurred after 75 seconds. 
The cabin view clearly shows how exits constitute bottlenecks in certification 
evacuations. It was found that queues of passengers formed and stabilised around all 
exit positions in the first 10-15 seconds of each trial undertaken. / the rate of 
evacuation attained thereafter is governed predominantly by the exit now rates that 
are achieved. Passengers at the rear of queues are provided ample time to change their 
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Figure 9.2: B-757 Certification Evacuation Trial 
choice of' exit as the evacuation develops, this means that their speed of movement 
becomes unimportant. 
: xit flow rates can be gauged by the gradient of the curves in the evacuation 
plots. In the Boeing 757 example shown, the number 2 door (ahead of the wing) is 
wider than the other three exits and it thus enables passengers to disembark more 
rapidly. Asa result the number 2 door was the busiest exit, being used by a total of 68 
evacuees. In contrast, the plot shows how exit number I at the front of the aircraft 
tended toi be under-utilised and only received one passenger during the final 10 
seconds 0f the trial. 
Remaining with the Boeing 757 example, the last 6 passengers to leave the 
aircral't all left via the narrow number 3 door, located aft of the wing. This exit, 
therelore, appears to be the critical one in determining the certification of the Boeing 
757 cabin configuration shown. It may be pertinent to note that Boeing has chosen to 
locale two galley units adjacent to the number 3 door (these are shaded dark grey in 
the dia('ram). l'llcctively, this removes 9 seats from the vicinity of the critical exit and 
appears toi reduce the overall evacuation time for the aircraft by approximately 6-8 
seconds. Without the galley units in this position, certification of aircraft might have 
proved toi he difl cult. 
It was bound that evacuation times achieved for a given aircraft varied 
signilicantly from run to run. This meant that it was necessary to undertake many 
simulations in order to ascertain the true performance of the four aircraft types under 
test. i kure 9.3 shows the variation in times that were obtained in 100 simulation runs 
of an Airbus 320 evacuation. For the particular set-up tested, the mean time achieved 
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Figure 9.3: Distribution of_FIN, -l -lie 11-atioll Times Achieved in 100 A3211 i'ri=als 
was f'Ound to he 89.9 seconds, with a standard deviation of 1.481 , ccon. Is. 'I he results, 
appear to be normally distributed, with the lit shown inºI)IyiI1t. a siii 'le-tailed 95 
percent confidence interval of approximately 2.44 seconds -i seenmiur; Iy tight error 
margin. 
Differcnces in the results obtained from individual runs were (hIe to ran(iOni 
variations in passenger characteristics, such as reaction limes and ný, ºxiimini rates ui 
movement. Exploratory testing revealed that, if aver ge levels of per16rni, inee remain 
constant, greater levels of variation in passenger capabilities tends toi result in slower 
evacuation times overall. This finding is simple to account liir; skmo: r movers will 
usually inhibit the progress of many other evacuees, whereas Cask-1- iiu very ar unable 
to hasten the movements of surrounding passengers to aiiv si4ýniticant extent. 'I II(- net 
result of this is that groups of dissimilar passengers Move at the speed OI' the sI(MCSt 
individual present. 
Fable 9.1 shows the mean evacuation times obtained liar each OI' the lour 
aircraft tested. In the case of the Airbus A320 and Loring 757 aircraft, results OI' 
actual certification tests are also provided tier comparison. It can Irr seen that tlºe 
simulation results compare reasonably with the real outcomes of th e evacuation trials. 
Although the simulation figures are 6-8 percent higher, the relative perlurniaiiee ot-the 
Airbus and Boeing types appears to been predicted accurately. 
Aircraft Type Number of Seats 
Evacuation Time 
Achieved in 
Certification Test 
Airbus A320 179 79. O s 
Boeing 757 219 73.5 s 
Airbus A321 224 NA 
Boeing 737-800 189 NA 
Mean Evacuation 
Time Achieved in 
Simulation Tests 
8', 1 
77.8s 
81.2s 
91.8s 
Table 9.1: Results of (ýcrtificatiººn 'Trial Simulations 
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The time estimates for the two new aircraft are of interest. The Airbus A321 is a 
lengthened derivative of the A320 and features eight door exits as opposed to the four 
door exits and four overwing hatches of its predecessor. This revised exit 
configuration is very similar to that of the Boeing 757 and it seems to be more than 
adequate for dealing with the 25 percent increase in passenger numbers. 
In constrast, projected details of the stretched Boeing 737-800 aircraft indicate 
that it will retain the exit configuration of its predecessors, whilst increasing 
maximum seating to 189 passengers. Results of simulation testing suggest that this 
m ay make it difficult for the design to meet current certification requirements in 
anything but the most favourable of circumstances. 
9.3 Representation of a Manchester-Type Fire Scenario 
9.3.1 Introduction 
On the 22nd of August 1985, a Boeing 737 aircraft suffered a catastrophic 
engine failure whilst attempting to takeoff from Manchester International Airport, in 
the I IK. 'I he aircraft was brought to a halt on a runway turnoff but, in spite of prompt 
attendance by the airport emergency services, was quickly destroyed by fire before 55 
o1'those on board were able to evacuate. 
"I he incident is now infamous throughout the world's air-safety community 
and subsequently has been the subject of much analysis. Arguably, the accident 
(which has already been mentioned in Chapters 3 and 5) is notable chiefly on two 
accounts. Firstly, the rapidity with which the external fuel fire was able to penetrate 
through into the fuselage interior was a revelation to many observers, even those 
tiºnýiliar with previous accidents of a similar type. Secondly, the event was the subject 
of an extensive inquiry, which lead to the publication of a report of unprecedented 
detail and scope (King, 1989). The later has been described as a watershed in the 
men ilv tiffs and reporting of aircraft accidents by experts in the field (Taylor, 1996). 
In this section, the use of' the model to investigate the circumstances of the 
Manchester accident is demonstrated. This is achieved by reproducing features of the 
incident as closely as possible and examining the accuracy with which the outcome 
can he predicted. In addition, the significance of exit usage in the accident is explored 
by simulating some alternative scenarios that result in some very different outcomes. 
9.3.2 Model Set-uh 
The fire in the Manchester accident was effectively a pool of burning fuel 
located under the trailing edge of the port wing. Although the fire started whilst the 
aircraft was midway through its takeoff run, the aircraft sustained almost no fire 
damage whilst it was in motion. 1-Iowever, upon stopping, ambient wind conditions 
were such that smoke and flames from the fire were deflected back towards the 
aircraft. As a result, the rear fuselage was immediately enveloped and burn-through 
occurred within one minute. 
this lire scenario was represented with a 15 m2 pool fire, with an ellipticity of 
0.5 and positioned to overlap the rear fuselage mid-way between the overwing and 
rear door exits. The burnthrough time constant for the fuselage was set to equal 30 
seconds at 1000 '('. Wind direction was set to a relative heading of 295°, at a strength 
of 7 knots. 
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The aircraft was evacuated through the front two door and the starho; u'd 
overwing exits only. The rear starboard door was opened by a member of the cabin 
crew before the aircraft came to a stop, however, this exit quickly became obscured hý 
smoke and was not used by any of the aircraft's occupants. HIC starboard front door 
was only opened after some delay, however, once in operation, a member of-the cabin 
crew directed the majority of evacuating passengers towards this side, away fironi the 
fire. The exit opening delays in the simulation were set up to produce this sequence as 
fiollovvs: - 
Exit Number 1 2 4 6 
Type Door Door Overwing Door 
Position Front Left Front Right Mid Right Rear Right 
Approximate 
Opening Time (s) 25 70 45 0 
Evacuee Usage 17 34 27 0 
Table 9.2: Exit Details in Manchester Fire Accident 
The aircraft seating configuration was a high density layout, with all but two 
seats being occupied. With the addition of a child and a lap-held infant, this resulted 
in a total of 13) 1 passengers and there were also tour cabin attendants onhoard. I-or the 
purposes of simulation, the cabin configuration was reproduced exactly and all scat. 
were assumed to be occupied by one passenger, giving a total of' I :O evacuees. I he 
two cabin attendants who succumbed to the effects of' lire at the rear of' the aircraºCt, 
together with the two surviving attendants stationed at the Front exits ere not 
represented in the simulation. 
9.3.3 Discussion of Accident Features 
The prediction of fire development inside the aircraft is shown in the sequence 
of images contained in Figure 9.4. The fi'ur snapshots show conditions Ott 30,60.90 
and 120 seconds after the start of the simulation. Alter 30 seconds, the external Iire i,, 
just beginning to penetrate the left hand side of the aircraft's fuselage. At this time, 
exits I and 6 are open, setting up an airflow through the interior of the ýºirrt; ºtt in a 
rearwards direction. This then causes smoke to flow backwards, as shown in diacrann 
(h), and block the rear escape route after about I minute 15 seconds. 
After one minute, a significant portion of the fuselage burnt ihrough and the 
overwing exit has been opened. These two events rnodil'y the pattern of air ºno, cinent 
inside the aircraft such that the entering smoke is spread across the full width of' the 
cabin. This observation may explain the "wall of smoke" advancing rapidly' up the 
aircraft, as reporied by survivors of the accident. 
At 1 minute 30 seconds the second forward door has been (, atising the 
airflow in the forward hall of the r'a ßi'. 1 to reverse in 
direr ion agil rahlldly 
towards the front of the aýr'ta f t. The consequences of this c.. un he spa. n :. n di,, L caºn (d), 
smoke reaches the forward e; di after approximately two rthinutes and eoodit; ok-s in the 
remainder of the ý. ie corr: ýý, °. te y intl. nable. Ai ihrs porot., of' the 
aircraft havc burnt through, leading 'o the entire tail secpion ol'the aiirccart dropping k) 
the ground. 
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Details of the evacuation simulation are provided in Figures 9.5 and 9.6. T lie 
positions of passengers are shown at the start, mid-way through and near the end of 
the accident. After one minute, those still remaining in the rear of the aircraft are 
starting to succumb to the influx of dense smoke. This is indicated on-screen by a 
gradual darkening of these passengers. At this stage, both the number I and number 4 
exits have been opened and are being used by passengers. Egress through the fornmer 
is somewhat erratic, as it is affected by the heat radiating from the fire. This means 
that only 5 people are predicted to leave from the front of the aircraft during the first 
minute of the egress. 
At this point, many passengers are congregating around the jammed number 2 
door, which has still to be freed. Once this is achieved, queued passengers are able to 
escape rapidly and the exit sustains the second half of the evacuation process. After 2 
minutes 10 seconds, the last passenger is able to struggle out, leaving a total of' 51 
others still onboard the aircraft. 
Quantitatively, results of the particular simulation run discussed above 
compare very closely with the known details of the Manchester accident. I low ever. 
simulation results were found to vary slightly from run to run, due to random 
variations in passenger attributes and their seating positions. 'therefore, in order liar 
the model's performance to be evaluated properly, results needed to he averaged from 
a series of runs. To obtain this data, a total of 15 Manchester runs was performed and 
mean results were calculated. Table 9.3 compares details of the Manchester accident 
with these simulation results: - 
Case 
Actual 
Manchester 
Accident 
Mean Value 
Achieved in 
15 Runs 
Standard 
Deviation in 
15 Runs 
Exit 1 Usage 17 17.2 2.0 
Exit 2 Usage 34 30.9 2.0 
Exit 4 Usage 27 25.7 2.4 
Total Fire Fatalities 53 56.1 2.2 
Total Evacuation Time 3: 30 s 2: 09 s 5.1 s 
Table 9.3: Results of Manchester Accident-Anab9a 
It can be seen that figures for exit usage and fatalities are predicted to within an 
accuracy of 5-10 percent. These error margins are comparable with the standard 
deviation figures from across the 15 runs, indicating that the outcome of' the real 
incident lies well within the envelope of simulation results. 
The prediction of total evacuation time appears to be less satisfactory. A 
discrepancy of 81 seconds represents an error of approximately 39 percent - well 
outside of the observed standard deviation of 2.4 percent. This result clearly indicates 
that passenger evacuation rates and/or fire incapacitation effects ar, ý overestimated in 
the representation of the Manchester accident. Two suggestions are made to account 
for the magnitude of this deviation: - 
Firstly, circumstances of the Manchester accident were unusually severe in 
comparison with similar incidents, as discussed in Chapter 3. Specifically, many of, 
the passengers involved had comparatively little experience of air travel, which Icad 
to an unusually high incidence of confusion, delay and inappropriate behaviour. The 
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Figure 9.5: Passenger Evacuation Sequence 
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Figure 9.6: Evacuation Progress Plot 
rate of evacuation achieved was therefor rather lower than might normally have been 
expected. Consequently, the "typical" passenger characteristics used in the simulation 
produced significantly shorter evacuation times than that occurring in the real case. 
Secondly, the margin of error involved may not be as significant as it first 
appears. The explanation of this lies with the fact that the progress of an evacuation in 
an aircraft accident can be highly non-linear. For example, when passengers have not 
received crash injuries, evacuation rates tend to he comparatively high until a 
substantial deterioration in cabin conditions occurs. At this stage, those still remaining 
inside an aircraft are likely to suffer severe incapacitation within a short space of' time, 
which causes their rate of egress to slow dramatically. Consequently, only the most 
determined then stand any chance of survival and these Iew that manage to do so will 
require significant time to struggle free. In such accidents, the hulk of' survivors 
escapes in a few minutes, but the final few "stragglers" eflirctivcly prolong the 
duration of the evacuation by a substantial margin. Evidence ol'this tailing-ol Throccss 
is clearly visible with the last five survivors to emerge li'onl exit 4 in the evacuation 
progress plot. However, the duration of the evacuation tail-oil may have been 
underestimated by a substantial margin. 
It is precisely these aspects of' thernlo-toxic incapacitation and survival 
capability in extreme conditions that are impossible to analyse or quantify by ethical 
means. However, results froh the analysis of the Manchester accident suggest that the 
assumption of a simple linear relationship between FF1) and movement capability 
might be unduly pessimistic. 
9.3.4 Simulation of Alternative Outcomes 
The opening and subsequent utilisation of exits in the Manchester incident 
have been the focus of much attention. Potentially, the most effective means of escape 
appeared to be the number 2 and number 6 door exits, located on the right-hand side 
of the aircraft. However, the number 2 door jammed on opening, causing cabin crew 
at the front of the aircraft to divert their attention to activating the door on the Ich- 
hand side. As a result, the malfunctioning exit was not freed until approximately 70 
seconds after the aircraft had stopped. Despite the delay in its opening, more 
passengers eventually managed to leave the aircraft through the number 2 door than 
by any other exit. This suggests that many lives might have been saved it' the first 
attempt to activate the right-hand door had been successful. 
In contrast, the number 6 exit at the rear of the cabin was seen to be open with 
a successfully deployed at around the time that the aircraft came to a stop. I lowever, 
the presence of dense smoke outside the door caused a stewardess to direct passengers 
away from the exit, towards the front of the aircraft. (riven the prevailing 
circumstances, this decision was entirely reasonable and in accordance with the 
training given to cabin crew-members. With the benefit of hindsight, ho%%ever, it 
might be postulated that more people (including both stewardesses at the rear of the 
aircraft) might have survived if the open rear door had been utilised in the evacuation. 
It is possible to identify a number hypothetical scenarios in which emergency 
exits could have been utilised more effectively in the Manchester accident. For 
example, if no difficulties had been encountered with any of the exits utilised, what 
outcome might then have resulted? It was decided to investigate three Manchester 
scenarios of this type, in each of which exit utilisation differed fiom that in the 
original incident in one of the following three ways: - 
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1. The number 2 exit was opened without difficulty and its slide deployed 
successfully within 10 seconds of the aircraft coming to a stop. 
2. Passengers seated in the back of the cabin were directed towards (rather 
than away from) the open door exit at the rear of the aircraft. 
3. All four of the exits activated were opened promptly and then utilised to 
the maximum possible extent. 
The simulation results for these three scenarios are compared with those for the actual 
Manchester accident in Table 9.4. 
Case Simulated 
Mean 
Evacuation 
Time 
Mean 
Number of 
Fatalities 
Actual Manchester scenario 2: 09 s 56 
Hypothesis 1: #2 exit opened without any delay 1: 46 s 41 
Hypothesis 2: Passengers directed to use open rear door 2: 06 s 23 
Hypothesis 3: All four exits function to maximum potential 1: 16 s 0 
Table 9.4: Modification of Exit Usage in Manchester Accident Scenario 
Testing of the first hypothesis indicated that the 70 second delay in opening the front 
right door exit may have prevented about 15 passengers from leaving the aircraft and 
added 23 seconds to the overall evacuation time. The magnitude of these differences 
was lower than anticipated; the reason for this is that with immediate activation of the 
right hand door, effectively the left hand door was made redundant at an earlier stage 
in the evacuation. 
When passengers were left free to use the open rear door, a substantial 
reduction in the number of fatalities occurred. It was interesting to observe that in 
such circumstances the rear door tended to be the most heavily utilised exit in the 
evacuation. Ironically, however, because most of the additional survivors would 
otherwise have been amongst the first to succumb to the fire, there was little 
improvement in the overall evacuation time achieved. 
Simulation of the third hypothesis, indicated that passengers would begin to 
exit from the aircraft in substantial numbers within 15 seconds of it stopping on the 
taxi-way. The resulting evacuation is similar to the certification trials examined in the 
previous section. Although many of those seated in the rear half of the cabin are 
severely affected by smoke, usually all manage to escape in an average time of only 
76 seconds. 
Results obtained from testing of the three hypotheses underline the finely 
balanced nature of some aircraft fire scenarios. The speed with which a fire is able to 
penetrate the fuselage of a modern airliner frequently leaves those onboard with few 
options and very little time with which to effect an escape. In addition, seemingly 
minor features often have the potential to influence events occurring on a much larger 
scale. Frequently, these features occur randomly or are impossible to control in the 
circumstances that typically prevail in the midst of a serious aircraft accident. 
Consequently, it is usually very difficult to predict what the best course of action 
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might be, especially since survival prospects are likely to be dependent on'the äctions 
of others, over which there can never be a guarantee. 
9.4 Multiple Accident Analysis 
9.4.1 Introduction 
The first two case studies have each been concerned with the detailed analysis 
of a single accident scenario. However, a major objective of the research was 
formulate a model that would be capable of simulating all types of aircraft fire 
scenario. Then, when accident features are chosen randomly from appropriate 
probability distributions, many runs can be performed in order to obtain a fully 
representative sample of accident simulations. Results obtained from this type of 
study can thus be utilised for the purpose of risk assessment, as opposed to the hazard 
analysis demonstrated in the first two examples. 
It was just about feasible to undertake multiple accident analysis by hand at 
the completion of the study. To keep matters as simple as possible, these runs were 
restricted to a series of 100 accident simulations, involving the same aircraft type. 
However, each of the accidents is unique in terms of scenario details, crash effects, 
fire characteristics and the passenger evacuation process. The outcome of each 
simulation had to be recorded by hand and results processed with the aid of a 
computer spreadsheet. 
9.4.2 Model Set-up 
The aircraft type used in analysis was an Airbus A3 10, configured with 219 
passenger seats in a typical two-class arrangement. This cabin plan has been 
illustrated previously in Figure 6.8. A mean load-factor of 70 percent was assumed. 
All simulation parameters were determined randomly by using the probability 
functions built into the simulation model. The characteristics and derivation of each of 
these functions have been covered in previous chapters of the thesis. Thus many of the 
accident scenario features can be taken to be statistically representative of those that 
have been experienced in aircraft fire accidents occurring over the last 40 years. 
Obviously, the scenarios obtained with the model are not necessarily an accurate 
reflection of those that we might expect to occur with A3 10 aircraft flying today. 
The following results were recorded for each event simulated: - 
" Total number of passengers onboard 
" Number of impact trauma deaths 
" Number of fire deaths 
" Number of series injuries 
" Time required for completion of evacuation 
A total 100 accidents were run for the case study. Ideally, it was desirable to 
have undertaken a significantly larger number of simulations; however the results 
obtained are sufficient to demonstrate the feasibility of this type of work. In the longer 
term, runs encompassing 1000 or more accidents would enable outputs to be provided 
in the form of continuous probability distributions. 
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9.4.3 Findings and Discussion 
The mean casualty rates and mean evacuation time achieved in the 100 
accidents are compared with historical figures in Table 9.5. It can be seen that the 
impact trauma death and serious injury rates match very closely; this is to be 
expected, as the accident scenario generator merely reproduces historical variations in 
fliese data. Fire Fatalities were I 'mind to occur at a rate of 14 percent of those onboard, 
compared with an historical average of 23 percent. Given that we might expect the 
A3 10 to be more easy to escape from than older narrow-body types, this difference 
need not necessarily represent a cause for concern. However, this area obviously 
demands further investigation; perhaps more of the seriously injured survivors should 
he succumbing to the effects of tire. 
Result 
Achieved 
Historical 
Average 
Impact trauma deaths 21 % 22 % 
Fire deaths 14% 23% 
Serious Injury rate 15% 12% 
Evacuation time 2 mins 16 s 2 mins 19 s 
Table 9.5: Summary Results of 100 A310 
Accident Simulations 
II he prediction of mean evacuation times appears to be promising. flowever, in 
reality, the 310 niight be likely to perform significantly better than most other 
airliners and so the accuracy of' simulation results is very difficult to judge. A more 
satisf,, ºctory indication can be obtained about this aspect of the analysis by comparing 
variations in achieved evacuation times. Figure 9.6 illustrates this distribution for the 
100 runs and that for 44 accidents in which times are known. Note that the two 
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Fi-urc 9.7: Evacnation_I'imes Achieved in 100 A310 Accidents 
vLertic, il ýixýýs li; iýc been scaled differently to enable a direct comparison to be made. It 
can be seen that the characteristics of passenger evacuation times have been captured 
reasonably vveII. The historical distribution is spread more widely, with less oC a peak, 
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this might be expected as it has been compiled from accidents involving ºººany 
different aircraft types. The distribution of simulated times makes m iººteres; tinu 
comparison with that obtained for certification-type evacuation trials, ilItustlate(l ill 
11gure 9.3. 
In summary, this case study has demonstrated that it is feasible to , ººº; ºI\ se the 
outcomes of aircraft accidents with what may he acceptable accuracy .I 
IovvL"v er, the 
results presented are of a very preliminary nature and it is diilicult to make 
quantitative comparisons with historical data. ('o11segluently, ºººurlº 
further work to he undertaken in this area. 
9.5 Safety Implications of New Very Large Aircraft Designs 
9.5.1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, major aircraft nnaºnufacturers have hec"n undertal inl'. 
feasibility studies into the development or a new design or large airliner. i\Itention has- 
been focused both on "stretching" existing types and on the more expensive 
alternative of instigating a completely new design of aircraft. In the fatter case, some 
very innovative aircralt configurations have been explored, coverin ' AItern. ºti\ Cs; stich 
as fuselages with horizontal ovoid cross-sections, living vvings and even twin bodied 
aircraft. Ilow ever, these seemingly radical projects now appear toi beeiº dropped Iruººº 
further consideration, leading to the emergence of two rival Very I , ul'e Airetali 
(VIA) programmes. Both of the aircraft involved are essential l\ euti\e"ntioýn, ºl in 
deign and are prqjectecl to be generally comparable in their perforºººance. 
Currently, the largest airliner in service is the Uocing 717-4(1(l, Inch has been 
certificated fier the carriage or up to a maximum or 624 passcnjý, -rs. At the lime of' 
writing, Boeing in partnership with MclhonnclI Douglas, appeared tu Iº, ºv e ºIecided 
upon the option of launching a programme to rc-wing and Ienc'tlien this aircraft in 
order toi meet projected market demand in the early v ears of. the neyt cent ui *\,. As a 
result, the new stretched aircraft is projcctccl to be capable of acconºniodatinp around 
$ÜO passengers in a high density suiting configuration. 
In contrast, Airbus Industries is now appears to be committed toi an entirely 
new ''A3XX'' Ultra-l-ligh Capacity Airliner (IIIIC'A) progratnnºe, pussiI lv' to hLe 
launched sooner than its projected American competitor. I'bis (Ie"sil', n in IWO) too Iº; º\e 
a maximum seating capacity of 854 scats, over Arty percent or vv, Iºicli vv ill he located 
on an upper cabin deck. 
llndertaking the certification of an airliner in the VIA class \\ill present nº; ºn\ 
new challenges in the area of aircraft safety. Cabin crew will he responsihie I'M co 
ordinating larger numbers of passengers, using more emergency exit`. 'I liese : ºircr, ºlt 
may possess more than two aisles and, fear the first time, a substantial I, r(, purtiuHI of 
Occupants Will he required to evacuate From upper level exits. 
Ibis case study investigates passenger evacuation issues in two VI A desipns. 
Firstly, an incarnation of an Airbus A3XX design is subjected to a certiflea! ion-st\ IL' 
evacuation trial and the performance of the upper and lovver deck is romp tied. I hen 
the evacuation from the lower deck of a Boeing VI. A design study IIº, ºI posscsses 
three passenger aisles is examined in detail. Both of' these invcstigatioýns yield sonme 
interesting results. 
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9.5.2 Model Set-u1) 
In both the Airbus and Boeing runs, the simulation model was configured to 
undertake certification style evacuation tests. Ilalf of the total number of exits was 
ºnade available for use in each aircraft and a full complement of passengers was 
assumed. For the A 3XX, two runs were necessary; one each for the upper and lower 
passenger decks. Both cabin were configured in a high density arrangement, seating 
34o) and 48') passengers, respectively. Use of inter-deck stairways by evacuees and 
interlcrrnce between escape slides were not represented. All exits were assumed to be 
identical in eft ctiveness and were set to become available for use 10 seconds after the 
start Oleach test. 
Two simulation runs were also undertaken with the lower deck of the Boeing 
VI. A design. In both cases, a two class seating configuration with three aisles was 
assumed, providing a total of 405 passenger scats. For the first evacuation test, the 
aircrºli's cabin was fctt unmodified in its published form. For the second run, a minor 
modification was made to one of' the galley units situated in the rear half of the 
aircraft. This was intended to demonstrate how comparatively small details in the 
design of a large cabin can have a major influence on the efficiency of passenger 
evacuation. 
'1.5.3 A3XX Iipper and lower leck Comparison 
: vacu. ition from the decks of the A 3XX aircraft is illustrated in Figure 9.7. It 
can he seen that four exits are available for use on the upper deck and five on the 
ry tfYý 
Yt ar 
1. *ºr 
UPPER DECK 
LOWER DECK 
Iý'i urc 9.! {: Progress of Airbus A3XX Evacuation 
]Ovvcr. Passengers delaying at exits and constrictions in aisles result in the formation 
of gqººrucs in both cabins alter a period of approximately 20 seconds. Subsequent to 
tlºis, the total time required lºr completion 01' the evacuation is governed by the 
ººunmber of passengers choosinL to yueue at each exit and the exit flow rates that can 
he achieved. Willi passengers heading, I'm their nearest available exit, doors positioned 
it the l'roiit and rear extremities of the aircraft arc under-subscribed on both decks. It 
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is thus probably not l coincidence that these are the positions in which stairways. have 
been chosen for location by Airbus. 
The mean evacuation times together with other details ui the upper and lomýer 
A3XX decks are compared in Table 9.6. 
Passenger Number of Deck Seats Exits 
Upper 349 4 (x2) 
Lower 489 5(x2) 
Seats per 
Mean 
Exit Evacuation 
Time 
43.6 '. )l 1s 
489 7`>2s 
Table 9.6: Evacuation Details for A3XX ('1)1wr and Lim er Decks 
With the assumptions used in the analysis, it is apparent that the upper sleek ()I' the 
aircraft can he evacuated in about three-quarters of the time required f'0r the lower 
Cahill. This diffcl-ence is primarily due to the lower passenger to exit ratio present in 
the upper cabin. It is also worth noting that the INC of stairs by evacuees would further 
accentuate the dil'lcrence in evacuation tine between the two decks. 
In reality, it may not be realistic to expect the longer upper-level escape slide" 
to deploy in the same time as those can the Over deck: also the si:! nilicatilly tgreater 
height of' the upper exits will be more likely to produce passen irr Iresit, rlilýn in 
doorways. The above simulation figures imply that an average peruse of' l, nl. \ 11. "t I 
seconds per upper deck passenger would he suflicirnt to equalise the evaeu; rtion time, 
of the two decks. Only time may tell irthis magnitude lil saf' tv margin, sulliwieiil 
9.5.4 Experimentation with Boeing VI. A Design 
The unmodified cabin configuration of' the I3oeiir, c VIA design \\; I,, Comid to 
evacuate in a time of 77.7 seconds. This figure compares reasonably witlr nrairv 
existing airliners, but is not tth to the standard of' some \videhud\ types, stich as the 
Drein. 747-400 series liar example. The key to this mediocre I, c 
rli, 
rnr, rnc c by the 
design was quickly discovered to he the Bret that it utilised dace passenger aisles in 
areas of' high density seating. This particular Icaturc need nagt he clrlrinrc ntcrl to 
evacuation performance, provided that adequate escape piths are provided lior 
passengers unfortunate enough to find themselves in a central aIisle". I Iý vever, in the 
case cif the Boeing VLA cabin configuration used in this studN., l)rohlei>>s ýýcue blond 
to occur in the area cif a galley positioned narr the rear of the ýriier; rfl. 
The top diagram in Figure 9.8 illustrates the overall eonfit: ur; itiun kit the 
aircraft concerned. PictLire (a) details the congestion that was týl, icalIv li, und to occur 
in the region of the number 4 door on the starboard side oI'the airCl. ilh. It can he sceii 
that evacuees emerging from the central door are fi, rcccl toi queue heft al ;I1. ()\\ of 
seats in order to move towards the side 01, the aircraft. I bis has the eIICrt of 
constraining the flow of* passengers reaching the number 4 dtwr, thus preventinp, tlie 
exit from bein' used to its fullest extent. 
The most obvious way remove this bottleneck in the evacuation as to icilioýve 
a portion of'the galley' unit positioned at the end ol'the central aisle. 'I his nrodilic", ition 
is depicted in diagram (b) of' Figure 9.7. The cl'lect oI' the cllaiige on the oveiall 
evacuation perform trace was startling. Table 9.7 shows that the revised evacuation 
time was only 69.1 seconds. This level 01' inilprowenleirt could be aecorintL"d lor. 
entirely in terms of' increased utilisation 01' the number 4 door. Ohsýrý, itittu oI' III(* 
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(a) centre aisle terminated by galley (b) modified galley configuration 
Fit; ure_ 9_9_ Modification of Boeing VIA Design 
rvacuatiRn runs revealed that a significant proportion of the passengers travelling 
through the galley cut-out actually chose to turn right and then make for the idle 
number 5 door at the hack of the aircraft. Effectively, the modification spread 
passengers more evenly throughout the rear section of the aircraft, and improved the 
litilis"ItImi of l\vO exits. 
Original Galley Revised Galley 
Configuration Configuration 
Mean 
Evacuation 77.7 s 69.1 s 
Time 
Table9_7: FAfect of Revision to (. alley Configuration 
on Time Required for Passenger Evacuation 
This exam ple demonstrates the potentially critical eflccts that small design 
changes can 11m c on the evacuation ol' aircraft. The value of the simulation tool for 
uiidertokiwg these types of preliminary exploration study has thus been clearly 
utid rIined. 
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Chapter 10: Evaluation and Conclusions 
10.1 Evaluation of Research 
10.1.1 Attainment of Research Objectives 
The primary objective of the study was to consti-uet a computer lased risk 
assessment tool suited for the investigation of issues in aircraft fire sakty. 'I'I1e 
research programme was completely su ccessfººl in attaining this goal. the tool 
operates by generating details ARM! accident scenarios and then sinºul; ºtimu tlºeir 
outcomes in terms of the number of fatalities incurred. Many complex aspects or 
accident survival needed to be considered in this analysis. "I Iºe main components o 
the model and the interactions that occur between them are depicted in I"igure M. 1. 
IN computer model can be configured to control any aspect or the accidents Leint'. 
simulated and has been shown to deliver accurate results. 'I Ihese capabilities enable 
quantitative risk assessment studies to he undertaken in almost any aspect of aircraft 
Are safety. 
A second requisite for the research was to provide the ability tu deal with a 
fully representative range of aircraft accident scenarios, not pot those that are 1ºu, re 
amenable to established methods of analysis. I'bis was required hrcau'; e, in order to 
undertake true risk assessment studies, h is necessary to estimate "hot till' omiteomlle o 
different types of accident will he and also take account of tlºe relative lreuiulenev with 
which these accident scenarios can be expected to occur. I Iºns, il' lindimws are to 
accurately reflect the risks faced in everyday operations, all accident types Ihat arge 
likely to be encountered must be dealt with. 
it was ensured that this requirement would be satisfied 1,. \ undertaI: iºº; all 
extensive survey of past aircraft accidents and carelillly li, rlººulatin, ' the scope or the 
research to match the findings obtained. This led to the idenlilicatioºn of a key 
parameter in the analysis being undertaken - the time required far lire to innres; into 
the passenger cabin. Many factors influence this ingress time, such as the type or fire 
involved, its rate of growth, the level of crash damage sustained b the aircrºf t, wind 
conditions, etc. These details were föund to vary widely from incident to incit, letmt, 
thus the requirement for risk assessment implied that it would he hiecesscºr\ to 
simulate many accidents in order to obtain statistically valid results. ('onsegluentl\, 
from a practical standpoint, the computer model needed to he capable of processing 
accidents autonomously and at a rate that was comparable to that of'real tine. 
Arguably, one class of accident was not dealt \w ith : ººiý quately by the 
simulation model; those which involve internal fires. As outlined in ('halter 7, t1ºe 
decision to neglect internal Are scenarios was based on two accounts. Firstly, findings 
From the historical survey clearly indicated that fatal incidents this type Iºavc become 
near to tieing eradicated in the course of the last two decades. 'blue second Factor was 
that the analysis of internal fires was better suited to ordinary computational lire 
modelling techniques, rather than the hybrid fire type or ºººodel heimu. litrnºul; ºted. 
"thus, the efractive outcome of this decision was to prevent attrition diverted 
unduly towards accident scenarios that were becoming increasiººt: ly uººreprescntative 
of'contemporary events. 
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The analysis of fire lethality in aircraft accidents is a complex task, because 
influences as diverse as crash details, fire development and progress of the passeneer 
evacuation usually need be taken into account. Frequently, powerful interactions can 
occur between these different aspects ()fail accident, which prevents them from beint 
analysed on an independent basis. As a consequence of this, a further Objective of the 
research was to utilise a holistic approach in the analysis, nmodelIIn g all factors that 
have the potential influence fire lethality in a balanced and integrated nmanner. 
Before these factors could be modelled, it was necessary for them toi he 
identified. This was achieved by performing correlation tests with scenario data 
obtained from the accident survey. An important result 01' this activity was IIº(" 
revelation that the level of' structural damage sustained by an aircraft was ýº better 
indicator of fire lethality than the size Of fire present or the Speed of' evacuation 
achieved. This finding implied that as well as the modelling of lire development and 
occupant evacuation, wider details of' accident scenarios needed to taken into 
consideration. 
Because a high degree of integration was necess, ºry-, the Validity 0[ the 
resulting model would be limited by the weakest aspect of' the analysis that il 
contained. Therefore, a suitable balance needed to be achieved between the nmode"Iliºº11 
of' crash, fire and evacuation aspects of accidents. 't'hroughout the process of 111mik"1 
construction, this balance was frequently governed by quality of calibrºtion data 
obtainable from past accidents and experimental research. 
The final objective of the research was to demonstrate that it is I', isihie to 
undertake quantitative risk analysis of' aircraft accidents, safety issues and safety 
policies with the tool that was being constructed. Fach of these aspects has been 
covered at preliminary level in the case studies provided in ('h, ºpter 9. 
As far as the analysis of accidents is concerned, it has been shown that the 
model can be used to focus down onto the details of a specific incident. Alternatively, 
levels of risk can be computed across a representative spectrum of accident scenarios, 
possibly involving many different types of aircraft. This then introduces the caºpahiIity 
to explore effects that result from changes ol' safety policies, 0r xamiýºý issue sorb 
as the introduction of new designs of aircraft. 
10.1.2 Limitations in the Work 
10.1.2.1 Dealing with Difficulties 
The trans-disciplinary nature of the work performed in the re. scmvil made it 
inevitable that there would be niany areas of compromise. Most of the difficulties that 
were encountered involved analysing of aspects of safety that were either dealt \\ ith in 
a different way or else considered to be out of bounds by other researchers. sa result 
of this, there was usually no obvious way to circumvent Ipro, I, lrnls Iliac arose I,. N 
recourse to published theory or alternative sources ofinf6rn1,1tion. 
In most areas, however, the presence of' difficulties can he antIC11MIedI and tlheii 
allowed for in the planning of the research. In the short-term, this usually involýcd the 
establishment of an approximate stop iah solution, or temporarily hý ssinV, the need 
for the relevant part of the model to be used. This then enabled the basic structure of 
the model to be established and its overall functionality eon firmed. tiulhsegluently, 
however, these fixes needed to he resolved by replacing them with a more substantive 
analysis. Generally, this was achieved in one oflour wavs: - 
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" Adapt techniques that are used in another discipline or in a! different 
context (e. g. the application of potential flow theory to model the 
movement of smoke) 
" Develop new methods to specifically fit the circumstances (e. g. use of 
fire spread plots and simulating details of occupant evacuation) 
" Adopt empirical approach, involving the look-up of statistical data (e. g. 
modelling the effects of crash impacts) 
" Resort to stop-gap estimation or educated guesswork when little or no 
information is available (e. g. evacuee mobility in dense smoke) 
The most important limitations in the analysis involved quantifying the 
relationships that occur between people, crash effects and fire. Inevitably, these "weak 
links" occurred as a direct consequence of being forced to adopt the last of the above 
approaches during model construction. Significantly, it can be that the interactions 
involved link all parts of the model, rather being located in one particular area. This 
fact is consistent with the attainment of a holistic and balanced analysis, one of the 
main objectives of the research. 
A discussion of the areas involved now follows. 
10.1.2.2 Modelling of Evacuee Behaviour 
The task of formulating a realistic representation of human behaviour is a 
challenge that has to be dealt with in many types of computational simulation 
analysis. Given that aircraft accidents typically involve people acting in unfamiliar 
and hazardous circumstances, modelling of their behaviour becomes especially 
difficult. The main inadequacies in the evacuation analysis consist of predicting 
occurrences of irrational behaviour, planning of escape strategy in a complex 
environment and incapacitation by the effects of fire and trauma injuries. 
Many examples of seemingly irrational behaviour were encountered in the 
accident data survey. At the simplest level, cases might be apportioned into three 
categories, crudely labelled here as "submissive inaction", "ineffectual panic", and 
"exaggerated altruism" respectively. Some instances of behaviour that fall into the 
third category are explainable in terms of an individual's next of kin being present in 
the accident. These effects could therefore probably be represented within the 
evacuation modelling by some form of group behaviour mechanism and defining 
suitable passenger attributes. Other categories of exaggerated behaviour, such as 
uncooperative actions, seat climbing and exit crowding might also be dealt with in an 
analogous manner. In contrast, occurrences of panic and inaction appear to be much 
harder to quantify. One possible inroad into this area might be that these reactions 
appeared to occur more frequently when people are exposed suddenly to large fires or 
seated near to breaks in a fuselage. Possibly, the best way to incorporate these aspects 
of behavioural modelling into the analysis is via a statistical approach. 
When people are tasked with evacuation from an aircraft, they are usually able 
to formulate a suitable plan of escape, even in the most confusing or, unfamiliar 
circumstances. Because this task can be performed sub-consciously in a very short 
space of time, evacuees can adapt and update their escape strategies to take account of 
changing circumstances and the availability of new information. When examined in 
detail, these capabilities appear to be very complex and consequently are almost 
impossible to represent concisely within a computer programme. It was therefore 
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predictable 'that determining passenger's escape strategies would be an area of 
significant compromise in the model. I 
Orderly certification-style evacuations are reasonably straightforward to 
approximate. Paths to exits are simple to determine and passengers can be made to 
take account of queue lengths, behaviour of others, exit flow rates, etc. without 
difficulty. Many complications arise, however, when the effects of fire and crash 
disruption are introduced into the evacuation scenario. The decision making analogy 
must then take account of far wider range of influences, such as cabin visibility, 
obstruction of aisles, egress via breakages, progress of fire, etc. It would have been 
possible to allocate major portion of the available research time for the writing a 
knowledge-based algorithm able to fulfil these demanding requirements. Realistically, 
however, time constraints and the need to simulate the movements of hundreds of 
individuals in real time meant that this solution was not feasible. Even when evacuees 
are assumed to retain their full capabilities, the complexity of the situation was such 
that only the simplest of rules could be implemented to deal with each eventuality. 
The task of calibrating even this basic decision-making model was 
problematic. The best insight into the area can probably be obtained from survivor 
accounts of past accidents, 'especially if a reason or explanation for observed 
behaviour is required. However it is then usually very difficult to structure these 
processes or quantify them numerically. For example, it is know from study of past 
accidents that the possession of relevant training or experience can be a very 
important factor in determining evacuation performance. Do we attempt to model this 
type of attribute explicitly or should it be translated into qualities that can be defined 
more meaningfully, such as speed of movement, rate of reaction and rationality? 
Video recordings of experimental evacuation trials were found to be valuable 
for quantifying simpler behavioural parameters, such as reaction speeds, rates of 
movement and exit flow rates. Videos also provide a useful qualitative insight into 
more detailed aspects of the evacuation process. A significant drawback of using such 
data, however, is that results obtained from experimental trials cannot generally be 
taken to be representative of real accidents. Thus, it was necessary to apply correction 
factors to account for anticipated differences in evacuee behaviour and performance in 
real accidents. 
Researchers have interviewed trial participants in an attempt to explore their 
perceptions of an evacuation and elicit reasons for choosing certain courses of action. 
The information obtained in this way is likely to form an interesting comparison with 
the experiences of real accident victims and a combination of these two resources 
appears to constitute the best basis from which to advance the evacuation analysis. 
One particular aspect of passenger behaviour that might have been more 
feasible to address within the shorter term is utilisation of stairways during egress 
from future double-deck aircraft designs. People are almost certainly less willing to 
jump from upper floor exits and stairways are likely to constitute bottlenecks if used 
by many passengers. Although the former issue was investigated in one of the case 
studies, time constraints prevented the effects of stairways from being incorporated 
into the analysis. Given that provision was made for this facility within the model, it 
should be reasonably straightforward to implement and would enable some interesting 
optimisation studies to be undertaken. Currently, experience with obtained with 
existing Boeing 747 aircraft and experimental evacuation trials is insufficient for 
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quantifying these issues. As a result, effecting the capability to analyse large aircraft 
constitutes one of the more immediate priorities in the development of the model.. - 
One of the most difficult aspects of modelling passenger evacuation is dealing 
with the effects of trauma injuries and fire incapacitation. Significant knowledge 
exists on the physiological effects of fires, but there is very little coverage of 
psychological aspects. In addition, virtually nothing appears to be known about levels 
of debilitation that result from crash injuries. It is obviously impossible to undertake 
experimental research in these areas and thus anecdotal evidence from past accidents 
is the only information available to work from. The implementation of fractional 
scales to represent smoke incapacitation and injury levels within the model were 
found to be convenient and these concepts have already been established in the 
building fire safety and car safety industries. However, in spite of the fact they appear 
to deliver reasonable results, the applicability of these scales to aircraft accidents has 
not been verified. Similarly, the psychological effects of smoke were represented as 
being just a linear drop in speed with increasing smoke density. This was a 
consequence of there being only one set of experimental data to work from in this 
area. 
One final aspect of the evacuation modelling that warrants discussion is the 
exclusion of aircraft cabin crew from the simulation. This was done to simplify the 
analysis and avoid the need to accommodate more than one type of evacuee. Whilst 
the decision was clearly justifiable in the earlier stages of the work, the effects of 
cabin crew actions might need to be incorporated in detail when performing some 
types of analysis. For example, experimental evacuation trials have shown that 
assertive behaviour by cabin crew can produce a significant increase in the flow of 
passengers through door exits. It might desirable to test the implications of this 
finding across a range of different accident scenarios. 
10.1.2.3 Analysis of Crash Effects 
In addition to the modelling of passenger evacuation, a substantial portion of 
the research was concerned with representing the effects of crash impacts in aircraft 
fire accidents. Impact disruption was incorporated in terms of structural damage 
suffered by the aircraft, levels of cabin disruption and resulting occupant trauma 
deaths or injuries. In the case of structural damage and levels of cabin disruption, 
acceptable statistical relationships were obtained with the use of a simple categorical 
1-5 scale of severity. Whilst this methodology was suitable for quantifying, the 
consequences of crashes at a general level, it does not allow for more specific details 
to be determined, such as floor integrity, failure of seat attachments or littering of 
aisles, for instance. The occurrence of each of these features tends to affect accident 
survivability in a slightly different way, but such considerations are not reflected the 
level of resolution incorporated into the impact effects model. 
Given that the interest of the research lay primarily with the analysis of fire 
lethality rather than crash survivability, the level of compromise adopted in this aspect 
of the work is probably acceptable. However, the use of a simplified approach tends to 
preclude the effects of recent crash-safety initiatives from being modelled in detail. 
Examples of safety improvements that may need to be taken account of in this way 
include detailed improvements in crash-worthiness of aircraft structures, introduction 
of 16 g rated passenger seats, precautions for those seated facing solid surfaces, and 
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strengthening of overhead stowage bins. If any of these considerations is to be dealt 
with, their interactions will need to be facilitated at an appropriate level. 
Prediction of occupant injury levels in the crash effects modelling is also 
relatively simplistic. Both the numbers and severity of injuries arc quantified on a 
statistical basis, being classified as either fatally injured, seriously injured or 
unharmed. Again, this approach was probably appropriate for the type of work being 
undertaken, but potential exists for substantial improvements to be made in this area 
of the analysis. As seen in Chapter 3, a significant amount of work has been 
performed in the area of quantifying human trauma injures. Potentially, many of the 
methods used are applicable in the analysis of aircraft accident victims and could 
therefore be incorporated into the current research. 
However, even if the nature of impact trauma injuries could be classified and 
predicted with accuracy, the problem of determining what the resulting effects on 
occupant evacuation capabilities will be still remains. Quantifying these factors 
satisfactorily with information gained from past accidents is likely to prove extremely 
difficult, as the evidence available is patchy and anecdotal in character. One source of 
data that might prove complimentary to this material arc results of evacuation trials 
undertaken with handicapped passengers. In the context of evacuation from aircraft, 
the constraints imposed by common physical and mental disabilities appear to bear n 
close resemblance to those that result from typical trauma injuries. If it were possible 
to establish some equivalence relationships between the two, an important aspect of 
aircraft fire survival could potentially be made accessible to analysis for the first time. 
10.1.2.4 Approach to Fire Modelling 
The third main component of the simulation model was the representation of 
accident fires and the resulting thermo-toxic environment inside the passenger cabin. 
The choice of approach in this part of the analysis was governed by the unusual 
requirement to model the key interactions and approximate effects of a fire, incurring 
the absolute minimum of computational overheads. As a, result, a hybrid scheme was 
formulated, which comprised a two-dimensional cabin fire model used in combination 
with an external pool fire analysis. The two were linked, in part, with a two- 
dimensional potential flow solver that was efficient enough to update cabin airflow 
each time an exit was opened or a significant portion of cabin wall burnt through. 
The main shortcomings of the fire analysis stem both from the philosophy 
behind its construction and limitations imposed by time constraints in the research. It 
is acknowledged that modelling the development of even a comparatively simple 
aircraft fire scenario is an extremely difficult task. The best way to analyse this type of 
fire problem is with the use of a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) method. 
However, the time needed to set up boundary conditions and obtain just a single 
solution is typically of the order of several weeks and the quality of results obtained 
can never exceed that of the input data available. Effectively, these limitations ruled 
the use of CFD out of consideration, leading to the search for a simpler and more 
practical alternative. It was aimed to create a fire model that would match and 
integrate fully with other parts of the safety analysis, working with a higher level of 
simplification. The quality of the results provided needed only to match the 
requirements of the thermo-toxic incapacitation analysis rather than providing new 
insights into the development of fires. 
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As a consequence of this philosophy, many compromises needed to be made 
in the fire modelling. Most of the simplifications were justified on the basis that 
certain features were fundamentally incompatible with the primary objectives of the 
analysis being undertaken. However, some omissions were the result of time 
constraints associated with the research, as opposed to arising from technical 
considerations. Arguably, the three most important of these were lack of smoke 
modelling outside the aircraft, omission of the effects of fire fighting operations and 
the failure to incorporate three-dimensional smoke stratification effects inside, the 
aircraft's passenger cabin. 
The theory of open pool fire modelling deals predominantly with estimating 
the extent and radiative power of flame envelopes. An important assumption in the 
methods used is that smoke rises or is blown rapidly away from the flames and it thus 
has little or no influence in fire development. This then allows fire properties to be 
calculated as being purely a function of fuel details and ambient wind conditions. 
Whilst the use of this approach appears to be acceptable for modelling the vast 
majority of aircraft fuel fires, it ensues that smoke movement outside an aircraft plays 
no part in the fire analysis. Significantly, however, the spread of external smoke can 
sometimes reduce the availability of exits in adverse wind conditions. An example of 
this was encountered in the Manchester case study, where an open rear exit on the 
opposite side of the aircraft to the fire was effectively blocked by smoke flowing 
around the exterior of the rear fuselage. In other circumstances, external smoke may 
enter an aircraft from the outside if fuselage damage has occurred or if an 
inappropriate exit opened. A related point is that the large volume of gaseous products 
generated by fires will tend to modify airflow patterns on the exterior of an aircraft. 
These considerations are not dealt with in the fire modelling, but clearly they 
could be influential in some accident scenarios. The movements of external smoke 
would be relatively straightforward to predict on an approximate level, given that the 
necessary fire, wind and fuselage geometry are already available in the analysis. The 
phenomenon of fire-induced distortion of airflows would also be simple to represent 
by locating a suitably sized potential source element at the centre of the fire. 
Consequently, this work forms one of the more immediate options for undertaking 
further improvements in the fire modelling. 
Another significant area of omission in the analysis of fires is the lack of 
representation of intervention by fire fighting and rescue services. Although justifiable 
in the initial development phase of the research, this issue might need to be addressed 
at a later stage. Information on the significance of fire fighting and rescue actions was 
gathered during the survey of past accidents and possible linkages with fire 
survivability rates were explored. It was found that the outcomes of incidents in which 
emergency forces had attended promptly did not differ significantly from those where 
no intervention had occurred. This finding was the primary justification for choosing 
not to incorporate any fire suppression mechanism within the simulation. 
However, study of past incidents clearly indicated that effects of intervention 
were undoubtedly significant in some types of accident scenario. Unfortunately, the 
resulting improvements in fire survival rates appear to be too small to be readily 
quantifiable from the analysis of simple summary statistics. A complicating factor in 
this area is that emergency services are more likely be able to attend landing accidents 
that occur on-airport. Thus, rescue crews are predisposed towards dealing with 
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scenarios that tend to involve higher than average fire fatality, rates, effectively 
swamping out any savings of life made. 
Consequently, in order to determine the role that emergency services play in 
aircraft accidents, incidents need to be analysed on a case by case basis. The main 
mechanisms for saving of life appear to be as follows: - 
" Fire containment and suppression of smoke 
" Opening of emergency exits 
" Clearing evacuees away from escape chutes 
" Cutting wreckage and rescue of trapped survivors 
" Administering of emergency medical treatment 
The task of quantifying the effects of each of these actions in typical fire scenarios is 
extremely difficult. Evidence from past events can provide isolated examples of where 
these factors are known to have been significant, but the data available is generally 
insufficient for purpose of calibrating their simulation. Consequently, the effects of 
intervention by emergency services can only be predicted with simple estimation 
analysis, used in conjunction with findings from experimental trials, in areas where 
applicable work has been undertaken. Because of the levels of uncertainty associated 
with these procedures, this work constitutes a longer term priority in the development 
of the research. 
One final aspect that might have been dealt with in the fire modelling was the 
representation of three dimensional stratification effects in a cabin's thermo-toxic 
environment. In Chapter 7, it was seen that, initially, hot smoke tends to spread 
through the interior of an aircraft at ceiling level, as a result of buoyancy effects. As a 
result, conditions near the floor of a cabin can remain survivable for a considerably 
longer period than those encountered at head height. For example, this factor, was 
known to be significant in the Manchester incident, where survivors reported that they 
found themselves recuperating slightly after collapsing to the floor. 
The decision to use a two dimensional model to represent an aircraft's cabin 
atmosphere clearly prevented these stratification effects from being taken into 
consideration in the analysis. The consequences of this are that rates of evacuee 
incapacitation are likely to be over estimated when dense smoke moves steadily 
through a largely intact, fuselage in a level orientation. 
It was anticipated that it would be a simple task to incorporate stratification 
effects into the cabin thermo-toxic environment model; the provision of this facility 
was a prominent consideration when this aspect of the analysis was being formulated. 
Currently, conditions are depicted in a horizontal plane, located at 1.5 meters above 
floor height. The most obvious way to extend this analysis to three dimensions is to 
calculate similar distributions at heights of, say, 0.5,1.0 and 2.0 meters above the 
floor. Rates of smoke transport and diffusion constants would be reduced at lower 
levels, producing a progressive filling of the cabin from the ceiling downwards. 
The stratified cabin environment could then be incorporated into the evacuation 
analysis, interpolated between different layer heights if necessary. Given that this task 
comprises a relatively simple extension of existing work, it could be undertaken in a 
short time scale. 
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10.1.2.5 Implementation Issues 
In addition to the limitations inherent in the formulation of the risk assessment 
model, some points might be raised about the way in which the work has 'been 
implemented as a computer programme. Although the study strictly only needed to 
produce a tool capable of fulfilling research requirements, it might have 'been 
desirable to construct a model that was more suited to hands-on utilisation by other 
users. Effectively two issues needed to be addressed if this requirement was to be met; 
the provision of an interface to facilitate setting up of simulation runs and transfer of 
the programme to a more widely used computer environment. 
When using the model, all accident simulations were performed individually 
and the results obtained processed by hand. In circumstances where specific types of 
scenario needed to be tested or certain parameters adjusted, the original source code 
was edited and then re-compiled into an executable programme. Achieving this task 
requires specialist knowledge, together with appropriate software and requires several 
minutes for each modification to be effected. Whilst being perfectly acceptable to an 
author in the process of developing a programme, this procedure is too involved to be 
practicable for other users to achieve. Consequently, in the longer term, some form of 
user-interface is needed to make the functionality of the model more accessible. 
Such an interface would have required considerable effort and time to develop; 
because of this the task was not feasible attempt in the time available. However, äs the 
emphasis of the work shifts from away from development and towards usage of the 
model, the provision of a user-interface would be expected to become an increasingly 
higher priority. Provision of the capability to automatically run and process the results 
of many accident simulations would also serve to emphasise the unique approach 
adopted in the work. r 
A second factor that makes the simulation model less accessible to other users 
is that it has been developed in a UNIX environment, running on specialised 
engineering workstation computers. To offer increased flexibility, it desirable for the 
programme to' be ported to run on Personnel Computer (PC) machines. Potentially, 
this move introduces issues concerning computational speed and memory constraints. 
However, given the rapid increases in PC capabilities seen during the course of 
research, this should no longer be an area for concern. -, 
10.1.2.6 Limitations Inherent in the Use an Holistic Approach 
At a more general level, the work that has been performed is intended to 
address the area of risk assessment, rather than be suited to performing more 
specialised hazard analysis in specific areas. Thus, accidents are represented at a level 
of detail that allows for a full range of accident types to be covered with the relative 
probability of different scenarios being faithfully represented. However, two of the 
case studies presented in the last chapter have demonstrated that it is feasible to 
examine aspects of aircraft safety, such as evacuation trials and analysis of real 
accidents, in a resolution that is greater than strictly necessary for the purposes of risk 
assessment. Although undertaking these more specialised kinds of activity was not a, 
central emphasis in the work, the holistic approach adopted in the research meant that 
potential capabilities of this type existed across many areas. It is possible to foresee 
that the interests of some end users might focus upon only a relatively small part of 
the analysis and, as a result, they probably require more detail to be added in one 
particular area. How feasible might this be to achieve? 
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Obviously, the use of an holistic approach made it impossible to deal with all 
aspects of aircraft fire safety in great levels of detail. However, because the model has 
been implemented in a general purpose programming language, its functionality can 
be extended or refined in any area that is desired. The key difficulties in this respect 
usually' comprise lack of understanding or usable data about some of the more 
complex phenomena being modelled, rather than the existence of any limitations built 
into the model. Thus, if a point of particular interest can be faithfully conceptualised 
or at least measured with an acceptable degree of accuracy, it should be possible to 
address its affects within the simulation. 
Arguably, a reasonable guideline to adopt when extending the analysis in this 
way is to only model details at a level'that is sufficient to resolve the phenomena 
being investigated. If features are represented in at a lower level than this, unnecessary 
complexity and the potential for additional errors are introduced into the model. 
An example of an issue that could have dealt with in this manner is the 
utilisation of stairways in the evacuation of VLA designs. Undertaking a thorough 
investigation of this area requires more functionality to be added to the evacuation 
model. However, the details of movements that individual evacuees make within a 
staircase are not necessary for the purposes of such an analysis. Effectively, all that is 
required is the rate at which individuals are able to enter a staircase and the time that 
they then take to descend to the lower deck. The latter information could be obtained 
by implementing a simple queuing process, as opposed to a more complex iterative 
scheme that reproduces step by step movements of each evacuee. 
10.1.3 Implications for Design & Implementation of Research 
Overall, the adoption of an holistic approach for the analysis of aircraft fire 
safety has been shown to be feasible and capable of delivering insights' that are 
difficult to obtain by other means. Consequently, it is perhaps a little surprising that so 
little of this type of work has undertaken in past. However, when such a task is 
embarked upon with limited time and resources, many difficulties are soon 
encountered. These can range from simple practical details through to a more general 
lack of precedents or established expertise in the field. 
Perhaps the most significant challenge to be faced, however, is the 
requirement for several disciplines to be spanned in any such programme of research. 
Specifically, the current study involved a fairly even division of effort between 
historical survey, safety research analysis and computer simulation activities. This 
required a high degree of flexibility to deal with and careful appropriation of available 
resources. Also, given the diversity of the areas involved, significant preparatory 
efforts are required before substantial achievements begin to emerge. This work 
occupied a period of approximately two years in the study -a major proportion of the 
total time available. In comparison, restricting the scope of safety research to a single 
more specialised area is likely to lead to far more immediate results. 
It is perhaps a combination* of these and other issues that has held back 
development of holistic research methodologies suitable for dealing with complex 
issues in aircraft safety. Regardless of the difficulties involved, however, arguably not 
enough examples of these types of analysis exist. As a consequence of this, many 
techniques and areas of knowledge had to be developed from first hand experience. 
Some of the more detailed observations made during implementation of the work, 
together with their possible implications are now discussed. 
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In order to construct holistic analysis in the area of aircraft safety, it is 
essential to have a thorough knowledge of aircraft accidents. It was found that study 
of past events induced significantly different emphases to those found in existing 
research and legislation in the area of aircraft fire safety. Even when it is unfeasible to 
use historical data in order to quantify specific issues of interest, the background 
knowledge obtained from these sources is likely to prove invaluable when designing 
programmes of experimental research. 
Undertaking detailed simulations of aircraft fire accidents is difficult, as it 
inevitably involves analysis of areas in which little or no quantitative information 
exists. The task of formulating and implementing a computer model forces the 
practitioner to be explicit in all details modelled, regardless of the quality of data 
available. Thus, the methods used in construction cannot be concealed or fudged; all 
weaknesses and assumptions present in an analysis are laid bare. As a result of this, 
models may appear crude or overly simplistic; however there is still much potential 
for valuable new information to be gained. This knowledge is likely to accrue both 
during the process of researching the construction of the model and from end use of 
the completed tool. 
Typically, it was found that as much effort was expended in setting up 
boundary conditions and probability levels within the model as spent formulating and 
solving equations. Arguably, this balance between practical implementation and 
underlying theory is rarely present in established categories of air safety research. 
Experimental trials tend to involve a pragmatic approach, with concern for 
measurement and statistical reliability of results taking precedence over theoretical 
explanation of the observations made. In constrast, the emphasis computational-based 
investigation tends to be concerned more with establishing generic capabilities and 
validating them in simplified test cases than with spending time in attempting to 
replicate more complex real world scenarios. Thus, although the main product of the 
research is likely to be interpreted as being merely another category of computer 
simulation, the scope of the work is rather wider than other computational studies in 
the area of aircraft safety. 
When undertaking a wide-ranging investigation in a complex area, matching 
the level of analysis across all areas being studied often forces difficult compromises 
or trade-offs to be made. The researcher faces issues of having to spread available 
resources thinly and of working beyond boundaries of existing data. Effectively, the 
reliability of findings is governed by characteristics of weakest links present within 
the analysis. However, it can be argued that these same limitations are present when 
attempting to apply any type of research to real events; they just happen to be 
excluded from explicit analysis. In contrast, with an holistic approach, such links no 
longer constitute unstated or concealed unknowns; they form an integral part of the 
analysis. Potentially, this then allows for more accurate assessments to be made and 
safety margins assigned more appropriately. 
Revealing the boundaries of existing knowledge also forces the presence of 
gaps to be highlighted. Given that other areas are usually covered in more than 
adequate detail by existing research, it is possible to interpret the existence of "islands 
of knowledge", between which very little additional information exists. Consequently, 
this means that holistic research is likely to involve a large proportion of time being 
spent working at a low level in areas that have received little or no attention from 
other researchers. 
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Generally, analysis of issues within aircraft fire safety is constrained by the 
quality or applicability of available data. This can mean that advances made some 
areas of research are seemingly redundant as they are impossible to apply in a 
practical context. Alternatively, the influence of the issue under study can sometimes 
be completely overshadowed by ancillary factors, about which very little is 
understood. Consequently, when performing research into specialised areas, it 
sometimes appears to be possible to overlook the ultimate reason why the activity is 
being undertaken. This implies that, when undertaking applied safety research, it is 
not always necessary or even desirable to analyse complex phenomena in the 
maximum attainable level of detail. Instead, if the focus of a study is restricted to a 
level that is just sufficient to resolve features of interest, the husbanding of resources 
that results may enable the scope of the work to be extended to obtain a wider 
applicability. 
Finally, when attempting to simulate and understand complex interactions 
occurring simultaneously between many processes, computer graphics can constitute 
an invaluable aid. For the developer of a model, their use enables large quantities of 
dynamic information to be presented on-screen simultaneously. This allows problems 
to be quickly isolated and makes it possible to spot unpredicted interactions and 
behaviour patterns occurring on a larger scale. Graphical displays also help 
unacquainted observers to quickly assimilate the main features of model. 
Consequently, however, the true complexity of the analysis actually being undertaken 
can sometimes be belied. Another factor that needs to be taken into consideration is 
that graphics are likely represent a substantial overhead, both in terms of the effort 
required in their programming and the computational processing demands imposed 
when a simulation is being run. 
10.1.4 Implications at Policy Level 
The conflict between holism and depth of analysis constitutes an interesting 
trade off when planning research in aircraft fire safety. Researchers are currently 
working to quantify a multitude of issues, covering many aspects of fire survival. 
However, the task of combining the findings obtained from these various 
undertakings and using them to guide policy formulation appears to have been paid 
comparatively little attention. Given the diversity in scope and approaches that have 
been adopted across different research studies, it appears difficult to prioritise or 
systematically evaluate all the information that available frone these sources. In 
addition, the implications of research findings cannot be interpreted merely in their 
own right; they need to be integrated with knowledge that is obtainable from the 
examination of past events. Information of the latter type is usually very different in 
nature to that provided by scientific analysis, further compounding the difficulties of 
those responsible for overseeing matters of air safety. 
The work described in this thesis, may represent one of the first attempts to 
address these issues. The problem of information complexity has been dealt with 
through the construction of computer-based simulation model. The use of this 
methodology enables a large quantity of knowledge to be drawn together and 
implemented in the form of a single tool. Widely differing types of data can be 
matched with each other and almost all aspects of aircraft safety integrated in a 
balanced and thorough manner. Where gaps in understanding exist, it is possible for 
them to be clearly identified and then the effectiveness of improvisatory solutions 
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tested. The research has also been based upon the analysis of both past aircraft 
accidents and scientific safety research studies. 
As a result of undertaking these activities, it has been possible to compare the 
work that has been undertaken by others in different areas of aircraft fire safety. -The 
approaches used and findings obtained in these studies has also been related to the 
events that are known to have occurred in past accidents. Many of the observations 
made, together with the advances to have been contributed by the current study, hold 
implications that lie beyond those that need to be considered when implementing a 
single programme of research. Some of these issues will now be discussed. 
The first and perhaps most obvious point to note is that there appears to be 
very few examples of holistic analyses in any area of aircraft survivability. Those that 
have been published are all produced by national aviation authorities (i. e. the FAA 
and CAA) and involve extremely basic analysis of past accidents. As a result, a large 
gap exists between these generalised risk assessment studies and more specialised 
scientific research being undertaken to quantify specific aspects of aircraft safety., 
The work presented in this thesis has shown that it is feasible to bridge this 
void with a computer-based simulation analysis that integrates statistics obtained from 
past accidents with knowledge derived from scientific research. Use of this approach 
enables a full range of accident scenarios to be considered in a level of detail that is 
compatible with the scope of scientific analysis. Just as significantly, perhaps, the use 
of holistic computer simulation appears to make it feasible to evaluate safety issues in 
fixture accidents, as opposed to just mapping the effects of recent safety developments 
onto past events. 
It was also apparent that, in many areas of aircraft safety research, knowledge 
that is potentially obtainable from past accidents is being under-utilised. This is 
probably a consequence of traditional delineations that exist between different 
scientific disciplines. These divides tend to mean that individuals and research 
departments build up expertise in one particular mode of research, such as 
experimental testing, computer simulation, or volunteer trials. Unfortunately, whilst 
this situation may help to nurture scientific advancement, it does not facilitate the 
analysis of more complex multi-disciplinary areas, such as fire-safety engineering. 
This has meant that little awareness or expertise has been established in the area of 
interpreting information from past aircraft accidents. As a result, whilst information 
-about these events is generally accepted as being useful and anecdotes are often cited 
for the purpose of reinforcing scientific arguments, the potential significance of 
historical data is under-appreciated. Consequently, performing detailed analysis of 
past accidents is regarded as being an unwarranted or merely a peripheral activity by 
most safety researchers. 
Compounding this situation is the fact that, for those tasked with formulating 
air safety policies, scientific findings are likely to be more appealing than indications 
derived from historical analysis. The reasons for this are numerous; results of 
scientific investigation appear more consistent, more rigorous and easier to interpret 
than findings from accident surveys. 
In spite of this apparent neglect within the scientific research community, 
information on past accidents is gathered and utilised by aviation authorities, aircraft 
manufacturers and consultancy organisations. These endeavours are usually 
undertaken either for the purpose of examining detailed technical aspects of aircraft 
safety, or for establishing global statistical trends. As a result, the levels at which 
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information is processed tend to fall on either side of that which is required to 
complement scientific safety research. Whilst there have been some isolated 
exceptions to this generalisation (Schaefers, 1990), this, situation appears to represent 
a lost opportunity in the advancement of aircraft safety. The current research has 
demonstrated that by analysing a substantial number of accidents with the explicit 
purpose of quantifying safety issues, information can be obtained in a form that is 
compatible with the needs of scientific studies. 
When surveying the work that has been published in aircraft safety, it became 
apparent that the emphasis and direction of research were not always well matched to 
the type of events that are known to occur in aircraft, accidents. Practical constraints 
obviously limit the degree of realism that can be achieved in trials that involve human 
volunteers. However, these types of restrictions do not apply when investigating 
aircraft crashworthiness or patterns of fire development. It is therefore difficult to 
accept the unrealistically conservative approaches frequently adopted when 
performing tests in these areas. Arguably, there sometimes appears to be a reluctance 
to reveal the catastrophic consequences that can result when parameters such as 
deceleration forces, structural dismemberment, radiant intensities, fire size and 
position, etc. are represented at more realistic levels. 
Given the adverse media coverage that has been attracted by some aircraft 
crash fire testing, this reluctance is understandable and, if undermining of public 
confidence results, perhaps even justifiable. However, when considered exclusively in 
terms of the data actually needed for undertaking survivability analysis, there is a 
requirement for more information that corresponds with more severe accident 
scenarios. 
Another point that became very apparent in the study of past safety research 
was, the comparative rarity of cross-disciplinary studies. For example, in many cases, 
the effects of aircraft crashes and fires can be highly interdependent, but in' recent 
decades there has been a trend to separate these two areas of analysis. This may be a 
consequence of the increasing levels of specialisation and consequent narrowing of 
awareness within the safety research community mentioned previously. 
Admittedly, experiments involving more than one substantive aspect of 
analysis are not straightforward to set up and typically only a very restricted set of 
variables can be explored in each of the areas encompassed. This can make it difficult 
to decide experimental priorities and integrate results obtained across different parts 
of the test. However, the current practice of obtaining detailed knowledge about 
certain features of aircraft accidents when present in isolation, but then having little 
idea how they may interact in combination 'is not entirely satisfactory. When full 
consideration is given to the potential benefits, feasibility and cost of undertaking 
tests, there may be opportunity for greater levels of integration in safety research. 
The use of a computer simulation tool to analyse aircraft accidents opens up 
many new possibilities in the development of aircraft safety. For the first time, it may 
be feasible for safety features of a new airliner to be optimised on the designer's 
desktop. At present, aircraft are certificated to common safety standards that cannot 
(and are not intended to) be representative of true accident scenarios. Many years of 
service usage, usually involving a number of accidents, then have to occur before 
safety features and operating procedures can be developed to their fullest extent. By 
using some of the techniques developed in this thesis, in the future it may be possible 
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to advance the analysis of aircraft fire safety to levels of efficiency comparable. with 
those currently found in aerodynamics, structures and systems design. 
10.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
10.2.1 Improvement of the Model 
The time constraints imposed by the study left ample opportunities . 
for 
undertaking further development of the model. Detailed refinements that could be 
implemented in a relatively short time scale include: - 
" Model the presence of cabin crew and the effects of their actions in 
aircraft accidents. 
" Represent the stratification of cabin thermo-toxic environments in three 
dimensions and integrate this information with the evacuation 
modelling. 
" Provide the ability to analyse simultaneous evacuation from two decks, 
including the use of stairways by passengers. 
" Quantify the role that advances in safety may have had in recent decades 
and factor these effects into the analysis explicitly. 
" Transfer the model to a PC Windows-based environment. 
" Creation of a simple command interface to enable simulation parameters 
and multiple runs to be set up by other users. 
In the longer term, more substantial work on the development of the model 
could be performed. Revisions might then be made in the following areas-- 
* Extending accident data to include more recent years and updating of 
probability functions within the model to reflect any changes. 
" Modelling the effects of crash disruption and occupant injuries in 
substantially more detail, using some form of injury severity scale. 
" Use of three dimensional flame envelope and solid flame emissivity 
calculations for external fire model. This could then be used to model 
fuselage burnthrough more accurately in three dimensions. 
" Analyse the possible significance of aircraft design configuration in 
accident survivability and modify generation of crash effects and fire 
characteristics, if appropriate. 
" Introduce airline fleet information, aircraft utilisation levels, accident 
rates and their anticipated rates of change to enable analysis of future 
safety trends on a global level. 
10.2.2 Safety Studies that could be Undertaken with Model 
Potentially, many issues within aircraft fire safety could be investigated with 
the analysis model. Currently, the most important areas in which further knowledge is 
needed are interpreted as being: -, 
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" Studying implications, associated, with, the -future introduction of new 
very large aircraft designs. 
" Quantifying the expected benefits of fire safety improvements that are 
gradually being applied to the world's airline fleet over coming years. 
" Examining the safety potential that exists for introducing fire hardening 
materials and associated improvements in the detailed design of airliner 
fuselages. 
" Determining the role that airport fire and emergency rescue services 
might be expected to play in future aircraft accidents. 
" Evaluating the potential consequences of making Type III overwing 
exits more straightforward for passengers to operate. 
" Re-examining the effectiveness of cabin water mist sprays, in the light 
of the search for a suitable replacement for Halon in engine and cargo 
hold fire suppression systems. 
10.2.3 Research within the Field of Aircraft Safety 
In addition to suggestions for further'work in the current study, it is possible to 
make some recommendations for activities to be undertaken in associated areas of 
research. Some of the more important of these include: - 
" The establishment of a unified database of aircraft accident information 
and statistics, based on standard definitions and made available to 
qualified researchers world-wide. 
" Development of a technique suitable for quantifying the approximate 
severity and associated consequences of aircraft crashes. 
" The making of greater moves towards integrating experimental research 
being undertaken into different aspects of aircraft accident survivability. 
" Formulation of better methods and quantitative tools for performing risk 
assessment analysis in the area of aircraft safety. 
" The undertaking of experimental investigations into evacuation of 
passengers from wide body aircraft and exits located on upper decks. 
" Investigation of injury types that are received in aircraft crashes and 
their effects on the faculties and mobility of accident victims. 
10.3 Conclusions 
The main points to have emerged from the study can be summarised as follows: - 
(1) The work described in this thesis has led to the creation of a computer-based risk 
assessment model, suitable for the purpose of analysing key'issues in aircraft fire 
safety. 
(2) The direction that the research took was largely determined by findings obtained 
from the undertaking of an extensive survey of past aircraft fire accidents. 
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(3) The historical study indicated that fire' survivability tends to be governed-by the 
interactions that occur between crash effects, fire ingress into the passenger cabin 
and the efficiency of occupant evacuation. 
(4) Consequently, it was necessary for each of these three factors to be considered in 
a balanced and integrated manner within the risk assessment analysis. 
(5) Experimental research undertaken in the area of aircraft safety can provide 
valuable insights into many aspects of accident survival; however, the emphasis 
of scientific studies does not always match circumstances that were found to be 
most likely to occur in real incidents. 
(6) Many features of aircraft fire accidents are extremely difficult to quantify or 
understand. As a result of this, it is usually far from straightforward to determine 
the effectiveness of either current or proposed new safety policies. 
(7) In order to deal effectively with these problems, knowledge must be combined 
from across all available sources, including the study of past events, experimental 
investigation, analytical simulation and expert judgement. 
(8) A computer-based simulation methodology was adopted in order to construct this 
type of holistic analysis. The resulting tool functions by stochastically generating 
aircraft accident scenarios and determining their outcomes in terms of occupant 
survival rates. 
(9) The use of this approach resulted in an analysis that is both explicit in detail and 
systematic in coverage. Consequently, where gaps in understanding are revealed, 
they are clearly identifiable and forced to be positively accounted for. 
(10) In order to encapsulate the most significant features of aircraft fire accidents and 
represent the relationships that exist between them, it was necessary to formulate 
the analysis in a lower level of detail than is typically used in scientific 
applications of computational simulation. 
(11) Because of the number and complex nature of the interactions being modelled, 
the use of an animated graphical display was found to be invaluable, both during 
programme development and for conveying the workings of the model to 
unacquainted observers. 
(12) It was also concluded that a full range of accident types needed to be processed if 
the undertaking of risk assessment studies was to be feasible. This then implied 
that it was necessary for simulations to run in near to real time, if the tool was to 
fulfil its intended purpose. 
(13) Initial testing of the model has clearly demonstrated that it is possible to create 
statistically representative accident scenarios and then predict with reasonable 
accuracy how casualties are likely to be incurred as a result of the effects of fire. 
(14) By quantifying trends in the outcomes of large numbers of accidents, the tool can 
be used to test the significance of new developments or changes in policy within 
the area of aircraft fire safety. 
(15) The model can also be configured to investigate a particular type of accident 
scenario, specific details in one aspect of the analysis, or related areas of safety 
such as certification evacuation trials. 
-256- 
(16) Overall, the study has contributed a new approach to the analysis of aircraft fire 
safety, integrating much of the best information that is currently obtainable from 
across the various research disciplines involved in the form of a single holistic 
risk assessment tool. 
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C. I Variation In Fuselage Structural Damage Levels 
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Figure C. 2: Fuselage Structural Damage Levels 
(Fuselage in Two Pieces: Front Section) 
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Figure C. 3: Fuselage Structural Damage Levels 
(Fuselage in Two Pieces: Rear Section) 
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Figure C'. 4: Fuselage Structural Damage Levels 
(Fuselage in Three Pieces: Front Section) 
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Figure ('. 5: Fuselage Structural Damage Levels 
(Fuselage in Three Pieces: Centre Section) 
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Bure ('. 6: Fuselage Structural Damage Levels 
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C. 2 Cabin Orientation at Different Levels of Structural Disruption 
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C. 3 Exit Opening Times at Different Levels of Structural Disruption 
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Figure C. 12: Variation in Exit Omni !g Times at 
Structural Disruption Level of 0.00 
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Appendix D: Thermal Radiation from Open Pool Fires 
D. 1 Introduction 
The state of the art in predicting the thermal environment of hydrocarbon spill 
fires consists essentially of semi-empirical methods, many of which are based on 
results obtained from experimental tests. Quantifying the thermal radiation field 
surrounding a fire involves the following steps: - 
1. Geometric characterisation of the pool fire 
2. Determination of the radiative properties of the fire 
jyt3. Calculation of the radiant intensity at a given position 
Each of these stages will now be outlined. 
D. 2 Representation of Fire Geometry 
The geometry of fire consists of the average size of the visible flame envelope. 
Generally, this is approximated by assuming that flames are a solid grey emitter and 
form a well defined shape, such as a right circular or tilted cylinder. The diameter of 
flames present depend on the spill size and the rate at which the fuel burns. For larger 
fires (i. e. those over lm in diameter), the later can be assumed to be fixed at a value of 
about 4 mm fuel depth per minute for most common fuel types. This enables simple 
differential models to be constructed to describe fire diameter in terms of original spill 
size, fuel flow rate and elapsed time. 
Flame height of depends on the fire diameter and type of fuel present. Thomas has 
developed the following correlation to describe the mean visible height of turbulent 
diffusion flames in the absence of wind: - 
H= 
42 m gD 
0.61 
(I). 1) 
Dp 
where 
H= flame height (m) 
D= flame diameter (m) 
g= gravitational acceleration (9.81m/s2) 
m= mass burning rate per unit pool area (kg/m2s) 
p= ambient air density (kg/m2) 
By assuming a burning rate of 4 mm per minute, mass burning rate per unit pool area 
can be calculated directly from fuel density. Thus, given that all other terms can be 
assumed to be approximately constant, flame height of liquid pool fires in zero wind 
conditions can be reduced to a function involving only fire diameter. 
The effects of wind on open pool fires are twofold; flame length is altered and the 
vertical axis of the fire is tilted in a downwind direction. Thomas provides the 
following correction for flame length: - 
0.67 
55 m gD U* -0.21 (D. 2) Dp 
where is u the non-dimensional wind velocity given by 
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gmD 
rr = tr .II 
(1). 3) 
P 
\vIIcre U Is \ý ind velocity in m/s. 
The Annerican Gas Association provide the following expression for determining 
Ilainc tilt in wind: - 
I for u' <1 
cos 0=r (I). 4) 
i 11 Jr ietr ?1 
\% here 0 is the angle oI tilt From the vertical, as measured in the downwind direction. 
-: yuait ions D. 1 -I). 4 enable the geometry of' open pool fires to modelled in the form of 
,i sheared circular cylinder, as shown in Figure D. I. For a given fuel type, the 
II 
-i 
wcd 
'c liun 
1111'; iu-c_I). 1: Cylindrical Model of Fire Geometry 
PrOpurtimis of this cylinder are eftcctivcly determined by only three variables, namely 
L"(Iniv, ilcnt 11, mic clianieter, wind speed and wind direction. 
I). Z Radiative Properties of Pool Fires 
'I lie tlierin, il rýuii; ition properties of' pool fires can be estimated by two 
methods. 'I lie first oI'these is the point source model, which takes no account of the 
geometric sine of i lire. Consequently, it can be formulated on the basis of the 
li, lloýý in, three assunºhtions: 
I. I Iºe flame can he represented by a small (point) source of thermal 
2. The energy radiated from the flame is a specified fraction of the total 
mere y released during combustion; and 
ý. 'I Iºe thermal radiation intensity varies proportionately with the inverse 
square of tlºc distance from the source. 
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Although this model is elegant in it's simplicity, it possesses two important 
limitations. Firstly, it is not possible to derive the fraction of combustion energy 
radiated by a fire to it's surroundings by theoretical means. Experimental tests show 
that this fraction can vary greatly with fuel type and fire size. For example, in the case 
of gasoline fires ranging from 1.0 to 10 meters in diameter, the fraction of energy 
radiated varies from 60.0 to 10.1 percent respectively. The second limitation of the 
point source model is that values of thermal radiation intensity are overestimated at 
locations close to the fire. This is because near field radiation levels are influenced 
significantly by flame size, shape and tilt, of which no account are taken. 
The solid flame thermal radiation model is based on the proposition that 
thermal radiation emissions are proportional to the size of' the visible flame volunme. 
This implies that non-visible gases do not emit significant quantities of radiation, it 
fact that has been confirmed by experimentation. The thermal radiation intensity, j/ 
to an element outside of the flame envelope is given by the equation: - 
cj =TEF (1). 5) 
where T is the atmospheric transmissivity, E is the average emissive lower of' the 
flame and F is the view factor present. The estimation of these three har 11eeter,, \\ii 
now be addressed. 
1). 4 Atmospheric Attenuation 
The transmission of thermal radiation through air varies primarily as a 
function of the distance (or path length) involved. Radiation is allein Ited by 
absorption and scattering, chiefly as result of water vapour and carbon dioxide plescnl 
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F i;; urc D. 2: Atmospheric Transmissivity for a 
1400 K Thermal Radiation Source 
in the atmosphere. This process occurs at a number of discrete absorption I'rcyucncics, 
the bandwidths of which must be integrated in order to obtain the total level of 
attenuation present. Results of this type of transmissivity calculation are illust r, atcd in 
Figure I). 2 for a continuum source possessing a temperature of 1400 K, typical of it 
-. )o - 
large hydrocarbon pool fire. It can be seen that attenuation levels vary widely with 
atmospheric water vapour content (a function of ambient temperature and relative 
humidity levels). 
D. 5 Heat Emission from Flames 
The emissive power of a flame is most important parameter in the solid flame 
model. The thermal radiation from a fire emanates from both gaseous species, such as 
water vapour, carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide as well as from luminous soot 
particles. Gaseous species emit radiation in discrete spectral bands, whereas the soot 
radiation is continuous over the entire spectral range of importance. 
The emissive power of a large turbulent fire is often approximated by the following 
expression: - 
E= Ehc (D. 6) 
where Eb is blackbody emissive power (kW/m2) and e is emissivity. If the mean 
radiation temperature of a fire is known (which is significantly less than the adiabatic 
flame temperature), it's irradiance can be obtained from Planck's law of radiation: - 
Eb =a(Tf4 -Tao) (D. 7) 
where 
Tf = radiation temperature of the flame (K) 
TQ = ambient temperature (K) 
o= Stefan-Boltzmann constant (kW/m2K4) 
The emissivity factor accounts for the fact that flame is a grey emitter, i. e. not an ideal 
blackbody radiator. Calculation of the combined emissivity of the products of 
combustion (soot, water vapour and carbon dioxide) is extremely difficult and 
involved, even when concentrations are uniform and temperatures are constant. Thus, 
the emissive powers of fires are usually estimated directly by experiment. 
Most hydrocarbon fuel fires become optically thick when the their diameter 
approaches 3 meters. Under these conditions, emissive powers in the range of 110 to 
130 kW/m2 are typical. However, as the fire size increases, the measured heat flux 
appears to drop substantially. This is because, in large liquid hydrocarbon fuel fires, a 
substantial proportion of the fire is usually obscured by thick black smoke on the outer 
periphery. This smoke layer a significant part of the radiation and results in very little 
emission to the surroundings. However, the smoke layer occasionally opens up, 
exposing the hot flame and releasing a pulse of radiation. From the filming of 
experiments, it has been estimated that the resulting luminous zones cover 
approximately 20 percent of the flame surface area, on a time averaged basis. 
For the prediction of thermal hazards, the thermal radiation from black soot can be 
combined with the radiation from luminous spots on an equivalent area basis to arrive 
at an average emissive power for a fire. The following correlation has been derived 
from experimental data for determining the average emissive power of large, sooty 
hydrocarbon fires: - 
E,,,, 
r,, g, = 
E,,, e-s" + Es(I - e-SD) (D. 7) 
where 
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E,.. = maximum emissive power of luminous spots (approximately 
140 kW/m2 ) 
E, = emissive power of smoke (approximately 20 kW/m2) 
S=a parameter determined using experimental data (0.12 m") 
This function is illustrated in Figure D. 3, together with results from the fire tests used 
for, it's calibration. Note that the experimental data has been obtained from a 
combination of gasoline, kerosene and JP-4 fire tests. 
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Figure D. 3: Mean Surface Emissive Power for 
Gasoline, Kerosene and JP-4 Pool Fires 
D. 6 Calculation of Radiant Intensity: Fire View Factor 
The radiation exchange between a fire and an element outside of the fire 
depends on the flame's shape, the relative distance between the fire and the receiving 
element and the relative orientation of the element. These dependencies are taken 
account of in the solid flame model by the use of a geometric view factor. 
In general, the view factor, F, is represented by the following equation: - 
CoSOI CosO2. l. l F'4-, d, 42 - IAA 7Crr2 1 
(D. 8) 
where 1 and 2 are, respectively, the angles made by the normals and dA, on the fire 
and dA2 on the receiving element; and where r is the distance between the fire element 
and the receiving element. The integration is carried out over the entire surface of the 
flame (A, ). In the case of a sheared cylindrical model of flame geometry,, this integral 
can be evaluated analytically for any receiving element orientation. 
In general, a maximum view factor will experienced when an element is 
angled somewhere between horizontal and vertical positions. This corresponds with 
the peak radiation intensity that can be expected to occur at some point on a rounded 
surface. The magnitude of the maximum view factor simply equals the vectorial sum 
of horizontal and vertical view factors, i. e.: - 
O Experimental data 
E 140 103 "2° 3 a'1! D . - +20a10 (1"e ) 
N 
O 0 
T 7 
1 
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Mudan has employed a contour integral approach to determine. closed form equations 
for view factors from a slanted cylinder of arbitrary length and radius (Mudan, 1987). 
These enable solid flame model view factors to be determined for a receiving surface 
at any orientation. Expressions for horizontal and vertical view factors for a slanted 
cylinder follow. 
At locations very close to a fire, the maximum view factor experienced at 
ground level is not very sensitive to flame height. In contrast, flame cylinder tilt 
angles are highly significant at all distances from a fire. 
D. 7 Cylindrical Flame Geometry 
It was seen in section D. 2 that the flame geometry of an open liquid 
hydrocarbon pool fire can be represented by a cylinder of radius r and height h. This 
cylinder may be slanted through an angle 0 to take account of the effects of wind, as 
r 
kI.. 
No 
. 10 
h' : 
: receiving element 
8 (horizontal or vertical 
orientation) 
If d k' 
slanted cylinder 
flame geometry 
Figure D. 4: Notation used in Cylindrical Flame Model 
shown in Figure D. 4. For the purpose of calculating the radiant properties of this 
flame envelope, as experienced by a receiving element positioned at ground level, two 
parameters need to be calculated. These are a height to radius ratio and a scaled 
distance of the receiving element from the fire, respectively. 
The height to radius ratio of the cylinder is defined as follows: - 
a_ 
flame height h (D, 10) 
flame radius r 
Similarly, the non-dimensional distance of a receiving element from the flame axis is 
defined to be: - 
b_ element 
distance d (D. 11) 
flame radius r 
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D. 8 Geometric View Factor for a Vertically Inclined Element 
The view factor, F, experienced by a vertically inclined clement, situated at a 
distance d from the fire centre is given by the following expression (Mudan, 1987): - 
acos0 a2 +(b+1)2 -2b(1+asinO). tan' 
Arb-1l 1/2 
b-asinO AB Blb+1/ 
cos0 ab - 
(b2 
-1 , in0 
(b2- 1 , in0 
+ tan 
2-+ 
tan 
b1 b2 -1 
a cosO - 
(b - asinO) b+l 
I). 12 
where 
A= a2 +(b+1)2 -2a(b+1)sin0 
B= a2 +(b-1)2 -2a(b-1)sin0 
C=1+ (b2 -1)cos2 0 
D. 9 Geometric View Factor fora Horizontally Inclined Element 
Similarly, the view factor, Fh, experienced by a horizontally inclined clement 
at the same location is given by: - 
7tF, = tan- 
b -1 
b+l 
_ 
a2 +(b+1ý -2(b+l+abcos0). tan 
Ab-1 '2 
ABýb+i) 
sinO ab- b2 -1 "inO + tan' 
b2 -1) 
ý2 
sinO 
+ tan 
b2 -1 
JC (1). 13) V_c 
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Appendix E: Fire Spread Diagrams 
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Cabin damage extensive 
Fire fatalities 0.00 
Aircraft B-727-23 
Scenario crashed on approach 
Starting point rear of cabin 
Initiation time 0: 00 
Burnthro' time 010 
Cabin damage completely destroyed 
Fire fatalities 0.23 
660422 (Impact) I 
Aircraft Britannia 102 
Scenario undershot 
Starting point nose 
Initiation time 0.00 
PLirnthro' time 0 00 
Cabin damage destroyed 
F ire fatalities 0.19 
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hL 
Aircraft A a7n 
Scenano 
. itt, intrtf. -d qrr around 
Starting point loft & light wings 
Initiation time 1) (l0 
firunlluo' time 0 1(1 
( tin damage cornpIu! lcly destroyed 
nc I, rt, rlities 0 02 
1 900511 (Burnthrough) 920730 (Burnthrough) 
Ali(i, ill k /0! 328 
Scenario abandoned takeoff 
Starting point left inner wing 
Initiation time 000 
liwnthro' tine! (0: 30) 
Cilhin rl, rinagte completely destroyed 
I Ili, f, rtalIhi"! ' 0 00 
620722 (Impact) 1 651108 (Impact) 
Au i; itt Iu; a a't 
- 
tiuennno unifur:, lýýýl 
St, utiny trouit mn(. i huýl t; rnk . 
Initiation time 0 Ott 
ltunttluu' time 0011 
(;; ibirt dalliage destroyed 
f pie fat, thtirrs 0 11 
Aircraft L-1880 
Scenario crashed on approach 
! farting point scattered 
Initiation time 0 (10 
lS untliro' time 0 00 
Cabin damage destroyed 
F ire fatalities 0.12 
1 660901 (Impact) 
Aircraft CV-580 
Scenario crashed on approach 
Starting point right side of fuselage 
Initiation time 0 00 
Burnthro' time 0.00 
Cabin damage none 
Fire fatalities 0 00 
Aircraft F-28-1000 
Scenario stalled after takeoff 
Starting point left wing 
Initiation time 0: 00 
E3urnthro' time (0 30) 
Cabin damage completely destroyed 
1-ire fatalities 0 68 
At :, itI I 2/Is 
Scenario crashed oil 
Starting point left engine 
Initiation time 000 
ßurnthro' time (5: 00) 
Cabin damage extensive 
Fire f, italities 0.00 
730219 (Im Ct) 
740911 (Impact) 
760427 (Impact) 
730410 (Irnp; tr; t) 
750624 (Imi ;i 
770327B Illpart I 
; 15 
Aircraft Iii I1,4 
Scenario crashed on appru, i, h 
Starting point right side of fusel, up- 
Initiation time 0 00 
tiurnthro ä111e (0 30) 
t; abin d, rninIIl compli Ii ly 
I ne faLrlllie; 0l, I 
681224 (Impact) I 
Au I, IIt `.. Illl'" ,l 
', t, nhntt point ulllt win, l 
I , uIt It on 111114, uu 
I ýIjmfhln till- n nil 
Ui 
ni1cri, tt I)( 'i r1 
; c(r1ariu ý I. r 11'"t ('n '11)[1 n, rr h 
Starting point wiry Links 
Initiation tune 000 
Ilurnthro' lime 0 00 
(: shin d; rrrr; rrir rw. troyrri 
I nc fatalities 00 
740126 (Impact) I 
Ir( r)(lflt I. 
! ýu1ý. rhuri linir" n rý! 
Ittrnthro' bin n 
u Lrl, i! I! Ili 
Aiii ill f4 il r All 
ý n; run overran i, n 
t, iitinrl point right winýl 
Iiuhtrhr n firm, ()00 
111)1111110' tann, 000 
(:; ibin d; tnl; l{le rii r iroyý I 
ire t; rt; ilitir'; 0 2t, 
750830 (Impact) 
" '1 1,11111 111 811111) (. 111h 
'. I. uIt nl Illnnl 11 lllll-1 L, il v. 
Ilu+liluon Irmo o 110 
Itlilnihln Illlný (II "1111 
. -! nn 11I1 u"iý! r IIIý". tlýý}r. l 
n, 1,11.111111". ,1 qýt 
790329 (Impact) I 
luf(, I, I1 H-727-200 
Scenario missed approach 
Starting point rear centre fuselage 
Initiation time 0: 00 
B rnthro' time (0: 30) 
Cabin damage destroyed 
Fire fatalities 0.31 
Aircraft 
Scenario 
Starting point 
Initiation time 0 00 
Burnthro' time ? 
Cabin damage 
Fire fatalities 0.00 
Aircraft F-27 
Scenario engine detached 
Starting point right engine 
vitiation time 000 
Burnthro' time 0: 00 
Cabin damage extensive 
Fire fatalities 0.13 
nitu, if( L 1880 
Scenario crashed after takeoff 
Starting point wing tanks 
Initiation time 0: 00 
Hurnthio' lime (010) 
Cabin damage destroyed 
I üe fatalities 0.54 
Aircraft L-1011-385 
Scenario crashed on approach 
Starting point left wing root 
Initiation time 000 
E3urnthro' time 0: 00 
Cabin damage extensive 
Fire fatalities 0.12 
Aircraft DC-10-10 
Scenario forced landing 
Starting point separated right wing 
Initiation time 0: 00 
Burnthro' time 0 00 
Cabin damage extensive 
Fire fatalities 0 12 
Aircraft DC-9-14 
Scenario takeoff collision 
Starting point rhs of fusetagu 
Initiation time 000 
Rurnthro' time 0.00 
Cabin damage completely destroyed 
I ue fatalities 0.13 
Aircraft B-737-300 
Scenario landing collision 
Starting point left inboard wing 
Initiation time 0100 
lturnthro' time 0: 00 
(; abin damage completely destroyed 
l' ire fatalities 1024 
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l, ircraft A-320 
Scenario crashed on approach 
tarring point centre of aircraft 
n, tiation time 0: 00 
hurnthro' time 0.00 
Cabin damage destroyed 
Fire fata! it cs 
bbý 
801119 (Impact) 790313 (Impact) 
850802 (Impact) I 1 890719 (Impact) 850121 (Impact) I 
1 901203 (Impact) I 910201 (Impact) I 920120 (Impact) 
Aircraft DC-10-30 
Scenario overturned on landing 
Starting point rear fuselage 
Initiation time 0: 00 
Burnthro' time 0: 00 
Cabin damage extensive 
Fire fatalities 
Aircraft Viscount 700 
Scenario in-flight fire - landed 
Starting point cargo bay 
Initiation time -2: 00 
Burnthro' time 0: 00 
Cabin damage destroyed 
Fire fatalities 0.17 
Aircraft DC-9-40 
Scenario in"fligfit fire landed 
Starting point rear toilet 
Initiation time -800 
Burnthro' time 000 
Cabin damage minor 
Fife fatalities 0 00 
Aircraft Caravelle 
Scenario in-flight fire crashed 
Starting point electrical eyt b, ry 
Initiation time -18 00 
Burnthro' time 0: 00 
Cabin damage destroyed 
f-ire fatalities 0.03 
Aircraft It 707-320 
Scenario in-flight fin, cia-, hel 
Starting point rear toilet 
Initiation tunic G-00 
Hurnthro' turne 0: 00 
Cabin damage destroyed 
I ire fatalities 0.00 
Aiiclaft I 1011 200 
Scenario III (light fire I, In(le(I 
Starting point C4 cargo hay 
II1itiatiorl fiele. 
-19.00 
10it I Itlif 0, ti file 000 
("Ibill damage totally dw; troyi(I 
I ue fatalities 1.00 
690817 (Internal) 
Ali I, ný : I 1., ) 1 1 
; ýcenauo 
1 
IJ II III IIl I. Irn11l1 1 h 
! -, Luting point radio load 
IluIIdtlon tlmc 1() 00 
1{Il1 rittlfo, tlllll' I) (H) 
Mini ýI. Inl. u)I 
w 1at'llihrt. 
Iýxlý ný, lvl 
111111 
Almau Ix 9: t1 
:; c enari(, irr fllr(hl fir I, 110-1 
`; Llrtinq pr, iiil oIrr(; 
iii 
. 11 lý. Iy 
li, i(i; itini, tl (ln 
I+uýýnutiun , týýýýi o clcl 
(;; thin danciyrr nnuinli 
[to! f, il'ililirn;; 000 
: ýcýýn. Ulu n (hýllit LIA ix id 'l 
I'llIlliq point wal hill I 
IIII(18(IOIl lullt' 18 00 
IlUliit(i 1, IIII1o 000 
11ml (1,1111,1,1o 
[it, f t'llili " 
111 shuyrll 
0 60 
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690726 (Internal) I 1 921221 (Impact) I 
741105 (Internal) 730711 (Internal) 700506 (Internal) I 
830602 (Internal 800819 (Internal) 781001 (Internal) I 
Aircraft M[)-83 
Scenario in-flight fire - landed 
Starting point cargo hold 
Initiation time -800 
fiuinthia turne 0 00 
Cabin dlinage minor 
I ire fatalities 0 00 
Aircraft MD-80 
Scenario fire during taxiing 
Starting point cockpit 
Initiation time -0: 30 
Burnthro' time 000 
Cabin damage none 
Fire fatalities 0 00 
Aircraft I )C 8 G; 
Scenario takeoff engine failure 
Starling point #1 engine 
Initiation time 0 00 
Burnlhro' time - 
Cabin damage none 
f uc fatalities 0 00 
Aircraft B-707 
Scenario aborted takeoff 
Starting point left wing 
Initiation time 0: 00 
E3urnthro' time - 
Cabin damage none 
i ire fatalities 1000 
Airrr; t P, 72/ 100 
Scenario takeoff enrpne lira 
Starting point #1 enyiiir 
Initiation time 0 00 
[fur rrthro' time - 
%itniil damage cumin 
Irin tnfalitles 1000 
Aircraft L-1 88A 
Scenario undershot on landing 
Starting point left then right wings 
Initiation time 000 
Burnthro' time - 
Cabin damage none 
Fire fatalities 0.00 
Aircraft DC-8-61 
Scenario aborted takeoff 
Starting point right landing gear 
Ir itiation time 0 00 
E3urnthro' time - 
Cabin damage none 
Fire fatalities 0.00 
Aiicratt B-737-200 
Scenario in-flight bomb crash 
Starting point forward toilet 
Initiation time 0: 00 
Burnthro' time 000 
Cabin damage minor 
Fire fatalities 0.00 
Alf craft B-727-92C 
Scenario undershot 
Starting point right side 
Initiation time 0: 00 
Burnthro' time (2: 00) 
Cabin damage totally destroyed 
Fire fatalities 0.00 
-318- 
600914 (External) I 910928 (Internal) I 880203 (Internal) I 
1 730621 (External) 700419 (External) I 720813 (External) I 
1 780521 (External) 1 790426 (External) 801121 (External) 
Appendix F: Fire Scenario Analysis 
F. l Positions of Fire Starting Points 
The interpretation and plotting of 72 past accident lines in tIºe loon or 
equivalent pool fire areas enabled some valuable discoveries to he made about (Ile 
basic characteristics of aircraft fires. Much of the data that was derived h\ the-, c 
means was essential for generating realistic fire scenarios fier usr vv iIºiin the 
simulation analysis. Ilowever, in spite of the fundamental inlluenee paranºcteis; such 
as lire shape, size and position have can accident survivability, this type of' iiih rinºation 
could not he obtained from any other sources. Consequently, a lthout: lº the v orl: vus 
undertaken at a comparatively simple level, much of the infiormation proviikd in this 
appendix is almost certainly unique. 
The first analysis to he performed with the lire spread diagrams as to 
determine whereabouts, in relation to an aircraft's passenger cahin, fires were Iil. eiv tu 
initiate. F'stimated fire starting points were plotted on a square grid, \olº units based 
upon the cabin length of the aircraft type involved. 'I'Iºese were then coded into 
probability distributions fier determining lire positions in the aºeciclcnt siiiºuleºtlulls. 
lt was of interest to discover that lire starting positions were dependent on thie 
type of lire involved. For instance, Ilurnthrou4gl1 fires ýýere particularly likely to 
initiate in the inner wing/engine area. whereas IntcrnnºI acid I sternal tires were inure 
Iil: ely to he encountered nearer to the extremities of an . urereilt. 11111". it \\as decided 
to break the analysis down by fire type. 'I'Iºe raw data 1,01 tur11-tlºouglº, inºpat'l and 
internal/external fire types are shown in Figures F. 1-3: 
O6 
5 
84 
O3 
02 
1 
number of 
incidents 
figure F. 1;. -Place ººf 1'irc__I_niti_atipn (Biºrntlirough hires) 
-., I ý)- 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
OI 
number of 
incidents 
Figure F. 2: Place of Fire Initiation (Impact Fires) 
O6 
85 
84 
3 
02 
O 
number of 
incidents 
Figure F. 3: Place of Fire Initiation (Internal & External Fires) 
One point worthy of note in the data obtained as that, overall. fires appeared more 
likely to start on the right hand side of the aircraft. This result was tested and found to 
be just statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence level. Although no 
convincing explanation could be offered for this apparent anomaly, the data was used 
as recorded, with no corrections being applied to make the distributions symmetrical 
about the aircraft centreline. 
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F. 2 Variation in Fire Areas 
The areas of accident fires were non-dimensionalised to take account of 
variations in aircraft size. The resulting area parameter is defined as follows: - 
Maximum area of equivalent /pool fire 1"-irc 
. -Irc a 
Pararnrrter = (1". 1) (aircraft cabin length). 
)istiibutions in fire size for various types of fire are given in Figures F-4-6. 
0.45 
0.40 0 
p cases 
Fire Area 0.35 assumed 
Parameter distribution 
0.30 
0.25 
0.20 
0.15 00 
0.10 
0.05- 
0.00 
05 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 
Case 
Figure F. 4: Variation in Fire Area: Burnthrough and Impact Fires 
0.25 
Fire Area 0.20 
Parameter 
0.15 
0.10 
0.05 
0.00 
p cases O 
_ 
assumed 
distribution 
O 
O 
000 
123456789 10 
Case 
Figure F. 5: Variation in Fire Area: Internal Fires 
-321- 
0.35 
il 
0.30 
Fire Area 
O cases Parameter 
assumed 
0.25 
li 
distribution --- 
0.20 
0.15 --- - --- -__-,. 
0.10 00 
0.05 
O 
0.00 
123456789 
Case 
Figure F. 6: Variation in Fire Area: External Fires 
F. 3 ('hange in Fire Shape with Lengthwise and Spanwise Position 
The shapes of aircraft fires were found to be dependent on where they 
occurred with respect to the aircraft's fuselage. Thus fires starting near the centreline 
of the aircraft were more likely to be extended in the longitudinal direction, whereas 
fires occurring away from the fuselage tended to be longer in the spanwise direction. 
The deviation of a fire from a truly circular shape was quantified with the use of an 
"ellipticity" factor, defined as follows: - 
Fllij)liciry Shape fuctor 
xmax Yma\ 
_ (F. 2) i (X. 
", + 
where: 
maxim ml size of fire, as measured in spanwise direction 
maximum size offire, as measured in lengthwise direction 
The proportions of, various pool fire ellipticities are illustrated in Figure F. 7: 
ýýý .l 
Ia 
h# 
rk 
_, 
1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 
AIRCRAFT 
ORIENTATION FIRE ELLIPTICITY SHAPE FACTOR 
j, 'i; urc F'. 7 Variation in Shape of Equivalent Pool hires 
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Fire shapes were found to be dependent on the spanmse position at which the lire 
started, the closer a lire was to the aircraft's centreline, the more likely it was toi he 
elongated in a longitudinal direction. This probability distribution used to represent 
this relationship is shown in figure 1.8: - 
1.0 
Ellipticity 
Shape 0. s 
Factor(E) I0Ö 
0.0 - 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Od 
obö -0.5 
O 
O000 cases 
assumed pmhat)IIIty 
1.0 0 Interval 
0 
Ö 
-1.5 -- . --- 
IDistance from Aircraft Centreline) (cabin lengths) 
Figure F. 8 Change in Fire Shape 1ý itlº tili: ºnýý ise Pwo iw)n 
In contrast, no clear pattern was discovered when cxaiººinin", ýlº. ºiº , iiº tiro sli; il, ý a; ,1 
function 01, longitudinal starting position: - 
Ellipticy 
Shape 
Factor (E) 
15 cases 
no roiationshil, 
found 
-01 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 ON 07 0H o p0 
0 
o. s Ö0Q0OO <) c, 
OII c) c) 
-1.0 Q.. p a, 0 
öjQ ý3 '> 
Distance along Aircraft Cabin (cabin lengths) 
c_iii Fire 'Shape -with 
I, cnv. tlmikc Position 
sa result. lire shapes were delinal as a hrt, l)ahilistic I, unrtiotl t, I I 
USition OIlly. 
_ýý, _ 
F. 4 Movement of Fire Centre 
The lire growth plots clearly showed that the position of a fire can often shift 
as it grows in sire. An attempt was made to quantify this effect by comparing the 
position ol'the lire centre when fully developed with the position of its starting point. 
Figures l 
. 10 and F. 1 I shows that it was possible to establish some clear trends 
for 
incorporation in the fire model: - 
ol00 
0o 
-0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 
Lengthwise 
Movement 
(cabin lengths) 
OO cases 
assumed probability 
interval 
00 
iQ 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
o- o ;00 Lengthwise 
Starting Position 
(cabin lengths) 
0 4.. p p 
f_-tire F. 11__Fire 
_Movement 
in I. engthnvise Direction 
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Figure F. 10: Fire Movement in Sparavise Direction 
Note that, in both cases, fires starting away from the centre of" an aircraFt mll tend toi 
move towards the central wing area as they grow in size. The trend is particularly 
apparent in the spanwise direction, which implies that engine Or Win, " fuel tank fires 
will usually spread towards an aircraft's fuselage. Obviously, this tendencv 
accentuates the threat that a fire poses to aircraft occupants, and so it ýý: ºS iºnf)cratiVc 
that shifting of fire centres was incorporated into the siniulatiou analysis. 
F. 5 Fire Growth and Extinguishment Times 
A generic shape function was used to model change (fl' lire sire vvitii liinc 
during the course of an accident simulation. As shown in figure 1ý. 7, this curvC has a 
classic exponential growth, peak and decay distribution, typical oI- tlhos e ncountý red 
in many kinds of resource depletion processes. The coefficients oof* the tlircc cubic 
FIRE AREA FUNCTION 
0.0<t<0.25 0.255t<0.50 0.50 - t- 1.00 
-128t3 +48 t2 
1'>-«4 
16t3 -24 t2 + 9t 
b 
-6t3 + 16t2 - 14.5t + 4.5 
1.0 --.. - .1 
0.9 
Fire 
Area 0.8 
Fraction 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 6/ 
0.0 0.1 
-t 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Time Fraction (t) 
Figure 7.12: Parametric Firc (: -mvili I'unclion 
polynomials used to dehne the curve can he modified Its tlic shape (d Inc 
development. It should be noted that the values slioovvn have been chosen fite 
convenience, providing points at (0.0,0.0), (0.125,0.5), (0.25. I. 0). (U. S. 1.0) mid 
(1.0,0.0) respectively. 
For the parametric growth curve to he 01' any use, it needed toi he scaled tt, 
represent the properties ofa real fire. 11wo items (II infornmtioýn werc required Ir tlik; 
maximum fire area and the total time required liar fire eslin)ý. uis1iinýnl. I lie Ittrnirr 
was Obtained from the fire spread diagrams, as recounted in section Ie; iv ill)' II1(" 
task of establishing fire extinguishment tinnes rer»ainin'. 
The first test undertaken was to compare the extinguislinient tinnes rLeglitired I, v 
different types of fire. figure I Q13 shows the results of sealing exting, uislinient Linie 
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-- Impact 
- -a -- External 
j 
Q _ß' 
I/ 
----------------e 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Fractional Ranking 
Figure F. 13: Fire Extinguishment Times for Different Fire Types 
distributions for Burnthrough, Impact and External fires on a common axis'. It can be 
seen that, within the limitations of the data used, the variations in extinguishment 
times are broadly comparable across the three fire categories. This fact suggested that 
the times for the various fire types could be grouped together and analysed 
collectively, in order to obtain more reliable results. 
The fire extinguishment times were tested for correspondence with other 
scenario variables, such as impact damage, terrain, distance of accident site from 
airport, occurrence of fire-fighting intervention and phase of flight in which the 
accident occurred. Figure F. 14 shows the results of comparing fire extinguishment 
times with the type of terrain present at the accident site. It can be seen that the times 
are very similar for incidents occurring on grass and on paved runway surfaces; wvhich 
is perhaps a significant result. Note also how the extinguishment times for fires 
occurring in other surroundings, such as a car park, ravine or street also appear to be 
consistent with the airport fires. Thus, it was concluded that the type of terrain present 
at the site tended not play a significant role in determining fire extinguishment times 
in aircraft accidents. 
Of all the variables to be tested, the time required for fire extinguishment 
correlated best with the size of fire present. Rather obviously, in general, bigger fires 
usually take longer to put out. Significantly, however, large variations can occur in 
individual cases, as shown by the wide scatter of the points in Figure F. 15. When data 
is examined more closely, some patterns begin to emerge. Firstly, note how most of 
the points are clustered in the bottom quarter of the plot. It is possible to group the 
fires into two loose categories; it was decided to label these high-ppersistence fires and 
lotic-persistence fires respectively. The former comprised only 26 percent of the cases 
Fires in each category have been ordered (shortest extinction time first) and then numbered i, 2,3, 
etc. "I he case number is divided by the total number of cases in present the category, to arrive at a 
(non-dimensional) "fractional ranking" for each fire. 
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Figure F. 14: Variation in Fire Extinguishment Times 
with Type of Terrain Present at the Accident Site 
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Figure F. 15: Dependency of Extinguishment "Dime oºn Fir-C 'Area 
studied and tended to involve fires that were either not li u"ht electively , 
itiaceess, ihle 
or occurred a large distance from populated areas. In both cateporics, the tunes 
required for fire extinction appear to be approximately proportional to maximum (ire 
sizes, albeit with a large degree of scatter present. The relevant details are listed in 
Table F. I. Note that the fire area parameters have been non-dii»ensionalised by the 
square of the aircraft's cabin length. 
Fire times were generated fir the simulation analysis, by taking, the previously 
established value for maximum lire area and picking a suitable extinction time at 
random from the high or low persistence scatter envelopes. The two envelopes were 
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sampled at relative frequencies of 26: 74 respectively, in accordance with the 
comparative likelihoods of the two fire types. 
Fire Category Low-Persistence High-Persistence 
Frequency of 74% 26% Occurrence 
Average 
Extinguishment 14.7 71 
Time (mins) 
Extinguishment Time 
Size Factor 67 ± 40 450 ± 343 
(mins per cabin length2) 
Table F. 1: Characteristics of Low & High Persistence Fires 
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